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Abstract 
 
 
Severe recovery deficits after post-disaster interventions have become the landscape seen 
globally. Humanitarian operations have struggled to find coherence between relief and 
recovery activities, which has resulted in a perceived operational ‘gap’ between relief, 
recovery and development. This current dynamic has caused significant deficiencies within 
humanitarian programming, such as weak strategy, a lack of transition mechanisms, exit 
plans and effective recovery. A situation that stems from the current paradigm the 
humanitarian system operates under and the framework that has evolved around it.  
 
Supporting the development of adaptive resilience of a disaster-affected population, within 
the humanitarian sphere, has been theoretically posed to be fundamental for recovery; a 
programmatic consideration that could ensure former weak resilience would not hinder 
post-disaster recovery. Therefore, could a resilience building approach offer much needed 
solutions to the challenge of recovery within post-disaster contexts? This research aimed to 
understand whether resilience building within post-disaster environments could increase 
potential recovery of disaster affected populations and whether it is feasible to build 
individual/household (HH) level resilience through emergency response operations? The 
research looked specifically at adaptive resilience at the individual/HH level, clarifying the 
concept and understanding its modality in order to operationalise it within humanitarian 
programming.  The common barriers to recovery experienced by individuals/HH in a crisis 
event were gauged, and the relationship between adaptive resilience and recovery 
determined.  
 
A unique singular case study was used to collect quantitative and qualitative data required to 
answer the key objectives of this research. The case study chosen was the 2010 Haiti 
earthquake response. Primary data was collected over a 7 months period through 37 semi-
structured interviews and 31 online questionnaires with donors, government, INGOs, 
LNGOs and the private sector, that were operating within the Haiti response, and 18 disaster 
affected community members within a community discussion forum. Bringing a total 
participation of 86 individuals and organisations. An in-depth case study was developed in 
order to offer an evidence base for the proposed theory, that supporting adaptive resilience 
through emergency response programming has the ability to stimulate recovery. A new data 
collection tool was trialed within the community discussion forum, namely the Sociogram. 
ii 
    
This tool looked to assess the main components of adaptive resilience. Methodological 
rigour was introduced through the use of methodological and data triangulation to ensure 
validity and reliability of the research.  
 
The research successfully identified the main barriers to recovery, pinpointed the key 
components for adaptive resilience and the influence of emergency programming on the 
development of adaptive resilience, establishing the relationship between them. The role 
emergency response operations can play in the development of adaptive resilience was then 
explored.  It has been demonstrated that to ensure recovery and allow for a more resilient 
society to evolve, adaptive resilience needs to be and can be supported and developed 
within emergency response operations. The research has been able to demonstrate, through 
the analysis of the Shelter and WASH response undertaken in Haiti, that developing 
resilience in the post-disaster environment is possible and an approach that is able to 
improve strategy within emergency response operations. Improvements would be seen in 
the provision of essential services within the response, a substantial increase in transitional 
and exit options and an increased capacity to proactively stimulate rapid recovery. This 
strategic approach to emergency response programming has the ability to offer the 
coherence needed between relief, recovery and development. Determining that a resilience 
building approach within emergency response operations could be the ‘missing link’ or 
resolution to the perceived operational ‘gap’ between relief, recovery and development. 
Pursuing a resilience building approach has the potential to bring much needed cultural 
change within the humanitarian sector that will shape operations for a more strategic and 
successful future.  
 
Key words: post-disaster; adaptive resilience; operational gap; humanitarian programming; 
humanitarian framework; recovery; Haiti; resilience approach 
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Glossary of Terms 
 
Linking Relief, 
Rehabilitation and 
Development 
These three distinct activities describe the flow between 
emergency and non-emergency work undertaken within a 
country. Currently, operating at distinct 'phases' with little 
coherence between them. LRRD aims to find the coherence 
between these activities by identifying the 'missing link'. 
 
Operational Gap The lack of coherence between relief and recovery activities 
seen after a disaster response is termed as an 'operational gap' 
(Lloyd-Jones 2006). 
 
Continuum Describes a continuous sequence of stages that are distinct 
from one another, but are fundamentally connected, e.g. the 
current disaster management cycle operates under distinct 
'phases' of relief, recovery, rehabilitation and mitigation on a 
continuum. 
 
Contiguum Designates that all considered stages operate at the same time 
in overlapping juxtaposition, e.g. within a post-disaster 
response relief and recovery activities will operate 
simultaneously. 
 
Humanitarian 
framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Resilience 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As referenced within this thesis, the humanitarian framework 
consists of components within the humanitarian system that are 
supportive and fundamental to executing emergency response 
operations, i.e. financial mechanism, coordination mechanisms 
etc. 
 
Resilience is the ability of an individual or community to return 
to a previous (and good) condition after experiencing a crises; 
high resilience in a community means it will be less vulnerable.  
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Vulnerability 
 
The ability of a society to withstand adverse impacts, to which 
they are exposed, deems this state of vulnerability.  
 
Post-disaster resilience Terms the level of resilience an 
individual/household/community possesses in the immediate 
aftermath of a disaster, this existing resilience can be promoted 
and developed through emergency response operations (i.e. 
adaptive resilience). 
 
Adaptive capacity Describes ‘the ability or capability of a system to modify or 
change its characteristics or behaviour to cope better with 
actual or anticipated stresses (Brooks and Adger 2003). 
 
Adaptive resilience Describes an individual’s/HH’s/community's adaptive capacity 
within a post-disaster environment, which can be developed 
within a post-disaster context to actively raise resilience for 
recovery.  
 
Individual and 
Household level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There are different levels of social groupings that exist - 
individuals, households, communities etc., which possess 
different dynamics that need assessing separately. To designate 
a clear unit of analysis the research has used the most basic 
social groupings- individuals and households. 
 
 
Sociogram Is a tool that aims to measure the level of individual/HH 
resilience that exists in post-disaster environments. 
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1.         Introduction 
This introductory Chapter will present this research thesis and establish the fundamental 
reasons for pursuing this investigation. It will offer an outline of the field of study, leading 
to specific areas of interest, including a summary of previous research. This will be 
followed by the introduction of the research problem and the specific aims and objectives to 
be investigated. 
 
1.1. Research Context 
The threat of ‘natural disaster’ is ever increasing at a global scale (DFID 2005) and the 
effects disaster can have on an unsuspecting vulnerable society can be devastating, not just 
in the short-term, but for their overall functionality and standard of living for decades 
following such devastating events. The impact of disaster on a population is determined by, 
the level of resilience and preparedness within a society, its infrastructure and its 
government (Bosher and Dainty 2011), highlighting the necessity to ensure resilience and 
preparedness within any vulnerable society. 
 
Within many post-disaster environments basic relief can be provisioned, but it is 
continuously noted that transitioning to a state of recovery is a constant problem (Oxfam 
2006; Amin and Goldstein 2008; DEC 2011a). This has hindered the success of emergency 
response operations and the ability of an affected population to regain a functioning, 
productive life (Buttenheim 2009). This issue can be termed the operational ‘gap’ between 
relief and recovery (Lloyd-Jones 2006).   
 
It is generally accepted that there is a link between humanitarian action, recovery and 
development and that humanitarian action should establish a framework for recovery 
(ALNAP 2006). But the opportunities for building on international good practice, as a 
foundation for long-term recovery and development, in the early stages of the relief effort 
are often lost. Over the past two decades there has been considerable discussion and 
research concerning the link between relief and development, but it has been argued little 
progress has been made (Bailey et al. 2009). There has been an enhanced focus around the 
effect of relief interventions on recovery. ALNAP (2008) highlighted the need to avoid 
compromising recovery during relief interventions, pointing out that agencies should 
consider the likely impacts of an intervention on recovery, and whether a different approach 
might be better for recovery. The continual problems encountered in emergency response
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has had the sector re-evaluating its approach to operations (DFID 2011a; IFRC 2012). Many 
agencies are battling to be able to provide the very real relief and recovery needs of the 
affected communities their mandate aims to help. Stiff funding frameworks, weak 
coordination and leadership has hindered effective response programming, transition 
capacity and recovery (ALNAP 2008, 2011a, 2011b). 
 
The continual discussions by key parties in the humanitarian sector on the need to stimulate 
recovery in relief operations, reveals the necessity of this approach, but also the 
misconception and lack of conceptual clarity and physical capacity to practically implement 
such an approach. The aid framework is set up under a distinct separation between 
humanitarianism and development and this has built the inherent platform emergency 
programmes operate from. Consequently, offering a rigid structure that is unable to respond 
to the reality on the ground. The revival for more sustainable programming in emergency 
response speaks of a need to find coherence between this false dichotomy between 
humanitarianism and development. 
 
The level of resilience experienced by an individual/HH before a disaster event is inherent 
with the absorptive capacity that they will express post-event (Cutter 2008). This absorptive 
capacity will determine the impact felt. The level of resilience expressed in a post-disaster 
environment has a direct effect on the level of achievable recovery of that individual/HH. It 
has been presented that initial levels of resilience can be improved early and this is deemed 
adaptive resilience (Cutter 2008). Adaptive resilience can be supported through emergency 
response programmes to proactively increase an affected society’s ability to rapidly and 
sustainably recover.  
 
Currently, there is a lack of conceptual clarity around key aspects of resilience in the post-
disaster context. Thus, how humanitarian interventions could offer programmes that 
proactively support adaptive resilience for recovery. In order to approach the evaluation of 
resilience and potential resilience building initiatives within humanitarian programming, 
current conceptual understanding put forward to understand resilience, including 
characteristics and frameworks, need to be further developed and better understood in the 
post-disaster context. A more thorough conception of the context and the influence of 
different types of humanitarian intervention need to be explored. Also, how agencies can be
3 
    
better equipped when entering a response to evaluate individual contexts, therefore, 
effectively plan interventions that either specifically build resilience or are mindful of it. 
 
Without this depth of knowledge, what is considered a resilience building intervention could 
be fundamentally misguided, which would ultimately lead to failed programmatic attempts. 
Successful implementation of resilience building initiatives in humanitarian responses has 
the potential to increase the effectiveness of humanitarian assistance, recovery, risk 
reduction, longer-term development and for the development of much needed coherence 
between these sectors.  
 
The concept of resilience has gained currency in the last few years. However, as 
demonstrated this has been in the absence of substantiated conceptual dimensions, a lack of 
clarity of definition, substance, and most importantly, its applicability in disaster 
management and sustainable development theory and practice. Therefore, it is crucial to 
fully comprehend what disaster resilience really means and how to successfully develop and 
implement resilience building interventions in humanitarian programming. 
 
The next, clarifies the fundamental research problem being investigated within this thesis 
and the specific research issues to be explored and resolved through the literature and data 
collection. 
 
1.2   The Research Problem  
Following the introduction of the field of research this thesis is focused on, this section 
looks to clearly define the research problem being investigated and state a broad overview 
of how this research problem will be confronted within this research. The following section 
will then detail the specific aims and objectives that will be used to focus the investigation 
in order to solve the stated research problem. 
 
The research problem: 
Can resilience building within post-disaster environments increase potential 
recovery of disaster-affected populations and is it feasible to build 
individual/household level resilience through emergency response operations? 
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This thesis will investigate this problem by, firstly, exploring and investigating the 
theoretical concept of resilience in the post-disaster context through exiting academic and 
field based literature (Chapter 2) and through the use of a real life case study (Chapters 4 
and 7). Secondly, by gauging whether emergency response operations support or hinder 
adaptive resilience, again using the wealth of literature from an array of emergency response 
operations and through an assessment of humanitarian operations within a specified post-
disaster case study (Chapters 5 and 6). Thirdly, the thesis will undertake a comprehensive 
analysis of this evidence to conclude how adaptive resilience could be supported through 
emergency response operations (Chapter 8). 
 
1.3 Aims and Objectives 
 
1.3.1 Aims 
This research, firstly, aims to conceptualise what individual/HH level resilience means in 
the post-disaster environment. Secondly, the research aims to understand what a resilience 
building approach could look like in the humanitarian sphere and how it could improve 
emergency response programming and the coherence between relief, recovery and 
development activities.  Thirdly, this research looks to comprehend what would be needed 
to mainstream such an approach within the humanitarian framework. 
1.3.2 Objectives 
With these research aims in mind this sub-section details specific objectives that have been 
devised to investigate this thesis’ stated research problem. These objectives require a 
structured research investigation to produce necessary valid evidence, to investigate the 
indicated research problem, how these will be measured is briefly detailed in the following 
sub-section and will form the foundations of this thesis’ data collection and analysis. 
 
Objectives encompassed within this thesis: 
 Objective 1. To clarify the concept of resilience within the post-disaster context 
(discussed in Chapters 2, 4 and 7). 
 Objective 2. To gauge the impact emergency response programmes had on 
individual and household resilience in post-earthquake Haiti (discussed in Chapter 
5). 
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 Objective 3. To gauge the impact of the humanitarian framework on the level of 
resilience developed in the context of post-earthquake Haiti (discussed in Chapter 6). 
 Objective 4. To determine the link between post-disaster resilience and the level of 
potential recovery experienced at the individual/household level (discussed in 
Chapter 7). 
 Objective 5. To comprehend possible resilience building initiatives within 
emergency response operations (discussed in Chapter 8). 
 Objective 6. To comprehend how resilience building initiatives can be supported 
within the humanitarian operational framework (discussed in Chapter 8). 
 
1.3.3 Methodology to Measure Objectives 
This sub-section will describe in brief the methodology that was chosen to measure and 
meet the objectives of this research stated in the previous sub-section.  
 
An in-depth literature review and an in-depth case study in a post-disaster environment 
(Haiti 2010 earthquake) will both be used to meet the objectives of this research, 
specifically allowing a holistic overview of the humanitarian sector and current recovery 
challenges felt globally. Using the case study to uncover specific critical operational areas 
related to resilience and the promotion of recovery and to tap into a real life post-disaster 
context, to gauge the real components of resilience expressed by a population currently 
experiencing a disaster event. The literature will help support the findings coming from the 
case study to enable a level of generalisability. 
 
The literature review will layout the fundamentals of the research problem presented in this 
thesis, from a breakdown of the debate around the lack of recovery seen in post-disaster 
interventions, often referred to as ‘the gap’ between relief and recovery (Lloyd-Jones 2006) 
or the ‘missing link’ between relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD) (EC 2011). To 
see how this problem plays out in a variety of post-disaster events. The literature review 
will, also, break down the humanitarian framework, to understand the key elements for 
analysis within the data collection. Finally, it will build a conceptual understanding of 
resilience through current proposed theory. Presenting an analytical model that will sum up 
variables involved in this largely qualitative research, describing relationship theory 
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between the variables detailed in the literature review to set the stage for data collection and 
analysis.  
 
The literature review will begin to look at the first 4 objectives: 
 Objective 1. To clarify the concept of resilience within the post-disaster context 
(discussed in sections 2.6-2.9). 
 Objective 2. To gauge the impact emergency response programmes had on 
individual and household resilience in post-earthquake Haiti (discussed in section 
2.4). 
 Objective 3. To gauge the impact of the humanitarian framework on the level of 
resilience developed in in the context of post-earthquake Haiti (discussed in section 
2.4). 
 Objective 4. To determine the link between post-disaster resilience and the level of 
potential recovery experienced at the individual/household level (discussed in 
sections 2.3 and 2.6). 
 
The in-depth case study will encompass several methodologies that aim to meet all 6 
objectives in their finality, these include: 
 Semi-structured interviews with a wide variety of stakeholders relevant to the post-
disaster environment, these will include INGOs (International Non-Governmental 
Organisations), LNGO (Local Non-Governmental Organisations), Donors, 
government - national and local, and the local private sector (refer to sub-section 
3.8.2.3). 
 An online questionnaire will also be made available. This methodology will allow an 
alternative and easier response outlet, offered both in French and English. It enables 
access by a wider audience active in the specified post-disaster response and it also 
enables an element of quantitative data to be produced. This response outlet will be 
made available to the same stakeholders stated within the semi-structured 
interviews (refer to sub-section 3.8.2.4). 
 A community discussion forum will be undertaken with members of a disaster 
affected community, in order to include the voice of the affected within the data 
collection and to also undertake an adapted tool, named a Sociogram. A tool that 
was developed to measure resilience. Through this tool resilience is measured 
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through the perceived strength of connection with social networks and access to 
assets and services, before and after the disaster (refer to sub-section 3.8.2.5). 
 Archival analysis will be collected specific to the case study response, allowing the 
collection of in-depth context specific information (refer to sub-section 3.8.2.2). 
 
This Chapter has laid the foundations of this thesis, introduced the field of study and the 
research problem, detailing specific aims and objectives and the methodologies to be used to 
measure these objectives. Upon these foundations this research can be conducted and its 
contributions to knowledge attained. 
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2. The Theoretical, Analytical and Practical Background of the Research Problem 
Following on from the previous introductory Chapter that has laid the scope and 
justifications for this research thesis, this subsequent next Chapter will explore the research 
problem in considerable depth. It will present theoretical and analytical insights into the 
nature of natural disaster, the significance of vulnerability and resilience in society, current 
humanitarian operations and its continual challenges of exit, transition and recovery within 
the response landscape. Developing the conceptualisation of the operational ‘gap’ or 
‘missing link’ between relief, recovery and development. Discussing these theories and 
observations within a current post-disaster operation of the Haitian 2010 earthquake. 
Finishing the theoretical discussion by investigating resilience theory, focusing on current 
conceptualisations of resilience, dissecting proposed resilience frameworks, and 
understanding their potential and limitations within the post-disaster environment. The 
Chapter will conclude the main variables involved in this research and the relationship 
theory within an analytical model, to summarise and make clear the connection of research 
theory, current practice and the direction of this thesis. 
 
2.1 The Cyclical Nature of Disasters 
 
2.1.1 Natural Disaster 
‘Disaster’ can be defined as ‘a serious disruption of the functioning of a community or 
society causing wide-spread human, material, economic and environmental losses, which 
exceed the ability of the effected community or society to cope using its own resources’ 
(ISDR 2008). 
 
The number of disasters felt worldwide is ever increasing, with the incidence of geophysical 
disasters (i.e. earthquakes, tsunamis) remaining steady; hydrometeological disasters (i.e. 
weather-related) have doubled since 1996 (DFID 2005). This significant increase is further 
threatened by urbanisation, with ever increasing numbers of people living in towns and 
cities. Many urban centers lack the capacity to equip its residents adequately, exposing 
vulnerable populations to substantial disaster risk. 
 
With large populations living in densely crowded, ill-serviced accommodation, amounting 
to extremely vulnerable urban slums and the increasing prevalence of disaster, the need for 
disaster preparedness, effective emergency response and the consideration of adequate and 
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sustainable recovery needs to be at the forefront of government and the humanitarian 
community. Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) and resilience is a human rights imperative. 
 
2.1.2 Vulnerability and Resilience in Society 
The resulting impact of a disaster is determined by the level of resilience and preparedness 
within a society, its infrastructure and its government (Bosher and Dainty 2011). When a 
population is left vulnerable without access to critical provisions needed to withstand and 
recover from a disaster, that population will suffer impacts that go far beyond a natural 
cause (Bosher 2008). The consequential effect on that population significantly increases 
their risk to future impacts, which could see that population entering a cycle of disaster that 
could cost millions of lives unless it can be broken.  
 
To break this cycle, there is a need to recognise the hazards facing a society and their 
associated vulnerabilities, in order to mitigate them and build-in a level of resilience. This is 
represented well in Wisner’s, disaster pressure-release model (refer to Figure 2.1, pg. 11).   
 
There is a multi-faceted relationship that exists between development and disaster, which in 
part determines people’s vulnerability (Wisner et al. 2004; Wamsler 2008). The ability of a 
society to withstand adverse impacts, to which they are exposed, deems this state of 
vulnerability. This state is due in part to social and political networks, economic capital and 
access to key socio-economic resources (Bosher 2007).  Strengthening and increasing 
access to these resources will reduce vulnerability by increasing resilience, where resilience 
is the ability of an individual or community to return to a previous (and good) condition 
after experiencing a crises; high resilience in a community means it will be less vulnerable 
(Bahadur 2010). 
 
Key factors that can determine a societies vulnerability to hazards include: 
 Exposure to hazard: people who have limited access to resources will often have 
limited access to safe land and accommodation, therefore ending up in undesirable 
hazard prone areas, such as flood plains, steep hill sides and low lying coastal areas 
(Smith 1996; Bosher 2008; Oxfam 2011). 
 Exclusion and marginalisation: people who have limited access to socio-economic 
resources, such as employment, credit, improved basic services, i.e. water and 
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sanitation and health, and legal representation can be expected to have less capacity 
to manage and control decisions and events affecting them (Blaikie et al. 1994; 
UNISDR 2008; Pasteur 2011). 
 Poverty: in terms of asset ownership, if a person has access to assets they can be a 
resource in a time of need reducing vulnerability (Sen 1981; Swift 1989; World 
Bank 1990 and Putnam 1993). 
 Magnitude and temporal elements of natural events: seasonality of events can 
disrupt essential times for crop harvests and labour recruitment periods, which can 
severely hinder annual income and food security increasing vulnerability (Chambers 
1983). 
 Social connections: the level and strength of connections a person has to family and 
friends, as well as institutional connections, such as community leaders and civil 
society affects their level of vulnerability as these connections offer support and a 
safety net in times of need (Tobin 1999; Wisner et al. 2004; Bosher 2007). 
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Building resilient societies is key to ensuring hazards do not hinder development 
progression and foster a continual degrading cycle of poverty. Figure 2.2 (refer to pg. 12) 
demonstrates visually how a shock would affect a resilient society verses a vulnerable 
society. The graph demonstrates the idea that a resilient society would experience less 
impact from the shock, whereas a vulnerable society would experience significant impacts, 
resulting in a disaster. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1. A pressure-release model, a model that emphasises the underlying causes of disaster and 
the social production of risk. [Source: Wisner et al. 2004] 
12 
    
 
In low resilience societies disaster impacts will be experienced at a greater scale and these 
societies will also have less tools for recovery. If an international humanitarian operation is 
launched within this affected country, ensuring that that society has the ability to survive 
and recover rapidly is fundamental.  If resilience measures are not set in motion at crucial 
points in the ‘relief phase’ then recovery will be prolonged, leading to a fragile state that is 
prone to future impacts of disasters, costing many lives and a huge unnecessary financial 
burden (O’Donnell et al. 2009). 
 
2.2 The Disaster Management Cycle 
Many current models of humanitarian intervention, unfortunately, do not employ an 
approach that encompasses resilience building at the crucial time within a response, as noted 
in the previous section. Instead, current models are set up institutionally to respond solely to 
basic survival needs, i.e. shelter, food and water. In some instances this one-dimensional 
approach has the adverse affect on ‘potential recovery’ and the building of resilience within 
an affected society, e.g. aid dependency, market disruption and weakened national entities 
(HPN 2001; PAHO 2011). The approach fundamental to the humanitarian intervention 
actually divides responsibility for survival and recovery sectorally and within a phased 
approach. The current disaster management model that represents this continuum is detailed 
in Figure 2.3 (refer to pg. 13), this two dimensional model presupposes that relief needs, i.e. 
shelter, food, water etc., and recovery dynamics operate at distinct stages along a post-
disaster timeline. Presenting a model that does not conceptualise the idea that relief and 
Figure 2.2 Illustrates the affect a shock would have on a resilient society verses a 
vulnerable society. [Source: Pasteur 2011] 
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recovery needs both begin simultaneously from day one. The immediacy of survival basics, 
such as shelter, food and water is fundamental and has shaped the thinking which 
humanitarian operations are built around. However, it does not represent the whole picture 
within emergency contexts and, consequently, has narrowed the view of the humanitarian 
sector to some of the basic realities in different post-disaster contexts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Financial and operational architecture have evolved to support these distinct areas of 
activity, i.e. relief, early recovery, development (inclusive of mitigation, DRR, preparedness 
and resilience) with little overlap possible under this current framework. However, this 
structure is seemingly a false dichotomy, as it does not fit the reality seen in many 
emergency contexts, where relief and recovery needs and development progression is an 
interactive process. Resulting, in disaster management needing to be viewed as a 
contiguum, rather than a ‘phased’ continuum (refer to Figure 2.4, pg. 14). Examples of this 
false dichotomy are given below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3 A representative diagram of the disaster management cycle, 
presenting an idea of a continuum. [Source: www.pre-drp.org] 
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The 2005 Indian Ocean Tsunami officially took 225,000 lives and made 2.5 million people 
homeless (UN Office of the Secretary-General’s special Envoy for Tsunami Recovery 
2005). A year and a half after the disaster, most of the people who lost their homes were 
without permanent shelter and this was despite a well-funded and successful immediate 
humanitarian relief effort (Lloyd-Jones 2006). According to Oxfam, a year after the tsunami 
only 20% of people made homeless were in satisfactory permanent accommodation (Oxfam 
International 2005). In September 2005, the Office of the UNs Special Envoy for Tsunami 
Recovery reported, it would take at least another 12-18 months to provide adequate 
temporary housing to all the displaced persons in Aceh alone, deeming this ‘an unacceptable 
situation that needs to be urgently addressed’ (UN Office of the Secretary-General’s special 
Envoy for Tsunami Recovery 2005). 
Similar inability to amount sufficient recovery was seen in Myanmar when Cyclone Giri hit 
in October 2010. Substantial emergency relief was distributed by the local authority, 
International and local Non-Governmental Organisations (I/NGO), the United Nations (UN) 
and others to provide basic needs, such as food, livelihood support, health services, 
reconstruction of schools, health services and temporary shelter. However, a year later there 
were still over a 100,000 people living with host families in the 4 worst affected townships 
(UN 2011a). Without additional support 60% of affected houses could not be repaired or re-
built before the rainy season, increasing the risk of another humanitarian disaster. Even with 
Figure 2.4 A representative diagram of an interactive contiguum approach 
to disaster management. [Source: developed by researcher] 
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the initial contributions by donors and ongoing government support, a significant financial 
gap threatened to hamper early to medium term recovery in Myanmar. These funding 
constraints have left the population extremely vulnerable. The slowing of support echoed 
the response after Cyclone Nargis hit in 2008, which left 140,000 dead and affected 2.4 
million (UN 2011a). Only 1/3 of the US$690 million needed for post-Nargis recovery 
covering to the end of 2011 was received (UN 2011a). 
These examples clearly demonstrate an inability to ensure strategy and programmes that are 
able to support recovery under a system of humanitarian relief, has often resulted in the 
creation of protracted crises.  Unnecessary protracted relief situations can actually increase 
vulnerability within the affected population, as it extends their weakened state of resilience. 
This is further compounded through the negative side effects of humanitarian intervention 
that can occur, such as the distortion of markets, weakening of the private sector and aid 
dependency. These current relief approaches can often leave a society highly exposed to 
future disaster. A clear example of this was seen in the case of the 2010 earthquake in Haiti 
and the resulting humanitarian intervention.  
The epicenter of the 2010 earthquake in Haiti struck some of the most highly dense urban 
centers on the island, including the capital Port-au-Prince (PaP), where a quarter of the 10.2 
million population live (Government of Haiti 2010). Over 220,000 people were killed (UN-
DESA 2010) and 1.5 million made homeless (IFRC 2010). Thousands of INGOs flooded 
the country in the following weeks (DEC 2011a). With an immense emergency response 
and substantial funding received many of the 1.5 million homeless were stuck in thousands 
of tent cities in and around PaP until 2012. With the lack of government capacity, security 
issues, political upheaval and a severe lack of coordination and strategy within the 
humanitarian community, a transition from the relief phase was incredibly problematic. This 
situation resulted in a prolonged relief situation that carried on for over 2 years, which 
significantly hindered effective and sustainable recovery (DEC 2011a). The increased 
vulnerability of the affected population saw them exposed to a major cholera outbreak, that 
hit 9 months after the earthquake, where over 7000 people died and over 300,000 were 
hospitalised (Humanitarian Response 2012). This was followed by an annual hurricane 
season, causing severe flooding, death and the spread of disease. With this incidence being 
experienced year on year by the 100,000s of whom were stuck in the temporary shelter until 
adequate recovery solutions were conceptualised and implemented (IFRC 2011; Davis 
2012). Funds will run out and Haiti needs to ensure that the thousands of tented cities do not 
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turn into permanent slums, that are not provisioned with even the most basic of facilities. A 
result that would further increase the vulnerability of the urban poor to future disasters 
(Oxfam 2011). 
It is fundamental to understand whether there were opportunities within these disaster 
responses to proactively stimulate recovery and if there were, why were they not utilised? 
Understanding the humanitarian mindset, framework and resulting operations is key to 
ascertaining what is causing the ‘gap’ so often seen between relief, recovery and 
development and understanding what would be needed to link these currently separated 
sectors. The following sections will uncover the current arguments surrounding the problem 
of the observed operational ‘gap’, conceptually and in reality, along with the presentation of 
the current humanitarian framework and its resulting operational challenges. This dissection 
of theory and practice will begin to pinpoint some key factors that are contributing to the 
observed disconnection and lack of coherence between relief, recovery and development.  
2.3 Disconnection Between Relief, Recovery and Development 
There has been a significant amount of debate around the disconnection between relief, 
recovery and development. This next section will present these debates, firstly, through 
understanding what the operational ‘gap’ is, then looking at the conceptalisation of LRRD. 
Finally, these conceptualisations will be detailed within a real life post-disaster context. The 
post-disaster context to be evaluated will be the Haitian 2010 earthquake. 
 
2.3.1 The ‘Gap’ 
Many post-disaster environments are finding basic relief can be provisioned, but 
transitioning to a state of recovery is a constant problem (Amin and Goldstein 2008). This 
has hindered the success of response programmes and the ability of an affected population 
to regain a functioning, productive life (Buttenheim 2009). This issue can be termed the 
operational ‘gap’ between relief and recovery (Lloyd-Jones 2006). 
 
The long-term impacts of response and recovery dynamics on the overall disaster cycle need 
to be considered. The current ‘phased’ disaster management cycle exists on a linear 
continuum, but how clear-cut are these ‘phases’ in a post-disaster environment? Often 
recovery begins simultaneously with relief. This current humanitarian mindset raises the 
question, whether emergency programmes are supporting the real needs expressed in a post-
disaster situation? This current disaster management cycle paradigm needs to be re-
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evaluated to allow operations to have the capacity to support real contextual post-disaster 
needs of the most vulnerable, as the humanitarian mandate states. A new approach that 
doesn’t consider the post-disaster needs as ‘phases’ on a continuum, but rather as a 
contiguum, i.e. the simultaneous occurrence of humanitarian aid, rehabilitation and 
development, has the ability to design humanitarian operations to have the capacity to 
stimulate rapid recovery, building-in resilience, increase the effectiveness of response 
operations, improve exit and transitional programming, as well as actively supporting the 
reduction of risks of an affected society to future disasters (Armiño 2002). 
 
It is generally accepted that there is a link between humanitarian action, recovery and 
development and that humanitarian action should establish a framework for recovery 
(ALNAP 2006). But the opportunities for building on international good practice as a 
foundation for long-term recovery and development in the early stages of the relief effort 
are often lost. The short-term mandates of many international organisations and the different 
interests involved have meant the link between immediate humanitarian relief and longer-
term reconstruction is often poorly managed (Lloyd-Jones 2006). Does the humanitarian 
sector need to start acknowledging within programme plans and funding models that the 
dichotomy between the work of the humanitarian sector and development sector is false and 
that they are not mutually exclusive? 
 
2.3.2 Linking Relief, Recovery and Development 
The previous sub-section presented the issue of the disconnection of relief from recovery 
and development, understanding that there is an observed operational gap and a false 
dichotomy between the humanitarian and development sectors. This sub-section observes 
the debate over the decades that looked to link the different perceived phases of relief, 
recovery and development. Detailing how this debate has evolved through to its current 
state. 
 
There were discussions on aid in protracted crises during the 1990s that placed the idea of 
‘linking’ relief and development on the agenda, with much of this discussion stemming 
from experiences in natural disasters. Early academic literature focused primarily on the 
challenges of linking relief and development strategies, where it became coined a relief–
development ‘continuum’ (Harmer and Macrae 2004). The approach sought to identify 
complementary objectives and strategies in relief and development aid, with the rationale 
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behind the debates encompassing two dynamics. Firstly, to use development aid to help 
reduce communities’ vulnerability to the effects of natural hazards, providing investment, 
e.g. for water conservation or flood control measures, as well as enabling populations to 
build up assets on which they could draw in the event of crisis. Secondly, the use of relief 
aid to protect assets and provide the basis for future development work, e.g. food for work 
could be used to generate employment, releasing resources for food purchase, enabling 
investment in infrastructure, such as roads, which could yield long-term development gains 
(Harmer and Macrae 2004).  Implicit in the ‘continuum’ idea was that relief should be seen 
not just as a palliative, but also as a springboard for recovery, and the development of more 
resilient and more profitable livelihoods. With this there was also a concern to ensure that 
the instruments of international engagement avoided creating dependency, particularly on 
food aid, and contributed to revitalising and protecting people’s livelihoods (Hammock and 
Lautze 1996).  
 
The second key premise upon which the 1990s ‘continuum’ model was based was that crisis 
was essentially a transitory phenomena; short interruptions to an otherwise progressive, 
state-led process of development (Duffield 1994; Macrae 2001). In this sense, the idea of 
the continuum became the embodiment of a ‘progressive’ ethos of development.  
 
In response to these debates the way in which relief was being delivered and issues, such as 
the marginalising of national and local capacity, techniques were adopted from development 
practice, including community participatory approaches, empowerment strategies, capacity 
building and vulnerability analysis. Much of this work, and the discourse around bringing 
developmental approaches into relief, was driven by multi-mandated UN agencies and 
INGOs. But at this time the relatively small humanitarian sector and coinciding budget was 
being uncomfortably stretched to accommodate these new developmental approaches. A 
situation, which was exacerbated by the fact many donor governments, for largely political 
reasons were restricting funding to solely ‘life-saving’ activities (Harmer and Macrae 2004).    
 
By the end of the 1990s ‘developmental relief’ had become the central doctrine of `good 
practice' in humanitarian responses, challenging assumptions made about the efficacy of 
developmental relief models in complex emergencies (Bradbury 1998). But the concept of 
‘developmental relief’ did not find the success and desired results it set out, which were to 
develop effective links between relief, recovery and development. Macrae (1995) argues 
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that the nature of the task of rehabilitation is often misunderstood, equating it to 
reconstruction of infrastructure and assets, which reinforces the idea of a linear continuum 
from relief to development. Macrae states that those developmentalist approaches have not 
been able to respond to the challenges of political disasters due to the framework relief 
programmes operate under, which assumes that crises are primarily material and emergency 
aid is politically neutral and that there is an illusion of a continuum (Macrae 1995). Davies 
(1994) saw this distinction between the three categories of activity in the ‘continuum’ 
tended to reflect the organisational concepts of international agencies and do not necessarily 
capture the more complex reality of disaster-affected populations. 
 
Through the work of Bradbury and Macrae they suggest that the ‘developmental relief’ 
approach has not worked as a fundamental concept and with the lack of success the idea of 
integrating such ‘developmental’ approaches in relief have been relegated and deemed as a 
failed concept. But several factors need to be considered when evaluating this concept. 
Firstly, the structure of this approach worked off the notion that there is a distinct ‘phased’ 
continuum, where ‘developmental’ approaches were providing long-term gains as a part of 
the prescribed continuum, instead of understanding relief and recovery needs and 
development progression as a more linear and interactive process. Therefore, was the model 
conceptually flawed?  
 
Secondly, what compounded the inevitable failure of such an approach was the heavily 
institutionalised aid architecture, distinctly separating relief and development budget lines, 
making it difficult to find the adequate funding to support the capacity needed to implement 
such an approach.  
 
Thirdly, this concept was broadly applied to function within natural disaster, as well as 
conflict and post-conflict settings, not distinguishing between these two differing political 
dynamics. Conflict and post-conflict environments bring a host of political complexities, 
which this approach had not adequately accounted for. Therefore, the approach under its 
current conceptual and theoretical framework could not function in the reality of the 
context. 
 
Over the past two decades there has been considerable discussion and research concerning 
the link between relief and development, but it has been argued little progress has been 
20 
    
made (Bailey et al. 2009). There has been an enhanced focus around the effect of relief 
interventions on recovery. ALNAP (2008) highlighted the need to avoid compromising 
recovery during relief interventions, pointing out that agencies should consider the likely 
impacts of an intervention on recovery, and whether a different approach might be better for 
recovery. Approaches suggested, are the use of cash and local procurement whenever there 
are working local markets, to build local capacity. The World Bank evaluation of its disaster 
assistance notes that ‘actions taken during the first weeks and months after a disaster have a 
major impact on the recovery process to follow, and they need to be planned and 
implemented accordingly’ (World Bank 2006).  
 
DFID’s most recent Humanitarian Emergency Response Review (HERR) states there is a 
need to fund recovery from day one, recognising that their split funding model (e.g. relief, 
recovery, reconstruction) has caused a false dichotomy between these activities. The review 
found that what affected populations want and need the most, is an immediate start to 
livelihoods recovery and that the neat donor split does not work to meet this need (DFID 
2011b). It is acknowledged that there is a disconnection between relief, recovery, and 
development (Lloyd-Jones 2006) and the continual problems encountered in emergency 
response have had the sector re-evaluating its approach to operations (ACF 2011; DFID 
2011a; IFRC 2012). Many agencies are battling to be able to provide the very real relief and 
recovery needs of the affected communities their mandate aims to help; stiff funding 
frameworks, weak coordination and leadership has hindered effective response 
programming, transition capacity and recovery (ALNAP 2008, 2011a, 2011b). It has been 
recognised that there needs to be a more strategic approach to programme planning that can 
look ahead, understand its long-term impacts, be more demand driven, and that can build 
the capacity of the affected population and national entities (Tearfund 2012; IFRC 2011; 
Oxfam 2011).  
 
The continual revival of this concept over the decades reveals the necessity and potential in 
this approach, but also the misconception and lack of conceptual clarity and physical 
capacity to practically implement such an approach. The aid framework is still set up under 
a distinct separation between humanitarianism and development and this has built the 
inherent platform emergency programmes operate from. A platform, which offers a rigid 
structure, that is unable to respond to the reality on the ground. The revival for more 
sustainable programming in emergency response speaks of a need to find coherence 
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between this false dichotomy. 
 
The following section breaks down the humanitarian framework into its various operational 
levels to begin to open up the complexity of its systems and begin to understand the key 
issues and challenges experienced with exit, transition and recovery. 
 
2.4 The Humanitarian Framework  
This section details the various operational levels within the humanitarian framework, 
beginning with understanding humanitarian principles, key players and their coordination. 
Followed by donor and financial mechanisms, the dynamics of assessment and planning, 
and finally gauging programmatic elements, specifically looking at exit, transition and 
recovery programming. Concluding the potential and importance of resilience building for 
affected societies within humanitarian programming. The subsequent sections will more 
thoroughly explore resilience as a concept and as a programmatic reality. 
 
2.4.1 Humanitarian Principles 
Humanitarian principles provide the foundations for humanitarian action. The 4 key 
humanitarian principles are: humanity, neutrality, impartiality and operational independence 
(refer to Table 2.1, pg. 22). The United Nations humanitarian work is formally enshrined in 
two resolutions by the General Assembly. The first 3 principles are endorsed in General 
Assembly Resolution 46/182, which was passed in 1991. The fourth principle was added in 
2004 under Resolution 58/114. The General Assembly Resolution 46/182 created a 
framework for humanitarian assistance and a set of guiding principles.  Commitment to 
these humanitarian principles are also expressed at an institutional level by the vast majority 
of humanitarian organisations (OCHA 2010a). 
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In addition to these 4 basic humanitarian principles, 481 organisations globally are signatory 
to the Red Cross/NGO Code of Conduct for operations in disasters, which includes a 
commitment to adhere to these humanitarian principles (IFRC 2012). The code lays down 
ten points of principle, which all humanitarian actors should adhere to in their disaster 
response work. The code also describes the relationships that agencies working in disasters 
should seek with donor governments, host governments and the UN system (refer to Box 
2.1, pg. 23). The Code is used by the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red 
Crescent to monitor its own standards of relief delivery and to encourage other agencies to 
set similar standards (IFRC 2012). 
 
These principles and code of conduct are self-policing. There is as yet no international 
association for disaster response that possesses any authority to sanction its members (IFRC 
2012).  
 
Table 2.1. Details the 4 basic humanitarian principles. [OCHA 2010] 
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OCHA works to promote compliance from the entire humanitarian community in every 
humanitarian response. It does this by promoting practical compliance measures within the 
Humanitarian Country Team (refer to sub-section 2.4.3), through its engagement with state 
and non-state actors at all levels and through participation in policy development in the 
United Nations Secretariat (OCHA 2010a).  
 
To improve the quality of humanitarian assistance and the accountability of humanitarian 
actors to their constituents, donors and affected populations the humanitarian charter and 
standards (the Sphere project) was established in 1997 (The Sphere project 2012). The 
Sphere project was initiated by a group of humanitarian INGOs and the International Red 
Cross and Red Crescent Movement. Their aim was to improve the quality of their actions 
during disaster response and to be held accountable for them. The project produced and 
frequently updates a handbook for humanitarian practitioners, that states the humanitarian 
charter and minimum standards to be implemented in a response. The Humanitarian Charter 
Box 2.1 Principles of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Movement and NGOs in Disaster Response Programmes 
1. The humanitarian imperative comes first. 
2. Aid is given regardless of the race, creed or nationality of the recipients and without 
adverse distinction of any kind. Aid priorities are calculated on the basis of need alone. 
3. Aid will not be used to further a particular political or religious standpoint. 
4. We shall endeavour not to act as instruments of government foreign policy. 
5. We shall respect culture and custom. 
6. We shall attempt to build disaster response on local capacities. 
7. Ways shall be found to involve programme beneficiaries in the management of relief 
aid. 
8. Relief aid must strive to reduce future vulnerabilities to disaster as well as meeting basic 
needs. 
9. We hold ourselves accountable to both those we seek to assist and those from whom we 
accept resources. 
10. In our information, publicity and advertising activities, we shall recognise disaster 
victims as dignified human beings, not hopeless objects. 
[Source: www.ifrc.org]  
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is a statement of established legal rights and obligations, providing the ethical and legal 
backdrop to the protection principles and the core and minimum standards that follow in the 
handbook. The standards themselves are reflected in the handbook’s four technical chapters: 
water supply, sanitation and hygiene promotion; food security and nutrition; shelter, 
settlement and non-food items; and health action (The Sphere project 2012). 
 
To further develop good working practice the OECD (Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development) established Principles for Good International Engagement 
in Fragile States and Situations (OECD 2007). These principles include: taking context as a 
starting point, do no harm, focus on state-building as the central objective, prioritise 
prevention, recognise the links between political, security and development objectives, 
promote non-discrimination as a basis for inclusive and stable societies, align with local 
priorities in different ways in different contexts, agree on practical coordination mechanisms 
between international actors, act fast, but stay engaged long enough to give success a 
chance, avoid pockets of exclusion (refer to Box 2.2, pg. 25) (OECD 2007). 
 
The principles that have been developed help humanitarian agencies function within the 
realms of humanitarian law, as well as providing guidance to achieve effective response 
operations.  
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Box 2.2 The OECDs Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States 
and Situations. 
 
Take context as the starting point. It is essential for international actors to understand the 
specific context in each country, and develop a shared view of the strategic response that is 
required. International actors should mix and sequence their aid instruments according to 
context, and avoid blue-print approaches. 
 
Do no harm. International interventions can inadvertently create societal divisions and 
worsen corruption and abuse, if they are not based on strong conflict and governance 
analysis, and designed with appropriate safeguards.  
 
Focus on state-building as the central objective. States are fragile when state structures 
lack political will and/or capacity to provide the basic functions needed for poverty 
reduction, development and to safeguard the security and human rights of their populations. 
International engagement will need to be concerted, sustained, and focused on building the 
relationship between state and society.  
 
Prioritise prevention. Action today can reduce fragility, lower the risk of future conflict 
and other types of crisis and contribute to long-term global development and security. 
International actors must be prepared to take rapid action where the risk of conflict and 
instability is highest.  
 
Recognise the links between political, security and development objectives. The 
challenges faced by fragile states are multi-dimensional. The political, security, economic 
and social spheres are inter-dependent. Importantly, there may be tensions and trade-offs 
between objectives, particularly in the short- term, which must be addressed when reaching 
consensus on strategy and priorities. Within donor governments, a ‘whole of government’ 
approach is needed, involving those responsible for security, political and economic affairs, 
as well as those responsible for development aid and humanitarian assistance. This should 
aim for policy coherence and joined-up strategies where possible, while preserving the 
independence, neutrality and impartiality of humanitarian aid. 
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2.4.2 Finance and Donors 
At every stage of a humanitarian response decisions are made about where, how and when 
to spend money. These decisions determine the types of organisations that are supported, 
the assistance delivered and the types of need that are met. There are many mechanisms 
used to transfer financial resources to a disaster response these include: 
 
Promote non-discrimination as a basis for inclusive and stable societies. Real or 
perceived discrimination is associated with fragility and conflict, and can lead to service 
delivery failures. International interventions in fragile states should consistently promote 
gender equity, social inclusion and human rights.  
 
Align with local priorities in different ways in different contexts. Where possible, 
international actors should seek to avoid activities, which undermine national institution 
building, such as developing parallel systems without thought to transition mechanisms and 
long-term capacity development.  
 
Agree on practical coordination mechanisms between international actors. This can 
happen even in the absence of strong government leadership. Where possible, it is important 
to work together on: upstream analysis; joint assessments; shared strategies and coordination 
of political engagement.  
 
Act fast, but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance. Assistance to fragile 
states must be flexible enough to take advantage of windows of opportunity and respond to 
changing conditions on the ground.  
 
Avoid pockets of exclusion. International actors need to address the problem of ‘aid 
orphans’ – states where there are no significant political barriers to engagement, but few 
international actors are engaged and aid volumes are low. This also applies to neglected 
geographical regions within a country, as well as neglected sectors and groups within 
societies. When international actors make resource allocation decisions about the partner 
countries and focus areas for their aid programs, they should seek to avoid unintentional 
exclusionary effects.  
 
[Source: OECD 2010] 
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 The CAP (Common Appeals Process) is a tool used by aid organisations to plan, 
coordinate, fund, implement and monitor their activities. It undertakes a process 
where agencies publish projects in the CAP document in a cohesive and 
uncompetitive manner, combining their efforts. Overall responsibility for this 
process is given to the Emergency Response Coordinator (ERC), where the 
humanitarian country teams, who are headed by the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC), 
conducts the CAP process. The humanitarian country teams refer to cluster lead 
agencies, who validate the proposals to be included in the process (OCHA 2013).  
 
As a planning and programming tool, the CAP contributes significantly to developing a 
more strategic approach to humanitarian action. As a coordination mechanism, the CAP 
fosters closer cooperation between host governments, donors, aid agencies, and in 
particular, between NGOs, the Red Cross movement, IOM and UN agencies.  Working 
together in the world’s crisis regions, they produce a Common Humanitarian Action Plan 
(CHAP). The CAP is more than just an appeal for money it, as it includes coordination 
programme cycle elements, such as strategic planning, leading to CHAP (Common 
Humanitarian Action Plan), resource mobilisation, coordinating programme 
implementation, joint monitoring and evaluation (M+E) and reporting on results (OCHA 
2013). 
 
 CHAP (The Common Humanitarian Action Plan) is a strategic plan for humanitarian 
response in a given country or region. It provides: a common analysis of the context 
in which humanitarian assistance takes place, an assessment of needs, best, worst, 
and most likely scenarios, identifies roles and responsibilities, i.e. who does what 
and where, offers a clear statement of longer-term objectives and goals and a 
framework for monitoring the strategy and revising it if necessary. The CHAP is the 
foundation for developing a Consolidated Appeal, and is as such part of the 
Coordinated Appeals Process (CAP) (OCHA 2013). 
 
 The Flash Appeal is a tool for structuring a coordinated humanitarian response for 
the first 3-6 months of an emergency. The HC triggers it in consultation with all 
stakeholders. The Flash Appeal is issued within one week of an emergency. It 
provides a concise overview of urgent life-saving needs, and may include recovery 
28 
    
projects that can be implemented within the timeframe of the appeal. Information 
required from agencies in flash appeals in less detailed than the CAP (OCHA 2013). 
 
 CERF (Central Emergency Response Fund) is a financial mechanism to provide 
agencies with cash to cover immediate expenditure in the aftermath of a crisis, while 
waiting for donor pledges to be transferred. The CERF was set up in 2006 with a 
total to date of US$2.1 billion in contributions from 150 donors (Global 
Humanitarian Assistance 2011). Eligible recipients include UN and IOM, NGOs 
may indirectly benefit. The HC approves projects (OCHA 2013).  
 
 ERF (Emergency Response Fund) is an un-earmarked pool of funds for unforeseen 
humanitarian need. The HC allocates these funds. However, the HC doesn’t consult 
with national authorities (OCHA 2013). 
 
 CHF (Common Humanitarian Fund) is an in-country pooled mechanism, with the 
aim of making funding more flexible and predictable in accordance with the Good 
Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) principles. CHFs provide government donors with 
an opportunity to pool their un-earmarked contributions to a specific country, to 
enable timely and reliable humanitarian assistance. CHFs support cluster 
coordination and stronger humanitarian leadership as promoted by the humanitarian 
reform process that began in 2005. They allow the HC to fund in country. 
Disbursements from the CHFs are made available to UN agencies and INGOs that 
participate in the country’s consolidated appeals process (CAP). A small proportion 
of a fund’s budget, usually around 10%, is reserved for emergency response (Global 
Humanitarian Assistance 2011).  
 
 DREF (Disaster Response Emergency Relief Fund) is managed by IFRC to ensure 
that immediate financial support is available for Red Cross Red Crescent emergency 
response to disasters. Money can be authorised and released within 24 hours (IFRC 
2012). 
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 The Recovery and Reconstruction Fund is managed by the World Bank and the UN 
offers pooled funding for medium and large-scale disasters, within this mechanism 
there is the CHFs (Global Humanitarian Assistance 2011). 
 
The majority of aid flowing through these mechanisms is recorded through the Financial 
Tracking Service (FTS), which is a real-time database that is used to track global 
humanitarian aid flows. The service is operated by OCHA it records all reported 
international humanitarian aid (including that for INGOs and the Red Cross / Red Crescent 
Movement, bilateral aid, in-kind aid, and private donations) (FTS 2012). 
 
This service helps to understand how money is channeled through the humanitarian system, 
how well individual crises are resourced, type of activities of focus, i.e. Shelter, WASH, 
protection, and the type of implementation partners used, i.e. government ministries, private 
sector, agencies etc. Tracking the humanitarian dollar through the system, particularly 
project allocation and dissemination would help gauge the efficiency and effectiveness of a 
response in response to the context and the need. However, this is currently hindered by the 
lack of central repository of information indicating how aid has been spent, as well as the 
absence of a feedback loop that enable people affected by disaster to say what they have 
received and when. Without this feedback on what commodities and services are being 
provided the effectiveness and efficiency of the response is hard to measure. In response to 
this need an initiative has been agreed on amongst donors, aid recipient country 
governments and civil society organisations called the ‘International Aid Transparency 
Initiative’. This is an initiative that aims to make information about aid spending easier to 
access, use and understand (IATI 2012). 
 
Donors have expressed that they find certain funding mechanisms useful, such as pooled 
funding mechanisms, like common humanitarian funds, useful in facilitating coordination 
through government bodies. However, some of these mechanisms do not always involve 
government counterparts (Global Humanitarian Assistance 2012). There is a lack of 
objectives for donors to coordinate around. The only available guidance can be found in the 
GHD. The GHD initiative was developed in 2003, detailing 23 principles and good practice 
guidelines to provide both a framework to guide official humanitarian aid and a mechanism 
for encouraging greater donor accountability (GHD 2012). These were drawn up to enhance 
the coherence and effectiveness of donor action, as well as their accountability to 
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beneficiaries, implementing organisations and domestic constituencies, with regard to the 
funding, co-ordination, follow-up and evaluation of such actions (GHD 2012).  
 
Current financial mechanisms, donor government’s aid architecture, i.e. that separate 
different types of financial assistance  (i.e. relief, recovery, development) and donor pre-
requisites all have significant impacts on programmes implemented, as well as the overall 
success of a response. Below details a few examples from emergency responses undertaken 
in the 2005 Gujarat earthquake, the 2008 Myanmar cyclone, and the 2005 Indian Ocean 
tsunami, highlighting some key issues related to funding. 
 
Gujarat earthquake 2005 
In the aftermath of a disaster there is a great pressure to gain quick results through donor 
and media pressure. Many agencies have a mandate that is limited to short-term 
humanitarian relief. After the Gujarat earthquake managers on the ground found they were 
becoming more bound to spending money within the DEC (Disasters Emergency 
Committee) timetable rather than planning good programmes (DEC 2001). This ‘quick 
results attitude and a general agency mandate geared only towards relief activities hindered 
the process of long-term recovery. 
 
Myanmar Cyclone Nargis 2008 
In many post-disaster situations it has been seen that funding can slow down after the 
immediate aftermath, which was experienced in Myanmar (refer to section 2.2) severely 
affecting the recovery process, as funds are not available to plan more long-sighted, 
effective programmes or even to complete relief phase programming. This ran the risk of 
creating a prolonged relief and an extremely vulnerable population (HPN 2005). 
 
Indian Ocean Tsunami 2005 
After the Indian Ocean Tsunami the US$10 billion reconstruction estimate was met with 
US$13.6 billion of committed funds for post-tsunami recovery (UN Office of the Secretary-
General’s Special Envoy for Tsunami Recovery 2005). The Tsunami response was not the 
case of a lack of financial resources, but the lack of capacity and political will to spend it 
effectively, hindering the recovery process (Lloyd-Jones 2006). 
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Even when funding can be found, spending caps and short-term timeframes for relief and 
recovery programming, i.e. often 6 months to a year, frustrate efforts to plan effective, 
context appropriate relief operations that can smoothly transition to longer-term recovery. 
Realistic funding timeframes for recovery programming would require spending periods of 
around 3-5 years, rather than the current 6 months- 1 year. Recovery timeframes may be 
dictated by politics, bureaucratic rules or media pressure, rather than sound needs 
assessments (ALNAP 2008). The World Bank evaluation of disaster assistance, noted it 
often happens that activities that might contribute greatly to recovery efforts and subsequent 
long-term development are not included in Emergency Recovery Loan projects, as they 
cannot be completed in the 3 years allocated. Financial allocation needs to be extended in its 
timeframe for recovery programming in order to allow humanitarian actors to develop 
effective long-term plans that will support a sustainable recovery process (World Bank 
2006). 
 
Ring-fencing and the lack of flexibility in the funding process prevents it being allocated 
more appropriately and equitably between the early and later stages of recovery and 
transferred between different types of recovery efforts or even between disasters as the need 
arises (Lloyd-Jones 2006). Central planning and co-ordination needs to be backed by 
mechanisms that allow funds to flow more freely down to the local level, where there is 
better knowledge of how they can be used to meet the immediate and long-term needs of 
communities (Lloyd-Jones 2006). There is also a call to decentralise decision-making, to 
bring it closer to the ground. This makes sense in complex environments where you need to 
be reactive to ever changing needs and operational environments (Boulton 2012). This 
approach would move away from the reality of a default master plan, often centralised in its 
nature, being implemented. A master plan, which is unable to offer the reactivity needed to 
respond to the variety of changing needs in specific contexts. 
 
Host government representatives have voiced their frustration with the artificial division 
between relief and development aid in international aid architecture (ALNAP 2012). Donor 
perspectives are beginning to change and there are many already concerned with the 
processes necessary to Link Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD), these include: 
ECHO, DFID, The World Bank, Swiss and German Corporation and CTB (Belgium 
development agency) (EC 2011).   Many of these financial institutions have gauged the 
necessity to fund recovery from day one, to allow more coherent funding timeframes and 
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focus on resilience building in post-disaster environments (World Bank 2006; ECHO 2011; 
DFID 2012). However, the most recent Humanitarian Response Index (HRI) showed donors 
were still scoring poorly on prevention, risk reduction, recovery, learning and 
accountability; elements that are consistent with the implementation of effective LRRD 
donorship (DARA 2011).  With the heavily institutionalised division in funding frameworks 
between relief, recovery and development, as well as weak operational capacities that are 
central to the provision of such an agenda, there is still a significant amount of policy and 
operational work within the donor community to ensure the successful implementation of 
this fundamental paradigm. 
 
2.4.3 Key Players and Coordination  
International relief can only be activated in response to a formal request for assistance from 
the affected government (IFRC 2012). Therefore, when a disaster strikes and the 
government of that affected country feels they lack the capacity and resources to respond to 
the needs of its people they will initiate a ‘call’ to the humanitarian community for 
humanitarian assistance. Key players within the humanitarian community will then assess 
whether they wish to respond and if so, how? These main players and their functions are 
detailed below: 
 The host government - Inclusive of central administration, ministerial branches and 
regional and local administration. The government of a disaster affected country 
possess the power to allow access, set the regulatory and legal frameworks 
governing relief assistance, provide law and order, protection and technical 
assistance (e.g. ministerial), they are also responsible for monitoring and 
coordinating external assistance (ALNAP 2010). Therefore, it is essential if there is 
sufficient capacity to communicate, involve and partner with government in relief, 
recovery and rehabilitation activities. 
 Donors - With the main financial contributions coming through donor governments, 
such as USAID (United States), ECHO (European Union), DFID (United Kingdom), 
AECID (Spain) and CIDA (Canada). 
 The Inter Agency Standing Committee (IASC) - The IASC is the primary 
mechanism for inter-agency coordination of humanitarian assistance. Established in 
1992 in response to United Nations General Assembly Resolution 46/182 on the 
strengthening of humanitarian assistance, the IASC is a unique forum that involves 
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key UN and non-UN humanitarian partners (IASC 2013). The committee designs 
policy regarding crisis response and reconstruction, they allocate responsibilities 
among agencies in humanitarian programmes and identify areas where gaps in 
mandates or lack of operational capacity exist. They also, set a common ethical 
framework for all humanitarian activities and advocate for common humanitarian 
principles to parties outside the IASC (IASC 2013). 
 The Under-Secretary-General and Emergency Relief Coordinator (USG/ERC) 
– The USG/ERC is responsible for the oversight of all emergencies requiring United 
Nations humanitarian assistance. They also act as the central focal point for 
governmental, intergovernmental and non-governmental relief activities. The ERC 
also leads the IASC and can appoint a Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) to ensure 
response efforts are well organised (OCHA 2012). A Humanitarian Country 
Team (HCT) is under the leadership of the HC and it is comprised of organisations 
that undertake humanitarian action in country and that commit to participate in 
coordination arrangements. Its objective is to ensure that the activities of such 
organisations are coordinated, and that humanitarian action in country is principled, 
timely, effective and efficient, and contributes to longer-term recovery (IASC 2009). 
    Cluster system - In 2005, a major reform of humanitarian coordination, known as 
the Humanitarian Reform Agenda, introduced a number of new elements to enhance 
predictability, accountability and partnership. The Cluster approach was one of these 
new elements. Clusters are groups of humanitarian organisations, both UN and non-
UN, in each of the main sectors of humanitarian action, e.g. Shelter, WASH (Water, 
Sanitation and Hygiene), Health, Protection, Logistics etc. They are designated by 
the IASC and have clear responsibilities for coordination. The HC and the HCT 
manage a humanitarian response through the clusters. All clusters have focal points, 
known as Cluster Lead Agencies, which operate at the global and country level. 
Globally, Cluster Leads are responsible for strengthening system-wide preparedness 
and coordinating technical capacity to respond to humanitarian emergencies in their 
respective sector. In specific countries, Cluster Leads serve as the main contact for a 
government and the HC. They ensure that humanitarian activities are coordinated 
and make a difference to people in need. They also act as a provider of last resort in 
their respective sector (OCHA 2012). 
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 UN agencies: 
o     OCHA is the part of the United Nations Secretariat responsible for 
bringing together humanitarian actors to ensure a coherent response to 
emergencies. OCHA also ensures there is a framework, which each actor can 
contribute to the overall response effort. UNDAC (UN Disaster Assessment 
and Coordination) is a branch of OCHA, set up in 1993, which enables the 
UN and government coordinate incoming international assistance nationally 
in the first phase of an emergency (OCHA 2012). OSOCC (On-Site 
Operations Coordination Centre) was created by OCHA and International 
Search and Rescue Advisory Group network to provide a link between 
international responders and the government of the affected country, as well 
as a platform for cooperation, coordination and information management 
among international humanitarian agencies (OCHA 2012).  
o     UNOPS is an operational arm of the United Nations, providing project 
management and procurement services, helping a range of partners 
implement a range of aid and development programmes (UNOPS 2012). 
o     UNHCR (UN High Commissioner for Refugees) was established in 
1950 by the United Nations General Assembly. The agency is mandated to 
lead and co-ordinate international action to protect refugees and resolve 
refugee problems worldwide. Its primary purpose is to safeguard the rights 
and wellbeing of refugees (UNHCR 2012). 
o     UN-HABITAT is the United Nations Human Settlements Programme. 
It is mandated by the UN General Assembly to promote socially and 
environmentally sustainable towns and cities with the goal of providing 
adequate shelter for all (UN-HABITAT 2012). 
o    UNICEF (United Nations International Children's Emergency 
Fund) works to protect and help children globally. UNICEF offers a multi-
sectoral approach in its work, i.e. health, education, protection, WASH 
(UNICEF 2012). 
o    WFP (World Food Programme) is the food assistance branch of the 
UN operating in response to disaster (WFP 2012). With its sister agency 
FAO (Food and Agricultural Organisation) who’s mandate is to raise 
levels of nutrition and improve agricultural productivity (FAO 2012). 
o    UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) is the development 
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arm of the UN, They also have a mandate to facilitate Early Recovery 
(UNDP 2012). 
 
 IOM (International Organisation for Migration) is mandated to provide secure, 
reliable, flexible and cost-effective services for persons who require international 
migration assistance, to advance understanding of migration issues and encourage 
social and economic development through migration (IOM 2012a). 
 
 The International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies 
movement is the world's largest humanitarian network. The Movement is neutral 
and impartial, and provides protection and assistance to people affected by disasters 
and conflicts (IFRC 2012). The Movement has three main components:  
 The International committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) During situations of 
conflict, the ICRC is responsible for directing and coordinating the Movement's 
international relief activities, meeting the needs of internally displaced persons, 
raising public awareness of the dangers of mines and explosive remnants of war, 
trace people who have gone missing during conflicts and promote the 
importance of international humanitarian law and draws attention to universal 
humanitarian principles (IFRC 2012). 
 The International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies 
(IFRC) coordinates and directs international assistance following natural and 
man-made disasters in non-conflict situations. The IFRC works with National 
Societies in responding to catastrophes around the world. Its relief operations are 
combined with development work, including disaster preparedness programmes, 
strengthening recovery, as well as the promotion of humanitarian values (IFRC 
2012). 
 187 member Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, these societies forms the 
backbone of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.  National 
Societies support the public authorities in their own countries as independent 
auxiliaries to the government in the humanitarian field. Their local knowledge 
and expertise, access to communities, and infrastructure enable the Movement to 
get the right kind of help where it’s needed, fast (IFRC 2012). 
 
36 
    
 INGOs (International Non-Governmental Organisations) these include some 
prominent agencies, such as MSF, Oxfam, ACF, Merlin, IRC, Mercy coups, Save 
the Children, GOAL, ACTED, CARE, Concern, Cordaid, CRS, IMC, Plan, 
Solidarités and Tearfund. 
 
 Local civil society- this is inclusive of NGOs (Non-Governmental Organisations), 
community groups and committees. These groups represent the needs of the affected 
communities and can offer a wealth of contextual knowledge. 
 
2.4.4 Coordination 
The relationship and level of involvement and coordination between the humanitarian 
community and the government can be complex. The UN Resolution 46/182 highlights the 
state’s primary responsibility in responding to disasters: 
 
The sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity of states must be fully 
respected in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. In this context, 
humanitarian assistance should be provided with the consent of the affected country 
and in principle on the basis of an appeal by the affected country. 
(UN 1991) 
 
The Sphere guidelines also ‘acknowledge the primary role and responsibility of the state to 
provide assistance when people’s capacity to cope has been exceeded’ (The Sphere Project 
2012). National governments also set the laws and regulations governing how aid agencies 
may operate within their territory. Wherever they work, INGOs are obliged to register with 
the government and are generally required to report on their activities (IFRC 2007a). Thus, 
the development of a good working relationship is crucial to ensure an effective operational 
environment and the development of context specific and effective response and recovery 
programming. Funding and operational dynamics set up at the initiation of a disaster 
response, impacts the type and level of coordination undertaken in the early phase of a 
response. These dynamics come from the need for the humanitarian community, under 
humanitarian principles, to remain independent from political, economic or military 
objectives (GHD 2003), how a government is viewed in the eyes of donors and 
implementation agencies in terms of the level of corruption, competence and political 
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dynamics, which will affect how aid will be channeled to support the response and the level 
of communication and partnership developed between the humanitarian sector and the 
government (ALNAP 2010). Since 2001, IFRC has been engaged in a large-scale review of 
international response, laws, rules and principles in natural disasters (IDRL). The Federation 
has now produced guidelines for domestic facilitation and regulation of international 
disaster relief and initial recovery assistance (IFRC 2007b). 
 
A critical problem at the global level is the lack of opportunities for western and G77 
governments and international aid agencies to discuss and create a dialogue on humanitarian 
issues (ALNAP 2010). Current outlets include the UNs General Assembly and the United 
Nation Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). ECOSOC is the only official forum for 
donors and disaster affected states to discuss humanitarian issues, making it an important 
arena to highlight political and policy concerns at the intergovernmental level (ALNAP 
2010). 
 
Further tensions were experienced with the induction of the cluster system, which was 
introduced as one of the new elements of the humanitarian reform process in 2005. There 
were concerns about inclusions of national authorities in cluster coordination, this led to 
revised guidelines that stresses the role of national authorities (IASC 2007). However, 
recent evaluations of cluster coordination have noted a continuing failure of clusters to 
engage sufficiently with national authorities. How they currently are implemented largely 
exclude national and local actors and often fail to link in with and build on existing 
coordination or response mechanisms. This is due to insufficient analysis of local structures 
and capacities before cluster implementation, as well as the lack of clear transition and exit 
criteria and strategies. This results in the weakening of national and local ownership and 
capacities (Steets 2010). 
 
The introduction of the clusters system has been an important development for both OCHA, 
in adding an accountability mechanism to the coordination model, and to the vast array of 
independently operating INGOs and other stakeholders in a response, to enable them to 
work within a common operating framework and gain strategic guidance to undertake a 
coherent operation (OCHA 2013). The cluster system also offers an essential 
communicative mechanism between all response actors, particularly between the 
government and the humanitarian community. However, as previously noted the system in 
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its current state of operation is not functioning in a way that can meet these fundamental and 
necessary objectives.  
 
Continual issues of coordination can be clearly seen in both the response to the earthquake 
in Pakistan in 2005 and Haiti 2010: 
 
Pakistan earthquake 2005 
The earthquake that hit Pakistan in 2005, affected over 5 million people, leaving huge 
devastation in the Pakistani-administered Kashmir (PAK) and the North West Frontier 
Province (NWFP) (Oxfam 2006). In response to this crisis, the government of Pakistan 
created the Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority (ERRA) to oversee 
early recovery and reconstruction. One of the challenges faced by ERRA was getting the 
balance right between leadership, co-ordination, service delivery, long-term institution-
building and programme sustainability. It was found that the strong centralisation of policy-
making, the lack of clarity about roles and responsibilities, and the new, under-resourced 
structures caused tensions between ERRA, provincial and state governments, and public 
services departments, which affected the efficiency of the recovery process (Oxfam 2006). 
The local authorities in Pakistan were concerned about their involvement in strategy 
creation, their access to resources and technical support and also to what degree their 
mandates were being challenged (O’Donnell et al. 2009).  
 
Haiti earthquake 2010 
In response to the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, thousands of INGOs flooded the country in the 
first few weeks of the response; this presented a huge coordination issue and a lack of 
accountability. The government lacked capacity and ownership of the relief and recovery 
effort, which has subsequently found Haiti experiencing a prolonged relief phase, that 
significantly hindered the progress of rapid and sustainable recovery (DEC 2011a). 
 
Lessons learnt from past responses to disasters highlight the importance of engaging with 
national and local authorities and civil society groups. Such partnerships are essential for 
promoting national ownership and coordination before, during and following a disaster, 
paving the way for a sustainable recovery (O’Donnell et al. 2009).  
 
International relief efforts have also often been criticised for ignoring, sidelining or actively 
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undermining local capacities. These instances can occur through flooding disaster zones 
with international workers, poaching local government staff, failing to coordinate properly 
with host governments, showing scant respect for local government officials and eroding the 
social contract, by making it possible for governments to evade their own responsibilities 
(ALNAP 2010). Although policies and inter-agency guidelines contain clear commitments 
to building national capacities, the practice often falls short of the rhetoric. This may be a 
result of the fact humanitarian agencies claim an international humanitarian mandate, and 
appeal to global standards that make reference to international treaties or agreements and 
downplay national laws and local administration. As a result humanitarian agencies are 
often reluctant either to adapt to local practice or even try to understand the administrative 
mechanisms that constrain and regulate local practice and local institutions, which they may 
perceive as less competent, less well-resourced, less honest and, crucially, less caring of ‘the 
vulnerable’ (Levine 2012). 
 
Structures and organisational cultures within aid agencies, the lack of contextual knowledge 
and the potential inability to speak local languages also hinders the international 
community’s ability to involve local partners and develop a good working relationship with 
the host government. There is a need to better understand the context at an early stage to 
gauge local coordination mechanisms, capacities and administrative structures to develop a 
response system that is coherent and works with and not against local structures. 
 
It is also frequently noted that INGOs fail to establish sufficient community consultation 
and participation in their relief and recovery programmes (HPN 2007). The pressure on 
agencies to produce quick results works against the process of community participation, 
which is critical to ensure an appropriate and sustainable long-term recovery effort. Despite 
agencies commitments, many are still failing to fully engage with the communities hit by 
disaster or to consider fully the implications of their various interventions on the local 
economy and institutional stability (Levine 2012). Lessons learnt from responses to past 
disasters demonstrate that community participation in decision-making, implementation and 
evaluation of humanitarian efforts produces effective results, particularly in strengthening 
local capacities (Collaborative for Development Action 2010). Close consultation with 
communities is recommended as a means of ensuring that relief and recovery policies and 
programmes are needs-based, reflect community priorities and avoid negatively impacting 
vulnerable groups, such as women, youth, children and others ‘at risk’ (ALNAP 2010). 
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Local consultation within humanitarian programming is an area that needs much 
improvement (ALNAP 2012b). 
 
Limited support and investment in the capacities of local operational partners can often be 
seen. Many operational gaps could be bridged by the appropriate use of existing 
professional and business skills. However, there is a lack of recognition and utilisation of 
locally presented skills in a disaster-affected area that would significantly contribute to the 
recovery process. This issue arises due to institutional constraints and a lack of targeted 
funding (O’Donnell et al. 2009). Local organisations also face significant capacity issues 
often working beyond max capacity, finding it difficult to tap humanitarian funding and 
meet international standards. With these obvious issues local capacity building still remains 
one of the hardest areas to raise funds for in non-emergency periods (ALNAP 2010).  
 
2.4.5 Assessments and Planning  
To plan effective response and recovery programmes assessments need to be carried out to: 
understand the context, the type and level of disaster impact, where the affected 
communities are located, gauge the needs of the affected population, understand risks, as 
well as logistics to ensure an effective response. This sub-section looks to understand the 
types of assessments available, the ones actually used, the capacity to implement within the 
sector and to understand key challenges within this area of operation. 
 
There is a plethora of assessments available for individual agencies to undertake, such as 
rapid assessments, needs assessments, impact assessments, monitoring and evaluation 
(M+E). There is also a dedicated Needs Assessment Task Force (NAFT), which is an inter-
agency standing committee, based in Geneva, made up of UN agencies and INGOs. The 
task group focuses on improving needs evaluation practices between humanitarian actors 
(IASC 2012).  Joint needs assessments are also carried out, which combine capacities of 
agencies, reducing duplication of assessments.  Real Time Evaluation (RTE) is a tool now 
used in the early stages of humanitarian operations, these evaluations feedback findings in a 
real time manner for immediate use and decision-making. Inter-agency RTEs can benefit 
the whole humanitarian system from this real time learning. RTEs also contribute to 
improved programming and accountability (DARA 2012).  
 
However, current approaches to humanitarian needs assessment often do not provide a 
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sufficiently coherent picture of humanitarian requirements, especially not in the initial 
phases of an emergency (ACAPS 2012). In spite of the importance of assessment for 
programme planning and implementation no commonly accepted methodology exists within 
the humanitarian system and there is no consensus on how to carry out a common multi-
sectoral assessment, which would provide the humanitarian sector with the shared 
understanding of what the main needs are following a disaster (ACAPS 2012).  
 
ALNAP (2012) note that there is a need for more joint assessments between organisations, 
which will offer more effective coverage. This deficit could be addressed by technical 
advances in methods for conducting needs assessments. The assessment capacities project 
(ACAPS) and Emergency Capacity building (ECB) are both projects that have been set up 
to evaluate and improve assessment methodology.  
 
Humanitarian organisations are increasing their focus on more comprehensive, inclusive 
and participatory needs assessments (ALNAP 2012). Due to the fact the current use of 
‘quick and dirty’ needs assessments in post-disaster situations generate essential, timely 
information, but because the assessment uses ‘convenient samples’, which are readily 
available groups, deems this information unable to represent the population at large and is 
unable to sufficiently account for contextual information (Kolbe et al. 2010). This inevitably 
is leading to programme approaches that are not context specific and will not account for 
the real short- and long-term relief and recovery needs of affected communities. Introducing 
a process that could facilitate the use of community-led surveys and independent 
monitoring, by local civil society, with appropriate professional support, could stimulate a 
community-driven approach to post-disaster recovery, which builds on this social capital 
allowing for the development of more appropriate programming (O’Donnell et al. 2009). 
 
The use of and effective implementation of M+E, as well as impact assessments is currently 
weak within the humanitarian sector (DFID 2011). These are crucial programme tools, as 
effectiveness is measured by how well the humanitarian response met their objectives, how 
quickly the system was able to respond, and the quality of leadership and competence of 
coordination efforts. But objectives are often not clearly defined and there are often large 
time delays in M+E assessments rendering them incapable of feeding back information at 
the necessary times to ensure programmes meet the real needs efficiently (ALNAP 2012). 
The lack of baseline data produced in a response makes understanding and, thus, measuring 
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true impacts difficult. It has been noted that evidence on the impact of humanitarian 
interventions is not forthcoming and impact assessments are often insufficiently rigorous in 
the sector (CGD 2006; Forss and Bandstein 2008). There are now both explicit and implicit 
commitments by aid agencies and convening bodies to better assess impact. Several INGOs 
have introduced impact assessment systems that aim to improve accountability at the 
organisational level. For example, Action Aid’s Accountability, Learning and Planning 
System (ALPS) and Save the Children UK’s Global Impact Monitoring (GIM) (Hofmann 
2004). The ECB agencies have produced a widely disseminated ‘Good Enough Guide’ to 
impact measurement (ECB 2008), while DEC’s new Accountability Framework also 
addresses the question of the impact of its member organisations (DEC 2011b).  
 
Despite considerable progress the use of impact assessments has not become common 
practice. A great deal of confusion remains regarding the conceptualisation and definition of 
impact assessment, the range of approaches, tools and methodologies, and whose needs are 
actually being met (ALNAP 2009). To facilitate improvements in impact assessment 
methodology the OECD-DAC Evaluation Network, the Network of Networks on Impact 
Evaluation (NONIE), and the International Initiative on Impact Evaluation (3ie) are all 
undertaking essential work in this area (ALNAP 2009). 
 
Overall assessments carried out in a disaster response in the main part can lack clarity of 
conceptualisation, quality of data, comprehensiveness and mechanisms to feed in 
information in a timely manner. Individual agencies are undertaking their own internally 
developed assessments with very few commonly practiced methodologies available. This 
results in ineffective sharing of data, leading to considerable duplication, wasted resources 
and with an end result that often lacks the detail and quality to effectively influence the 
planning of appropriate and responsive relief and recovery programmes. 
 
2.4.6 Exit and Transitional Programming 
All international organisations will have to exit from or transition their programmes of 
humanitarian assistance. Exit and transitional programming are essential elements that 
affect recovery and longer-term programming. This sub-section breaks down the strategic 
levels exit and transition activities are coordinated, understanding the types of approaches 
and essential factors required to effectively implement this type of programming, along with 
gauging the continuous challenges experienced within the sector. 
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Exit strategy is primarily a process of moving from emergency to rehabilitation and 
development, addressing a change in the roles of the UN agencies and other humanitarian 
organisations in the country (IASC 1997). Ensuring an exit from emergency assistance is 
supportive to the transition to recovery is stated within the General Assembly Resolution 
46/182- ‘emergency assistance must be provided in ways that will be supportive of recovery 
and long-term development activities’ (UN 1991). It is part of the functions of the HC at the 
field level and the IASC, under the leadership of the ERC, at the global level, to ensure that 
these systemic links are made and continually refined (IASC 1997). 
 
Exit strategy should be conceptualised before, during and after implementation of 
emergency assistance. Government capacity, local capacity and existing planning and 
coordination mechanisms, that are aimed at development, should all be considered when 
planning the exit or transition of emergency programmes (IASC 2006).  
 
The HC is in charge of determining, in consultation with the in-country team and the 
government, whether the conditions are met to proceed with total or partial exit strategy 
(OCHA 2012c). It is important not to exit too quickly, if national and/or local capacity is not 
able to provide the assistance needed the affected population will be in an extremely 
vulnerable position. If transition occurs too late, beneficiaries may become dependent on the 
humanitarian assistance and develop expectations that the government may not be able to 
satisfy. However, the time of an exit may not be identical for each sector and agency. The 
determination of the appropriate time requires an evaluation of the situation at geographical 
and sectoral levels and should be undertaken by an inter-agency forum under the leadership 
of the HC (IASC 1997). 
 
Conditions that indicate the situation is appropriate for the exit of the humanitarian 
community include: 
 The reduction of a significant number of civilians affected by the emergency. 
 The resumption of normal social, political and economic activities.   
 The government's capacity to resume its obligation towards the population, in 
particular the victims of the disaster.   
 A resource mobilisation strategy should be in place that covers the strategic 
framework for post-conflict activities (IASC 1997). 
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Exit planning of humanitarian assistance programmes, in reality, is weak within individual 
agencies and often only considered at the end of the implementation process (IFRC 2011; 
Tearfund 2012). This means that many strategic opportunities are not recognised or utilised 
and effective exits are delayed, sometimes resulting in protracted relief situations, e.g. as 
noted in the response in Haiti (refer to section 2.5). There is also the issue that agency’s 
funding is often short-term and inflexible. Thus, leaving agencies geared up for early exits 
that are guided more by financial resources than contextual need (Lloyd-Jones 2006).  
 
The transition of relief services into recovery and rehabilitation activities is fundamental, to 
ensure a disaster-affected country is able to return to or advance to a functioning society. A 
number of processes and mechanisms are needed for transition to occur. OCHA play a 
significant role in transition, defining it as: 
 
‘A phase of humanitarian crisis in which the acute vulnerability begins to decline, 
leading to a reduction in international life-saving assistance and an increase in early 
recovery, recovery and rehabilitation activities. Transition relates to an improving 
situation, implementation may be triggered by a decrease in risk factors, i.e. increase 
in coping capabilities’.  
(OCHA 2010b) 
 
To ensure a transition of activity takes place a number of initiatives are carried out by the 
UN, these include: 
 Decreasing the remaining acute vulnerability through well coordinated assistance 
efforts. 
  Assisting development actors to launch and scale up recovery assistance. 
  Work to integrate humanitarian needs into social service network and development 
frameworks. 
  Assist in-country coordination system to prepare for resurgent or new crisis. 
 The handover of appropriate services and coordinate activities. 
 Encourage strategic and operational coherence between humanitarian, recovery, 
rehabilitation and development assistance. 
 When a country is identified as being transitional the office will initiate an internal 
planning process aimed at developing a detailed and practical phase down and exit 
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plan. 
  A cluster working group on early recovery in cooperation with UNDG ECHA 
(United Nations Development Group Executive Committee on Humanitarian 
Assistance) work on transitions. 
 (OECD 2011) 
 
As demonstrated in several case studies, including: the 2005 Indian Ocean Tsunami, 2011 
Cyclone Nargis and the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, transitional programming on the ground is 
often insufficient in its undertaking. There are many possible reasons for this that include: 
the lack of contextual knowledge generated at an early stage to set up sufficient transition 
mechanisms; the time in which these initiatives are initiated is often 3-6 months after the 
disaster, which becomes a problem if humanitarian assistance has not involved national or 
local entities, thus, the foundations to commence such programming is compromised; and 
funding that is made available for transition is firstly, lacking and secondly, there is a lack 
of definition for what constitutes transitional programming, resulting in limited resources 
for these activities. 
 
Improvements need to come in the form of: improved policies governing financial flows, 
i.e. offering simultaneous and coordinated funding for relief, transition and recovery 
activities, as well as procedural flexibility; procedural and cultural changes within 
administration, i.e. adopting a long-term, non-linear approach to transition, and the 
humanitarian development divide should avoid fragmented engagement with mismatched 
objectives; and responsibility for transition programming should be clarified within 
government and the humanitarian community. 
 
It is clear that exit and transitional programming is poorly planned and implemented within 
humanitarian operations. There are strategies presented at a sectoral level to guide exit and 
transition programming. However, these strategies are broadly based with little precise 
information and guidance that will really allow these strategies to take place. The approach 
to exit and transitional planning and implementation is weak and there is a fundamental 
need to gauge how effective strategies can be practically implemented within programming, 
to ensure exit and transitional programming can take place effectively. It is clear that such 
programming is crucial to develop a productive and conducive environment for rapid and 
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sustainable recovery. Recovery programming is discussed further in the following sub-
section. 
 
2.4.7 Recovery Programming 
This sub-section clarifies the definition of recovery programming and the operational 
parameters that are placed around it by the humanitarian sector. Assessing some complex 
processes that are involved in recovery, to gauge the current success of their implementation 
and what has been highlighted as essential challenges within the process. The sub-section 
also looks at recommended improvements suggested by the humanitarian sector. 
 
It has been generally accepted that recovery interventions begin from month 3-6 after a 
disaster strikes (UNDP 2012). This is consistent with funding frameworks and UN 
operational frameworks. UN early recovery capacity is mandated under UNDP, who lead 
the early recovery cluster.  A select few agencies undertake what is deemed a ‘multi-
mandate’ that consists of both relief and recovery programming from the beginning of a 
response. These include agencies such as: Mercy corps, ACF, Oxfam and Solidarités. IFRC 
and other Red Cross Societies are operationally set up to think long-term from the start, to 
support the national Red Cross Society’s capacity to respond and then undertake handover 
processes. They also, have a wealth of contextual knowledge that they can immediately tap 
into. Therefore, the Federation and other Red Cross societies are set up to respond to 
context specific needs, build up essential capacities and develop programmes that support 
recovery (IFRC 2012). 
 
There are many agencies that do not undertake or conceptualise programmes of recovery 
and/or rehabilitation, due to the belief that these activities are the sole responsibility of 
national capacities and are under the operational and funding realms of developmental 
programmes. However, as noted in previous sections a significant operational gap exists 
between relief, recovery and development and there is no coherence seen between these 
programmes. This indicates that the current paradigm towards the separation of relief, 
recovery and rehabilitation activities needs to be revised. 
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OCHAs definition of early recovery: 
 
‘Early recovery is a multi-dimensional process of recovery that begins in a humanitarian 
setting. It is guided by development principles that seek to build on humanitarian 
programming and catalyze sustainable development opportunities. It aims to generate self-
sustaining, nationally owned, resilient processes for post-crisis recovery. It encompasses the 
restoration of basic services, livelihoods, shelter, governance, security and rule of law, 
environment and social dimensions, including the reintegration of displaced populations’. 
            (OCHA 2011) 
 
Understanding the objectives to obtain early recovery within this definition shows some 
complex processes that need early conceptualisation within response operations, to enable 
such processes to be catalyzed.  
 
To develop national ownership the humanitarian community needs to ensure the host 
government is involved in the coordination, planning and implementation of response 
activities from the start. To ensure self-sustaining services you need to consider the context, 
implement demand-led programmes, develop community participation, and support and 
develop national and local operational capacity (Tearfund 2012). Restoring shelter beyond 
that of temporary options, takes strategic considerations and longer-term planning from the 
outset, to ensure resources are channeled effectively and legal and administrative concerns 
can be dealt with. Restoring social dimensions, such as the reintegration of displaced 
populations, requires an in-depth knowledge of the affected society and a knowledge of 
legal and administrative dimensions, such as land ownership. Many of these processes are 
lacking or non-existent in humanitarian programming. To ensure recovery objectives are 
achieved, there is an obvious need for different types of assessment, the development of 
strategic capacity, technical knowledge and funding options to support these types of 
initiatives. 
 
Governments and international agencies are looking to link relief, recovery and 
development (DEC 2001; Lloyd-Jones 2006; ALNAP 2008). Developing effective relief 
operations that fosters an environment for the effective implementation of recovery 
activities, will enable the essential social, physical and economic infrastructure needed to 
enhance the resilience of the exposed population, stimulating a rapid recovery, reducing an 
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affected population’s risk to future disasters.  
 
Programmatic aspects discussed in this Chapter has presented some fundamental 
components in ascertaining effective recovery. The subsequent section, further dissects 
these fundamental components within a real-life post-disaster context of Haiti’s 2010 
earthquake, giving an example of the deficiencies produced through current humanitarian 
approaches. 
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2.5 Case Study Background: Haiti Earthquake 2010 
This section has been included, firstly, to present a real-life post-disaster context to 
highlight some key deficiencies experienced in recovery, gauging their link to outcomes of 
humanitarian operations. Secondly, to present a background for the in-depth case study 
utilised within this research thesis. It will begin by assessing Haiti’s experienced recovery 
deficit, highlighting the issues and potential reasons for its occurrence. Then it will assess 
Haiti’s pre-earthquake conditions, to take into consideration these features when evaluating 
the damage that occurred, as a result of the earthquake. 
 
 
 
      
   
    
2.5.1 Haiti’s Recovery Deficit 
In January 2010, a magnitude 6.9 earthquake struck the South and South West of Haiti 
concentrated impacts were felt in the Capital Port-au-Prince, Jacqmel and Leogane. The 
earthquake claimed over 220,000 (UN-DESA 2010) and left 1.5 million homeless (IFRC 
2010). 
 
Figure 2.5 Presents the island nation of Haiti in the Caribbean, detailing the epicenter of the 
earthquake and its intensity and proximity to the capital Port-au-Prince. [Source: 
www.coolgeography.co.uk] 
50 
    
In response to this disaster a huge humanitarian response was received by Haiti, where 
thousands of INGO flooded into the capital of PaP, with the aim to provide relief to the 
millions of affected people (ALNAP 2011a). The 1.5 million homeless found shelter within 
the thousands of IDP camps and makeshift camps set up in and around PaP, 4 million 
received food and assistant, 1.2 million received water and 1 million benefited from Cash-
for-Work (CfW) programmes (Homes 2010). This humanitarian response achieved its 
immediate objectives, providing support to basic critical needs. However, sustaining this 
relief in the face of a failed transition to any form of effective recovery has deemed this 
response a failure (ALNAP 2010). 
 
Significant amounts of financial support was provided to Haiti following the 2010 
earthquake, with the United Nations contributing US$1.44 billion from a flash appeal, the 
World Bank and the IMF sent US$894 million in emergency assistance and committed 
another US$1.2 billion (UN-DESA 2010). Donors pledged a total of US$9.9 billion, of 
which US$5.3 billion was pledged over two years (against the requested US$3.9 million) in 
support of the Haitian government’s Action Plan for National Recovery and Development 
(ALNAP 2010). 
 
There were delays in the disbursement of funds, which was in part due to the lack of a 
functioning government, caused by the delay in the 2010 presidential election. The original 
election was to take place on the 28th February 2010, but was postponed until 28th 
November 2010, to which the run-off and eventual announcement of the new president, 
Michel Martelly, on the 5th April 2011 (Guardian 2010). Thus, this delay seriously hindered 
the ability of the government to make the crucial decisions needed to support an effective 
transition to a sustainable recovery process. 
 
The post-disaster needs assessment conducted by UN-DESA suggests that at least US$11.5 
billion would be needed for reconstruction. There was sufficient foreign assistance 
mobilised for reconstruction and sustainable development, but managing this influx of 
resources was a huge challenge for the new Haitian government, as they lacked the capacity 
to utilise this assistance (UN-DESA 2010).  
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An outcome of this complex emergency was a protracted relief situation that persisted for 
over 2 years. This consequently, hindered the process of effective recovery. Crucial failings 
within this response have been noted: 
 A severe lack of coordination within the humanitarian community and with the 
government and other local structures and organisations (Fiscale 2011). 
 The lack of accountability to the Haitian government, found state actors struggling 
to get answers from donors and agencies working in Haiti about where money was 
being spent (ALNAP 2011a).  
 A serious leadership gap across the sector - Clusters formed rapidly, enabling a 
certain amount of activity to be achieved, however, it was felt that they could have 
been more effective (Fiscale 2011). Coordination problems encountered included: 
the large number of organisations active on the ground, making meetings 
unproductive with a focus on information sharing rather than coordination. It was 
also evident that many organisations lacked the professionalism and capacity to 
carry out effective work (Holmes 2011). 
 There was a lack of Haitian involvement - the humanitarian community did not 
conceive the capacities of local civil society and did not listen closely enough to the 
affected (Holmes 2010). This led to misjudgment about what was needed and 
consequently, errors in the overall strategy.  
 
The vulnerable state the nation found itself in allowed for an epidemic of cholera to become 
the second disaster experienced by Haiti in the same year, with more than 300,000 people 
being hospitalised and leaving over 7000 dead (Humanitarian Response 2012). The camp 
model introduced in this emergency attracted huge numbers of people, with many coming to 
access the aid and provisions in the camp, even if they were not in need of shelter (IFRC 
2011). This booming camp population created densely populated tent cities that were not 
adequately serviced, particularly with water and sanitation facilities (DEC 2011a). 
Establishing immediate and sustainable WASH services in and around the camps could 
have stemmed the outbreak of cholera by reducing the transmission of the disease. Instead 
huge camp populations were left with little provision and as a result many lives were unduly 
lost. 
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Haitian vulnerability and future resilience needs to be addressed to ensure that the thousands 
of camps do not develop into permanent urban slum areas that will have little or no access 
to basic amenities. This possible eventuality means a population of several million will be at 
high risk from impacts of disasters with high mortality rates and a cycle of disaster that will 
never be broken. Ultimately hindering any potential for sustainable development and the 
alleviation of poverty, that is so severely felt in Haiti. 
 
2.5.2 Pre-Earthquake Conditions  
Haiti has a clear designation of a fragile state; with public institutions functioning at gross 
inefficiency, prior to the disaster, with less than half the population provided with basic 
services, like electricity, water and sanitation (UN-DESA 2010). The capital PaP before the 
earthquake was a crowded urban settlement, plagued by widespread poverty and social 
inequality with 86% of urban residents living in slums (Oxfam 2011). Confidence in the 
government was low and there is a long history of civil strife and security issues. The UN 
has intervened in Haiti’s political activities, to restore order and security, since the early 
1990s (UN-DESA 2010). 
 
Corrupt and ineffective governance in Haiti, has ensured the country has been unable to 
develop sufficiently to end the poverty so extensively felt in Haiti. Haiti still remains the 
least developed country in the northern hemisphere (ALNAP 2010).  
 
The Haitian capital, PaP, has suffered rapid urbanisation in the last 20 years with a quarter 
of the 10.2 million population living in the city (ALNAP 2010).  Before the 2010 
earthquake over 800,000 people were living in urban slums, with the largest, City Solei, 
housing between 200,000-300,000 (Pinera 2007). The annual national growth rate is 1.5%. 
However, in urban centers it is 6% (ALNAP 2010), these centers have doubled since 1982 
and has resulted in a high density, vulnerable population, often living in appalling 
conditions (ALNAP 2010). Life expectancy in Haiti is 61 years and the level of literacy 
seen in the country only covers 37.9% of the population (ALNAP 2010). 
 
Port-au-Prince has a long history of corruption, state violence and organised violent crime 
and widespread poverty. Along with a weak civil society, this has meant there were few 
local institutions or resources (Pelling 2010). High prices have to be paid for public goods, 
due to the privatisation of the health, education, transport and water sectors (ALNAP 2010). 
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This has left the most vulnerable people largely un-served with even the most basic of 
services.  Haiti has been shown to be one of the only countries in the world where improved 
access to water and sanitation has decreased in recent years; with only 17% of the 
population gaining access to improved sanitation and 63% to improved water sources 
(WHO/UNICEF 2010). 
 
Before the earthquake the majority of the urban population depended on trucked water and 
purchased bottled water, with 63% having regular access. GRET, who is a professional 
solidarity and international cooperation association, rehabilitated water and sanitation 
services (WSS) throughout PaP from 1995-2005 (Pinera 2007). The government’s dedicated 
water and sanitation ministry, DINEPA (Direction Nationale de l'Eau Potable et de 
l'Assainissement), used GRET’s model to frame the reforms of its domestic water supply 
policy (Pinera 2007). With highly privatised services, provided by a small and fragmented 
private sector, that is suspicious of the public sector and vice versa and with the low 
capacity of NGOs, has left the WASH sector struggling to meet the basic needs of this 
largely vulnerable Haitian society. CAMEP (Centrale Autonome Métropolitaine d'Eau 
Potable), who are in charge of billing for water use, stated they were unable to cope due to 
there being a virtual absence of government in last 20 years (Pinera 2007).  
 
Along with an extreme lack of public services, the urban center of PaP is exposed to 
hurricanes and tropical storms with a large number of residences living on steep ravines and 
hill slopes. In the past 20 years, Haiti has experienced 50 so-called ‘natural disasters’. The 
frequency of such disasters (e.g. droughts, storms and floods) increased 2.5 times between 
1970-1989 and 1990-2009, whilst the number of fatalities per disaster climbed 5 times (refer 
to Figure 2.6, pg. 54) (UN-DESA 2010). Since the earthquake in January 2010, Haiti’s 
institutions and administrative capacities have been further eroded by the destruction of 
public registries, infrastructure and by the significant loss of human capital (UN-DESA 
2010). The Haitian government lost much of its operating capacity; 13 of 15 ministry 
offices were destroyed, and one-third of Haiti’s 60,000 civil servants died (Oxfam 2010). 
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Figure 2.6 Graph detailing the relative increase in frequency of disasters experienced 
in Haiti compared with the fatalities per disaster. [Source: UN-DESA 2010] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The extent of damage wreaked by the earthquake was highly determined by the extent of 
poverty, exclusion, inequality, and inappropriate political decisions and actions. Therefore, 
it can be understood that social conditions increased people's vulnerability to this disaster 
and has made recovery more difficult.  
 
As stated in sub-section 2.1.2, in low resilience societies disaster impacts will be 
experienced at a greater scale and these societies will also have less tools for recovery. If an 
international humanitarian operation is launched within this affected country, ensuring that 
society has the ability to survive and recover rapidly is fundamental.  If resilience measures 
are not set in motion at crucial points in the ‘relief phase’, then recovery will be prolonged, 
leading to a fragile state that is prone to future impacts of disasters, costing many lives and a 
huge unnecessary financial burden (O’Donnell et al. 2009). It is clear from the literature and 
within practice that building resilience within the post-disaster environment is key for 
recovery and to proactively ensure affected, vulnerable populations build resilience against 
future disaster. Understanding this crucial link guides the need to further understand 
resilience conceptually and how it could look within the humanitarian sphere. The following 
section looks to assess current resilience frameworks and begin to gauge resilience within 
the humanitarian context. 
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2.6 Resilience 
Resilience is a concept that needs clarifying conceptually and practically. This thesis aims to 
gain specific clarity of resilience in post-disaster environments, which is necessary to gauge 
its potential and importance for stimulating recovery and how it can be supported through 
humanitarian operations. This section, firstly, dissects all current resilience frameworks that 
have been developed, to conceptually explain resilience in society. Secondly, offers a 
synthesis that begins to gauge how these current frameworks can conceptually inform 
further investigation into resilience in the humanitarian sphere. Lastly, the literature will be 
assessed to gain further insight into the potential for resilience in the humanitarian sphere to 
stimulate recovery.  
 
The concept of resilience may have the ability to offer the basis for increased coherence 
between relief, recovery and development, suggesting the need to better understand 
resilience as a concept and in its potential application in the humanitarian sphere. This could 
see a need for a new conversation about the practical application of humanitarian principles 
(ALNAP 2012b).  
 
Attempts have been made to define and clarify the concept of resilience, developing 
characteristics and frameworks (Twigg 2007; Maguire and Cartwright 2008; Bahardur et al. 
2010; DFID 2011a; Mitchell and Harris 2012, Mayunga 2007; Cutter et al. 2008, Longstaff 
et al. 2009). It can be seen that there is a lack of consensus and, therefore, a common model 
has not been achieved. This occurrence indicates the complex, multi-faceted nature of 
resilience, as well as our current limited ability to translate this concept into operational 
outputs. The limitation of not having a common definition hinders agencies and donors 
ability to determine how resilience fits into their current practice, e.g. deciding what 
agencies and departments are responsible for resilience, how budget needs to be defined and 
what programming can be classified as ‘resilience’ (Levine 2012). Therefore, the question 
remains whether an analytical framework can be viably used to base the foundations of 
standard programming guidance, policy and the determination of indicators (Mitchell and 
Harris 2012). More practical case studies looking at community and operational dynamics 
in emergency response, could offer the insight needed to gauge the dimensions of 
‘resilience’ and translate it into practical resilience building initiatives that can be 
effectively integrated into emergency response programming. 
56 
    
2.6.1 The Concept of Resilience 
There have been attempts to define what resilience is through an approach that addresses the 
question ‘what makes something resilient’, this has been done by identifying characteristics 
and components of resilience (Twigg 2006; Bahadur et al. 2011). Bahadur et al. (2011) 
reviewed 16 different understandings of resilience from social and ecological systems and 
compiled 10 common characteristics from resilience frameworks (Bahadur 2011) (refer to 
Box 2.3, pg. 56). John Twigg, used the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) to identify 
some components and characteristics of resilient communities (refer to Figure 2.7, pg. 58) 
(Twigg 2009). The characteristics compiled by Bahadur et al. are viewed as an analytical 
framework that has been commonly used in other developed frameworks. 
 
These characteristics show some of the fundamental attributes to a resilient system, i.e. that 
they have a high degree of diversity and equity, characteristics of resilient 
communities/countries, i.e. good governance and effective institutions, and of how aid 
agencies could build resilience through programming, i.e. that resilience programming 
involves participation and is based on local knowledge. Some of these characteristics are 
already principles of development and humanitarian programming, e.g. designing assistance 
in a participatory manner (Levine 2012).  
Box 2.3 Bahadur’s 10 common characteristics of resilience frameworks 
 
1. A high level of diversity (e.g. availability of economic opportunities, voices included in 
a resilience building policy process, the natural resources on which communities rely). 
2. Effective governance and institutions, which may enhance community cohesion.  
3. Acceptance of uncertainty and change. 
4. There is community involvement and the appropriation of local knowledge in any 
resilience building projects. 
5. Preparedness activities aim not at resisting change but preparing to live with it by 
building in redundancy within systems or by incorporating failure scenarios in planning. 
6. A high degree of social and economic equity exists in systems; resilience programmes 
consider issues of justice and equity when distributing risks within communities. 
7. The importance of social values and structures is acknowledged  
8. The non-equilibrium dynamics of a system are acknowledged.  
9. Continual and effective learning is important.  
10. Resilience is built through social, political, economic and cultural networks that reach 
from the local to the global scale. 
 [Source: Bahadur et al. 2011] 
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Cimellaro (2010) defines resilience in 3 ways; a generalised definition, a recovery specific 
definition and a definition of a disaster resilient community; 
 Definition 1. Resilience is defined as a function indicating the capability to sustain a 
level of functionality or performance for a given building, bridge, lifeline networks, 
or community, over a period defined as the control time that is usually decided by 
owners, or society (usually is the life cycle, life span of the system etc.). 
 Definition 2. The recovery time is the period necessary to restore the functionality of a 
structure, an infrastructure system (water supply, electric power, hospital building, 
etc.) or a community, to a desired level that can operate or function the same, close 
to, or better than the original one. 
 Definition 3. Disaster resilient community is a community that can withstand an 
extreme event, natural or manmade, with a tolerable level of losses, and is able to 
take mitigation actions consistent with achieving that level of protection. 
 
Resilience theory offers insight into behavior of complex systems and the importance of 
such system attributes, as diversity, ability to self organise, system memory, hierarchical 
structure feedback systems and non-linear processes (Carpenter et al. 2001; Holling 2001 
Cummings et al. 2005). 
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2.6.2 Resilience Frameworks 
The development and use of frameworks has allowed the presentation of the operation of 
resilience for empirical study (Cumming et al. 2005). There have been many frameworks 
developed in an attempt to further understand the complex, multi-faceted nature of 
resilience. These are inclusive of:  
 Tobin’s, Structural-cognitive model (1999), which explored structural changes, 
situational and cognitive factors. 
 Paton and Johnson’s, Model of resilience to hazardous events (2001), taking a 
disasters and communities perspective, attempting to understand the links between 
vulnerability, resilience and preparedness. 
Figure 2.7 Twigg’s Components of resilience. [Source: Twigg 2009] 
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 Gunderson and Holling’s, Panarchy framework (2001), which attempts to 
understand resilience in a multi-dimensional perspective, taking account of temporal 
and special considerations. 
 Cumming’s, exploratory framework (2005), which aims to understand links between 
social and ecological systems and the concept of social-ecological resilience. 
 Cutter’s, A place based model (DROP) (2008), which looks specifically at 
community resilience to natural disasters. 
 Maguire and Cartwright’s, Resilience conceptual framework (2008), which attempts 
to understand the relationship between resilience, vulnerability and adaptive 
capacity. 
 DFID’s, Resilience conceptual framework (2011), a framework exploring the 
concept of resilience and the elements that determines capacities to deal with shocks 
and disturbances. 
 Practical Action’s, Vulnerability to resilience framework (2011).  
 
The attributes and progressional thought in the development of these different frameworks 
are discussed below. 
 
Structural-cognitive model (Tobin 1999) 
The approach taken here is primarily an ecological one, utilising aspects of the socio-
political ideas put forward by Bates and Pelanda (1994), and the political-economy and 
human ecology approach outlined by Hewitt (1983) (Tobin 1999). Structural-functional 
views, conflict theory, competition for resources, and other geo-sociological and 
anthropological principles are raised here as possible frameworks in understanding 
community resilience. This model highlights internal (i.e. structural, situational and 
cognitive factors) and external influences (i.e. mitigation and recovery) on overall 
structural-functional characteristics of resilience. It is interesting to note this model includes 
factors experienced in the post-disaster environment and holds value on the interventions 
offered in humanitarian assistance (refer to Figure 2.8, pg. 60). 
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A model of resilience to hazardous events (Paton and Johnston 2001) 
This model looks specifically at risk perception and its resulting effect on social and 
psychological factors that are attributed to resilience in disasters. Social and psychological 
factors are fundamental in the conceptualisation of individual and community resilience, but 
are factors that are not encompassed in later models. These factors are crucial when 
developing schemes to build in community preparedness, as well as considering resilience 
building initiatives in humanitarian responses. This indicates that the lack of consideration 
in later models could highlight a missing link in the holistic conceptualisation of resilience, 
which is necessary to effectively operationalise resilience. 
 
From a social and psychological perspective, resilience is a function of the operation of 
personal characteristics, the ability to impose a sense of coherence and meaning on atypical 
and adverse experiences, and the existence of community practices, e.g. supportive social 
Figure 2.8 Structural-cognitive model. [Source: Tobin 1999] 
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networks, which mitigate adverse consequences and maximise potential for recovery and 
growth (Violanti et al. 2000).  
 
The model links risk perception and risk reducing behaviour. While perception of a threat 
remains a pertinent precursor, the key factors are action-outcome expectancies (i.e. 
consideration of whether risk may be reduced) and self- efficacy judgments (i.e. whether the 
required actions are within the capabilities of the individual). Because people make 
assumptions about the possible consequences of action before considering engaging in that 
behaviour, action-outcome expectancies precede efficacy judgments (Paton and Johnston 
2001). Studies of response to hazard effects by Bishop et al. (2000) and Millar et al. (1999) 
revealed that the above factors enhanced resilience (refer to Figure 2.9, pg. 61). 
 
The Panarchy framework (Gunderson and Holling 2001)  
The Panarchy framework looks at the links between human and natural systems, with an 
attempt to understand these components in temporal and special dimensions. The model has 
developed a hierarchical structure, where natural systems and human systems are linked in 
non-stop adaptive cycles of growth, accumulation, restructuring, and renewal. These cycles 
occur in nested sets of ecological, temporal, and spatial resolutions and most occupy 
Figure 2.9 A model of resilience to hazardous events. [Source: Paton and Johnston 2001] 
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discrete niches in space or time. Within the model, structures and processes are also linked 
across scales. It is argued that the dynamics of a system at one particular scale of interest 
cannot be fully understood in lieu of accounting for the dynamics of other cross-scalar and 
hierarchical influences within the system. The model embodies the idea that to foster 
resilience and sustainability within a system, an understanding of adaptive cycles within the 
coupled human–environmental system, and the scale at which they occur is necessary (refer 
to Figure 2.10, pg. 62). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Exploratory framework (Cumming et al. 2005) 
Cumming’s framework encompasses social/ecological interaction, but also accounts for the 
importance of temporal and spatial factors. What Cumming does, is try to elaborate on the 
identity of the system of resilience. Equating resilience with the ability of a system to 
maintain its identity, where system identity is defined as a property of key components and 
relationships (networks) and their connectivity in time and space.  
 
Figure 2.10 The Panarchy framework [Source: Gunderson and Holling 2001] 
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Cumming recognises that when a system is under stress you begin to see specific variables 
that are relevant to resilience. This is done by assessing the potential for change under 
specific drivers and perturbations. This in combination with a scenario based approach to 
consider alternative futures, obtains a surrogate measure of the current resilience of the 
system. Consequently, yielding insights into mechanisms of change and potential 
consequences of different policies and management decisions (refer to Figure 2.11, pg. 63). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Place-based model (DROP) (Cutter 2008) 
The disaster resilience of place model (DROP) has been designed to improve the 
comparative assessments of disaster resilience at the local or community level. The 
framework aims to capture disparities between levels of resilience and vulnerability in 
Figure 2.11 An Exploratory framework. [Source: Cumming et al. 2005] 
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communities that could result in different rates of recovery. Focusing on the place and the 
spatial interactions amongst the social system, built environment and natural processes. 
 
Natural systems, social systems, and the built environment are interconnected and human 
actions impact the state of the environment. In turn, a degraded environment provides less 
protection against hazards. Thus, the DROP model presents resilience as both an inherent or 
antecedent condition and a process. The antecedent conditions can be viewed as a snapshot 
in time or as a static state, yet the post-event processes embedded within the model allow 
the conceptualisation to also be dynamic (Cutter 2008) (refer to Figure 2.12, pg. 64). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The model sees the conditions that define resilience are dynamic and ultimately change with 
differences in spatial, social, and temporal scales. Adaptive resilience can see social 
learning and improvisation occur at a social scale; at a temporal scale, a society deemed 
resilient to short-term environmental hazards, such as severe weather, due to mitigation 
measures, may not be resilience to long-term hazards, such as climate change. These factors 
are crucial when considering the variables and parameters to be used as indicators of 
‘resilience’ post-disaster.  
Figure 2.12 A schematic representation of a disaster resilience of place (DROP) model. [Source: 
Cutter 2008] 
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A Resilience conceptual framework (Maguire and Cartwright 2008) 
Maguire and Cartwright see community resilience as the ability of a community to respond 
to a change adaptively and that a community’s resilience is shaped by its vulnerabilities, 
resources and adaptive capacities. The model attempts to conceptualise the relationship 
between vulnerability, adaptive capacity and resistance to determine a model of resilience 
(refer to Figure 2.13, pg. 65). 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The ‘deficit model’ on the left hand side of Figure 2.13 (refer to pg. 65) is outcome oriented, 
in that it focuses on research questions, such as who is vulnerable? And what are they 
vulnerable to? This approach sees vulnerability as a deterministic state (i.e. where a 
community is assessed as ‘more vulnerable’ or ‘less vulnerable’). External interventions are 
then applied to attempt to reduce this vulnerability. 
 
The resilience conceptual framework, on the right hand side of the diagram, sees resilience 
as a function that has an inherent ability to evolve and transform a community’s state of 
Figure 2.13 A conceptual framework of resilience, vulnerability and adaptive capacity. [Source: 
Maguire and Cartwright 2008] 
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living, adapting to better suit the new environment, rather than simply returning to a pre-
existing state. The model looks at 4 components: 
 Vulnerabilities - a component, which may weaken a community’s ability to 
respond adaptively to a change.  
 Resources - are the strengths and abilities of a community to enable it to 
overcome its vulnerabilities and to respond adaptively to change.  
 Adaptive capacity - is ‘the ability or capability of a system to modify or change 
its characteristics or behaviour to cope better with actual or anticipated stresses’ 
(Brooks and Adger 2003). 
 External processes - such as the broader political, economic, and physical 
environment, influence a community’s response to change, as well as its internal 
vulnerabilities and resources, and the way in which these are translated into 
adaptive action. 
 
The response that a community demonstrates to a change, has a certain degree of resilience 
and is driven by its ability to build on its resources and adaptive capacity, translating these 
into adaptation. This resilience model is dynamic and context-dependent; the ways in which 
these processes occur will vary between communities and within the same community in 
response to different types of change (Brooks 2003). 
 
Resilience conceptual framework (DFID 2011) 
DFID’s framework has been developed to portray the concept of resilience and the elements 
that determine capacities to deal with shocks and disturbances. The framework shows that 
when a household or community is ‘disturbed’ (e.g. experience a natural disaster) the model 
describes the ability to deal with the stress or shock, is a function of exposure, sensitivity 
and adaptive capacity. The more exposed and sensitive something is to the shock, the more 
likely it is to experience the shock and the more severe the negative impacts will be; the 
stronger the capacity and ability to deal with the disturbance, the better the outcome. 
 
This framework seems one dimensional and linear in its conceptualisation. The framework 
does not indicate the specific categories of context information to be considered (e.g. 
historical context, markets, power dynamics, livelihood groups etc.), which leaves room for 
the user to interpret what information is most useful. Different factors of influence are not 
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identified specifically for a community, household or individual, thus, not separating the 
different dynamics and key factors that influences their state of resilience. The model also 
doesn’t factor in the cyclical and parallel dynamics of shocks, what makes people resilient 
to one shock might not make them resilient to another, deeming the proposed outcome 
invalid (refer to 2.14, pg. 67). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Vulnerability to resilience framework (Practical Action 2011) 
Practical Action has developed a framework, which is practical in its application in 
programmes. Practical Action, has used this framework as a basis for its programming in 
Darfur (Pasteur 2011). The framework includes some characteristics of resilience (e.g. 
decentralised and participatory decision-making, diversified livelihoods etc.), as well as 
programming objectives (e.g. improving understanding of trends and their local impacts). 
Unlike other resilience frameworks, this one considers resilience through a livelihoods lens, 
a fundamental programmatic element that is consistent with economic opportunity. 
Opportunities, which open up access to financial resources, and to potential accumulated 
assets that an individual or HH can tap into in a time of crisis (refer to Figure 2.15, pg. 70). 
 Figure 2.14 A resilience conceptual framework. [Source: DFID 2011] 
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Summary of the current scope of resilience frameworks 
Assessing the array of resilience frameworks that have been developed, has enabled an 
understanding of the extent this topic has been explored conceptually. Gaining a 
comprehension of its complexity, its potential and its limits.  
 
It is clear there is further need for conceptual clarity on the issue of resilience, due to its 
complex nature. The progressional development of theory surrounding resilience, sees its 
concept faceted into different dimensions. The concept has been explored within cognitive 
(Tobin 1999), temporal and spacial (Gunderson and Holling 2001) and socio-ecologic 
(Cumming 2005) realms, along with its relationship with vulnerability and preparedness 
(Paton and Johnson 2001; Practical Action 2011), and with its relationship with adaptive 
capacity after a disaster event (Cutter et al. 2008; Maguire and Cartwright 2008; DFID 
2011).   
 
Later frameworks begin to explore the practical implications of resilience within a 
development (Practical Action 2011) and humanitarian context (Cutter et al. 2008; Maguire 
and Cartwright 2008; DFID 2011); recognising the need to proactively consider resilience 
within programming to gain required outcomes. From Practical Action’s framework it is 
clear the idea of resilience has been progressively explored within the development context, 
enabling precise programmatic approaches to be developed. This progression within the 
development sector can also be seen through tools that are currently available, such as 
political economy analysis, vulnerability analysis and sustainable livelihoods framework. 
Tools developed to help inform programmatic decisions in this area. However, resilience in 
the humanitarian sphere has been significantly less developed, which is apparent within the 
latest frameworks to be presented on resilience within the post-disaster context. Cutter 
(2008) and Maguire and Cartwright (2008) make crucial conceptual links between prior 
resilience and the level of absorptive capacity affected populations would have post-event, 
also how adaptive capacity can be increased through response interventions to increase 
potential recovery and future resilience. However, no clarity has been found in terms of how 
response interventions can practically increase adaptive capacity of affected populations and 
to date no sector wide tools have been produced. This current deficiency is clearly presented 
within DFID’s 2011 framework, which is one dimensional and linear in its 
conceptualisation. Firstly, the framework does not take into account many of the 
complexities of a realistic post-disaster context. Secondly, the framework does not have the 
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ability to offer guidance or act as a building block to practically develop response 
programming.  Through the literature it becomes clear that there is an obvious gap in 
knowledge surrounding how to practically support adaptive capacity post-disaster to ensure 
prior weak resilience doesn’t hinder potential recovery.  
 
The concept of resilience has gained currency in the last few years. However, as 
demonstrated there is a void of knowledge when concerning resilience outside of the 
developmental arena, particularly in post-disaster contexts. There is an absence of 
substantiated conceptual dimensions, lacking the clarity of definition, substance, and most 
importantly, its practical application in disaster response interventions. 
 
The next sub-section explores the concept of resilience in the humanitarian sphere in more 
detail, clarifying some key attributes resilience building would have if taken into account 
within post-disaster settings, highlighting fundamental gaps in programmatic knowledge to 
support a resilience building approach.  
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Figure 2.15  A vulnerability to resilience framework. [Source: Pasteur 2011] 
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2.6.3 Post-Disaster Resilience 
Assessing current comprehension of resilience theory, has indicated that there is a gap in 
knowledge, in terms of how to practically implement programmes within emergency 
response that are able to encourage resilience building, which would develop the adaptive 
capacity of affected populations. These two following sub-sections begin to underline the 
relationship between resilience and the post-disaster context; utilising the post-disaster 
context of Haiti to gauge potential resilience building opportunities and how they could 
have played a role in recovery. 
 
Resilience is intrinsically linked with humanitarian assistance, whether it would be in a 
supportive manner, i.e. increasing peoples’ ability to cope in a crisis, as it is a source of 
support people might access; through its influence on an affected persons strategic decision-
making, i.e. the timeliness, effectiveness, predictability and duration of aid might affect the 
level of debt people take on; whether they sell or replace assets; or if it hinders potential 
resilience, i.e. through undermining national and local authority, local economics and 
livelihood opportunities, or through changing settlement patterns (Levine 2012). 
Humanitarian assistance is not the only resource in a crisis, however, it can heavily 
influence the resilience status of an affected community. Therefore, it needs to be evaluated 
and become apart of the discussion of resilience.  
 
Resilience could also bring attention to the need for assistance in protracted and recurrent 
crises to take a longer-term view. In 2009, 70% of humanitarian funding went to countries 
that were long-term recipients of humanitarian aid (Development Initiatives 2011). Funding 
cycles are typically 1 -1.5 years, and the model of using short-term tools in humanitarian aid 
to address prolonged humanitarian crises has serious limitations (Levine 2012). Resilience 
could bring more emphasis on the importance of programming to take a long-term view of 
issues such as, food security, threats to livelihoods and sustainable service provision.  
 
In order to approach the evaluation of resilience and potential resilience building initiatives 
in humanitarian programming, current conceptual theory put forward to understand 
resilience, including characteristics and frameworks, needs to be further developed and 
better understood in the post-disaster context. A more thorough conception of the context 
and the influence of different types of humanitarian intervention need to be explored and 
how agencies can be better equipped when entering a response to evaluate individual 
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contexts. In order to effectively plan interventions that either, specifically build resilience or 
are mindful of it. 
 
Without this depth of knowledge, what is considered a resilience building initiative could be 
fundamentally misguided, consequently, leading to failed programmatic attempts. 
Successful implementation of resilience building initiatives in humanitarian responses has 
the potential to increase the effectiveness of humanitarian assistance, recovery, risk 
reduction, longer-term development and for the development of much needed coherence 
between these sectors. Therefore, it is crucial to fully comprehend what post-disaster 
resilience really means and how to successfully develop and implement resilience building 
initiatives in humanitarian programming. 
 
2.6.4 How is individual/household level resilience defined in the post-disaster 
environment 
 
Post-disaster resilience can be summarised from the literature, as essentially looking at 
adaptive resilience, which is described in Cutter’s DROP model. Individuals/HHs will 
possess a level of ‘resilience’ before a disaster that will stem from their access to resources, 
such as assets, services, financial and their strength of relationships with friends and family, 
local authority and civil society (Bosher 2004). This existing level of resilience ascribes the 
level of absorptive capacity made available to that individual/HH in the event of a disaster. 
Consequently, this absorptive capacity determines the level of perturbation experienced, as 
well as the capacity available to recover/return to a state of functionality, i.e. adaptive 
resilience (refer to Figure 2.16, pg. 73). Adaptive resilience is the term given to an 
individual’s/HH’s level of resilience expressed in a crisis event (Cutter et al. 2008) and the 
modality that humanitarian response can support and develop. 
 
In post-disaster contexts, understanding and supporting individuals/HHs adaptive resilience, 
would ensure former weak resilience would not hinder their ability to recover. It would also 
build in resilience for the future, strengthening absorptive capacity and the ability to manage 
their own recovery.  
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Essential components of resilience as described in the literature sees 5 essential components 
(Bosher 2004):  
 
1. Access to assets 
Asset ownership, such as a house, transportation or tools forms a level of 
security and capital for potential recovery.  
2. Access to basic services 
Services, such as water, sanitation and health care, are vital for survival and 
maintenance of health. Adequate provision also means time spent on ensuring 
these vital activities is limited, freeing up time for more productive pursuits, such 
as livelihood activities. 
3. Economic opportunities 
Proactively encouraging livelihood opportunities and market development will 
foster local economic recovery, stimulating the rehabilitation of local services 
and amenities. It will also allow individuals and HHs to raise essential capital to 
manage their own recovery. 
 
 
Figure 2.16 A schematic diagram of post-disaster adaptive resilience and necessary humanitarian 
support to increase level of potential recovery (adapted from Cutter’s DROP model). [Source: Cutter 
2008] 
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4. Access to legal and financial services, i.e. loans, grants. 
Access to cash in a crisis can be fundamental to securing accommodation, 
starting up business’ and offer an opportunity for individuals/HHs to manage 
their own recovery. 
5. Strong social and political networks 
Supportive social networks, such as friends, family and community members, 
help mitigate adverse consequences and maximise potential recovery. Political 
connections, i.e. access to local government, civil organisations and international 
organisations provide essential support, information and guidance. 
 
Supporting these components through emergency response programming will inherently 
allow recovery to take place and a resilient society to develop, which will ultimately break 
the cycle of disaster many countries continually face (refer to Figure 2.17, pg. 75) 
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Many current models of humanitarian intervention, unfortunately, do not employ an 
approach that encompasses resilience building at this crucial time. Instead, they are set up 
institutionally to respond solely to basic survival needs, i.e. shelter, food and water. In some 
instances this one-dimensional approach has the adverse affect on ‘potential recovery’ and 
the building of resilience within an affected society, e.g. aid dependency, market disruption 
and weakened national entities (HPN 2001). The approach fundamental to the humanitarian 
Figure 2.17 Demonstrates the relationship between adaptive resilience and recovery 
within an operational perspective. 
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intervention divides responsibility for survival and recovery. The current disaster 
management model that represents this continuum presupposes that relief needs, i.e. shelter, 
food, water etc., and recovery dynamics operate at distinct stages along a post-disaster 
timeline, not conceptualising the idea that relief and recovery needs both may begin 
simultaneously from day one (Figure 2.3 and 2.4, pg. 13 and 14 respectively). The 
simplicity of this current response approach has evolved to ensure a rapid and manageable 
response by the international community, however, intrinsically this approach is unable to 
meet or respond to the natural complexities within often volatile post-disaster contexts, 
seeing an approach that is counter intuitive to the environment it operates in and 
consequently will be fraught with issues.   
 
2.6.4 Could Resilience Building Have Played a Role in Recovery In Haiti? 
Following the introduction of this case study in section 2.5, that looked to understand the 
recovery deficit felt within the response period and to consider what the main features were 
that resulted in the noted deficit. This sub-section takes the case study background further, 
to begin to comprehend resilience in the post-disaster environment. The sub-section briefly 
assesses the post-disaster context of Haiti, considering the international response that was 
undertaken, as well as highlighting potential areas where resilience could have been 
stimulated, understanding its role in potential recovery. 
 
In the months before the January 2010 earthquake, Haiti’s social and economic prospects 
were starting to look somewhat brighter. After years of political turmoil, the country was 
entering a new phase of relative stability (CAFOD 2011). The humanitarian crisis exposed 
some of the country’s most deeply rooted problems: structural problems, unequal land 
distribution, an unclear and unregulated land tenure system, continued violation of the basic 
human rights of Haiti’s most vulnerable people, poor governance, insufficient social 
consultation and adversarial state and civil society relations that have long undermined the 
Haitian social fabric. These problems translated into obstacles preventing the delivery of an 
effective response and sustainable recovery programme in the country (CAFOD 2011).  No 
policy environment existed in post-earthquake Haiti and no building codes have been 
established to date (CAFOD 2011). 
 
There was an opportunity provided by the disaster to carry out modernisation projects for 
sectors like WASH, such as expanding coverage of water and sanitation services. However, 
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in many cases these projects replicate the failures in the damaged systems, and actually 
increase their vulnerability to similar natural hazards. But it has been noted that after major 
disasters few efforts have been made by the WASH sector to develop technologies or 
technical standards that reflect prior experience (PAHO 2006). Matthias Schmale, IFRC 
states ‘we need to take action now to build sanitation into Haiti’s future’ (IFRC 2010).  The 
integration of an accessible and sustainable water and sanitation service for all into the 
reconstruction plans in Haiti was essential, however, not accomplished.  
 
Many opportunities to Build Back Better (BBB) are missed in international response, 
considering the extensive financial and human resources often available in many post-
disaster environments (Fan 2013). Tackling the challenges associated with disaster risk is 
paramount. Building-in resilience early will lead away from a culture of dependency and 
vulnerability to one of recovery and resilience. This would ensure a legacy of sustainable 
solutions would be left behind and not one of chaos. 
 
This problem area has been highlighted in the Hyogo Framework for Action’s 10 year plan, 
which looks to reduce disaster risk world-wide. Priority 4 recognises the need to reduce the 
underlying risk factors in post-disaster situations. The 2009 HFA update report noted risk 
reduction is not being systematically built into relief, rehabilitation and recovery processes; 
clearly stating that this is a priority area of action (UNISDR 2009). 
 
To reduce vulnerability in Haiti essential services needed to be (re)established, the vast 
majority of affected people were still living in official and unofficial camps with only 
temporary and costly services being provided i.e. trucked water and high maintenance 
latrines until 2012 (Groupe URD 2010; RTE 2010). Service provision for the WASH sector 
provided by international partners in the Haiti response is an example of unsustainable 
provision. The largest providers of sanitation in Haiti in the response were: ACF, ACTED, 
CARE, HAVEN, Oxfam GB, Red Cross and Save the Children. In 2010 only a third of the 
trucked water was being supplied by DINEPA and two thirds by international partners, like 
Oxfam and IFRC. In total 70% of the affected population were provisioned through a 
trucked water supply (IFRC 2010). The humanitarian sector needed strategies early to allow 
for more innovative, longer-term solutions to be put in place to support recovery. 
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Prolonged provision of water and sanitation in camps, is both expensive and in many cases 
undermines pre-existing service providers, who could not compete. Before the earthquake 
communities were self-sufficient through using water kiosks that sold low-cost water, they 
generated profits that were then fed into community projects. Since the disaster, these 
kiosks had to be abandoned, due to free water being distributed in camps and nearby areas 
(Oxfam 2011).  
 
The need for long-term sustainability within the WASH sector has been recognised and 
initiatives have been undertaken. The British Red Cross and DINEPA strived to re-establish 
the Haitian water market, that supported the campaign of ‘Haiti first’, an initiative that 
encouraged all to buy in Haiti (IFRC 2011). Oxfam GB helped re-establish water kiosks and 
the repair of public water points, working with DINEPA to establish Haiti’s first drinking 
water and sewerage standards (Oxfam 2011). Oxfam also supported the creation of master 
development plans for the major suburb of Carrefour Feuilles (DEC 2011a). DINEPA has 
established a strategy where resources are being moved away from camps towards 
investments in the surrounding neighbourhoods (DEC 2011a). 
 
Innovative exit strategies are needed to support the transition to recovery. INGOs need to 
provide sustainable solutions from an early stage of a disaster response to allow an effective 
transfer of responsibility of service provision to the government and the private sector, 
which would have put it back in Haitian hands.  
 
Good exit strategies depend on good local governance systems that will be able to take up 
the recovery role. With a quarter of civil servants losing their lives in the earthquake, a weak 
administrative capacity was seen, which created a barrier to reconstruction (Schilderman 
and Lyons 2010). Fundamental differences in approach to reconstruction among donors and 
clusters undermined an already weak government authority and its power to act, as well as 
undermining local trust in any given policy (Schilderman and Lyons 2010). The estimated 
cost of reconstruction was US$11.5 billion (DEC 2011a), which presents an opportunity to 
BBB creating a more resilient Haiti. But many opportunities to BBB were missed and 
recovery and reconstruction hindered due to the short-term programming initiated by relief 
agencies and the ‘operational gap’ left behind. 
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Redevelopment should be socially just, economically viable, environmentally compatible 
and less vulnerable to hazards (Schilderman and Lyons 2010). The challenges ahead are: to 
develop a legal framework for DRR; to change the focus from hydro-meteorological hazard 
scope to a multi-hazard approach; strengthening human capital; appropriation of 
management of the risk of disaster by line ministries; increase the capacity to develop tools 
for detection of all kind of risk; operation of permanent monitoring tools; stimulation of 
research; and co-ordination among various actors and required leadership (WMO 2010). 
 
The GoH, its ministries, the private sector and I/NGOs need now to focus on stimulating an 
effective recovery that will ensure sustainable, long-term resilience. Institutional and 
societal coping strategies need to be reviewed and addressed in order to tackle the 
challenges associated with disaster risk. It is fundamental to get the approach of introducing 
resilience into public policy, thus, stimulating fiscal resource allocation. This will be vital if 
the capacity of the public and private sector are to be sufficiently developed, encouraging a 
system that will withstand the impacts of future disasters. 
 
A huge response flooded into Haiti, millions received relief, but 2 years after the 
earthquake, Haiti still found itself in a prolonged state of relief, which created huge 
vulnerability and dependency within the affected population. Agencies and the international 
community struggled to generate a state of recovery and transfer responsibility for initiated 
programmes and services back to the government. Could this operational deficit have been 
avoided if agencies had put longer-sighted strategies in place from the start to promote 
recovery and support their own effective transition and exit strategies? Could sustainable 
solution have been left behind rather than a weakened state and a vulnerable population?  
 
Does the humanitarian sector need to re-examine their approach to relief and recovery 
programming, to ensure the impact of their programmes are not hindering the process of 
recovery, instead supporting and strengthening resilience from the start?  
 
Encouraging and promoting resilience from day one, could provide the strategy that is 
needed to ensure the critical components necessary to support an effective recovery process 
are in place at the right times along the post-disaster timeline. Guiding away from pre-
designed centralised camp models, that promote dependency and ultimately hinder recovery 
to a more context-specific, demand-led and community centered approach.  
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Thus, the questions remain: what are the critical components that constitute post-disaster 
resilience? What measures can be developed that would support and foster adaptive 
resilience at an early stage? How can these strategies be mainstreamed into humanitarian 
programming? And what are the differences in potential approach between different types 
and scales of disaster? 
 
2.7 Conceptual and Theoretical Framework 
This final section will present an analytical framework that will sum up the fundamental 
variables of this exploratory research thesis. Presenting their relationships to summarise the 
theoretical, analytical and practical concepts and issues highlighted in this Chapter. 
Detailing the next step in the research process necessary for this framework to be explored, 
for stated objectives to be met, to examine this thesis’ research problem in-depth.  
 
Figure 2.18 (refer to pg. 82) details the individual variables that will be assessed through 
this thesis. These variables have been established in order to meet the aims and objectives 
set out at the start of this thesis in section 1.3. These variables will be assessed through an 
in-depth case study and will be supported by literature. Figure 2.18 demonstrates that there 
are two distinct areas to be investigated: humanitarian operations and resilience. Within 
these two overarching areas, there are specific variables that will be investigated in each. 
Within humanitarian operations these include: investigating the overall operational 
framework - specifically financial mechanisms and coordination structures; agency 
operations - specifically programmes (i.e. WASH and Shelter, chosen for their inherent link 
with resilience) and assessments and planning; and lastly, the impact the humanitarian 
operations framework had on the disaster context will be examined- specifically nation level 
and local level exchange. Within the area of resilience, the concept of resilience in the post-
disaster context will be further clarified, along with the exploration of what constitutes a 
resilience building initiative. 
 
The assessment of these variables will guide an understanding of how the current 
humanitarian sector is functioning, whether the humanitarian operational framework and 
particular emergency approaches are contributing factors to the witnessed recovery deficit 
seen in Haiti. Also, to further clarify what is resilience in the post-disaster context and what 
types of initiatives and supportive mechanisms are needed to encourage resilience building 
and support adaptive capacity. Gauging whether supporting the development of adaptive 
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resilience through emergency response programmes can feasibly improve potential recovery 
of affected populations (refer to Figure 2.19, pg. 83). Having the ultimate aim to offer 
recommendation for policy and practice, in terms of resilience building initiatives within 
humanitarian programming, and what is needed to support and mainstream these initiatives 
into the humanitarian sector. 
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Figure 2.18 Details the various variables the research aims to encompass, conceptualise and analyse in order to meet stated aims and objectives. 
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Figure 2.19 Demonstrates the relationships between the main areas of research within this thesis, 
offering a sequenced framework that dictates the direction and aim of this exploratory research. 
 
The Chapter has broken down and examined essential variables within the research focus 
areas, laying the foundations for data collection, needed to meet the research objectives. The 
observed issues within the humanitarian sector, to which the research problem has been 
developed, was clearly dealt with in the initial sub-sections; presenting the literature that 
witnessed and conceptualised the existence of the operational ‘gap’ or ‘missing link’ 
between relief, recovery and development. These theories and observations were then 
further explored within a post-disaster response operation, the Haitian 2010 earthquake. 
Following this introduction the two key areas of research- resilience and humanitarian 
operations were then explored in detail. Within the area of humanitarian operations this 
Chapter laid out the dynamics within the current operational framework, key players and 
coordination structures, along with strategic and programmatic approaches. This was done 
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to portray a picture of the current set up within humanitarian operations, highlighting the 
challenges and the gaps in knowledge, but also using this assessment, as a tool within the 
analysis to gauge opportunities for operational improvement. Within the area of resilience 
this Chapter gathered and synthesised the current body of theory to gauge gaps in 
knowledge and decide the direction this thesis needs to take to offer contributions in the 
form of a clarified conceptualisation of resilience in the humanitarian sphere and determine 
whether it has the potential to stimulate recovery. 
 
The Chapter was concluded with the presentation of a conceptual and theoretical 
framework, that has clearly detailed the variables to be investigated within this exploratory 
research and the relationship theory between the variables that clarify the scope of the 
thesis. This framework offers the foundations that will guide the direction of the data 
collection and analysis, which will be presented in the next Chapter. Chapters 2 and 3 will 
then become the platform to produce a fully developed analysis and discussion. This will be 
presented in Chapters 4-8, which will be summarised in Chapter 9 and 10, which will offer 
conclusions and recommendations. 
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3. Methodology 
Chapters 1 and 2 have justified the research problem, presented the aims and objectives of this 
thesis, as well as the variables to be investigated necessary to gain conclusion to the research 
problem. These foundations have directed the formulation of data collection and analysis 
methodology; methodology that has the ability to meet the objectives set out. This Chapter 
presents the methodological stance of this thesis, an overview of the research design, a scoping 
study for the selected case study, the chosen data collection and analysis methodologies, and an 
overview of collected data. 
 
3.1 Methodological Stance 
This introductory section will make clear this thesis’ methodological paradigm, 
epistemological and ontological scope and research strategies. The subsequent section will 
then go into further detail of the research design that this thesis embodied. 
 
3.1.1 Methodological Paradigm 
Research should be conducted through appropriate methods that are objective, logical and 
systematic, in order to analyse phenomena, methods that are devised to permit the 
accumulation of reliable knowledge (May 2001). The types of research methods adopted in 
an investigation replicate the researcher’s perspectives on ‘social reality’. Therefore, a 
researcher’s epistemological and ontological approach, where epistemology is a concept 
that is used to describe the theory of knowledge and the theory of how people obtain 
knowledge, and ontology is what one holds to be true, need to be understood. How I as a 
researcher understand my truth (ontology) and how I know it to be true (epistemology) is 
important to understand when carrying out this research, as these are fundamental factors in 
the development and validity of methods chosen to investigate knowledge. In social science 
research, ones epistemological stance, such as positivism, will dictate methods of scientific 
procedure utilised to acquire sociological knowledge and would be different to those that 
would be suited to an epistemological stance, such as realism.  
 
The approach and choice of methodologies is a crucial step in the research process as 
methodologies, stated by Cornwall et al. (1994) ‘provide the user with a framework for 
selecting the means to find out about, analyse, order and exchange information about an 
issue. They define what can be known or exchanged, how that should be presented and by 
and for whom this is done’.  
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The following section will make clear, as a researcher, my epistemological and ontological 
stance and will be followed by the research strategies to be pursued within this thesis. 
 
3.2 Epistemology and Ontology 
Epistemology is a concept that is used to describe the theory of knowledge and the theory of 
how people obtain knowledge (Walliman 2006; Bryman and Bell 2007; Knight and 
Turnbull 2008). Epistemology, is intimately related to ontology and methodology; as 
ontology involves the philosophy of reality, i.e. what one holds to be true, epistemology 
addresses how we come to know that reality, while methodology identifies the particular 
practices used to attain knowledge of it (Krauss 2005). Consideration of how I, as a 
researcher, understand my truth (ontology), how I know it to be true (epistemology) and 
consequently, the methodologies used to attain particular knowledge, which will be 
fundamental to carry out this research.  
 
Epistemology poses the following questions: what is the relationship between the knower 
and what is known? How do we know what we know? What counts as knowledge? 
Epistemological paradigms commonly positioned within social research encompass a few 
key and opposing schools of thought. Firstly, there is the positivist paradigm, where the 
object of study is independent of researchers; knowledge is discovered and verified through 
direct observations or measurements of phenomena; facts are established by taking apart a 
phenomenon to examine its component parts (Krauss 2005; Fellows and Lui 2008). The 
approach of positivism to the social world in social research is similar, but not identical, to 
how the natural sciences approach the physical world, i.e. combining mainly deductive logic 
with empirical and predominantly quantitative methods, in order to seek generally applying 
regularities, whereas realism assumes only the existence of a social world external to the 
researcher, which can be accessed through sense and research (Payne and Payne 2004; 
Bryman and Bell 2007; Robson 2011). Secondly, an alternative view, the constructivist 
paradigm, sees that knowledge is established through the meanings attached to the 
phenomena studied; researchers interact with the subjects of study to obtain data; inquiry 
changes both researcher and subject; and knowledge is context and time dependent (Coll 
and Chapman 2000; Cousins 2002). Epistemologically, this research investigation takes on 
a more constructivist paradigm to establish knowledge. 
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Dobson (2002) questioned how a researcher’s ontological assumptions, i.e. their underlying 
belief system, plays a role in the choice of methods undertaken in selected research, arguing 
that it does largely define the choice of method and, thus, the methodology used. 
Alternatively, Bryman (1988) stated that methodologies are not epistemologically based at 
all and are instead technical constructs. Using technical constructs advocates flexibility in 
the selection of social research methods, based on the principle of choosing the most 
suitable methods for the nature of the problem being researched (Silverman 1985). This 
approach is referred to as ‘Methodological pluralism’ (Haralambos and Holboln 1991; 
Payne 2006). This research will take a methodologically pluralistic approach, utilising a 
variety of methods to conduct a variety of investigations necessary to examine the stated 
research problem.  
 
An inductive approach guided the process within the investigations. An inductive approach 
takes on active observations to come to a conclusion. Utilising inductive reasoning saw the 
investigation begin with specific observations and measures, progressing to detect patterns 
and regularities, which allowed tentative hypotheses to be formulated and then explored, to 
then finally to develop conclusions and theories (Bryman and Bell 2007; Bryman 2008; 
Robson 2011). Technical constructs were formed through the literature review and 
observations from the field (refer to Chapter 2 and section 3.6) determined the variety of 
investigations that were pursued and allow specific research questions to be formulated 
(refer to Chapter 1). This research design is, therefore, not purist in approach, but offers a 
design that is focused, but flexible enough to be explorative.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 88 
Table 3.1 Aspects of a unified thesis. [Source: Yin 1989] 
 
                Qualitative research                          Quantitative research 
  
 
3.3.1 Qualitative Strategy 
A qualitative methodology requires a research problem involving people's constructions of 
meanings, which have not previously been explored (Hassard 1990).  Qualitative research 
focuses on the meaning, complexity and connectivity of social phenomena (Silverman 1993). 
Using methodological techniques, such as unstructured and semi-structured interviews, 
biographical narratives, participant observation, focus groups and case studies. Utilising these 
types of techniques makes it possible for the researcher to study such ‘social realities’ from the 
informant’s perspectives, experience and knowledge. A qualitative approach is crucial for this 
research thesis, as it allows the processes and complexities of ‘social reality’ to be gauged, 
which within a quantitative approach is opposed to the static constructs of quantitative logic 
(Bryman 1988). It also allows for the generation of theory and concepts, which are apparent in 
the philosophy of grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Bryman and Bell 2007). Glaser 
and Strauss (1967) emphasised that ‘the generation of grounded theory is a way of arriving at 
theory suited to its supposed uses, so that theory is generated from the data obtained. This 
thesis utilised methodologies, such as a case study, semi-structured interviews, and focus 
groups to frame and develop an understanding of ‘social realities’ to develop grounded theory 
to inform better practice.  
 
It should be noted that qualitative methods, each to varying degrees, have been criticised for 
their lack of reliability and validity (Lincoln and Guba 1985; Kirk and Miller 1986; Bryman 
Research problem: 
How? Why? 
Research problem: 
Who (how many)? 
What (how much)? 
Literature review: 
Exploratory - what are the variables involved? 
Constructs are messy 
Research issues are developed 
Literature review: 
Explanatory - what are the relationships between the 
variables which have been previously identified and 
measured? 
Hypotheses are developed 
Paradigm: 
Critical realism/interpretive 
Paradigm: 
Positivist 
Methodology: 
For example, case study research or action 
research 
Methodology: 
For example, survey or experiment 
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and Bell 2007). The rejection of reliability and validity in qualitative inquiry in the 1980s, 
has resulted in a shift for ‘ensuring rigor’ from the investigator’s actions during the course 
of the research, to the reader or consumer of qualitative inquiry. The emphasis on strategies 
that are implemented during the research process has been replaced by strategies for 
evaluating trustworthiness and utility that are implemented once a study is completed 
(Morse et al. 2002). Morse et al. (2002) argue that reliability and validity remain 
appropriate concepts for attaining rigor in qualitative research and that qualitative 
researchers should reclaim responsibility for reliability and validity, by implementing 
verification strategies that are integral and self-correcting during the conduct of inquiry 
itself.  This thesis utilised verification strategies through various channels of triangulation 
(refer to sub-section 3.3.3). 
 
3.3.2 Quantitative Strategy 
Quantitative research is concerned mainly with concepts that are founded from theoretical 
frameworks, that allow for the generation of hypotheses. Such hypotheses would be tested 
through indicators that are translated into variables, which would be stated in the research 
design (Ford 1995). A researcher within social sciences needs to be aware that quantitative 
logic, by definition, pre-defines ‘social reality’ and as Silverman (1985) states ‘impose a 
meaning on social relations, which fails to pay proper attention to participant’s meaning’. 
Bryman (1988) adds that quantitative research is preoccupied with simplification to 
causality, generalisation, replicability and individualism. This research is concerned with 
generalisability, i.e. potential extrapolation of the findings to either a wider population or 
different political and social contexts (Nachmias and Nachmias 1996; Bryman and Bell 
2007) and replicability, i.e. the research conducted by one person could be conducted by 
another, who could attain the same results, concepts that are important to an overall 
qualitative approach. However, this research actively aims to avoid individualism, i.e. a 
concept that refers to the way quantitative data focuses on the individual resulting in an 
inability to study social groups and organisations (Bryman 1988). 
 
The research encompasses a few quantitative methods within its qualitative framework. 
These methods include the use of an activity called a Sociogram (refer to sub-section 
3.8.2.5, pg. 108) used within the focus group session and through several questions asked 
within an online questionnaire (refer to sub-section 3.8.2.4, pg. 107). These methods have 
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been included for their use as tools to help map perception on key social actions; these 
methods will be triangulated with other qualitative methods to validate the information. 
 
3.3.3 Mixed Strategies 
Gable (1994) states ‘one should attempt to mix methods to some extent, because it provides 
more perspectives on the phenomena being studied'. The positivist philosophy, view 
qualitative and quantitative methodologies as contrary to one another. However, there are 
many influential researchers that have stated the differences between the two main 
paradigms, positivism and constructivism, that have inherently defined the individual sets of 
methodology have been overdrawn, and that the schism is not as wide as has been portrayed 
by the ‘purists’ (House 1994; Tashakori and Teddlie 1998). Datta (1994) has given five 
practical reasons for ‘coexistance’ between the two methodologies and their underlying 
paradigms: 
1. Both paradigms have been in use for years. 
2. Many evaluators and researchers have urged using both paradigms. 
3. Funding agencies have supported both paradigms. 
4. Both paradigms have influenced policy. 
5. Much has been taught by both paradigms. 
 
On a philosophical level the ‘purists’ still view the incompatibility of the different 
epistemologies and their associated methods. In response to this, Howe (1988), attempted to 
counter this paradigm method link by proposing a different paradigm: pragmatism. A major 
part of Howe’s concept of pragmatism was that quantitative and qualitative methodologies 
are compatible, researchers began to make use of both sets of methodologies. Howe’s 
approach was supported by Brewer and Hunter (1989), stating ‘rather than being wed to a 
particular theoretical style and its most compatible method, one might instead combine 
methods that would encourage or even require integration of different theoretical 
perspectives to interpret the data'. Reichart and Rallis (1994) took the analysis of 
compatibility between the two lines of inquiry a step further by suggesting they possess 
many similar fundamental values. These values include: value-ladenness of inquiry, belief 
in the theory-ladenness of fact, belief that reality is multiple and constructed, belief in the 
fallibility of knowledge and believe in the undetermination of theory by fact. 
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The use of mixed methods has become part of the logic of triangulation, a concept that was 
in its origins developed by Weber (1949) (Weber 1994; Webb et al. 1966; Denzin 1970) and 
later characterised by Burgess (1984). Triangulation aims to implant methodological rigour 
to research, through the use of cross checking and cross referencing, utilising multiple 
methods, data sources, theories and investigators. Burgess (1984) describes four types of 
triangulation: 
1. Data triangulation - includes data collected over time, space and by different people 
or organisations. 
2. Investigator triangulation - involves the use of more than one researcher. 
3. Theory triangulation - requires the use of competing theories. 
4. Methodological triangulation - incorporating the combination of different, but 
appropriate research methods. 
 
Patton (1990), comments that the use of triangulation by use of multiple methods in the 
research design, contributes towards methodological rigour and is a recommended approach 
in many research methods texts (Burgess 1984; Yin 1984: Silverman 1985; Marshal and 
Rossman 1989; Patton 1990; Bryman and Bell 2007; Robson 2011). Triangulation does not 
provide the solution to the epistemological debates within social science. However, it is a 
technique that allows for a multi-perspective investigation.  
 
This thesis utilised the technique of triangulation to allow for a multi-perspective 
investigation, to answer the stated research problem using multiple sources of evidence in 
order to gain construct validity (Yin 1984; Bagozzi et al. 1991). This will be further 
elaborated in sub-section 3.7.3- Validity and Reliability.  
 
3.4 Research Design 
The research design created for this research (refer to Figure 3.1, pg. 94) was developed to 
gain a conceptual understanding of resilience in the post-disaster environment and its 
importance for recovery at the individual/HH level; to gauge how current humanitarian 
operations support or hinder adaptive resilience; highlighting the opportunities within 
humanitarian operations to proactively build individual/HH adaptive resilience and enable a 
rapid recovery; and to understand how these opportunities could be supported and 
mainstreamed within the humanitarian framework.  
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It begun through problem identification from the literature review and then narrowed down 
through preliminary data obtained from the field (Srinivas et al. 1979). An explanatory case 
study was undertaken, to generate an evidence rich study that was used to assess and isolate 
critical factors that hinder and/or support adaptive resilience and the phenomena of the 
‘operational gap’.  The case study allowed the investigation into this contemporary 
phenomena, within its real-life context (Yin 1984).  
 
The following sub-section states the units of analysis that will be used to obtain the 
necessary information needed to meet the objectives of this thesis. 
 
3.4.1 Units of Analysis 
To obtain the information necessary to meet the objectives set out within this thesis required 
multiple units of analysis, these included key stakeholders in the emergency response in 
Haiti 2010:  
 Response agencies - a representative sample of the main agencies operating in the 
response, within the 2 year period since the disaster, were included. With particular 
representatives from the Shelter and WASH sectors.  
 State entities - representation from national government, as well as local government 
were included. 
 Donors - a number of representatives from the most active international donors 
supporting the response were included.   
 Private sector - local private sector entities that were affected by the disaster or were 
instrumental in response and recovery activities were included. 
 The affected population - a directly affected community group was used as a sample 
of the affected population. 
 
For more detail on the sample size and sample frame refer to sub-section 3.8.2. 
 
The units of analysis are encompassed within a case study. The case study took the form of 
a singular-case design, in which a single research period covered a protracted period, 
collating and generating data that was both quantitative and qualitative. Multiple sources of 
evidence were collected to assume multiple triangulations, gaining essential construct 
validity (Yin 1984; Bagozzi et al. 1991). To assume external validity and reliability the 
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research was designed to ensure the ability to replicate with the potential to stimulate a 
multi-case study for the future. 
 
The selected case study that was used as a fundamental part of this research design and the 
scope of its analysis is further detailed in the following section. 
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Figure 3.1. A schematic diagram of the research design developed and undertaken to complete 
this research, Adapted from Yin 1989. [Source: Yin 1989] 
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3.5 Case Study Selection 
This section details the chosen case study context. The reasons for its selection and the 
scope of its analysis will be detailed in the subsequent section through an in-depth scoping 
study, that was undertaken to inform the generation of a practical data collection plan. 
 
A case study approach was chosen because it was compatible with the analytical framework 
of this thesis. It is an approach that can investigate a contemporary phenomenon within its 
real-life context, when the boundaries between phenomena and context are not clearly 
evident and in which multiple sources of evidence are used (Yin 2009). An empirical 
enquiry that can explain causal links, describe real life contexts, illustrate interventions and 
explore intervention as outcome (Yin 2009), making it a suitable line of enquiry to meet the 
objectives of this research to examine the research problem stated in Chapter 1.  
 
The case study required for this research needed to be one of a post-disaster context, where 
an international response was initiated; a case that would allow the assessment of response 
operations and its effect on adaptive resilience at the individual/HH level. 
 
The case chosen for study was the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, which covered a specific 
geological range of the capital Port-au-Prince, with a case study period of 2 years from the 
earthquake’s onset. A detailed review of this context was given in section 2.5. The disaster 
that occurred in Haiti in 2010 was of a significant scale, killing over 200,000 (UN-DESA 
2010) and making over 1.5 million homeless (IFRC 2010). The resulting devastation 
attracted one of the largest humanitarian interventions to date, with thousands of INGOs 
flooding into the country over the following few years (DEC 2011a). Haiti itself had 
suffered damaging annual hurricane seasons prior to the earthquake, along with 
experiencing violent dictatorships for decades, and with the majority of the 10 million 
population living in the poorly serviced and weak, unregulated infrastructure of the capital 
PaP, left the population significantly vulnerable when the earthquake hit. Weak former 
levels of resilience prior to the earthquake saw survivors struggle to recover. With the huge 
international response that was initiated and the recovery short fall that was witnessed after 
the disaster, the Haitian post-disaster context became a unique research opportunity to 
review resilience in the post-disaster environment, its importance for recovery and the 
impact emergency response interventions had on the recovery outcome. 
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The context of post-earthquake Haiti, presented an opportunity to review humanitarian 
operations in a real-life context, to uncover the main reasons why the period of relief was so 
prolonged and why it had struggled to transition into a sustainable state of recovery within a 
2 year post-disaster period. The protracted relief situation experienced within Haiti offered 
the opportunity to assess the effect disaster response had on the resiliency of an affected 
society. The scale of this disaster and the resulting response presented a case study that had 
the potential to reveal many of the underlying difficulties of emergency response, that in 
other crises might not be so visible. A case study in Haiti offered the opportunity to 
critically assess the international response, understand the operations and dynamics in the 
relief phase, the coping strategies within the population and how their recovery was 
supported. It also provided opportunities for uncovering the complexities and realities 
within this post-disaster environment, which highlighted critical operational areas within 
disaster response that could provide greater support in building adaptive resilience from the 
start.  
 
As highlighted, a case study approach is a suitable research strategy for this thesis. 
However, criticism of the case study approach needs to be noted and how this research aims 
to counter such issues. Patton (1990) offered a criticism regarding the extent to which 
individual cases can be generalised to other contexts. This issue has been considered in this 
research approach. Firstly, the case study is designed to be replicable in order to assess 
multiple contexts over time. Secondly, the case study chosen has been sited as highlighting 
some fundamental issues seen in humanitarian operations and the results; issues that have 
also be seen in many past humanitarian responses (Lloyd-Jones 2006; UN Office of the 
Secretary-General’s special Envoy for Tsunami Recovery 2005; Oxfam International 2005; 
O’Donnell et al. 2009; UNDP 2011). Reflecting that this chosen case study offers a 
significant element of representation for the purpose of conclusive and generalisable 
findings.  
 
3.6 Scoping Study 
The aim of conducting a scoping study was to enable a full understanding of the context 
within the country of research; looking to comprehend the relief and recovery activities that 
had taken place, since the January 2010 earthquake in Haiti. The scoping study was 
undertaken from the 2nd August – 16th September 2011 for a total of 6 weeks. Through this 
study a list of contacts for interview was created, scoping of potential sites for community 
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level data collection was undertaken and an understanding was gained on the feasibility of 
undertaking data collection in this chosen location. 
 
3.6.1 Activities Undertaken 
 The development of a comprehensive list of contacts that included: UN 
representatives, INGOs, Donors, LNGOs, government representatives (national and 
local), civil society and the private sector. 
 Six informal interviews were conducted to scope out the past and present operational 
context, sectoral dynamics and to collect assessment data and reports.  
 Read and analysed collected assessment data and relevant reports. 
 A review of methodological approaches was undertaken on the basis of contextual 
knowledge and insight gained from this study. 
 With the conclusion of the 6-week scoping study appointments were made for 10 
formal semi-structured interviews to take place over the next month with the aim to 
complete 40 within this main data collection period of 6 months.  
 Agencies were also identified and contacted about the potential access to 
communities through household surveys and community discussion forums. 
 
3.6.2 Research Collection Operating Environment 
Haiti, at the time of data collection was in a transition period, with many agencies exiting 
the country at the end of the year (2011). IDP camps still scatter the city, but at this time 
there was a push to begin disintegrating them. These factors created an operating 
environment that can be fairly volatile and insecure, resulting in security and access issues 
when considering research data collection. Because of this my methodological approach 
needed to be reconsidered and the resulting focus of the research re-strategised. 
 
3.6.3 Methodological Considerations and Restructuring of Data Collection Approach 
Due to the restricted access and level of potential violence in areas of research interest, the 
independent collection of household surveys was not feasible. Instead access to the 
community was only achievable through agencies operating within areas of interest. A 
community forum approach was deemed to be the most feasible option. This community 
discussion forum took place in an accessible area of PaP, where an affected community 
lived. Within the forum pre-deigned discussion questions were administered, as well as an 
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individually filled in Sociogram. This data collection method has been designed to 
understand individual/HH resilience, how it affected the rate of recovery and how these 
affected people were supported in the response.  
 
A suitable location was confirmed through the British Red Cross (BRC), who was operating 
in Delmas 19. Delmas 19 held an IDP community of around 17,000 people, displaced close 
to their original habitation. 
 
Interviews with agencies, INGOs, donors, government and the private actors proved feasible 
and successful. The knowledge gained through the 6 informal interviews, redirected the 
research focus to look more in-depth at relief and recovery operations at the humanitarian 
framework level down to agency programmatic level. Taking a more holistic approach in 
assessing resilience, by looking at WASH and Shelter programming in emergency response 
and early recovery operations. Assessing recovery barriers and opportunities to support 
adaptive resilience within programme operations from financial resources, to assessments, 
to implementation.  
 
The scoping interviews allowed a review and a refocus of the questions to be used in the 
semi-structured interview, as well as the design of the online questionnaire. The idea to 
include an online questionnaire was to generate quantitative data to widen the scope of 
analysis, as well as to increase the level of response. The questionnaire was made available 
in English and French, enabling a wider range of stakeholders to respond, as well as 
offering an ease of data analysis of a second language.  
 
3.7 Considerations as Role of Researcher 
Following on from consideration of practical implications of data collection within the 
prescribed research context, this section details, considerations as role of researcher, 
operating within the research context. The section will begin looking at research bias and 
how it was minimised within this research, ethical considerations, and finally review aspects 
of validity and reliability. 
 
3.7.1 Minimising Research Bias 
Silverman (1993), recognised ‘that no simple neutral or value free position is possible in 
social science’ and the values of the researcher will typically be ingrained in the research 
 
 99 
investigation and research design. What is important as a researcher is to acknowledge these 
values and reduce or eliminate their influence of the research findings. Actions that can be 
taken to achieve this are: 
 Attempt to gain internal legitimacy from communities, agencies and government 
involved, to gain ‘respectability’ in a way that does not compromise objectivity. 
 Utilising a ‘grass roots’ approach to research style, guided by local perceptions 
rather than agency, non-governmental and governmental perceptions. 
 Flexibility of research focus, to aid ‘cultural awareness’ against the potential for an 
insider’s ‘cultural blindness’. 
 Use of a holistic, iterative, locally evaluated approach, to reduce one’s own cultural 
values. Honesty, research transparency, openness and where possible flexibility in 
the research process is advocated. 
 
There are several specific areas of research bias that can occur, including: spatial, project, 
person, professional and diplomatic (Chambers 1983). These specific areas of research bias 
are further explained below including considerations for this research: 
 Spatial bias considers whether the research methodological sampling stuck to the 
easy path, followed roads and/or avoided isolated villages.  
o This research aimed to include the main stakeholders present in the post-
disaster environment within PaP, Haiti. Developing methodological 
approaches to ensure easy inclusion of more inaccessible groups. This 
included translation of the online questionnaire into French and the proactive 
search and contact with various stakeholders including: community 
members, local government, private sector, NGOs, INGOs, UN agencies and 
donors. 
 Project bias looks to assess whether the physical area of research interest has been 
extensively studied earlier? 
o Haiti as a post-disaster research context was studied extensively, the 
community participants had not had previous researcher contact, but were 
familiar with communication from an INGO. Other stakeholders were 
passionate to share their experience and views through the interviews and 
online questionnaires. 
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 Person bias looks to gauge whether the respondents are from a cross-section of the 
relevant stakeholders, i.e. men and women? Influential and non-influential? 
Empowered or repressed? 
o Within the community sampling there was a good balance of men and 
women aging from 18-70 years, with representatives from a variety of socio-
economic statuses and influence within the community.  
o Within the interviews and online questionnaire there were a mix of male and 
female respondents, with both English and French speaking respondents. 
 Diplomatic bias looks to assess whether participants were influenced by the 
researchers ‘elevated’ position in society as a professional? Was the researcher 
viewed as an official making respondents wary of telling the truth? 
o The participants within the community forum saw the activity as a way to 
voice their opinions and feedback on the post-disaster interventions they had 
experienced and what they needed now. This indicates that respondents felt 
free to air their opinions. However, what needs to be considered is the culture 
of dependency that was created in Haiti and communities ability to over 
exaggerate current needs to gain more support. 
 Professional bias looks to ascertain whether the researcher focused on all the actors 
and not just the professionals? 
o As previously mentioned efforts were made in choice and style of 
methodology to ensure the necessary variety of stakeholders were included 
within the data collection. 
 
3.7.1.2 Perspective as a Researcher and a Practitioner 
Due to being a practitioner in this field of study (i.e. an Emergency WASH Coordinator), as 
a researcher, this needs to be taken into consideration. As subsequently, it alters perspective 
on the subject matter being researched, which can bring up questions of researcher bias. 
However, as stated above, all potential bias has been accounted for through choice of 
sampling methods and methodologies embraced. 
 
It should be considered that as a researcher and a practitioner, it adds significant value, in 
the way of informed and practical outputs from this research. As a practitioner I have 
background knowledge of the obvious gaps witnessed within emergency operations and the 
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failings as a result. This understanding has informed the basis of this research, as well as 
allowing outputs from this research to be truly practicable in the field this research aims to 
improve.  
 
3.7.2 Ethical Considerations 
As a researcher undertaking the entirety of the data collection I gained proficiency in the 
knowledge and understanding of several sets of ethical guidelines. Firstly, the Social 
Research Association Ethical Guidelines. Secondly, Loughborough University’s Ethical 
Guidelines for Research. Thirdly, recommended ethical considerations by the Economic and 
Social Research Council (ESRC) were followed: 
 Honesty to subjects about the purpose, methods and intended and possible uses of 
the research, and any risks involved. 
 Confidentiality of information supplied by research subjects and the anonymity of 
respondents. 
 Independence and impartiality of researchers to the subject of the research. 
(ESRC 2012) 
 
Informed consent 
A clearly stated ethical consideration was the inclusion of informed consent. Within the 
research data collection process this was followed, producing a consent form for all 
participants that clearly stated the purpose of the research, methods used, and the intended 
uses of the research (refer to Appendix 1a). This consent form was signed by participants 
prior to their involvement in any data collection activity. 
 
Data protection 
The treatment of data and the forms of protection put on it was also made clear within the 
consent form. The data collection and analysis process in this research enabled data 
protection through the provision of optional anonymity, allowing for confidentiality of 
information. Participants were also informed that the data would only be viewed by the lead 
researcher and was not shared with any other party.  
 
The provision of these vital ethical considerations enabled this research to be approved by 
the ethics board at Loughborough University. 
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3.7.3 Validity and Reliability 
Research must be credible, transferable, dependable and confirmable (Lincoln and Guba 
1985) and to achieve this it is essential to strive for research that is valid and reliable. 
Validity refers to the extent to which an account accurately represents the social phenomena 
to which it refers (Hammersley 1992). Reliability refers to the degree of consistency with 
which instances are assigned to the same category by different observers or by the same 
observer on different occasions (Hammersley 1992; Bryman and Bell 2007). To ensure 
validity and reliability this research used the method of triangulation, as discussed 
previously in sub-section 3.3.3 - Mixed Methods.  
 
This thesis utilised the technique of triangulation using multiple sources of evidence in 
order to gain construct validity (Yin 1989; Bagozzi 1991). Specific areas of triangulation 
utilised in this research included: methodological triangulation, which was done by 
incorporating an array of different research methods to validate data being produced by a 
variety of stakeholders within the case study and data triangulation by comparing data 
produced through this case study with other past appropriate post-disaster case studies. 
 
The next section further details the methodologies that were used to undertake the specified 
methodological and data triangulation encompassed within this research.  Using these 
methods ensured the research was rigorous and credible. 
 
3.8 Data Collection 
The field research undertaken had to operate in a complex environment, which presented 
some significant challenges concerning access and security, but with careful planning this 
research has been able to generate a large amount of qualitative and quantitative data 
through primary data collection. With secondary data collection and the literature review 
allowing this primary data to be triangulated and contextualised. Table 3.2 (refer to pg. 103) 
details the data collection tools successfully used within this research, highlighting the 
positives and negatives of their use in the field and what was needed to counteract these 
negatives. 
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3.8.1 Data Collection Tools 
Table 3.2 Summary of data collection tools used in this research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	
Data collection tool Positives Negatives Counter-act negatives 
Literature review - Builds fundamental knowledge 
- Clarifies applicable concepts and theories 
- Highlights the gaps in knowledge 
- Non-peer reviewed publications. 
- Not all necessary documents are available. 
 
- Use credible online journal databases. 
- Seek out established authors and credible 
publications. 
Archival analysis - Collection of material that may not be easily 
available. 
- Provides unique, context specific information 
- Concerns regarding reliability and validity of 
data. 
- Select information/ datasets from established 
and reliable institutions and sources. 
Semi-Structured 
Interviews 
- Enables respondent to share what they deem 
necessary information. 
- Provided in depth information 
- Offers the flexibility to explore new and 
unknown concepts and tap in to specific 
knowledge of the participant. 
- Time consuming 
- Issues of misinterpretation between interviewer 
and interviewee. 
- Difficult to achieve reliability 
- Qualitative data hard to analyse statistically 
- Avoid the potential for leading questions. 
- Record interview to accurately translate and 
report answers. 
- Understand the interviewee’s potential 
standpoint and involvement in the process 
- Triangulate information with the online 
questionnaire, community/HH survey and 
archival data. 
Online questionnaire - Offers an alternative and easier response 
outlet. 
- an outlet that can offer complete anonymity. 
- Offered in both French and English in order to 
access a broader range of users in and outside 
of Haiti. 
- Provided highly useful quantitative data that is 
comparable between users and able to 
triangulate other quantitative data collected. 
- Potential of low response rates. 
- Time consuming if translations needed. 
- Potential for confusion on the point of the 
question or adequacy to answer certain questions. 
 
- Ensure the time to complete is between 10-15 
minutes. 
- Make the questions as clear as possible with 
an explanation or example where appropriate. 
- Explain the aims and objectives of the research 
clearly and concisely and the importance of their 
involvement. 
Community Group 
forums/ HH survey (to 
include Sociogram) 
- Generates a stimulating environment for real 
discussion and problem solving. 
- Brings large numbers of participants together, 
equaling an efficient data collection method 
- Utilize agency access to HH level participants 
by tagging questions onto relevant surveys 
being carried out.  
- Large sample size can be achieved 
- Administered by assistant to minimize 
problems with low literacy 
- Provides background demographics 
- Produces quantitative data enabling statistical 
analysis. 
- Offers a unique way to measure the level of 
resilience and understand the relationship and 
value of specific attributes. 
- Provides resilience indicators to crisis events 
 
- Issues of group generated bias 
- Individual opinions could be missed due to group 
format or time constraints 
- The no. of accessible communities/ HH to 
generate generalisable data sets. 
-  HH selection bias 
- Questions need to be carefully worded and 
translated sympathetically. 
- Time consuming process 
- Subjectivity in scoring on sociogram 
- Statistical analysis reliant on subjective 
generalization. 
- Subjectivity in respondents answers, specifically 
when viewing the past. 
- Potential for misleading or leading questions 
- Misunderstood expectation of respondent may 
lead to misleading results. 
- Untested in disaster context. 
- Avoid the potential for leading questions 
- Ensure adequate time frame on activities, 
create effective group sizes and allow an 
individual feedback capacity at the start and end 
of session. 
- Bring a level of diversity between communities 
accessed. 
- When conducting forum or administering 
questionnaire explain the purpose of research 
clearly and note that over or under stating 
answers will not help the cause but hinder the 
process. 
- Explain the scoring system clearly. 
- Triangulate answers with archival data and 
interviews. 
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3.8.2 Sampling and Data Collection Methodology 
Having demonstrated in brief the data collection tools used in this research, highlighting 
their individual positives and negatives and how the negatives were actively counteracted 
this sub-section looks at each data collection tool in-depth. Each tool will be presented in 
terms of the main sources, sampling methods, data collection methods and focused areas of 
interest, highlighting how they were developed to meet the objectives. 
 
The Objectives 
 Objective 1. To clarify the concept of resilience within the post-disaster context. 
 Objective 2. To gauge the impact emergency response programmes had on 
individual and household resilience in post-earthquake Haiti. 
 Objective 3. To gauge the impact of the humanitarian framework on the level of 
resilience developed in the context of post-earthquake Haiti. 
 Objective 4. To determine the link between post-disaster resilience and the level of 
potential recovery experienced at the individual/household level. 
 Objective 5. To comprehend possible resilience building initiatives within 
emergency response operations. 
 Objective 6. To comprehend how resilience building initiatives can be supported 
within the humanitarian operational framework. 
 
3.8.2.1 Literature Review 
Sources: library catalogues, online libraries, organisation- webpages, reports and 
publications, magazines/ bulletins/ blogs, sectoral publications, online bulletins and blogs 
from reputable institutions and organisations.  
 
Search criteria: 
 Quality: only reports and publications from reputable institutions and organisations, 
established library catalogues and peer-reviewed journals, magazines or blogs were 
sort and reviewed for documentation. 
 Relevance: institutional and organsational reports and publications were sort from 
bodies such as, key donor institutions, key knowledge institutions, and implementing 
agencies who have studied and/or reported on emergency operations in Haiti, as well 
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as within other emergencies relating to operational frameworks, dynamics, transition 
and exit strategy, recovery programming and resilience. 
 
Areas of focused interest: Emergency aid architecture, emergency management, DRR, 
preparedness, resilience, Haiti post-disaster operational environment, Haiti response and 
recovery operations and transitional dynamics, Haitian politics, other post-disaster response 
environments and dynamics, WASH, Shelter and Livelihoods interventions and 
reconstruction. 
 
How this data collection method contributed to meeting the objectives 
The literature review was used for several purposes. Firstly, it allowed the formulation of 
the research problem, as prescribed within an inductive approach. Secondly, it was used to 
gather foundational knowledge that helped to meet several objectives, including Objectives 
1,2,3 and 4. Thirdly, the literature review enabled other post-disaster responses to be 
evaluated, developing comparative studies that allowed for data triangulation and a level of 
generalisability to be attained.  
 
3.8.2.2 Archival Analysis 
Sources: institutional and organisational research and reports, websites, online platforms 
and databases that relate specifically to Haiti. 
 
Collection methods: direct from actors working in the humanitarian sector and actors 
specifically working or have worked in Haiti, as well as internet searches and dedicated 
online platforms. 
 
Areas of focused interest: components of individual/HH resilience, humanitarian 
operational framework, agency programming frameworks, Haiti post-disaster operational 
environment, Haiti response and recovery operations and transitional dynamics, WASH, 
Shelter and Livelihoods interventions, reconstruction. 
 
How this data collection method contributed to meeting the objectives 
Analysis of archival data will produce case-orientated secondary data and contextual 
information. This data and information will build into and develop knowledge concerning 
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all areas of the prescribed conceptual and theoretic framework (refer to section 2.7). This 
data collection method also developed insights into all 6 objectives.  
 
3.8.2.3 Semi-Structured Interviews 
The use of a semi-structured interview allowed the flexibility to explore new and unknown 
concepts through respondents and tapped into specific knowledge of the participant. This 
method only produced qualitative data. 
 
Sampling method: in order to gain a broad array of perspectives to allow for a more 
comprehensive overview of the response in Haiti and to counteract any biased opinions held 
by any one individual stakeholder, a range of stakeholders were targeted including: INGOs, 
UN agencies, cluster leads, LNGOs, government, private sector and donors. Different types 
of INGOs were targeted under criteria, such as the size of operations, whether they were 
operating in Haiti before or after the earthquake, the programme focus, i.e. relief and/or 
recovery and/or long-term initiatives, also sectoral focus, i.e. WASH, Shelter, Livelihoods 
and Early Recovery. UN agencies of interest included: UN-OCHA, UNICEF, UNDP and 
IOM. Government representatives were sought at the national level who had been involved 
in emergency coordination and sector specific ministries, as well as at the local level to 
include local government leaders. Private sector representatives that were involved in or 
affected by the earthquake were also sought. 
 
Number of interviews aimed for: 40 
 
Data collection method: A scoping study was used to identify appropriate stakeholders 
who had been or were currently active in Haiti, through collecting contact lists from the 
response archives. Sorting through these lists resulted in the collation of over 400 potential 
contacts. The use of the ‘snow ball’ technique to find new contacts from interviewees and 
associates in the field was also used. Conferences, cluster meetings and other events were 
attended to gain further relevant contacts.  
 
These contacts were individually contacted by email, phone and in person, to asked for their 
participation in either an interview and/or the online questionnaire. Interviews were 
scheduled over a 6 month period. The interviews were undertaken via several methods, 
either face-to-face, by phone or by Skype call.  
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Areas of interest: humanitarian sector operational framework; internal organisational 
operational frameworks, for agencies and donors; Haiti response operational environment; 
barriers and opportunities in emergency response to stimulate recovery, specific categories: 
internal: mandates and policies, donor set up, staffing and professionalism, assessments, 
programme implementation, recovery triggers, exit planning, timeframe of assessments, 
planning and implementation. External: operational environment, stakeholders, cholera/ 
hurricane season, community resilience factors, community participation, conception of 
recovery and perception of required programing and involvement of agencies, donors and 
the private sector. 
 
How this data collection method contributed to meeting the objectives 
The semi-structured interviews were actively used in the scoping of the key areas that are 
dealt with within the objectives: including Objectives 2, 3, 5 and 6. This was done through 
the coding process, which is explained in the following section. This enabled the 
professionals within the sector of research to inform the direction of the research analysis, 
this ensured correct assumptions were made and crucial areas of analysis were highlighted, 
reducing in turn potential researcher bias.  
 
Refer to Appendix 1b for the semi-structured interview coding outline. 
 
3.8.2.4 Online Questionnaire 
The online questionnaire was developed in English and French to access a broader base of 
respondents in and out of Haiti. Offering another participatory method that can allow total 
anonymity if required, further stimulating participation. 
 
Sampling method: the sample aimed for, was the same as the one used for the semi-
structured interviews, but has the added advantage of offering an easier respondent option 
for French speaking participants particularly within INGOs, LNGOs, government and the 
private sector. 
 
Number of questionnaires aimed for: 30 
 
Data collection method: an online questionnaire was produced in Google docs and 
disseminated to the collated list of contacts found through the scoping study via email. 
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Further encouraged by word of mouth and sent on to related parties through contacts and 
platforms. Both quantitative and qualitative data was produced.  
 
Areas of interest: humanitarian sector operational framework; agencies approach to relief 
and response programming; operational environment in Haiti; programmes focus of 
agencies within the first 6 months, by month 12 and by month 18; funding sources and how 
they shape programmes; assessments included and when were they issued; the level of 
community participation and how was it achieved or not achieved; efficiency of different 
stakeholders; programming considerations: approach to planning, implementation and relief 
to recovery; recovery conceptualisation and implementation; Haiti operational environment 
and its effect on recovery. 
 
How this data collection method contributed to meeting the objectives 
The online questionnaire was heavily orientated towards gauging the variables within the 
humanitarian framework, particularly programmatic elements. This was designed in order to 
gather data to develop an in-depth understanding of the programmes undertaken within the 
case study period to build a picture of the response operation in Haiti and detail key 
operational areas that are frequently highlighted as challenges, in relation to recovery. This 
collection method was able to contribute to meeting Objectives 2, 3, 5 and 6.    
 
Refer to Appendix 1c for the English and French versions of the online questionnaire. 
 
3.8.2.5 Community Discussion Forum (including Sociogram) 
The community discussion forum (CDF) provided a voice of the affected to add richness 
and depth to this research, as well as aiming to understand adaptive resilience and its 
importance for post-disaster recovery. 
 
Sampling method: with the security and access issues present in Haiti, access to IDP 
communities and HHs was restricted. To gain safe access to an affected community in the 
PaP area, INGO programme ‘beneficiaries’ were chosen. BRCs Delmas 19 community were 
the community of choice, this IDP community were directly affected by the earthquake. The 
participants to be involved in the session needed to be a mixture of ages, as well as offering 
a balance of both male and female. 
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Number of participants aimed for: 20 
 
Data collection method: the community chosen was accessed through an agency currently 
working in Haiti, due to security and access reasons. A community discussion forum was set 
up in Delmas 19, with the community contacted for participation through community 
mobilisers. The forum was undertaken in Haitian Creole and included discussion points and 
the Sociogram survey tool (refer to Figure 3.2, pg. 110). Participants were guided and 
helped by 2 community mobilisers, of whom took instruction from the researcher. Data to 
be collected was both quantitative and qualitative. 
 
The Sociogram 
The Sociogram is a survey tool that aims to quantify the level of resilience experienced in a 
community before and after a disaster. This tool has been adapted from Bosher’s (2004) 
developed Sociogram for use in the development context to assess the types and strength of 
social networks experienced individuals within an ‘every day’ context and within a ‘crisis 
period’ (refer to Appendix 1d). The tool has been adapted from the work of social 
psychologist J. L. Moreno, whose studies in the 1940s stimulated exploration into social 
network analysis (Scott 1992; Abercrombie et al 2000). This adapted tool takes the concept 
of recording the types and strengths of social networks experienced by respondents within 
an ‘everyday’ context, as well as within a ‘crisis’ period and expands the tool to include 
further components of resilience, such as the level of access to assets and services 
individuals/HHs have within a pre- and post-disaster context.  
 
The tool had been adapted within this research to go beyond just assessing the strength of 
social connections, but also, to assess the other 4 components of resilience theorised by 
Bosher (2004), which include: access to assets, access to services, economic opportunities 
and access to financial and legal services. This addition required a change in format of the 
Sociogram, to allow for easy of use and analysis. As has been demonstrated in Figure 3.2 
(refer to pg. 110), the categories for review have been allocated a number, rather than using 
the name of the item in question (e.g. family, church leader, friend etc.). This number is then 
written onto the target, by the respondent, in a position that represents the strength of 
connection or level of access to that particular numbered item or service.  
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The target has been more comprehensively and distinctly banded to distinguish the strength 
of connection or level of access, using 4 rings within the target, that are clearly marked for 
the respondent. Where Bosher’s Sociogram keeps the space unmarked for the respondent 
and then uses a scoring template, which encompasses 3 rings to scale the strength of 
connection. This amendment has been pursued to encourage more accurate placing of 
numbers, in reference to their strength of connection or level of access, which will result in 
more detailed and concise data sets. This adapted Sociogram has also been designed to be 
initiated within a post-disaster environment, to directly assess the ‘crisis period’, along with 
their pre-disaster situation.  
 
Figure 3.2 (refer to pg. 111) shows the activity sheet, inclusive of Sociogram, in English. 
However, this was disseminated in Haitian Creole. The activity was led by a session leader 
who ran through each of the questions with their corresponding numbers and the 
participants answered by writing that corresponding number within the ‘Sociogram’ in 
relation to the strength of connection or level of access they felt they had. An example of 
this process has been given in Figure 3.2 the example shows that the participant felt they 
had a strong connection with their family (placing a 1 near the center), but a weak level of 
access to services (placing a 13 away from the center) before the earthquake. After the 
earthquake there was stronger connections with community members (placing a 2 closer to 
the center point) and weaker access to assets (placing a 12 further from the center). This 
exercise was done for ‘before the earthquake’ and one for ‘after the earthquake’ to compare 
and contrast the impact the earthquake had on these components, as well as to understand 
who and what affected individuals/HHs relied upon after the disaster occurred. There was a 
second section to this activity that made up the activity sheet, which asked the participants 
to rate their perceived level of recovery 6 months, 1 year and 2 years after the earthquake 
(refer to Figure 3.2, pg. 111). 
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Strength of connection and access to the following before the earthquake: 
 
WHAT YOU NEED TO DO! Draw the numbers on the diagram (1-13), the closer to 
the center means the stronger the connection or access you have to each particular 
below. 
 
    1= Family  
    2= Other members of the community 
    3= Friends 
    4= Community leaders/ church leaders 
    5= Local organisations/ civil society groups 
    6= Local government (Marie) 
    7= Local businesses 
    8= INGOs 
    9= UN agencies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10= Credit/loan/savings/grant 
11= Existing livelihood (the way you earned 
money) 
12= Existing assets, i.e. house, motor vehicle, 
business 
13= Existing services, i.e. water supply (house 
connection, tap stand, well or kiosk), sanitation 
(private or public), health services? 
 
1 
13 
4 
3 
2 
7 
6 
 
5 
9 8 
11 
10 12 
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Strength of connection and access to the following After the earthquake: 
 
WHAT YOU NEED TO DO! Draw the numbers on the diagram (1-13), the closer to 
the center means the stronger the connection or access you have to each particular 
below. 
 
    1= Family  
    2= Other members of the community 
    3= Friends 
    4= Community leaders/ church leaders 
    5= Local organisations/ civil society groups 
    6= Local government (Marie) 
    7= Local businesses 
    8= INGOs 
    9= UN agencies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  
10= Credit/loan/savings/grant 
11= Existing livelihood (the way you earned 
money) 
12= Existing assets, i.e. house, motor vehicle, 
business 
13= Existing services, i.e. water supply (house 
connection, tap stand, well or kiosk), sanitation 
(private or public), health services? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8
"
13"
12"
!
5
"
4
"
3
"2
"1
"
11
"
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"
9
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Rate of Recovery 
 
WHAT TO DO! Mark one box for each question with an X 
 
1= No recovery, i.e. still no access to basics like permanent shelter and water sources. 
2= Some changes, but struggling to find basic provisions, i.e. food, water, and shelter. 
3= A lot of changes in living standard since the earthquake, but life has not returned to 
the  standard of living before the earthquake. 
4= A lot of changes in living standard since the earthquake, situation is comfortable, 
but not the same standard of living prior to the earthquake. 
5= Fully recovered, I am living a life that is equivalent or beyond the standard before 
the earthquake. 
 
Example: 
 
 
 
 
Question 1) Recovery after 6 months (June 2010)? 
 
 
 
 
 
Question 2) Recovery by the first anniversary of the earthquake? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
  X   
1 2 3 4 5 
 X    
1 2 3 4 5 
  X   
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Question 3) Recovery now 
 
 
 
 
Collected data: what resources were relied upon after the earthquake- ascertaining access 
to services and strength of social and political networks; rate of recovery after 6 months 
after, 1 year after and 2 years; assistance provided- by whom, what, how and when was it 
provided; communication- access to information throughout the response; were needs met? 
what are the next steps? and ascertain developed access to resources and their approach to 
recovery. 
 
How this data collection method contributed to meeting the objectives 
The community discussion forum was included for two purposes. Firstly, to begin to 
develop an understanding of resilience in the post-disaster context, to help meet Objectives 
1, 2, 4 and 5. Secondly, to include the voice of the disaster-affected within this research, 
which gave rise to some of the main barriers to recovery felt by the affected. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
  X   
Figure 3.2 CDF activity sheet, inclusive of Sociogram excercise (adapted from Bosher 2004). 
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3.9 Data Analysis  
 
3.9.1 Desk-Based Review: Analysis Framework 
The literature was analysed by reading and highlighting key information that contributed to 
developing background knowledge and context, to better understand the relevance of the 
objectives stated. Organising this information within the focus areas under sections: current 
debates, issues highlighted, gaps found in knowledge and case study support material. This 
information was then evaluated to allow a summarisation of the material, concisely 
documenting as a literature review. 
 
Archival information from in-field reports was analysed and organised in the same way, but 
were evaluated to develop a case study and offered supporting information to the primary 
data collection. 
 
3.9.2 Semi-Structured Interview: Coding 
Interview transcripts were coded into these specific categories: internal- mandates and 
policies, donor set up, staffing and professionalism, assessments, programme 
implementation, recovery triggers, exit planning; External- operational environment, 
stakeholders, community resilience factors, community participation, cholera and DRR.  
Once information had been organised into these categories, the information was analysed to 
whether it offered a barrier or opportunity to recovery and the reason for this. These reasons 
were again assessed on the basis of whether resilience was impacted, as a direct result or 
offered an innovation to improve recovery through building resilience. These highlighted 
elements were then questioned on how a ‘resilience approach’ to programming could 
improve the barriers to recovery and/or utilise the opportunities by creating innovative 
strategies, strategies that can build resilience through response programming. An example 
of the coding template if given in Appendix 1b. 
 
3.9.3 Online Questionnaire 
Quantitative data produced through the online questionnaire was charted and the responses 
compared. Particular variables were compared, to note any significant patterns, i.e. 
particular programme considerations implemented and the time taken to conceptualise and 
implement recovery initiatives. 
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For the qualitative data, data was coded and assessed under the categories used for the semi-
structured interview (refer to Appendix 1b). Other information was used to further 
contextualise the quantitative data produced in the online questionnaire. 
 
3.9.4 Community Discussion Forum (including Sociogram) 
The Sociogram produced qualitative data detailing information from before and after the 
earthquake. Answers to the 2 separate Sociograms, i.e. one before and one after the 
earthquake, were charted and variables compared. Information was gleaned from the 
discussion to bring further contextual knowledge of the response and understand in reality 
how affected communities were supported by humanitarian intervention. Gaining insight 
into community resilience and its effect on the rate of recovery. 
 
3.9.4.1 Critique of the Sociogram 
As detailed in sub-section 3.8.2.5, the Sociogram, is a tool that was adapted for use within 
this research. The use of the tool within a community discussion forum was successful. 
Participants were able to use it, producing usable data. However, the numbering system 
used to itemise the different connections and services needed extensive explaining, as well 
as support to individuals when filling in the form. It also stimulated communication between 
participants, which led to sharing of information, making results less individually 
representative. This is a situation that can be controlled, as long as the facilitator explains 
the activity thoroughly and the facilitator has a couple of assistants, to ensure participants 
are supported throughout the exercise.  
 
The adaption of more comprehensive banding, used to scale the strength of connection or 
level of access that was visible to respondents, enabled clearly defined results to be 
produced that could be graphed. This allowed pre- and post- earthquake information to be 
easily analysed and compared. It also, produces data that can be easily shared, due to the 
clear and user-friendly nature of the data produced.  
 
The results from the Sociogram, after triangulation with other data sources, including: the 
semi-structured interviews and the online questionnaire were representative. The data 
produced, highlighted many of the major issues experienced within the response, adding a 
valuable source of data. This data reflected key issues experienced, giving evidence of the 
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key components of adaptive resilience within the response and the impact of the response on 
these adaptive resilience components.  
 
The use of this adapted Sociogram tool, within this research, enabled the experience of 
affected communities to be reflected, which ensured all stakeholders within the response 
were represented. 
 
The validity of the data produced indicates the potential for this tool to be utilised to 
measure individual/HH adaptive resilience within post-disaster contexts. Results could then 
be fed into programme planning to better develop adaptive resilience early in a response. 
 
For future use, this tool should be implemented with necessary facilitators, to ensure the 
activity is understood by participants and filled out to produce valid, representative data. 
The group size should be no more than 20, for a facilitator and 2 assistants to effectively 
carry out this activity.  Testing this tool in difference emergency responses, to further 
validate the use of this tool for measuring adaptive resilience with post-disaster contexts, is 
the next essential step. 
 
3.10 Potential Research Limitations 
It is important to note the limitations within the methodologies. Firstly, to understand how 
the new knowledge produced fits into the current body of knowledge. Secondly, to 
understand its true validity. Thirdly, to present potential adaptions for future research. This 
section will briefly take note of the use of a case study methodology, as well as a few 
methodological limitations experienced in the field. 
 
3.10.1 Use of a Case Study Approach 
A case study approach is an approach that can investigate a contemporary phenomenon 
within its real-life context, when the boundaries between phenomena and context are not 
clearly evident and it is an approach that allows for an empirical enquiry that can explain 
causal links, describe real life contexts, illustrate interventions and explore intervention as 
an outcome (Yin 1989). Making it a suitable research strategy for this thesis. However, data 
produced is narrowed into the context of which it was extracted, i.e. within the post-disaster 
context of Haiti, seeing limits to its generalisability. Patton (1990) offered this criticism 
regarding the extent to which individual cases can be generalised to other contexts.  
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This research aims to contribute to the body of knowledge on the themes undertaken within 
this research for it to offer recommendations within practice and policy. The in-depth case 
study will firstly provide data rich evidence, fundamental to develop debate within the 
humanitarian sector for the eventual stimulation of change within practice and policy. 
Secondly, the case study has been designed to be replicable in order to assess multiple 
contexts over time, to further develop the evidence base and to increase its generalisability. 
Thirdly, the case study chosen has been cited as highlighting some fundamental issues seen 
in humanitarian operations and the results; issues that have also been seen in many past 
humanitarian responses (Lloyd-Jones 2006; UN Office of the Secretary-General’s special 
Envoy for Tsunami Recovery 2005; Oxfam International 2005; O’Donnell et al. 2009; 
UNDP 2011). Reflecting that this chosen case study offers a significant element of 
representation for the purpose of conclusive and generalisable findings.  
 
3.10.2 Methodological Limitations Experienced in the Field 
 
3.10.2.1 Limited Sample 
Post-disaster environments by nature are complex and volatile, within the data collection 
period in PaP, Haiti, security issues heightened, which made access to communities 
difficult. This led to the revision of the number of community discussion forums that could 
be safely undertaken. It also saw that the communities to offer representation were ones that 
were directly associated with particular INGOs, reducing the ability of the sample to be 
representative. This saw the data collection method allow for a selected insight into what 
constitutes post-disaster resilience, and to become a method that could allow members of 
the affected population to voice their experience of post-disaster interventions and their own 
recovery, adding valuable richness to the body of data.  
 
3.10.2.2 Language 
The working environment within post-disaster Haiti constituted English, French and Haitian 
Creole speaking nationals and internationals. Data collection methodology undertaken 
within this research accounted for this by offering an English and French version of the 
online questionnaire, as well as undertaking the community forum using Haitian Creole 
speaking nationals. However, all semi-structured interviews were undertaken in English, 
due to the researcher being an English speaker with organisations approached offering to 
conduct their interviews in English if it was their second language. This approach may have 
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limited the sample fractionally. It also saw that French speaking nationals and internationals 
that didn’t speak English were only able to contribute through the online questionnaire. 
 
This section has presented the methodological stance of this thesis, given an overview of the 
research design, presenting a scoping study for the selected case study, along with a detailed 
description of the chosen data collection and analysis methodologies, finishing with a 
clarification of potential methodological limitations. The next section details the data that was 
collected through the 6 months of fieldwork. 
 
3.11 Results: Data Collection 
The previous sections laid the necessary methodological framework for data to be collected 
effectively in the field. This section presents the achieved data collection, presenting the rate 
and type of respondents related to each data collection methodology. The analysis of this data 
will be presented in Chapters 4-8. 
 
3.11.1 The Participants 
Over the 6 month data collection period in the field during September 2011- April 2012, a 
total of 86 participants took part in the research, participating through either semi-structured 
interviews, the online questionnaire and the community discussion forum.  These 
participants ranged from UN agencies (9), INGOs (50), government representatives (3), 
donors (2), LNGOs (2), the local private sector (2) and community representatives (18).  
 
3.11.2 Semi-Structured Interviews 
A total of 37 interviews were undertaken with the total range of stakeholders operating in 
the emergency response: government, donors, UN agencies, INGOs, LNGOs and the local 
private sector. All the main UN agencies of interest (UN-OCHA, UNICEF, UNDP and 
IOM) were interviewed. All sectors of interest (WASH, Shelter, Livelihoods and Early 
Recovery) were also covered. Within the large array of INGO participants interviewed a 
range of specialisms and levels of authority were successfully included (refer to Appendix 
2). 
 
3.11.3 Online Questionnaire 
A total of 31 participants filled in the online questionnaire, which ran live for 4 months. 
There were 23 completed in English and 8 in French. Participants included government 
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representatives, UN agencies and INGOs. Offering a range of specialisms and levels of 
authority.  
 
3.11.4 Community Discussion Forum 
The community discussion forum attracted 18 participants from the Delmas 19 community. 
Of the participants that attended there were 8 males and 10 females, ranging from 18-70 in 
age. This equated to a good representative sample from the community. The session ran for 
1h 45mins, collecting 18 filled out activity sheets that included the Sociograms and 
perceived rate of recovery activity, along with an in-depth discussion. 
 
This Chapter has extensively detailed this thesis’ methodological stance, research strategy 
and specific data collection and analysis methodology. Which laid out the framework for 
how the objectives stated in Chapter 1 were measured. The Chapter was concluded with a 
presentation on the data collection results detailing the level and type of respondents 
involved in the research. This Chapter has laid out the data collection methodology offering 
the foundations for the following two Chapters, which will present a detailed analysis of the 
research findings. 
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4. Resilience Pre- and Post- Earthquake Haiti 
The previous Chapter outlined how data within this research was collected and how it aimed 
to meet the objectives, in order to answer the research problem. This Chapter presents the 
data analysis developed solely for the case study, breaking down the data and highlighting 
the patterns in accordance with each particular objective set out in this thesis. This 
Chapter’s structure will present an overview of the level of resilience seen pre- and post-
earthquake Haiti, looking at areas of adaptive resilience expressed and the recovery deficit 
seen. The results from this Chapter will be concisely concluded within Chapter 9 
demonstrating this research’s contribution to knowledge, theory and practice.  
 
4.1 Data Analysis Utilised 
The impact of the earthquake was severely felt by a large majority of individuals/HHs in 
and around PaP. It was a priority within this research to understand what the level of 
resilience individuals/HHs had pre-earthquake, to understand how that manifested itself 
post-earthquake. The data collection methods used to try and gauge resilience was the 
community discussion forum (including Sociogram), as well as summarised information 
from the literature review. The data produced from the community discussion forum was 
then triangulated with information generated from the semi-structured interviews and 
archival data. 
 
4.2 Levels of Resilience Pre- and Post-Earthquake Haiti 
As summarised in sub-section 2.6.4, the literature has highlighted 5 main attributes to 
resilience: access to assets, access to services, economic opportunities, access to legal and 
financial services and strong social and political networks. This section will review in brief 
each of these attributes, pre- and post-earthquake, to gauge the impact of pre-earthquake 
resilience on the level of absorptive capacity post-event and how this translated into the 
level of resilience expressed, highlighting key areas of adaptive resilience utilised. 
 
4.2.1 Access to Assets  
Access to safe housing was limited for individuals/HHs in the capital PaP, due to a quarter 
of the 10.2 million population now living in the city (ALNAP 2010), with 86% of urban 
residents living in slums (Oxfam 2011). Port-au-Prince is exposed to hurricanes and tropical 
storms with a large number of residences living on steep ravines and hill slopes, indicating 
huge vulnerability. The frequency of disaster experienced in Haiti (e.g. droughts, storms and 
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floods) over the past 20 years sees individuals/HHs loosing assets or suffering degradation 
of assets year on year, weakening resilience (UN-DESA 2010). 
 
The Sociogram participants were asked about their access to assets, which were explained to 
include permanent shelter and any items of financial value or productive use, i.e. tools used 
for livelihood activities, before and after the earthquake. The results showed that access to 
assets varied within the community before the earthquake. However, the majority of 
participants lost all assets after the earthquake. Participants explained that everything they 
had prior to the earthquake had been lost, such as their houses, vehicles, tools, even their 
identifications. Many stated that after 2 years they had still not regained any form of assets 
(refer to Figure 4.1, pg. 122). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Demonstrated the comparative results produced by the Sociogram for 
the question on ‘access to assets’ before and after the earthquake. [Source: 
results from Sociogram, refer to Appendix 1e] 
 
Key: 1= High access level, 5= No access 
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The length of time IDPs relied on tented shelters lasted several years, seeing heavy rains 
from multiple hurricane seasons exacerbated poor housing conditions. This situation was a 
common occurrence for the majority of the displaced in PaP. An INGO respondent stated ‘I 
don't think anyone anticipated it would take so long to clear the camps’. Figure 5.2 (refer to 
pg. 150) provides secondary data produced by IOM in 2012 that coincides with this 
statement. The figure shows the volume of camps and IDPs that existed over an 18 month 
period. It can be noted that after a full year on from the earthquake there were still approx. 
800,000 IDPs of the original 1.5 million dwelling in over 1100 IDP camps. Eighteen months 
on this had dropped, however, almost 400,000 IDPs still were without temporary or 
permanent housing and instead were insecurely situated in one of 575 IDP camps that still 
existed. 
 
Archival data (IFRC 2011, Davis 2012; IASC Haiti E-Shelter/CCCM Cluster 2012) and 
interview responses noted that weak temporary or permanent housing provisions were made 
over the 2 years following the earthquake. Figure 5.5 (refer to pg. 159) gives secondary data 
collected by IOM in 2012 that presents the provision of T-shelter and house repairs 
achieved within the first 18 months after the disaster. The data clearly demonstrates the lack 
of temporary or permanent shelter infrastructure made available to the affected population. 
Results indicating that only 80,000 T-shelters were established within this timeframe that 
aimed to meet the need of 1.5 million IDPs, with only 35,000 T-shelters achieved in the first 
year. Even with the provision of 80,000 T-shelters it was noted that only 23% of T-shelters 
built were provided to families living in camps. Since owning or having access to land was 
a prerequisite for a family to be a beneficiary of a T-shelter program (IASC Haiti E-
Shelter/CCCM Cluster 2012).  
 
Housing repairs themselves only began in February 2011, over a year after the earthquake, 
achieving 5275 repairs within the 18 months. The construction of permanent housing was 
also a significant challenge offering little in the way of permanent shelter solutions within 
the 2 year time period since the earthquake (refer sub-section 5.3.4). 
 
With T-shelters being offered as the main transitional solution for housing provision and a 
slow and limited number of housing repairs and permanent shelters being achieved, it is 
clear that it was an inadequate solution and saw a huge displaced population struggling to 
find sufficient shelter options. The challenges faced concerning shelter provision noted here 
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are further elaborated in sub-section 5.3.3 Presenting what prevailed over the 2 year period 
following the earthquake and the reasons for these challenges. 
 
4.2.2 Access to Basic Services 
Haiti has a clear designation of a fragile state with public institutions functioning at gross 
inefficiency prior to the disaster with less than half the population provided with basic 
services like electricity, water and sanitation (UN-DESA 2010). Haiti has shown to be one 
of the only countries in the world where improved access to water and sanitation has 
decreased in recent years; with only 17% of the population gaining access to improved 
sanitation and 63% to improved water sources (WHO/UNICEF 2010). High prices had to be 
paid for public goods due to the privatisation of the health, education, transport and water 
sectors (ALNAP 2010). This has left the most vulnerable people largely un-served with 
even the most basic of services.   
 
Before the earthquake the majority of the urban population depended on trucked water and 
purchased bottled water. Participants commented in the Sociogram that there was access to 
water. However, the supply came through trucking and local vendors with high prices, 
limiting resource accessibility. This led to household level vulnerability. After the 
earthquake, the Sociogram results showed a drop in the provision of water (refer to Figure 
4.2, pg. 125). However, this was not significant, due to the immediate revival of the private 
sector and the large delivery of trucked water provided by the humanitarian community. 
What is important to note is the shift in provider of water pre- and post-earthquake, the 
majority of water supply made available pre-earthquake was through private sector entities, 
post-earthquake the majority of water was provided through the international community, 
for over 2 years. This shift in provider has a negative effect on resilience due to the 
unsustainability of the provision, as well as the knock on effect a parallel service has on 
existing providers in terms of market viability, consequently destroying local service 
provision structures and local livelihoods. 
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The consequence of a camp focused approach and the difficulties presented in finding 
permanent shelter for IDPs saw the provision of basic services, such as water and sanitation, 
unable to return to a stable state. This was a consequence of basic provisions for water and 
sanitation being continuously delivered in the form of unsustainable services for camps, 
with very little public or private sector provision reinstated. Archival data1, in the form of 
transcribes from WASH cluster meetings and official statements delivered by the 
government, indicated that DINEPA wanted agencies to exit from trucking water (the main 
water supply option used) after 6 months of the emergency. However, agencies struggled to 
find alternatives, lacking the ability to exit from or transfer services. As a result water 
trucking continued for over 2 years with many organisations either, desperately trying to 
hand over to DINEPA, who had a very limited capacity, or just dropping services all 
                                                        
1  WASH Cluster meeting minutes from 24 meetings held between the 15th-27th January 2010. 
   WASH cluster plan for the distribution of water (21st January 2010) 
   DINEPA WASH Strategy (February 2010) 
Figure 4.2 Demonstrates the results from the Sociogram answering the question on 
‘access to services’ before and after the earthquake. [Source: results from Sociogram, 
refer to Appendix 1e] 
 
Key: 1= High access level, 5= No access 
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together, as a result of a lack of funds, which left communities un-served (refer to sub-
section 5.4.2).  
 
With the final number of IDPs in PaP alone reaching 1.5 million with the majority dwelling 
in camps saw the main strategy for water supply amounting to water trucking. INGO and 
government respondents highlighted within interview that investment in this strategy to 
supply water to the majority of the displaced through trucking was an incredibly expensive 
and unsustainable undertaking. Never-the-less, this ‘initial’ strategy became the WASH 
landscape for the next 2 years. 
 
Within the 2 year period after the earthquake, there were initiatives that looked to develop 
more sustainable water supply and sanitation facilities. These included some INGO actors 
offering to support the repair of the public water supply network, the standpipes and their 
storage reservoirs, also to capacity build local private sector water kiosks (refer to case 
study 4, pg. 176). These initiatives were not undertaken at scale and were initiated 6 months 
to 2 years after the earthquake and saw a limited impact and an increasing void in 
sustainable service provision. 
 
Sanitation services were provisioned mainly in camps with a few public facilities made 
available. INGO, LNGOs and government respondents noted that the provision of sanitation 
was slower than water supply provision, seeing many camps, particularly smaller ones 
without sanitation facilities for 6-12 months after the earthquake. Limited sustainable 
sanitation provision was achieved. The strategies that were initiated included 
neighbourhood sanitation solutions. However, these were achieved much later in the 
response and only at a small scale by a few agencies (refer to Case study 7, pg. 183). The 
lack of recovery of water and sanitation services highlighted here is further elaborated in 
section 5.4.2. This section breaks down the strategic challenges found and what resulted 
within the 2 year period since the earthquake. 
 
4.2.3 Economic Opportunities 
Port-au-Prince has a long history of corruption, state violence and organised violent crime 
and widespread poverty, seeing large levels of unemployment or employment with minimal 
income, i.e. labour, small scale agriculture or small stalls (Pelling 2010). The Sociogram 
demonstrated that participants struggled to find sufficient economic opportunities prior to 
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the earthquake. After the earthquake many participants stated they had lost their livelihoods 
and had been unable to regain sufficient work to generate much needed income (refer to 
Figure 4.3, pg. 127). Participants stated as a result they were still struggling to get back on 
their feet.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Archival data produced by donors (EC 2012; IDB 2012) suggested that there were 
initiatives that allowed for job creation, such as infrastructure projects that required large 
amounts of labour and private sector development initiatives through investment in SMEs 
(Small to Medium Enterprises). With UN agency data (UN 2011; UNDP 2013) stating job 
creation figures, such as in 2011, UN agencies created just over 280,000 jobs, with IOM 
generating 140,000 jobs and UNDP creating 125,000 jobs, and by 2012 UNDP managed 
solely to create 400,000 jobs, inclusive of both short-term and long-term employments using 
this approach (refer to sub-section 6.2.2.2). Thus, there were initiatives in place. However, 
the volume of jobs, the type of work, i.e. short-term, temporary, permanent, and the 
Figure 4.3 Demonstrates the results from the Sociogram answering the 
question on participant access to livelihoods, before and after the earthquake. 
[Source: results from Sociogram, refer to Appendix 1e]. 
 
Key: 1= High access level, 5= No access 
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timeframe of which this work was made available would not have been enough to make the 
impact needed to build crucial livelihoods for all that were in need.  
 
4.2.4 Financial Services 
Access to cash, loans and grants was also highlighted as an immediate problem. This was a 
heightened issue due to many of the affected population being renters prior to the 
earthquake, with the majority just putting down the bulk of their savings for the annual 
rental period. Thus, when the disaster struck many people had little financial resources to 
tap into. Also the use of community revolving funds was commonly used in Haitian society, 
seeing a large number of individuals/HHs owing money when the earthquake hit, leaving 
many indebted. After the earthquake participants noted there was limited to no access to 
cash and loans for over 2 years.   
 
Both archival data (Groupe URD 2010; Kolbe and Muggah 2010) and interview respondents 
noted that in the first months of the earthquake an incredible amount of financial support 
was sent by Haitian diaspora to their friends and relatives. Cash programme initiatives were 
also highlighted, such as Cash for Work, Cash for Food, house reconstruction grants, 
construction vouchers and rental support (refer to sub-section 6.2.2.3 and Case study 2, pg. 
155). The availability, timeliness and frequency of these initiatives saw only a limited 
number of individuals/HH able to receive cash through them, often being presented in an 
untimely and ineffective manner. Loans themselves, were limited in their existence and the 
ones that were made available were due to social investment initiative, aimed to help 
stimulate private sector development. Therefore, individuals/HH had almost no access to 
loans. A more detailed evaluation of the employment of cash, loans and grants is covered in 
sub-section 6.2.2. 
 
Through the Sociogram, participants were asked about their access to credit, loans and 
grants. The results showed that access to these financial mechanisms have always been low, 
with access decreasing after the disaster (refer Figure 4.4, pg. 129).  
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4.2.5 Social Connections 
Before the earthquake, Haitian society suffered social fragmentation, corruption and high 
crime rates leading to weak social bonds beyond immediate family. A weak civil society 
also existed which has meant there were few local institutions or resources available 
(Pelling 2010).  
 
Respondents within the Sociogram stated that during the first months after the earthquake 
the majority of individuals/HHs were able to rely on their families, who lived outside of the 
affected area or overseas, it was noted that there were very strong ties of solidarity within 
the community.  The Sociogram noted that connections with family were strong before and 
after the earthquake, with connections to community members being good before and 
becoming strengthened after (refer to Figure 4.5, pg. 130 and Figure 4.6, pg. 131). Archival 
data in the form of evaluatory reports (DEC 2011a; IFRC 2011b; CAFOD 2011), along with 
interview responses from a variety of stakeholders, also highlight the strong sense of 
Figure 4.4 Demonstrates the results from the Sociogram on the question of 
‘access to credit/loans/grants’ before and after the earthquake. [Source: results 
from Sociogram, refer to Appendix 1e] 
 
Key: 1= Strong connection, 5= No connection. 
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community that prevailed in the onset of the disaster. What was also noted was the large 
influx of support from the Haitian diaspora. This strong social connection between family 
and community members enabled essential survival strategies to be established, including: 
the sharing of scarce resources and social relationships, such as kinship, patronage, 
friendship and informal credit networks to be provided (Agarwal 1990). The existence of 
community practices, such as supportive social networks mitigate adverse consequences and 
maximise potential for recovery and growth (Violanti et al. 2000). 
 
Interesting to note is that connections with community/church leaders and friends decreased 
after the earthquake (refer to Figure 4.7, pg. 132 and Figure 4.8, pg. 133). This could be 
attributed to the weaker original strength of connection felt with community/church leaders 
and friends, therefore, the level of dependence on those connections in a time of emergency 
in comparison with family and close community members.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5 Demonstrates the level of connection with family members 
before and after the earthquake. [Source: results from Sociogram, refer to 
Appendix 1e] 
 
Key: 1= Strong connection, 5= No connection. 
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Figure 4.7 Demonstrates the level of connection with community/ church 
leaders before and after the earthquake. [Source: results from Sociogram, 
refer to Appendix 1e] 
 
Key: 1= Strong connection, 5= No connection. 
 
 
Figure 4.6 Demonstrates the level of connection with other members 
of the community before and after the earthquake. [Source: results 
from Sociogram, refer to Appendix 1e] 
 
Key: 1= Strong connection, 5= No connection. 
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The respondents highlighted, through the Sociogram, that their connection with local 
organisations and INGOs increased significantly after the disaster, showing their heavy 
reliance on these entities for relief and recovery activities (refer to Figures 4.9, pg. 133 and 
4.10, pg. 134).  
 
4.3 Adaptive Resilience 
The low levels of resilience at the individual/HH level witnessed in Haiti saw the existence 
of weak coping strategies and as a result experienced a significant impact from the disaster 
event. Low levels of resilience saw individuals/HHs absorptive capacity exceeded rapidly 
and therefore, in a vulnerable state with limited ability to recover. There were several areas 
where adaptive resilience was expressed, including: the immediate dependence on host 
families. Digicel, a large mobile phone operator in Haiti, had data noting their customer 
movement after the earthquake. The data indicated that a large proportion of the disaster 
Figure 4.8 Demonstrates the level of connection with friends before 
and after the earthquake [Source: results from Sociogram, refer to 
Appendix 1e] 
 
Key: 1= Strong connection, 5= No connection. 
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affected population fled out the city and into the surrounding countryside (refer to Figure to 
4.11, pg. 135). Their exit was supported by free transportation issued by the government. 
This reduced the burden on authorities and provided essential security to traumatised 
families. 
However, due to the centralised support offered by the humanitarian community focusing 
on camps, saw little support reaching host families, resulting in families unable to 
continually support the large number of IDPs. The consequence of this, and as was 
witnessed by many INGO representatives, within 2-3 weeks hundreds of thousands of IDPs 
returned to PaP and flooded into the camps. Camp set up at the start of the response was 
small, however, within a few weeks many had doubled or tripled in size, e.g. La Piste camp 
had 30,000 IDPs at the start, 3-4 weeks later 50,000 IDPs and 5 weeks later 70,000 IDPs.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.9 Demonstrates the level of connection with local organisations 
and civil society before and after the earthquake. [Source: results from 
Sociogram] 
 
Key: 1= Strong connection, 5= No connection. 
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Figure 4.10 Demonstrates the level of connection with INGOs was weak 
before and after the earthquake. [Source: results from Sociogram] 
 
Key: 1= Strong connection, 5= No connection. 
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Figure 4.11 shows the affected areas in Haiti and movement of people after the earthquake.  
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Many of the IDPs within PaP became camp residents within the same commune they 
originated. Figure 4.12 (refer to pg. 136) demonstrates the actual level of communal 
displacement of IDPs, highlighting that 73% of displaced families were situated within the 
section of the commune they originated, with a further 7% of IDPs situated within the same 
commune, but in a different section. Resulting in an overwhelming majority of IDPs living 
in their original neighbourhoods. This indicated a reliance on strong social connections as a 
form of adaptive resilience. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The private sector was noted as very involved and ready to provide trucks and bottled water. 
The large and already operational private sector was utilised for trucking and bottle 
distribution only.  There was a significant network of private water vendors operating before 
the earthquake, which could have been capitilised on from day one to offer a further 
alternative supportive strategy to that of water trucking. One of a few strategies that could 
have allowed the build up of transitional capacity, enabling a rapid exit from trucking, 
reducing the huge financial burden and the development of sustainable service 
infrastructure. 
 
Figure 4.12 A graph showing IDP origin, highlighting the overwhelming majority of 
camp residents living in the same administrative section as before the earthquake. 
[Source: IOM Data Management Unit 2013] 
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4.4 Individual/Household Recovery Deficit in Haiti 
As a part of the community discussion forum participants, who were representatives of the 
disaster-affected population, were asked about their recovery. An activity presented to them 
sort to gauge their ‘perceived rate of recovery’ over a 2 year period, rating their perceived 
recovery after a 6 month mark, a 1 year mark, and a 2 year mark (refer to Appendix 1e). 
Participants rated on average their perceived rate of recovery, over the 2 years since the 
earthquake, had increased with the rate slowing down from year 1 to year 2 (refer to Figure 
4.12, pg.138).  Even with the increase in the perceived rate of recovery over 2 years the 
majority of the participants believed there had been some changes over the 2 year timeframe 
since the earthquake. However, they were still struggling to find basic provisions, such as 
food, water and shelter; seeing that recovery or a return to a functioning state had not 
occurred. 
 
Breaking down the ‘perceived rate of recovery’ results to the individual shows that 28% 
believed the level of their recovery has not changed at all over the 2 year period, 39% 
believed it had increased, 5% believed their level of recovery had decreased, with 11% 
saying the rate increased at year 1 and since has decreased, and the final 5% showed the 
level of recovery decreased for them between the 6 months mark and the year 1 mark, but 
had increased up until the 2 year mark (results from a response rate of 18 individuals).  
 
After 6 months most participants stated that they were able to access basic resources, such 
as water, foods, hygiene kits and money, but their position stayed the same; things didn’t 
change much up until the first anniversary. After the first anniversary of the earthquake 
respondents stated that they were still able to get access to basic resources, but not at the 
same service level, they were obliged to get things through their family, trying to help each 
other in the community. It was highlighted that the community were still struggling to 
recover. Many people commented that they still struggled because the rate of 
recovery/return to a functioning state had slowed down.    
 
In order to pinpoint the key areas that caused the barriers to recovery participants were 
asked ‘over the past 2 years were your needs met in a timely manner?’ The participants 
expressed that only their basic survival needs had been satisfied. They explain they were 
still living in the same way they were a few months after the earthquake.  
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The community discussion forum ended with participants being asked ‘what are your next 
steps?’ This was to give insight into factors they perceived to be important for them to 
recover and gain a state of functionality. The main answers included the need for 
progressive neighbourhood reconstruction, to gaining the ability to access money to set up 
businesses, many of the participants noted they were waiting for job opportunities and a 
wish to access knowledge through skills training, as they felt that would help them for the 
long-term.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.13 Perceived rate of recovery over a 2-year period since the earthquake (refer 
to key for clarification on rate of recovery classifications).  [Source: results from 
Sociogram activity, refer Appendix 1e] 
Key: 
1 = No recovery, i.e. still no access to basics like permanent shelter and water sources. 
2= Some changes, but struggling to find basic provisions, i.e. food, water, shelter. 
3 = A lot of changes in living standard since the earthquake, but life has not returned to 
       the standard of living before the earthquake. 
4 = A lot of changes in living standard since the earthquake, situation is comfortable, 
       but not the same standard of living prior to the earthquake. 
5 = Fully recovered, I am living a life that is equivalent or beyond the standard  
       before the earthquake. 
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There was a large humanitarian response that aimed to cater for immediate shelter, basic 
service and food needs. However, recovery was poorly established through response 
activities and the reasons for this will be analysed in depth in the following 2 Chapters. The 
main points that can be deduced in reference to raising adaptive resilience are: the provision 
of permanent shelter options – this provision increases protection and stabilises day to day 
functioning; the provision of sustainable services, such as water, sanitation and health - 
providing these essential services after a disaster reduces an affected population’s 
vulnerability, protecting public health and providing an economic good; access to 
sustainable livelihood options- provides an essential income that can be used to reduce 
individuals/HHs vulnerability by acquiring essential goods and services to build resilience; 
access to cash, loans and grants - offer opportunities to re-establish essential assets, such as 
a home, also this provision can be used to re-establish or establish new businesses 
generating essential livelihoods.  
 
This Chapter has assessed the data from the community discussion forum, including the 
Sociogram, triangulating data with archival data and information from semi-structured 
interviews, through the 5 main components of resilience (as referenced by Bosher (2004) – 
these components are further developed within section 7.2) to gauge pre- and post-
earthquake resilience at the individual/HH level. The analysis has highlighted that there was 
low levels of resilience before the earthquake hit Haiti, which saw individuals/HHs 
absorptive capacity exceeded rapidly. Consequently, leaving these individuals/HHs in a 
vulnerable state with limited ability to recover. Within the immediate aftermath of the 
earthquake a number of adaptive resilience mechanisms were witnessed including: the 
immediate dependence on host families, maintaining strong social connections by setting up 
tents close to their place of origin, private sector capacity ready to meet demand, markets re-
established. The humanitarian response didn’t actively support these adaptive resilience 
mechanisms due to their choice of response strategy, that took a centralised approach 
focusing on camp provision and the setting up of parallel basic services.  
 
The following Chapter will breakdown in detail Shelter and WASH sector programming 
undertaken within the emergency response.  To highlight how programmatic decision 
making and implementation affected the development of individual/HH resilience in Haiti.   
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5. The Impact of Emergency Programmes on Resilience in Haiti 
This Chapter looks to meet Objective 2. To gauge the impact emergency response 
programmes had on individual and household resilience in post-earthquake Haiti. Presenting 
the Chapter in a format that will firstly, layout the discussion of the main findings by 
drawing on relevant data sets offering up their analysis, and, secondly, concluding the main 
findings in order to deduce the objective in question within the case study context. The data 
analysis will be broken down into sections that will look in-depth at emergency response 
programmes, specifically at Shelter and WASH, assessing their immediate response 
approach and its outcome, followed by their transitional and recovery strategy 
understanding its outcome. The section will then breakdown elements of response agency 
capacity, detailing crucial programmatic components, such as assessments, transitional and 
exit planning, recovery programming, strategic capacity and community participation. 
 
5.1 Data Analysis Utilised 
A recovery deficit was identified in Haiti and an objective of this research is to understand 
how emergency response operations in Haiti supported or hindered adaptive resilience and 
its consequence on overall recovery. The data collection methods used to ascertain this 
objective included: the semi-structured interviews, the online questionnaire, and archival 
data. 
 
5.2 The Humanitarian Response Approach and its Effect on Adaptive Resilience 
In the onset of the emergency relief, thousands of NGOs flooded the country. Due to the 
scale of the disaster, the complex urban environment and a weak government, the response 
suffered huge coordination problems. Cluster groups formed rapidly, though many were not 
effective in their management. This was, in part, due to the sheer volume of representatives 
participating in co-ordination meetings. As a result, the meetings became information 
sharing sessions rather than the necessary environments to undertake planning and 
strategising activities (refer to Figure 5.1, pg. 141).   
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Figure 5.1 Humanitarian assistance seen in earthquake-affected areas by March 2010. 
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Many local Creole and French speaking organisations struggled in the initial English 
speaking cluster meetings and with a large focus on emergency planning, expertise in the 
development sector was ignored, resulting in many of these organisations being pushed out 
of planning and coordination activities. This was a missed opportunity to tap into essential 
local knowledge, something the humanitarian sector lacked when entering this response. It 
has been noted that dominating cluster personalities guided programming in a ‘preferred 
way of operating’, rather than being responsive to the operational environment, which 
resulted in losing sight of the context. 
 
With a separation of activities through the cluster system holistic, integrated programming 
was made difficult. Firstly, activities such as the provision of T-shelters and permanent 
housing, clearing rubble and early recovery were all separated into individually managed 
clusters. In addition, weak communication amongst the clusters increased the problem. A 
lack of expertise present at the meetings, due to many of the relief workers being new to the 
role, saw a weak understanding of how to manage large displaced populations. With a focus 
on number crunching and not on developing effective and timely strategies, the 
humanitarian sector was unable to adequately respond to the changing needs of the disaster. 
Moreover, the impact of the devastation also significantly limited technical communication 
and, as a result, individual agencies found their own appropriate solutions to overcome this, 
thus, further preventing a coherent and contextual strategy to be implemented. 
 
However, even with all these difficulties, the cluster system was seen as successful, 
particularly the WASH cluster that was lead by DINEPA - Haiti’s ministry for water and 
sanitation. This cluster’s Strategic Advisory Group (SAG) was seen to have authority, 
where protocol suggested was taken on by the agencies. It can be said that the support 
DINEPA received in the early stages of the response by the WASH community provided 
them with the capacity and skill to feedback effectively. 
 
The weak government and struggling clusters at an early stage also meant there was no 
effective policy environment for response actors to operate in. Thus, strengthening, 
informing and working with the government from the start of the response could have 
helped generate a policy environment the agencies could work effectively in, allowing for a 
more informed response. Instead what resulted was an ad hoc programming that had to 
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contend with failed country systems, land tenure issues and a lack of operating standards 
specific to the context. 
 
Lack of comprehension of the country systems and the battle against land right issues also 
led to delays in the conceptualisation, and possible implementation, of longer-sighted 
operational work. Establishing rights to land was a huge barrier to recovery. Ownership was 
difficult to establish. Thus, the construction of permanent housing was very difficult. 
Limited record keeping and the destruction of administrative offices in the earthquake, 
together with the fact there were many landowners who had died, or had been displaced, 
after the earthquake, meant that establishing land rights became extremely complex. This, in 
turn, then held up crucial recovery activity, as even temporary shelters could only be built 
on land that had a fully understood legal status or was rented.  
 
What was not supported were the host families that housed the large numbers of affected 
households. With the great burden of distant relatives and/or friends on already resource 
strained households, this provision was unsustainable. The large IDP camps that were set up 
in PaP offered the alternative support and it was found that many fled back to PaP. The 
numbers being received by IDP camps shot up exponentially a couple of weeks after the 
disaster. 
 
It has been noted that there was a change in the level of dependency after the earthquake 
had occurred. There is a history and a culture of dependency before the disaster, ‘but the 
response has increased it 10 fold’ states an INGO representative. This led to a culture within 
the relief environment that saw affected communities become demanding, not wanting to 
help themselves unless payment was available, and aggressive behavior was noted if all 
demands were not met. An example being: ‘You will rot in hell, because you have not 
provided us with an orphanage’ - a statement expressed to an expat relief worker in a camp 
where their work had provided extensive WASH and shelter facilities, to which the scope of 
their work was clearly communicated to the community. 
 
A particular problem with transition for many large IDP camps occupying state land was the 
recognition of ownership status. The state did not allow the building of any permanent 
structures or any other activities to be undertaken on the land. Thus, the communities, kept a 
temporary status and, consequently, temporary services, despite having resided there for 
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some considerable length of time. Consequently, a real problem in this set up is the potential 
for large camps to become ill-serviced slums when relief agencies have stop supplying 
temporary services, there being no alternative options to offer. 
 
To illustrate this point, the cholera outbreak in October 2010 had a huge impact on the 
Haitian community, hitting hardest areas of the country where WASH coverage was as low 
as 3%, with a consequential mortality of 7000 people and over 300,000 being hospitalised 
(Humanitarian Response 2012). It became the second disaster to hit Haiti that year. This 
outbreak and the oncoming hurricane season led to numerous and immediate changes within 
agencies operations. Many were trying to execute exit strategies just before the outbreak 
occurred; the outbreak delayed this by at least 6 months, taking up considerable resources.  
 
The end of 2011 saw many agencies closing down relief-orientated operations and/or 
handing over programmes in order to exit. A large number of INGOs left due to the lack of 
funds, abandoning many needed services; this caused some volatility from the Haitian 
community against the international community.  The government in 2012, then begun 
actively disassembling IDP camps, under their 16/6 programme (refer to Case study 2, pg. 
152), to start returning the city to some form of normality. However, this was not a simple 
process and tensions flared within these communities. The ministries, some agencies and 
financial institutions attempted to implement recovery initiatives and essential 
infrastructure, but there was a considerable lack of recovery expertise, capacity, resources 
and holistic strategy to ensure a rapid transition. This resulted in an unnecessary protracted 
crisis, where recovery was not adequately supported until 2 years after the disaster. This left 
the country vulnerable, with increased dependency and negatively affected local markets 
and services, leaving a weakened society that struggled to recover and rehabilitate itself. 
This, then, raises the question whether there is a more appropriate approach to take within 
emergency response that has the ability to stimulate recovery and leave more sustainable 
options for the disaster affected nation rather than chaos? 
 
5.3 Emergency Response Programme Analysis- Shelter 
The provision of shelter in the immediate aftermath of a disaster is a key priority for health 
and safety issues. The chosen approach to shelter provision and the continuing strategy 
plays a huge role in the level of household resilience experienced in the post-disaster 
environment, as it impacts on the level of vulnerability felt and also effects the level of 
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services provided, the potential availability of livelihood options and the maintenance of 
social networks, which all aid in the process of recovery (refer to section 4.2). 
 
5.3.1 Challenges in the Immediate Aftermath 
As presented in the literature reviewed for this case study context (refer to section 2.5), the 
post-disaster urban environment of PaP presented a host of challenges as, prior to the 
earthquake many problems existed, such as the lack of full civilian registration, low 
coverage of public services, a lack of quality infrastructure and housing stock, lack of urban 
planning, homeless and slum dwellers, land tenure issues, weak institutional capacities, and 
high population density (especially in small plots with high building occupancy). The 
majority of the population of PaP were tenants, with many tenants just having paid the 
annual rent; this saw a vast amount of the affected population with no savings.  
 
Archival data (IFRC 2011b; Groupe URD 2010; Ferris and Ferro-Ribiero 2012) and 
responses from stakeholders present in the immediate aftermath noted that after the 
earthquake, in PaP’s cramped urban environment, response agencies faced massive 
displacements with weak displacement tracking and a lack of accurate information in the 
first few months. This resulted in shelter needs not being well understood and the default 
support and development of thousands of IDP camps all over the city. There was a huge 
amount of debris in the streets, which hampered accessibility to neighbourhoods and, 
together with unclear land tenure status, this limited the delivery of T-shelters in original 
plots. Internally displaced populations in urban centers became operationally difficult to 
distinguish between the disaster affected population and the less affected urban poor. 
 
5.3.2 Immediate Response Strategy 
The Shelter Cluster in Haiti has been active since the 2008 hurricane, enabling a level of 
prepositioned stocks to have been developed. The Shelter and Food Security clusters were 
called by the GoH on January 13th 2010 and requested to immediately initiate the 
distribution of prepositioned stocks. However, only small quantities of prepositioned stocks 
were available in relation to the overall need. The collaboration between the two clusters 
and the logistic support of MINUSTAH did allow for the shelter cluster to distribute items 
very early in the response. The establishment of the emergency shelter pipeline in 
combination with prepositioned stocks allowed for continual and effective distribution of 
materials from the 14th January 2010.  
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The Shelter cluster was led by IOM in the immediate aftermath, from February 3rd 2010. 
IFRC then took the lead. IOM continued to provide assistance to cluster partners by 
managing the NFI pipeline and coordinating Camp Coordination and Camp Management 
(CCCM). IFRC sent a Shelter Coordination Team to support the Haitian government in the 
inter-agency coordination of Shelter actors. IFRC then handed over the coordination of the 
Shelter/NFI Cluster to UN-HABITAT on November 10th 2010.  
 
From the outset the cluster was split up into sub-working groups with a representative for 
each activity focus, e.g. rubble clearing, CCCM and the provision of T-shelter and 
permanent housing. This Cluster activity separation was noted as a problem due to the 
interlinking nature of the activities and the distinct lack of communication and cooperation 
between the working-groups. For example rubble clearing needed to be coordinated with T-
shelter provision and permanent housing construction and CCCM needed to be coordinated 
with T-shelter and permanent shelter for transition dynamics. Several INGO respondents 
stated that this separation didn’t allow a comprehensive strategy to be formed, which would 
have increased the effective delivery of response and recovery activities.  
  
There was also the problem of who was responsible for undertaking needs and damage 
assessments early in the response, delaying access to this vital information at critical times. 
 
Camps 
The sporadic pop up of communal tented camps by survivors led to the proactive adoption 
of a classic humanitarian approach of implementing IDP camps, despite the fact that it was 
an urban population, displaced in or near their neighbourhoods, who had taken refuge in 
case there were further tremors. Archival data, in the form of agency and donor reports, 
highlighted the fact that the sector had problems adapting to the large number and different 
types of camps, which had spontaneously sprung up in every spare gap in the city (e.g. from 
a few isolated tents in the streets to camps of several thousand people) and, despite efforts to 
register people, geographically reference sites and attempts to distribute the different areas 
between humanitarian agencies, the camps were unevenly served. Some camps, particularly 
at ‘high profile’ locations, received an abundance of aid, while certain sites in isolated areas 
and host areas were left ill-served. 
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Many INGO representatives saw involvement in larger camps as cheaper and better 
logistically in the short-term and the emergency shelter response was effective in that it 
managed to provide shelter for 1.5 million within 4 months. It was noted by a certain 
number of agencies that, once the larger camps were being provided for by agencies, some 
of the new agencies on the scene wanted to approach camp management on a smaller scale. 
Thus, were steered into supporting the smaller sporadic camps, which had kept people close 
to their neighbourhoods. It was found by these agencies that this strategy also helped 
redevelop livelihoods, as people could access their former customer base. 
 
The major problem came with the conceptualisation of how 1.5 million people would find 
alternative shelter arrangements in the long term, and how long the camps could be 
managed to meet camp residence needs until this time. 
 
As previously mentioned, the earthquake aftermath found most people with little cash and 
assets (refer to section 4.2). What was seen was an incredible amount of financial support 
sent by Haitian diaspora to their friends and relatives, which allowed many affected people 
to obtain better emergency shelter conditions and to get or contribute to an interim 
transitional solution. Host family support was also strong and helped to obtain better shelter 
conditions for thousands of affected persons.  
 
As also noted in section 4.2, in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, a large 
percentage of the affected population in PaP fled the city to all four corners of the country to 
find support from friends and family. This reduced the burden on authorities and provided 
essential security to many traumatised families. However, as witnessed by many INGO 
representatives, many of these families returned within 2-3 weeks and flooded into the 
camps. Thus, many of the small camps set up at the start had, within a few weeks, doubled 
or tripled in size, e.g. La Piste camp had 30,000 IDPs at the start, 3-4 weeks later 50,000 
IDPs and 5 weeks later 70,000 IDPs.   
 
Strategic planning 
A large amount of archival data (IFRC 2011b; DARA 2011; Crawford et al. 2010; IASC 
Haiti E-Shelter/CCCM Cluster 2012) that reported on the progress of the response noted the 
overwhelming shelter needs and post-disaster constraints that exceeded the capacities of the 
GoH and humanitarian actors to provide necessary shelter needs throughout the response. 
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The lack of damage and needs assessments, combined with the lack of land to relocate the 
displaced people to, forced humanitarian actors to make decisions on how to respond to the 
most pressing shelter needs on the back of minimal information. It was only in early 
February that the Shelter cluster put together and agreed, with the GoH, the first Shelter 
Sector Response Plan (SSRP), in which the main guidelines for emergency shelter were 
drafted, principal challenges were identified, technical advice was included and 
coordination and monitoring mainstreams stated. This allowed Shelter agencies to have a 
common platform to operate from. 
 
The SSRP was a 5-year strategy in two phases: the first three months and a later extended 
period. The plan aimed to achieve full transitional shelter within 12 months in two phases. 
The first phase objective was to assure emergency shelter within 3 months, before the 
hurricane season began. This was achieved. The strategy assumed a gap of about 6-8 
months between the emergency shelter milestone and one for transitional shelter. As 
highlighted later in this section, this was a complex process and not achieved in the planned 
timeframe. 
 
Together with the emergency shelter provision, the SSRP considered three main blocks of 
activities for transitional shelter: 
 1. A registration process 
 2. Assessment of building safety and demolition of unsafe structures 
3.The provision of a range of transitional shelter solutions for IDPs and Non-displaced 
tenants, including:  
a) For displaced populations: transitional shelters (a frame of timber, bamboo or 
steel sheeting and a roof of corrugated metal); cash/vouchers for additional 
construction materials; and coordinated rubble clearance.  
b) For non-displaced tenants: relocation assistance - rental assistance; extended 
credit; and the provision of a range of more permanent shelter solutions for non-
displaced owners, including: self-help, phased materials distribution, and 
technical advice. 
 
Archival data in the form of situational and reflective reports (Groupe URD 2011; IFRC 
2011; Davis 2012; IASC Haiti E-Shelter/CCCM Cluster 2012; IOM 2013) being generated 
by stakeholders in the response, along with corroborating data collected through the 
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interview and questionnaire, noted that, despite the wide range of options presented through 
the SSRP, they were not equally used nor integrated into the main response with the 
relevance that each one could have had. The direct provision and construction of transitional 
shelters was by far the most frequently used option to give an interim solution, both in IDP 
camps and in the previous living sites. Host family support and other cash transfer related 
options were integrated by some agencies to a much lower extent. Shelter actors did not 
especially promote its use, which could be due to the lack of proper assessments that would 
recommend this option and/or to the high workload. Transitional/temporary relocation in 
planned sites was not strongly supported due to the lack of available land and the possibility 
that large temporary settlements away from communities and livelihood opportunities may 
create dependencies, social problems and security threats and also inhibit recovery, as was 
seen in Coraille (a poorly planned relocation site for temporary shelters). However, when 
necessary, and only as a last resort, agencies supported the GoH driven relocations 
providing T-shelters to relocate the population. 
 
5.3.3 The Outcome of the Immediate Response Strategy on Adaptive Resilience and 
Resulting Level of Recovery 
An INGO representative involved in camp management highlighted that the cost in total to 
keep disaster affected people in the IDP camps was US$1000 per person per year (this 
figure includes all services provided to the IDP), which resulted in this being a very costly 
long-term option due to the fact IDP camps were unable to close or even attempt to close for 
over 2 years after the earthquake. Though the IDP camp residents were given plastic 
sheeting with a recommended life-span of 6 months in the first few months in the camps, 
the vast majority of the 135,000 families that were still in IDP camps 2 years on were just 
about to enter a third rainy season still using the same plastic sheeting. 
 
Due to the length of time IDPs were residing in camps throughout the city, landowners and 
communities became frustrated, resulting in many IDPs faced with forced eviction. In the 
first 2 years after the earthquake 53,366 people had been forcibly evicted from 130 IDP 
camps. A further 81,982 people living in 147 camps were also under threat of eviction at 
this time, representing 19% of the total IDP population in Haiti – almost one in five (IOM 
2012b). 
 
Figure 5.2 (refer to pg. 150), with data provided by IOM, show the evolution of the camp 
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population since the earthquake. When compared to the number of housing solutions 
provided by the international aid response it is striking to note that the vast majority of 
Haitian families in camps after the earthquake left the camp without any assistance. This 
could be attributed to the level of adaptive capacity. However, the fall in camp population 
can also be attributed to those who were forced to leave the camps through eviction and as 
the result of flooding, landslides and cholera. 
 
 
Sectoral reports (CAFOD 2011; IFRC 2011; Davis 2012) noted the shelter sector did not 
effectively assess and follow up on emergency shelter needs, with reinforcement and 
transition actions not being integrated into comprehensive strategy early on, and instead, 
continued to respond to the protracted emergency. Several INGO and government 
representatives stated that responding to the hurricane season and the cholera outbreak that 
occurred within the first 6 months consumed resources and increased the workload, keeping 
the focus on the emergency and delaying transition. Many INGO representatives 
interviewed felt that, despite the constraints posed in post-disaster Haiti, a thorough context 
and field assessment could have been achieved before committing to a specific response.  
 
A Haitian land rights expert stated ‘camps were the wrong approach in Haiti. At the 
beginning, many communities set up camps near homes and the humanitarian sector needed 
Figure 5.2 Shows the evolution of displaced population by number of camps, families and 
individuals over a 2-year period post-disaster. [Source: IOM Data Management Unit] 
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to have supported them to keep social networks strong and work on clearing the land to 
construct new homes’. The eventual response approach undertaken for shelter provision saw 
thousands of IDP camps unable to transition for over 2 years; populations were made 
vulnerable as a result of the protracted relief, hindering any chance for resilience building 
and therefore, effective recovery. The humanitarian sector chose to pursue the creation of 
IDP camps with little alternative options proposed, the sector should be responsible for the 
results and ensure households and individuals are not affected in their potential recovery 
because of the decisions made by the international response. 
 
5.3.4 Transitional and Recovery Strategies 
Programmatic information given by donor and agency representatives, and reports (Groupe 
URD 2010; IFRC 2011; IASC Haiti E-Shelter/CCCM Cluster 2012; IOM 2013) on response 
progress highlighted the housing strategy aimed for to find solutions to help families leave 
camps focused on: 
 T-shelters 
 Housing repair 
 Permanent housing 
 Rental support 
 Integrated neighbourhood approach 
 
With each strategy being implemented to varying degrees at different stages of the response 
bringing with them their individual complexities and problems. These four approaches are 
described below, with their resulting outcomes presented in the following section.  
 
Transitional Shelters  
T-shelters were the main housing solution of choice with many agencies focusing solely on 
the provision of this type of shelter. The T-shelters commonly introduced were mainly 
wooden framed structures with plywood walls and a tin roof designed to offer medium-term 
shelter for between 3-5 years (refer to Figure 5.3, pg. 152). 
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Figure 5.3 Example of a planned T-shelter relocation site on the outskirts of PaP. [Source: 
IOM 2012] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Case Study 1. Haven/ Habitat for Humanity 
The joint Habitat for Humanity and HAVEN two-week house building initiative was 
undertaken in Leogane in November 2011. The project flew in hundreds of volunteers to 
construct T-shelters to form a new community called Santo, by February 2012, 155 families 
moved from tents and makeshift shelters into concrete and wood houses that were built 
through this programme. This approach hindered the development of adaptive resilience by 
setting up a situation where IDPs would need to relocate, breaking fundamental social 
connections, the housed were only temporary and therefore offered a less significant asset 
for individuals/HHs. 
 
                 
[Source: Habitat for Humanity 2012] 
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Figure 5.4 Demonstrates the 3 level coding system applied to the status of damage a house has 
undergone, presenting a sprayed tag ‘MTPTC’ in the respected code colour. [Source: IOM 2012] 
 
 
House Repair 
This approach looked to repair or retrofit damaged houses. After the earthquake, the Haitian 
Government, along with international agencies, assessed the structural integrity of almost 
every building in Haiti. After the assessment, the engineers used a colour-coding system, 
tagging each house with a stamp painted either Green (safe); Yellow (in need of repair); or 
Red (beyond repair) (refer to Figure 5.4, pg. 153). The Government agency responsible was 
the Ministry for Public Works, Transport and Communication (MTPTC); therefore, the tags 
are colloquially referred to as ‘MTPTC status’. 
 
 
 
 
Permanent Housing Reconstruction 
Programs were created to replace houses so badly damaged that they were in need of 
demolition. The vast majority of permanent housing built was in peri-urban and rural areas 
outside of PaP. This was caused primarily by the complexities of building in dense, 
disorganised urban environments where land tenure was unclear. 
 
Rental Support Cash Grants 
The rental support scheme aimed to help families exit from camps through the provision of 
cash grants that support the rental of a safe property of their choice, in the neighborhood of 
their choice (refer to Case study 2, pg. 155). This approach encompassed 3 forms of 
support: 
 Families who entered into a formal rental agreement with a house owner. This 
category represents the majority of cases under this scheme. 
 Families who moved in with a host family (family or friend). The financial assistance 
has been broadly termed rent, though in the case of a beneficiary moving back into a 
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parent’s home, the family may have come to an informal arrangement about how the 
funds were divided. 
 Families who moved out of PaP to the provinces. These families were assisted in 
leaving the city in keeping with the effort of decentralisation. Once having arrived at 
their chosen destination outside PaP, these families either used the received funds to 
rent or moved in with a host family. 
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Integrated neighbourhood approach 
Case Study 2. 16/6 programme- neighbourhood resettlement 
The 16/6 neighbourhood return policy sought to rehabilitate existing settlements rather than 
attempt unrealistic relocation projects that have occurred with dire negative consequences in 
many disaster recovery situations. The programme focused on rehabilitating 16 neighbourhoods 
and exiting from 6 camps. The programme gave camp residents several housing options, 
including T-shelters, yellow house repair and rental support. The figure below shows the 
process associated with the housing assistance made available under this programme. 
 
                         
 
                
Camp Champs de Mars before and after an IOM housing assistance intervention. [Source: IASC 
Haiti E-Shelter/CCCM Cluster 2012] 
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Neighbourhood approaches 
Thinking changed from a camp focus in Aug/Sept 2010, 7-8 months after the earthquake, 
with several agencies coming to recognise and acknowledge that large sections, if not the 
whole, of the camp of IDPs originated from specific neighbourhoods close to the location of 
the camp. Figure 4.12 (refer to pg. 136) demonstrates the actual level of communal 
displacement of IDPs, showing that an overwhelming majority of IDPs were living in their 
original neighbourhoods. Case study 3 (refer to pg. 156) demonstrated a neighbourhood 
rehabilitation programme undertaken by J/P HRO. 
 
As a result, several large INGOs began to capitalise on designing and implementing 
‘integrated neighbourhood programmes’. The British Red Cross, who had carried out an 
early recovery assessment report, beginning the assessment at the end of week 3 after the 
Case Study 3. J/P HRO’s neighbourhood rehabilitation programme - Delmas 32 
J/P HRO found that a majority of the camp residents of the Petionville Club Camp originated from 
Delmas 32 and many residents were moving back to this same neighborhood. J/P HRO included 
school retrofits, the opening of two health clinics and a community center, as well as income 
generating projects including recycling and water kiosks in conjunction with the first phase of 
their relocations project. The strategy was to harmonize services, moving services that had been 
offered to families in the camp to neighbourhoods of return. This was designed as an added 
incentive for return and to ease and support the transition process. 
 
The second phase of their relocations plan included a comparable expenditure on infrastructure 
improvements. In addition community agents in communities of return function as points of 
contact assisting in the reintegration phase, addressing psychosocial issues, and organising focus 
groups of returned families to help them recreate a social support network among other families. 
 
                                          
[Source: IASC Haiti E-Shelter/CCCM Cluster 2012] 
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earthquake, now found that this allowed them to focus on developing a comprehensive 
integrated neighbourhood scheme in Delmas 19. The approach enabled the provision of 
integrated shelter rehabilitation and reconstruction, the installation or improvement in 
WASH facilities, and improved livelihood provision. BRC worked with both the camp 
community and the neighbourhood community in order to rehabilitate the neighbourhood. 
Household mapping was used, i.e. where original residents were asked the location of their 
homes, which was then cross-referenced with other community residents. This mapping 
exercise allowed BRC to develop a full GPS map of the neighbourhood to plan housing 
reconstruction. 
 
5.3.5 The Outcome of the Recovery Strategy on Adaptive Resilience 
 
T-shelters 
A hundred thousand T-shelters were eventually constructed in and around PaP, which 
provided much better accommodation than tent structures within the IDP camps (Davis 
2012). However, this approach has not been as effective as at first presumed. Firstly, to 
construct this number of T-shelters absorbed approximately US$500 million, reflecting an 
average cost of US$138.8 per m2, permanent dwellings cost an average of US$166 (Davies 
2012), making an investment in permanent shelters only marginally more than an 
investment in temporary shelters.  
 
T-shelters also frequently inhibited the construction of permanent dwellings due to 
occupying scarce areas of land in the densely populated urban area. Additionally, the 
lightweight timber technology used in their construction prevents the T-shelters being easily 
recycled into permanent dwellings. With many agencies leaving the post-disaster 
environment without demolishing these T-shelters, these shelters will inherently become 
substandard dwelling for years to come.  
 
Furthermore, construction of these T-shelters was slow in the first year with only 35% of 
planned shelters (39,219 out of 110,440) being constructed (Shelter Cluster 2011).  
 
Lastly, they failed to generate much needed local employment. This was a result of projects 
such as HAVENs ‘build a week’ where 300 volunteers from Europe were flown in to build 
50 houses in a week (refer to Case study 1, pg. 152). 
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While it is a great achievement that over 100,000 families received a housing solution 
through T-shelters, what was found was that only 23% of T-shelters built were provided to 
families living in camps. Since owning or having access to land was a prerequisite for a 
family to be a beneficiary of a T-shelter program, it was much easier for agencies to 
quickly and efficiently identify potential beneficiaries by looking in areas where there was 
land available, which was often outside of the densely populated urban center where there 
was the most need. 
 
Agencies focused on, and directly invested in, T-shelters, pushing aside other options, such 
as integrated housing approaches and rental support, which significantly narrowed the 
housing strategy to the delivery of T-shelters, providing less support to more effective 
transitional options. The T-shelter strategy eventually lost its value and relevance, opening 
up the opportunity to direct efforts into more effective options such as housing repair, rental 
support and integrated neighbourhood approaches. However, as a result and as witnessed by 
agency, donors and the affected population these options were significantly delayed in their 
implementation in response to the contextual need. 
 
House repair 
There was a delay in the undertaking of house repair due to the slow completion of house 
repair assessments carried out by the MTPCE, the production of guidelines on small 
building repair, as well as the limited amount of international capacity engaged in this 
activity. The assessment and guidelines were not finished until October 2010 and then it 
took a further 5 months for the approach to be implemented. 
 
The repair strategy has been a key approach in preventing the wasteful demolition of houses 
that are repairable, however, the approach was late in starting (refer to Figure 5.5, pg. 159) 
and was noted by agency representatives to be in a large extent supply-driven with decisions 
made on previous knowledge, ease of implementation, liability concerns and visibility, there 
was not enough focus on demand 
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Permanent housing 
All stakeholder representatives involved in shelter noted that the provision of permanent 
housing proved hugely challenging. Issues were frequently noted by representatives that 
caused slow progress, including problems with land tenure, lack of available land, training 
masons on the newly developed building standards and a policy and leadership vacuum in 
respect to government. These issues saw only a very few permanent houses built by the end 
of 2012. 
 
Agency representatives noted that there was substantial community level involvement 
witnessed in housing reconstruction activities through processes such as mapping exercises 
and community enumeration processes, which helped pave the way for vital neighbourhood 
Figure 5.5 A timeline detailing the progression of the housing repair approach. 
[Source: IFRC 2011b] 
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upgrading programmes. However, with this strategy, there was often the problem of raised 
community expectations, as activities would highlight priority areas, but available funding 
and capacity would not necessarily be able to match the needs. However, what it did 
achieve was the identification of areas where the community members themselves could 
undertake work at little to no cost, supporting the community to help themselves to recover. 
 
Rental support 
The major push for rental support came late as a result of other options failing to deliver 
transitional opportunities that would enable camp closure. With thousands of camps still 
filling every gap in the city the government’s 16/6 programme (refer to Case study 2, pg. 
155) was a symbolic move to clear key public spaces to restore some public confidence and 
hope. Several agencies including IFRC and IOM undertook large rental support 
programmes as a strategy to close camps. Rental support provided families with help 
locating a property and cash to support them for 1 year.  However, there were concerns over 
the availability of housing stock for the large numbers of potential new renters, as well as 
the programs inflationary effect on rental prices. 
 
The risk of affecting rental prices was acknowledged in the rental support program design 
phase, developing an approach that allowed families to ‘keep the change’ if they found a 
property for less than US$500. This ‘keep the change’ approach was critical as it 
incentivised each family to negotiate for their own benefit, seeing families paying the 
market rate, controlling inflation of rental prices as a side effect of the approach. Figure 5.6 
(refer to pg. 161) shows how the average rent was not affected by the increase in families 
renting as a result of the rental support programme. 
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A survey undertaken by IOM and J/P HRO in April 2012 looked at rental potential in 2 
districts of PaP- Delmas 32 and Delmas 40. Using figures generated from this study allowed 
an estimate of potential available rental housing stock to be around 19,000 for the whole 
metropolitan area of PaP; this indicated a good level of housing was still available to 
support potential new renters. 
 
A survey conducted by IFRC to see the sustainability of the approach found that 100% of 
families who responded to the survey had found a housing solution after the 1 year of rental 
support was finished: 63% of families were able to negotiate with their own means to stay in 
the same rental property and 27% of families were able to find an alternative solution (either 
by paying rent in another property, or by moving in with family or friends). Though 10% of 
families could not be contacted by telephone, there were no recorded incidences of families 
returning to a camp. 
 
Neighbourhood approaches 
This strategy requires that an urban planning approach is adopted from the post-emergency 
period, which raised some questions about the capacity of humanitarian actors and whether 
or not it is compatible with their mandate, seeing only a few agencies looking at this 
approach at an early stage of the response, i.e. Mercy corps, BRC, CRF and UNOPS. 
Neighbourhood approaches were only slowly adopted by the many other actors operating in 
Figure 5.6 Shows the average rental price paid by families receiving rental support between 
September 2011 and May 2012. [Source: IOM 2012] 
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PaP including agencies and donors. 
 
The neighbourhood approach was a complex undertaking in this urban environment due to 
the density of housing, the absence of available land and the operational complexity 
generated through the involvement of many different actors. Many humanitarian actors 
stated they had encountered issues with coordination, with decision-makers, but also within 
the agency itself, due to the multi-sectoral nature of the integrated programme approach.  
These noted issues saw programmes experiencing extended discussion times with 
stakeholders in order to come to a consensus about the operational objective. There were 
issues of unfinished or delayed projects, which resulted in the community taking matters in 
to their own hands. An example of this was seen with IOM’s canal construction in Delmas 
19, where canal restoration had begun, but was stopped, the floodwater would then flood the 
neighbourhood where the canal was unfinished. Thus, the community started to finish the 
construction, building the canal walls following the original height. Without technical 
guidance the community carried on the canal construction and ended up building incredible 
high and unsafe walls. BRC also experienced within their neighbourhood reconstruction that 
the delay in action by themselves after a decision to demolish housing saw the community 
undertake the planned demolition without instruction and the inherent issues this entails. 
 
Many agencies involved in implementing neighbourhood approaches stated that in the main 
part, programmes started much too late and that it should have been                                                                                                                                                            
an approach that was taken on early in the post-disaster context to ensure IDPs do not 
become dependant on camps and that transitional options are available. It was also 
highlighted by these representatives that if these programmes were in place earlier in this 
disaster, vulnerable individuals/HHs could have gained access to adequate shelter, 
increasing their access to assets, strengthening social connections and would have guided 
more sustainable service infrastructure, all building adaptive resilience, stimulating recovery 
much earlier in the response. 
 
5.3.6 Key Problems and What Needs to Change to Support Adaptive Resilience and 
Recovery 
Questionnaire data demonstrated that many agencies in the Haitian context that undertook 
emergency operations did not conceptualise exit, transition or recovery strategies till a much 
later stage in the response, often using external cues, such as the lack of funding, time 
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constraints, time lapse and sectoral pressure that trigger the mindset of the agency from 
emergency provision to transition, exit and recovery thinking. The data saw that recovery 
was conceptualised by some agencies within the first 6 months after the disaster (52% of 
respondents), with a large proportion only contemplating from 7 months to 2 years after the 
disaster (37% of respondents). The data also pointed out that there was a significant delay 
between conceptualisation and implementation with 5% of respondents implementing in the 
first month, 26% of respondents within months 2-6, a further 26% in months 7-12 and the 
majority at 42% implementing from 1-2 years after the disaster.  
 
The data also highlighted the main triggers that were used by agencies to begin 
implementation of recovery programmes (refer to Figure 5.7, pg. 164). These main triggers 
were assessment results (22%), community dynamics (21%), timeframe (15%), consensus 
with the sector (15%), money (13%) and donor requisites (10%). 
 
One INGO respondent stated ‘people seemed to use a percentage reduction in camp 
inhabitancy and look at it on the scale of time ‘we should be in a state of recovery by 
now…’ referring to triggers used to begin recovery programming. This coincided with the 
main answers given about triggers, with assessments undertaken, often accounting for camp 
dynamics (as noted in the following sub-section 5.5.1 recovery assessments were rarely 
undertaken, refer to Figure 5.7, pg. 164). ‘Community dynamics’ to many actors refers to 
camp dynamics as few were working within neighbourhoods, and ‘time-frame’ and 
‘consensus with the sector’ falls in line with the recognition that  ‘we should be in a state of 
recovery by now’, which would be promoted by the sector offering a clear indication of a 
lack of strategy. 
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Figure 5.7 This chart presents the main reasons that prompted organisations to start 
implementing recovery programmes. [Source: Online questionnaire] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Money and donor requisites make up 15% of responses showing that available funds drive 
programme implementation. A point noted and further elaborated on in the following sub-
section 6.2.1.1, which in brief demonstrated that very little recovery and reconstruction 
funds were made available, forced agencies to invest solely in emergency provision and 
later T-shelter. This limited the flexibility needed to meet beneficiary needs in a timely 
manner, forcing the situation to stay in a protracted emergency state. It is truly surprising to 
see recovery programming decisions not being based on beneficiary needs, seen here as low 
as 2% of the responses. 
 
Respondents also specified whether recovery initiatives were timely. Responses brought up 
a variety of issues experienced in the post-disaster environment. For example, many 
agencies believe that operations were beginning to transition and a focus on recovery was 
starting just before the cholera outbreak hit and the hurricane season descended, which 
meant resources were diverted to the preparation and handling of these 2 major events. 
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A representative from Concern Worldwide stated, ‘I don't think anyone anticipated it would 
take so long to clear the camps.  The Cholera epidemic in 2010 shifted the focus from 
recovery back to emergency. Concern WASH started to plan and implement recovery 
programmes from the beginning of 2011’.   
 
A representative from GOAL Ireland indicated that, ‘the pressure to prepare for the 
hurricane season [in 2010] presented an unnecessary distraction from moving into real 
recovery. Even after the hurricane season passed, the donor community and related 
organisations should have taken stock and made some strategic decisions that would have 
supported recovery. For some, this would have resulted in tearing up some grant 
agreements, but it would have been the best approach’. Thus, indicating that the response 
approach was, in essence, reacting to its environment, with little forward planning and 
strategic capacity to tap into to ensure the best and most effective outcome.  
 
From the data it is clear that a continuous review and updating of strategy, plans and goals 
should have been undertaken to make them flexible and adaptable. The shelter strategy 
should have been revised when it was obvious the objectives would not be met, which could 
have resulted in a more comprehensive long-term transitional and permanent housing 
approach. As agencies programmes were not flexible, often as a result of funding 
commitments, lack of strategy and/or poor programme design and capacity, interventions 
could not be easily adapted in the field to meet the ever changing needs in this volatile post-
disaster context. 
 
A lot of blame for the delay in and lack of recovery was put on external factors, such as the 
cholera epidemic, hurricane season, land issues, ineffective government and mindset around 
who was responsible for recovery. This attitude was witnessed in several INGO and donor 
responses:  
 
‘Given the constraints imposed by donors, government and the local context, many INGOs, 
though not all, did the best they could’- INGO representative. 
 
‘Recovery initiatives were, and still are, hampered by legal and political aspects and the 
absence of government’- Private sector representative. 
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‘The lack of recovery process has to do with land issues, corruption and lack of expertise’- 
INGO representative. 
 
‘Shelter agencies didn’t have the capacity or responsibility in this urban context to control 
the final outcome’- INGO representative. 
 
These were undeniable issues and it was highlighted through reports and evaluations (UN-
DESA 2010; Oxfam 2011; UN 2011b; IFRC 2011b; Davis 2012) that they did indeed 
present as extraneous factors affecting programming. However, these external factors are 
what were used by the humanitarian sector to satisfying the sector’s reasoning for 
insufficient results, rather than looking internally on an organisational and sectoral level. 
This culture sees that performance is not reviewed, systems are not enhanced and therefore 
programmatic output will never perform at its most effective level. 
 
It has been made clear that there was a ‘lack of vision at the micro-level’ as stated by an 
INGO respondent. With little contextual data gathered on transitional and recovery options 
(evident in assessments not undertaken- refer to Figure 5.13, pg. 187), strategic decisions at 
the sectoral level were being made on an uninformed basis, not ensuring a comprehensive 
and effective strategy. In essence the approach was one that ‘clutched at straws’, which with 
time became less relevant as more contextual data became available. 
 
An INGO respondent stated, ‘recovery activities should have been planned from the outset’. 
The Haiti response shows a need to develop longer-term comprehensive approaches that 
allow flexibility and encourage demand driven responses from the start. 
 
It should be recognised that, to achieve successful results in reconstruction, strategic 
decisions must involve the affected population. Empowering communities to carry out 
reconstruction allows them to realise their aspirations, contribute their knowledge and skills 
(which assist in their psycho-social recovery), helps establish community cohesion and 
increases the likelihood of satisfaction with the results (GFDRR 2010). Involvement and 
awareness raising needs to be encouraged in order to build ownership, as there is ‘no growth 
without ownership’ states an INGO respondent. 
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In Haiti many shelter options were unexplored in the early onset of the disaster, options that 
would have decentralised the approach, taking a focus away from camps and installed 
options that built on existing adaptive resilience allowing for faster moving recovery 
options. In such complex post-disaster situations there is a need to find simple ways to 
understand the context and the options available, such as introducing a rapid context 
assessment that could glean basic contextual information (refer to Chapter 10) that could 
have opened up potential shelter options, which then could have informed early strategy 
development. This would have optimised response intervention from day one- guiding and 
driving a different response culture, leading to more effective programming that would 
actively stimulate resilience and recovery.   
 
This section has broken down in-depth the strategy and programmes implemented within 
the Shelter sector throughout the 2 year period after the earthquake. The analysis of the data 
highlighted the achievements and deficiencies of the programmes carried out, demonstrating 
that transition and recovery were hindered through weak strategy, lack of planning, poor 
leadership, ineffective coordination and insecure capacity. There is a clear need to re-
examine programme approach and implementation to allow a more coherent and effective 
effort by the international community, one that will foster and stimulate greater results in 
both the short-term and in the long-term.  
 
5.4 Emergency Response Programme Analysis- WASH 
Following on from the in-depth assessment of the shelter response initiated in Haiti, this 
next section seeks to break down another crucial sector for recovery- WASH. The section 
will look at the problems experienced in the immediate response, as well as WASH 
coordination and strategy, assessing the interventions undertaken for relief and recovery 
activities, understanding their impact on adaptive resilience and eventual recovery of this 
basis service. 
 
WASH is a fundamental sector to critique, as it is vital to have sufficient clean water and 
sanitation in the immediate aftermath of an event in order to treat the affected population, 
provide for human consumption and maintain basic hygiene. These basic facilities also 
support the work of search and rescue, as well as facilitating productive and commercial 
activities, stimulating recovery. 
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Providing essential water and sanitation services after a disaster reduces an affected 
population’s vulnerability and improves resilience, protecting public health and providing 
an economic good. In the case of a natural disaster, the interruption or damage to services 
for an extended period limits the recovery of normal development activities for the 
population. Re-establishing the operation of water and sanitation services goes a long way 
toward restoring activities in a community impacted by a natural disaster. 
 
The longer it takes to restore services, the more activities are affected and the resulting 
social problems will intensify, affecting the process of economic, commercial, and social 
recovery of the affected population, leaving longer-term impacts.  
 
5.4.1 Challenges in the Immediate Aftermath 
This complex urban disaster presented a mass of new challenges for humanitarian 
organisations that have been more used to rural settings (DEC 2011). Issues included 
building demolition, debris management, road clearance, settlement planning, land tenure 
and issues of property rights for owners and tenants, which resulted in a particularly 
complex operating environment for humanitarian organisations working in sectors, such as 
WASH, Shelter, Camp Coordination, Camp Management and Early Recovery (IFRC 2010).  
 
Massive population displacement within PaP resulted in overcrowding in camps and 
resettlement areas, which raised the risk of transmission of certain communicable diseases. 
Drinking water and sewer systems that were functional before the earthquake were no 
longer usable. With 1.5 million displaced people needing emergency WASH services, it 
presented a huge challenge.  
 
Within the WASH cluster, DINEPA, Haiti’s dedicated water and sanitation ministry, took 
the leadership role. By the second month 70% of camps were supplied by tanker, at a cost of 
US$500,000 per month (Cocking and Bastable 2010) (refer to Figures 5.8 and 5.9, pg. 170). 
Within 6 months DINEPA were trucking a third of all subsidised water to camps (IFRC 
2010). The minimum water of 5ltr of safe water per person per day was being supplied to 
1.2 million and latrines were being shared by 200 people (over the 50 person per latrine 
SPHERE standard). However, this decreased to 100 people per latrine by October 2010 
(Groupe URD 2011). 
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The January 2011 WASH cluster meeting reported that the average amount of water used 
for drinking and domestic purposes was 83ltr per day per family or 17ltr per person per day 
(Oxfam 2011). It also interestingly noted that over 50% of people believed that water from 
trucks was not safe and home water treatments were very common (Oxfam 2011). Cocking 
and Bastable (2010) noted that this was most likely due to the pre-earthquake campaign 
about safe water making the people hesitant to drink trucked water. This resulted in many 
people continuing to buy water in bags, using the treated, trucked water for washing and 
cooking (Cocking and Bastable 2010). 
 
An evaluation of USAIDs Haiti Transition Initiative noted the complexity of this urban 
setting ‘vis-à-vis’ community attitude towards participation and communal ownership: the 
urban population tends to ‘look more toward government to solve problems rather than 
work them out themselves’ (Jutkowitz et al. 2006). Some humanitarian actors found a lack 
of community participation, except when there was employment or a salary on offer. This 
cultural attitude may stem from the fact Haitian society has a long enforced history of being 
passive recipients of aid, rather than equal partners in the process (Oxfam 2009). 
 
Some national feelings towards the ‘NGO republic’ go beyond being passive recipients, as 
can be seen in the graffiti around Port-au-Prince proclaiming ‘Aba ONG vole!’ (‘Down with 
thieving NGOs’) reflecting Haitians’ impatience and frustration with the response (ALNAP 
2010). 
 
The lack of communication capacity amongst organisations and accountability to 
beneficiaries, along with the lack of progress towards recovery, are some of the failings seen 
in this massive emergency response (King et al. 2011). 
 
The WASH sector has had to contend with a major outbreak of cholera that struck 6 months 
into the relief operation and came prior to a disruptive hurricane season. There were 
thousands of NGOs on the ground, all operating at full capacity to contain the WASH 
situation, but it was argued that approaches taken could never solve the key problems (IFRC 
2010). One year on from the earthquake, a large proportion of sanitation services and two 
thirds of water trucking was being provided by international partners, which created a 
situation that was unsustainable (IFRC 2010).  
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Several INGO representatives involved in the WASH sector noted that DINEPA wanted 
agencies to exit from trucking water after 6 months of the emergency, but agencies 
struggled to find alternatives, lacking the ability to exit from or transfer services. As a result 
water trucking continued for over 2 years with many desperately trying to hand over to 
DINEPA, who had a very limited capacity, or just dropping services all together due to the 
lack of funds, which left communities un-served.  
 
            
 
Archival data in the form of evaluation reports (DINEPA 2010; DEC 2011a; Oxfam 2012), 
highlighted that a huge opportunity to develop resilience was missed as, pre-earthquake, 
there had been a massive network of water vendors operating all over the city, many of 
whom still had substantial capacity to deliver and many who could have restarted their 
business with a little extra support. Oxfam was one of few agencies who did recognise this 
capacity and, in partnership with DINEPA, invested in the rehabilitation of water vendors, 
as well as existing public tap stands (refer to Case study 4, pg. 176). Other effective exit 
strategies were delivered in the form of neighbourhood approaches, e.g. early in 2011 IFRC 
began a strategy to take water supply services out of camps and place them close to 
neighborhoods, which were then managed by identified community members as a business 
(refer to Case study 5, pg. 177). Utilising existing capacity and introducing neighborhood 
approaches could have been achieved at scale far earlier in the response, as the supply 
options clearly existed.  
Figure 5.8 ‘Freche Lokal’ is one of the 
several water trucking companies that 
operated in PaP within the response. 
[Source: Oxfam 2012] 
Figure 5.9 Water storage through water bladders 
used to supply the vast quantities of treated water 
to the thousands of IDP camps in PaP. [Source: 
DINEPA 2012] 
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Oxfam have also supported the Haitian government to help achieve a sustainable recovery 
process within the WASH sector. Oxfam, in partnership with DINEPA, actively recruited 
expert WASH engineers to improve professional skills of the staff; helped to write Haiti’s 
first water quality guidelines and sewerage standards; aided the strengthening of overall 
WASH infrastructure; rehabilitated a number of water points and re-established the 
operation of water kiosks. DINEPA assumed responsibility for trucking water, with the 
long-term aim to provide water through the network, which was being progressively 
repaired. Even with these efforts, there was a dire need for innovative solutions to meet the 
long-term WASH needs of the affected Haitian communities throughout the response; 
solutions that could have allowed a rapid and sustainable recovery to occur. 
 
5.4.2 WASH Coordination and Strategy 
Reviewing cluster meeting transcripts (refer to footnote 1 on pg. 125) allowed the dynamics 
of coordination and strategy to be made clear. This data is triangulated with data from the 
interviews and the online questionnaire. The UNICEF WASH team that already existed in 
Haiti took over coordination from UNDP and based themselves at MINUSTAH base near 
the airport. Cluster meetings were held from the 14th of January at DINEPA offices. With 
many agencies already operating in Haiti before the earthquake there were many agencies at 
hand after the earthquake struck. Agencies operating early in the response included The Red 
Cross movement, Solidarités, Oxfam GB, ACF, CARE, Concern, NCA, WHO, CRS, PSI 
and Mercy Corps. The early cooperation of DINEPA and other existing WASH capacity 
helped develop a strong coordination base from an early stage of the response; a unique 
situation amongst the clusters operating in the response. 
 
In the first few weeks there was an attempt to gather information on Who, What, Where, 
When, but quickly found communication and capacity difficult on the ground. This saw the 
flash appeal being developed at the global level, which dictated the next 3 months of 
funding. CERF allocated US$10 million supporting priority areas in all sectors, which 
supported the priority areas highlighted in the flash appeal. Understanding the real needs 
and corresponding response programming in the first few weeks was difficult, particularly 
as there was limited information made available. A needs assessment was carried out by the 
Red Cross movement in the first week, however, a WASH Cluster needs assessment was 
not started until the 20th January, leaving it several weeks without adequate information to 
inform planning. A WASH strategy was not developed until the end of February 2010. 
 
 172 
It was increasingly noted by the WASH cluster, evident in their meeting notes on the 16th 
January, that many people were leaving PaP and that there would be a need to undertake 
assessments in other areas outside the city. A focus was directed to supplying hospitals and 
camps where people who stayed in the city were attempting to find shelter. The private 
sector was noted as being very involved and ready to provide trucks and bottled water. The 
WASH relief approach that was initially employed was the provision of bladders supplied 
by trucks to camps and hospitals. The mindset of the relief approach model is clear here, a 
focused, one directional and one dimensional strategy, which is understandable in a 
complex and ill understood operational environment to enable any relief at all. One INGO 
respondent notes, ‘the WASH approach was about the short-term, easy and cheap options, 
and how to reach the most people’. But this ‘initial’ strategy encountered challenges at the 
start. Firstly, through the massive vehicle and fuel requirements needed to run what were 
originally 80 trucks, but which quickly escalated to 178 trucks within the first week, which 
was needed to supply 180,000 beneficiaries. Fuel shortages, in particular, saw many trucks 
halted and unable to continue to supply water. With the final number of IDPs in PaP alone 
reaching over a million, investmenting in this as the sole strategy to supply water to the 
majority of the displaced became an incredibly expensive and unsustainable undertaking. 
This ‘initial’ strategy became the WASH landscape for the next 2 years. 
 
What could have been understood, even at day 4 of the response, was that people were 
flooding out of the city where there was a need and opportunity to support the large number 
of host families that will be supporting these IDPs, offering an opportunity to unburden the 
devastated capital. In all sectors, this was not enacted within the strategy and, as a result, 
what was found over the following months was that IDPs began flooding back into PaP and 
into the camps, driving up numbers exponentially. The large, and already operational, 
private sector was utilised for trucking and bottle distribution only, and as noted, there was a 
significant network of private water vendors operating before the earthquake, which could 
have been capitilised on from day one to offer a further alternative supportive strategy to 
that of water trucking. This was one of a few strategies that could have allowed the build up 
of a transitional capacity, which would have enabled a rapid exit from trucking, reducing the 
huge financial burden, building sustainability and enabling recovery. 
 
In the emergency WASH strategy developed by DINEPA on the 19th February, it was 
mentioned that the Haitian private sector that produced and sold treated water was the first 
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actor to mobilise and make available its services and capacity for the benefit of the victims 
of the disaster. All drinking water production was initially only distributed in the IDP camps 
for free. DINEPA mention that the private sector additionally had many kiosks able to 
distribute drinking water throughout the metropolitan area. DINEPA contracted two major 
operators to re-set the points of water distribution with the plan to fully fund these 
operations with the aim to use these kiosks to transition water supply from free to paid when 
people had gathered some financial resources. DINEPA at this stage had a long-term 
strategy offering the idea that, alongside rapid water supply interventions, partial restoration 
of the existing water supply infrastructure run by CAMEP in PaP would be undertaken. A 
suggestion was provided so that in the ‘consolidation’ period, CAMEP, along with the 
service providers running the kiosks, would be ready to gradually restore the payment of 
water by the population moving away from free-trucked water. The strategy highlighted the 
need to ensure activities and strategies become a part of a logical plan for the rapid recovery 
of the affected population. This strategy document shows that rapid recovery was 
conceptualised by the government early in the post-disaster environment and sustainable 
transitional options for water supply were on the table, asking the question why, after 2 
years, was there so little progress towards this end? 
 
Group URD’s RTE reports undertaken in 2010 highlighted the initial assessments, did not 
account for pre-existing practices in terms of access to water and excreta management, 
particularly in the urban context. It took a long time before water treated by inverse 
osmosis, the existence of standpipes and of CAMEP networks were taken into account in 
organisations’ strategies (RTE 2010). The humanitarian sector was also unprepared to deal 
with the scale of emergency sanitation required in this urban environment. The normal 
approach of utilising pit latrines was not appropriate in the majority of camps and affected 
neighbourhoods. No partnerships were formed with business foundations nor had there been 
any accumulation of contingency stocks, seeing a lack of preparation and the operational 
ability to create suitable options. This reality held up the response; and what resulted was 
the hiring of portable toilets that were emptied on a daily basis by private companies at an 
inflated market rate - all paid for by the INGO (Groupe URD 2010; RTE 2010). Above 
ground latrines were finally constructed in many camps, again with the need to de-sludge on 
a regular basis. However, with the huge amounts of waste being transported to the one 
single dumpsite available in PaP, waste saturation was quickly reached and excreta was then 
dumped in an uncontrolled manner in the country-side, presenting obvious health risks. The 
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WASH sector was unprepared for, and lacked strategic insight, to meet this vast sanitation 
situation. Again maintenance and long-term thinking did not occur along side planning.  
 
These waste disposal constraints forced the need to find solutions that involved in-situ 
treatment/recycling and/or ad hoc composting sites where possible. It was reported by 
several INGO and government respondents that a wastewater treatment plant was eventually 
constructed in PaP in order to receive the vast quantity of sludge produced by the thousands 
of camps that were in existence for over 3 years after the earthquake.  
 
Neighbourhood sanitation solutions were achieved on a small scale by a few agencies 
including Mercy Corps (refer to Case study 7, pg. 183) and Oxfam (refer to Figure 5.11, pg. 
174) where latrines were built at community level to be individually managed by the 
households themselves, Mercy Corps managed it in the first few months of the response; 
Oxfam undertook it as apart of a longer-term strategy. These initiatives allow ownership to 
develop and a self-managed service to be achieved, ensuring a sustainable basic service to 
build into an individuals/HHs level of resilience. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.11 Household owned latrines 
being constructed within existing 
neighbourhoods as a part of Oxfam’s long-
term sanitation strategy. [Source: Oxfam 
2012] 
Figure 5.10 Some of the thousands of above 
ground latrines that were constructed throughout 
the IDP camps in PaP. [Source: IFRC 2010] 
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Regarding water supply, a few actors (e.g. ACF, Solidarités International and Oxfam) began 
to offer support in the repair of the water supply network, the standpipes and their storage 
reservoirs, and also, to capacity build local private sector water kiosks (refer to Case study 
4, pg. 176). These actors felt these ‘long-term recovery strategies’ were difficult to 
implement quickly. A strong, supportive policy push from DINEPA at an early stage could 
have presented the necessary strategic guidance and raise the capacity required to undertake 
these types of interventions in a rapid manner. This would have enabled a new capacity to 
help support immediate water supply, as well as providing transitional mechanisms. The 
free water supply services to IDP camps began to be replaced by a neighbourhood approach 
in summer/autumn 2010 (refer to Case study 5, pg. 177).  
 
These activities suggest there was a small amount of progress being made in terms of exit 
strategies from the emergency phase; from free provision to paid provision run by Haitian 
stakeholders. However, the credibility of these sustainable approaches was undermined 
when the cholera epidemic forced a return to the free supply of chlorinated water.  The 
cholera epidemic forced WASH activity back into emergency provision, delaying any 
progress towards recovery and the development of sustainable delivery options that were 
beginning to be implemented. 
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Case study 4. Oxfam’s capacity building of local water kiosks 
 
Oxfam recognised the huge potential in the rehabilitation of local water vendors to sustainably 
meet water supply needs, this saw the agency undertake many rehabilitation projects of this 
nature. One such project was initiated in Corraille where 13 kiosks were built and connected to 
the water pipeline. Water meters and on/off taps were fitted, providing a water pumps with 
generator and fuel in order to ensure a regular flow. The management and operation of the 
systems were negotiated with DINEPA and the water committees were trained to manage the 
kiosks, paying DINEPA rather than Oxfam for water usage. 
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[Source: Oxfam 2012a; DINEPA 2010] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By the end of the cholera outbreak, many INGOs had run out of funds to continue WASH 
service provision. This situation was not supported by any handover or exit strategy, leaving 
many affected communities and IDPs un-served. Many agencies tried to hand over all 
WASH programmes to DINEPA and UNOPS, as no other sustainable option had been 
developed to the scale needed.  However, DINEPA did not have the massive resources and 
capacity that was needed to handle such a transfer. This created a huge service gap and a 
massive amount of pressure on the ministry, remaining INGOs, other service providers and 
their existing sources. 
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It was noted by many INGO respondents that there were two camps of thinking: one for 
short-term relief only and another that considered recovery and development within a long-
term programmatic vision. Due to a lack of government control, and therefore national 
leadership, dominant ‘relief’ minded personalities tended to control cluster discussion and 
eventual WASH strategy in the initial onset of the response.  The often disseminated post-
disaster model of water supply provision, i.e. free provision through delivery by INGOs, 
commonly centralised on camps, is often not contexualised or strategically determined. The 
default model is not open to parallel thinking or strategic planning, which would allow for 
more sustainable and decentralised options, which is required to ensure transition and exit 
from this ‘model’ of relief service provision.  
 
The strategic, operational framework was drafted over 6 months after the earthquake with 
the aim to build on the WASH strategy that was first outlined in February 2010, in light of 
evolving needs of the emergency and the GoH’s re-settlement policy. The framework was 
drafted by the SAG (Strategic Advisory Group) on behalf of the GoH following a ‘strategic 
review workshop’ with all stakeholders on the 16th June 2010. The framework was offered 
as a guideline that must be adhered to under the ministry (DINEPA), which allowed for 
strong cluster authority. 
 
At 6 months into the WASH response, it was noted that the WASH situation, while 
apparently under control, remained precarious as coverage was far from universal (notably 
Case study 5. IFRC Neighbourhood approach to exit water supply services from camps 
 
IFRC were operating water supply services to 66 camps within the response. The exit strategy 
undertaken in 2011 saw the identification of HHs within the camps who would be prepared to 
run a reservoir as a business in their community of origin. These HHs were then trained and 
capitalised. Camp residents were provided a 3 week subsidy: first week offered free water, 2nd 
and 3rd week offered 3 gourdes per bucket, by the 4th week owners could buy/rent their own 
trucks. IFRC managed to close all 66 camps for WASH by November 2011. 
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35% of smaller settlement sites still lacked toilets and risk factors, such as standing water, 
poor solid waste disposal, poor hygiene practice and overcrowding were prevalent).  
This framework was the first instance in which ‘early recovery’ and ‘risk reduction’ factors 
were highlighted as crucial elements to consider in programming by the international 
community. Many significant and appropriate suggestions were made. However, their 
planned inception of this approach was presented 6 months after the disaster occurred, after 
6 months of response programming that had laid out the operational environment. An 
operational environment that was not conducive for the sudden ‘phase’ change to recovery. 
This created a significant challenge to effecting recovery. A dynamic suffered in all sectors, 
which offsetting recovery to see a protracted relief situation prevail over the next 2 years. 
What should be noted here is that, if many of these ‘early recovery’ strategies were initiated 
or factored into programme development from the onset, there could have been a very 
different response landscape - one that offered productive and sustainable outputs and a 
more rapid recovery. 
 
Though the framework stated the need to ‘include beneficiaries in assessing and prioritising 
their own needs, as well as programme design’, many INGO respondents stated that there 
was little attempt to ensure effective community participation in their response 
programming. In addition, trust issues arose as the affected communities were not receiving 
updates on planned interventions, only hearing media coverage of the vast amount of aid 
being given out. Participation by stakeholders can offer key elements to improve 
programming, such as gaining contextual insight, access to assessing real need, opportunity 
to develop solutions that can be owned by the affected community- tapping into local 
capacity.  
 
In many of the IDP camps, community committees were set up, where members of these 
committees were voluntarily instated. There were many problems found in the effective 
operation of these committees, including issues of abuse of authority. These committees 
were later modified by DINEPA to only include educated and respected members of the 
community, i.e. teachers, doctors. The committees did offer a communicative mechanism 
for the agencies and were utilised by some to undertake assessments, to support relief 
activity and exit and recovery strategies (e.g. the establishment and training of camp WASH 
caretaker and hygiene promoters), implementation of feedback mechanisms (e.g. discussion 
sessions, complaints lines and suggestion boxes). 
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These initiatives and success stories were not widespread. Initial circumstances did make 
community participation difficult because of displacement and the psychological trauma in 
the immediate aftermath of the earthquake. People were also focused on their day-to-day 
survival, thus, with the heavy introduction of Cash for Work and payment for involvement 
in any programme (issued by the cluster), there were challenges getting people involved and 
willing to spare their time in activities that were deemed as unpaid work. This dynamic 
upset the potential for wide spread initiation of community participation early on. This is a 
clear example of where agencies must consider the impact of programmatic decisions on 
recovery. 
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Case Study 6. BRCs Integrated Neighbourhood Approach 
 
The integrated neighbourhood approach (INA) was undertaken by BRC in Delmas 19, one of 
several INA communities IFRC that undertook this approach. The INA took on a holistic 
strategy, which encouraged integration of key programmes in targeted neighbourhoods. It was a 
broad strategy to facilitate ‘camp to community’.  
 
Objective 1: Shelter, water, sanitation and infrastructure support 
    Increase access to safe shelter through a multi-pronged and gender-sensitive approaches 
involving owner-driven, donor driver and alternative shelter solutions.  
    Increase availability of and access to safe water in INA neighbourhoods.  
    Increase access to basic sanitation at both household and community levels in INA 
neighbourhoods. 
Objective 2: Livelihoods 
 Support targeted shelter solution beneficiaries to become more economically self-reliant 
through increased access to support packages, skill-building and economic 
opportunities. 
Objective 3: Community-based support 
    Mobilization, health, hygiene promotion and risk-reduction. 
    Mobilize community engagement and gender and diversity balanced participation in 
community-based assessments and activities. 
    Improve capacity of target communities to prevent and manage common 
             health problems.  
    Hygiene knowledge and behaviour is improved in INA neighbourhoods 
             benefiting from IFRC water and sanitation inputs through provision of hygiene   
             promotion. 
    Improve capacity of target community to identify and mitigate risks and 
             improve overall safety in the neighbourhoods (Disaster Risk Management). 
 
The focus in Delmas 19 was the provision of rental support, resettlement grants, undertake an 
extensive GIS survey to plan for reconstruction, improve storm channel reconstruction, WASH 
service provision and livelihood creation. A holistic approach that builds adaptive resilience 
through the support of the development of access to assets, services, economic opportunities, 
and social connections, as well as improving the level of resilience achieved through the 
stimulation of risk reduction and disaster risk management. 
 
[Source: BRC 2012] 
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The online questionnaire data indicated that after 2 years there was a fair level of 
community participation achieved within overall programmes (refer to sub-section 5.5.5). 
But this was after 2 years. Establishing this dynamic in the first few weeks could have 
enabled these successful exit and recovery programmes to have flourished early, stemming 
the potential for a protracted relief situation. 
 
An INGO representative stated that ‘Every effort should be made to engage civil society 
organisations and the private sector when planning local initiatives’- from the start, 
DINEPA pushed for engagement with national trucking companies and INGOs did used 
national companies to supply and maintain portable toilets. What was missed was the 
involvement of local level private sector at scale, i.e. local water vendors. The humanitarian 
community rarely directly engaged private sector entities in relief operations. As also noted 
in the following section, funding streams from major donors were not channeled to support 
the local private sector to implement much relief programming from the outset, though 
some donors directed funds later in the response for ‘recovery and reconstruction’ activities 
(refer to sub-section 6.2.1.1). Several UN agencies did engage local private sector as 
implementation partners, such as IOM, UNOPS, UNDP and WHO, though these activities 
were, again, engaged later in the response (refer to sub-section 6.2.1.1). Some support was 
offered to the local private sector through support schemes, such as IDB’s Social Investment 
Fund, Business Development Services and Productive Haiti Program, and EC’s and CIDA’s 
provision of micro-credit system (refer to sub-section 6.2.1.3). However, these initiatives 
were not utilised by the WASH response to support the local private sector. Setting up 
business rehabilitation and development schemes like these could have mobilized, at scale, 
local WASH service provision that could have met early relief needs, stimulating early 
recovery and leaving a strengthened WASH provision in this urban center. Operational 
policies to encourage the engagement of the private sector by INGOs are urgently needed.  
Currently, these working relationships are not customarily or effectively utilised within 
humanitarian response. 
 
The framework also states the need to restore livelihoods through support to local 
manufacturing and procurement. Understanding private sector capacity and establishing 
relationships will also help rapidly gather information on resources available that would 
support the use of local manufacturing and procurement within the WASH response. 
Typically WASH facilities use materials and products that are imported, i.e. bladders, tanks, 
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treatment units, chemical disinfectants, tarpaulin, plywoods etc. The model sees these 
products stockpiled for immediate dissemination, which is crucial, but often there can be 
challenges with shipments and customs, which can delay the arrival of products. 
Understanding the in situ market, particularly in urban disasters, can offer more effective 
alternative options to supply the necessary facilities immediately. Furthermore, it also helps 
to re-establish livelihoods and feeds into the local economy. 
 
Building the capacities of the GoH (DINEPA) was also prominent in the strategic 
framework - with the framework focusing on the transfer of technical know-how and 
building information management capacity. DINEPA was the most proactive and 
successfully involved ministry from the start of the response. The GoH, with its 
international partners, drafted a comprehensive recovery and development plan - the Post 
Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) in March 2010. This plan presented an extensive 
strategy to rebuild and develop the WASH sector. It included the development of technical 
and financial capacity, the construction of regional structures that could operate and manage 
urban water and sanitation systems, as well as the increased involvement of the private 
sector in areas of research, facility construction and network management. It was an 
ambitious strategy and needed the financial commitment and human resources of the 
international community and government departments at all levels. The WASH sector 
succeeded in establishing regional structures to maintain and operate water and sanitation 
facilities through support given to DINEPA and OREPA Offices Régionaux de l’Eau 
Potable et de l’Assainissement (Regional Potable Water and Sanitation Services). As noted 
previously, several agencies supported DINEPA in their technical development, for 
example, through the establishment of an emergency response unit within DINEPA (Oxfam 
Intermon), and the development of national water and sanitation guidelines and the 
assistance to recruit and train national WASH engineers (Oxfam GB). 
 
DINEPA were also supported to manage information centrally: an information manager 
within DINEPA cooperated with the WASH cluster information team. Information coming 
in from the CCCM Disaster Tracking Matrix (DTM) team (e.g. tracking outputs) and the 
WASH cluster information team was verified on a monthly basis by DINEPA using a 
standardised format agreed by the SAG. Information outputs included: Dashboard (an 
online information portal), updated contact lists, monthly statistical reports (including 
coverage and access, financial and programmatic gap analysis and programmatic progress 
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by agencies). WASH monitoring was initiated on 20th January 2010 by a dedicated WASH 
monitoring team set up by the cluster. Monitors reported to the SAG for planning and 
impact evaluation.  
 
At this point, the WASH cluster strategically stated the need to ‘engage in recovery actions 
in areas of origin that ‘build back safer and better’ and ‘move to neighbourhood approaches 
that are centered on returning home at the earliest opportunity’. This proved a difficult 
strategy to undertake when initial focus was solely on supporting camps. It is also a difficult 
strategy for WASH in that it is also highly dependent on the coordination with the shelter 
sector: a dynamic that was not as established as it should have been to adequately provide 
necessary WASH services to compliment the Shelter strategy. There are, however, 
examples of agencies that were able, from day one, to work in the neighbourhoods to 
rehabilitate services at the household level - one case enabled water supply to return to 
normal in just 2 months after the earthquake, allowing the agency to exit after 3 months 
(refer to Case study 7, pg. 183). Immediate localised rehabilitation and recovery was 
possible, but to allow this approach to reach the necessary scale the humanitarian 
operational model needed to look very different.  
 
 
 
This section has assessed the WASH response in Haiti in great detail and it has highlighted 
that the current operational model is unable to utilise existing capacity, engage with the 
private sector or adequately allow for community participation; programmatic elements that 
Case Study 7. Mercy Corps immediate household rehabilitation 
 
Mercy Corps global emergency team arrived after a week. They began work in Tabarre 
rehabilitating HHs immediate needs through vouchers for food and NFI (Non-Food Items), 
rental support and basic services, e.g. through rehabilitating local water vendors and providing 
latrines in the neighbourhood. Within 2 months of their operation water supply returned to 
normal. Mercy Corps were then able to exit after 3 months. This initiative contributed to a 
decentralised approach to emergency response programming allowing immediate rehabilitation 
of affected HHs, rapidly supporting adaptive resilience. 
 
[Source: Primary data from an INGO interview] 
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are crucial to ensure support to adaptive resilience of individuals/HHs, the existence of 
transitional and exit strategies and the stimulation of a rapid recovery. All these 
programmatic elements have been shown to be possible, and in Haiti, many of the eventual  
‘transitional’ and ‘recovery’ activities could have been undertaken over 18 months earlier 
than they were. Highlighting that with a revised humanitarian model Haiti could have 
avoided the protracted relief and poor recovery it suffered for years after the earthquake. 
 
The next section narrows down specific areas within agency operations that support 
programme development and implementation to see how this supportive framework impacts 
on potential programme outputs. 
 
5.5 Agency Capacity 
Gauging programme outputs within the Shelter and WASH sector in the previous sub-
sections has shown fundamental challenges within humanitarian operations and how current 
approaches are impacting on potential recovery. This section endeavours to critique 
programmatic elements that support programme development and implementation (such as 
assessments, transitional and exit planning, recovery programming and strategic capacity) to 
comprehend current practice, and how this supported or hindered programming aimed to 
build resilience, to ensure the development of transitional mechanisms and the stimulation 
of recovery. 
 
5.5.1 Assessments 
Assessments are crucial to ensure effective and appropriate programme planning. In Haiti, it 
was noted by several respondents and highlighted in evaluations that there was a lack of 
information and weak assessments carried out in the initial response. To understand what 
types of assessments were carried out, and when, within the response period, participants of 
the online survey were asked about the types of assessments that their individual agencies 
undertook, which were not undertaken and at what stage of the response they were first 
initiated. Figure 5.12 (refer to pg. 186) presents an overview of the stage at which 
assessments undertaken were carried out in the response period. The figure presents the 
individual assessment and its corresponding percentage breakdown of participants initiating 
that assessment in particular periods of the response, e.g. 55% of respondents that initiated 
contextual analysis within their agencies undertook this within weeks 1-4 after the 
earthquake, 15% within 2-6 months, 15% within 6 months-1 year, and a further 15% from 
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year 1-2 after the earthquake. The assessments included for analysis were: rapid needs 
assessment, risk assessment, contextual analysis, recovery assessment, monitoring and 
evaluation, community participatory assessment, impact assessment, disaster risk and 
management assessment, as well as internal programme audit. The timeframes used to 
assess initial implementation were broken down into phases of: 1-4 weeks, 2-6 months, 6 
months-1 year, 1 year-2 years. 
 
Figure 5.13 (refer to pg. 187) demonstrates the number of agencies that didn’t undertake 
particular assessments. The same 9 assessments used within Figure 5.12 were analysed. A 
summary of assessment data collected within the online questionnaire and corresponding 
data within the interviews and archival data is presented in the following sub-section. 
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Figure 5.12 Demonstrates the period after the earthquake at which respondents carried out each assessment. 
[Source: primary data from the online questionnaire] 
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Figure 5.13 Demonstrates the assessments not undertaken by respondents throughout the whole 
response. [Source: primary data from the online questionnaire] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary of assessments data 
Rapid needs assessments and risk assessments were on the whole carried out in the first 
month after the disaster. It can be noted that risk assessments were not carried out by all, 
potentially identifying a limited culture for risk identification, this is further reiterated by the 
number of organisations who do not undertake disaster risk and management assessments, 
as well as the different timeframes the assessments were actually undertaken. A need to 
standardise risk identification and disaster risk reduction and management assessments in 
the in post-disaster environment is evident.  
 
Context analysis was undertaken by the majority of organisations. However, almost half of 
the respondents indicated that they had undertaken their initial analyses from month 2, with 
some only undertaking the analyses 1 year after the disaster. Several INGO respondents 
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stated that context assessments were often not undertaken as it was deemed an unnecessarily 
time consuming exercise in an emergency. Context analysis is key to understanding the 
environment to be worked in and to planning and implementing appropriate and effective 
interventions. With so many organisations not investing in this analysis until a late date, this 
would imply that a large proportion of emergency response organisations suffered a lack of 
contextual knowledge to effectively build their programmes around. This resulting lack of 
coherence with the operational context is further reflected by the level of community 
participation undertaken, and the time at which it was initiated, with almost 50% of 
responding organisations that had undertaken community participation having only initiated 
it 6 months after the earthquake. It was noted by several INGO respondents that the 
implementation of a type of rapid context assessments would offer the opportunity to tap 
local knowledge, to engage with local development groups, to understand skills available 
locally and to develop links to the private sector. These are all key elements, if vulnerability, 
resilience and local capacity are to be understood; effective programmes that reaches the 
most vulnerable are to be planned; transition and exit planning mechanisms are to develop; 
and the impacts of programme choices on recovery comprehended. One INGO stated that 
they had undertaken a vulnerability assessment early on, looking particularly at a water 
point survey and potential rehabilitation. The INGO representative stated, ‘this allowed us 
[agency] to develop early recovery processes and to install a longer-sighted strategy’.  
 
Monitoring and Evaluation (M+E) was undertaken by the majority of organisations, but its 
early and effective implementation was only carried out by a few organisations (8% in the 
first month of operation, with a further 55% initiating within the first 6 months). An INGO 
respondent stated that ‘what M+E work that was done was donor driven though grants as 
opposed to implemented by the program to gain a greater knowledge of the context or to 
inform on program impact’. This result highlights that M+E was undervalued and under 
utilised. Baseline surveys were also weak or non-existent, a consequence noted by several 
INGO and donor respondents, that emergency responses are not interested in setting up 
comprehensive baseline information. This mindset resulted in programme plans being based 
on little contextual information, seeing programmes unable to actually ensure a programme 
reached the most vulnerable, which is a fundamental mandate of the international 
community. Further to this, no baseline data means programme impact is difficult, if 
impossible, to measure, which ultimately results in no real learning on the most effective 
response approaches. The poor implementation of M+E means response and recovery 
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programmes were unable to be reactive to changing needs or to increase programme 
efficiency. Instead, programme evaluations were often undertaken at the end of a 
programme, presenting results too late for a programme to be reactive and meet the required 
needs. This operational set up also fails to integrate results into future programme planning 
due to weak feed back systems. 
 
It has been clearly demonstrated that a large number of organisations do not undertake 
recovery assessments, with results from the online questionnaire presenting recovery 
assessments as the least undertaken assessment (refer to Figure 5.13, pg. 187). This 
incidence is a direct result of each organisation’s emergency mandate, which deems 
recovery as not being part of their responsibility. As a result, a void of knowledge is created 
and, automatically, a gap between relief and recovery activities develops, offering no 
cohesive ground to work from. Understanding the necessary recovery strategies early on 
will allow emergency organisations to gauge transitional and exit strategies, and, by 
understanding recovery dynamics, to develop integrated recovery strategy that would be 
advantageous for both emergency and recovery operators; offering the coherence that is 
needed.  
 
In point of evidence, the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Cross societies 
inherently have to think long-term, as a part of their mandate is to build up the capacity of 
the national society in order to hand over when they leave. Due to this, BRC implemented 
their Recovery Assessment Team (RAT) who carried out a recovery assessment by week 3 
after the earthquake. This information was then able to inform their programme planning, 
enabling them to successfully carry out longer-sighted programmes, such as extensive 
neighbourhood rehabilitation, increasing affected communities ability to recover. Examples 
like this show early recovery assessment is possible and can offer significant strategic gain 
for response programming.  
 
5.5.2 Transitional and Exit Planning 
Many INGOs stated within the online questionnaire and through the interviews that their 
agencies had to end services in Haiti on the basis of a lack of funds and transitional or exit 
options. Research data shows that a substantial amount of agencies didn’t undertake or 
adequately implement exit or transition strategies within their programmes (refer to Figure 
5.14, pg. 192). The lack of transitional or exit strategy resulted in communities being un-
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serviced and vulnerable, triggering anger amongst these communities, which on occasion 
led to attacks on agency staff and their cars, creating an unnecessary hostile environment. 
 
In the WASH sector, the Haitian ministry for water and sanitation (DINEPA) wanted 
agencies to exit from trucking water after 6 months of the emergency response, but agencies 
struggled to find alternatives, thus, lacking the ability to exit from or transfer services. As a 
result, water trucking continued for over 2 years, with many agencies desperately trying to 
hand over to the ill-prepared ministry or just dropping services all together due to the lack of 
funds, which left many communities un-served. In the Haitian response, a huge opportunity 
was missed, as, pre-earthquake, there had been a massive network of water vendors 
operating all over the city, many of whom still had substantial capacity to deliver and many 
who could start up their business with a little extra support. Oxfam recognised this capacity 
and in partnership with DINEPA invested in the rehabilitation of water vendors, as well as 
existing public tap stands (Oxfam 2011). By early 2011, IFRC began a strategy to take 
services out of camps and place them close to neighborhoods. The strategy saw the 
identification of HHs within the camps, who would be prepared to run a reservoir as a 
business in their community of origin. These HHs were then trained and financed. Camp 
residents were provided a 3 week subsidy: first week offered free water, 2nd and 3rd week 
offered 3 gourdes per bucket, by the 4th week owners could buy/rent their own trucks. IFRC 
managed to close all 66 camps for WASH by November 2011. Utilising existing capacity 
and introducing neighborhood approaches could have been achieved at scale far earlier in 
the response, the options existed. 
 
Utilising these types of options at scale would have built up relief service provision, as well 
as allowing transition and exit mechanisms to exist and sustainable services to be supported. 
A consequence would have been the stimulation of recovery early and the building up of 
resilience at the HH level. However, current operational approaches within humanitarian 
responses hinder the sector’s ability to exit and transition effectively and to offer control for 
potential negative impacts. This is a major concern the humanitarian sector needs to 
address. Many WASH agencies in Haiti tried to transfer services to their only recognised 
option - DINEPA. DINEPA, however, did not have the resources and capacity to handle this 
large a transfer of services. In essence, the agencies’ inability to plan for transition and exit 
resulted in the issues being transformed into the ministry’s problem and their, consequential, 
responsibility to pick up the pieces. 
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One INGO respondent stated, ‘exit strategies are usually conceptualised when the situation 
returns to normal, when another competent body is able to continue with activities that lead 
to development process, when the authorities within the country are capable of running the 
activities without overstretching, when funds are available to complete the process or when 
the resilience of the communities has been built up’. In reality, in Haiti, the perceived 
complexity of the post-disaster environment and the lack of planning and capacity building 
in crucial areas, i.e. government, private sector and communities, meant that exits were 
extremely difficult. Based on their experience in Haiti, many INGO representatives 
commented on the need for a change in their mentality, recognising that it is an imperative 
to consider exit planning on implementation of programmes. 
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Figure 5.14 Details the level at which respondents included certain programme elements into their response programming. [Source: primary data from the 
online questionnaire] 
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5.5.3 Recovery Programming 
The conceptualisation and planning of recovery interventions was undertaken at different 
periods of time after the earthquake. Research data collected through the online survey 
showed that a large proportion of agencies undertook recovery planning in either months 2-
6, or later, in years 1-2, after the earthquake (refer to Figure 5.15, pg. 193). Only a few 
conceptualised recovery from the onset of the response.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Implementation, in the main part, began over a year after the earthquake, with only a few 
organisations managing to implement activities in the first 6 months after the earthquake. 
However, the dip between planning and implementation of recovery strategies in months 7-
12 after the earthquake may have been as a result of the shift in resources needed to prepare 
for and respond to the hurricane season and the outbreak of cholera that hit Haiti at that 
time, which was noted by several INGO respondents within the interviews and online 
questionnaire. 
Figure 5.15  Illustrates at what stage each responding entity planned for and then physically 
implemented recovery programmes. [Source: primary data from the online questionnaire] 
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The research data also showed there was a low implementation rate for programmatic 
elements, such as sustainability and DRR, but a higher consideration rate for such 
programmatic elements. Therefore, indicating a shift in thinking and the issued value of 
these programmatic elements, but the current lack the knowledge and ability to assess and 
implement these activities. These elements are crucial for developing an emergency 
response approach that will stimulate recovery. 
 
5.5.4 Strategic Capacity 
As highlighted in the previous sub-section there is a considerable lack of strategic capacity 
in reference to transition and exits within agencies, which is not effectively countered by the 
cluster system (refer to sub-section 6.3.2). Recovery strategy is also weak; a vacuum exists 
due to the juxtaposed positions of the current disaster management paradigm and the nature 
of recovery. The current disaster management paradigm separates activities into ‘phases’ 
along a continuum (refer to Figure 2.3, pg. 13), which sees many agencies deeming any 
form of ‘recovery’ activity outside their mandate. With recovery beginning from day one, it 
needs to be conceptualised and strategically accounted for in response programming. This 
set up, therefore, sees no recovery expertise at a very fundamental stage of the recovery 
process. 
 
Agencies who often solely specialise in ‘relief’ activities often find themselves needing to 
transition services to local counterparts and ensure recovery is underway for relief agencies 
to deem that there is no more relief activities required. However, as one INGO respondent 
stated ‘emergency specialists don’t make good recovery analysts’, due to the mindset and 
approach needed to account for these different activities. Recovery programmes come with 
a suite of data management techniques and monitoring, but there is weak implementation 
because the main expertise lays in emergencies.  An INGO respondent states ‘we need to 
lay down recovery plans early and ensure recovery assessments and implementation are 
supported with financial and human resources, as currently when recovery programmes are 
required agencies are scrambling for expertise’.  
 
Limited recovery expertise and capacity in the earlier stage of a response, means that there 
is a limited (or no recovery) plan in place at the crucial time, resulting in a lack of 
transitional mechanisms and sustainable programme options, which, in Haiti, led to a 
protracted relief situation that carried on for over 2 years. 
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Figure 5.16 Shows the level of community participation experience by agencies within their 
response and recovery programmes. [Source: primary data from the online questionnaire] 
 
5.5.5 Community Participation 
Within the online questionnaire, participants were asked, ‘what was the level of community 
participation achieved in your programmes?’ The data indicated that there was a fair level of 
community participation achieved within overall programmes (refer to Figure 5.16, pg. 
195). What needs to be made clear is: firstly, this question is based on programmes that 
have been undertaken over a 2 year period, where a higher level of participation would have 
been achieved, secondly, the average rate of participation indicates that there were 
successful initiatives, but there were also issues experienced. 
 
 
 
 
 
Many organisations noted successful interventions that engaged camp communities and 
committees in undertaking assessments, as well as developing programmes and sustainable 
solutions. Others offered training to allow community members to more effectively 
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participate, i.e. camp WASH caretaker or hygiene promoters. Some organisations managed 
to implement feedback mechanisms, such as discussion sessions, complaints lines and 
suggestion boxes. 
 
Organisations that managed to develop early and effective community participation were 
those that were either working in Haiti long before the earthquake, and had, therefore, 
already built good relationships and strong networks; were organisations that had a number 
of national staff at an early stage that regularly worked with the same communities building 
trust and early participation; or were those organisations that mandate that their programmes 
are required to build resilient communities from the start, thus, involving the community in 
all of their activities from day one.  
 
Unfortunately, these initiatives and success stories were not widespread. However, it was 
noted by respondents that initial circumstances did make community participation difficult 
because of displacement and the psychological trauma in the immediate aftermath of the 
earthquake. Also, people were focused on their day-to-day survival, thus, with the heavy 
introduction of Cash for Work and payment for involvement in any programme (issued by 
the cluster) there were issues getting people involved and willing to spare their time in 
activities that were deemed as unpaid work. This dynamic upset the potential for wide 
spread initiation of community participation, resulting in an operational barrier. 
 
An example of the lack of participation, and the outcome seen, was explained by 
participants within the community discussion forum, who noted that they were only 
receiving some of the assistance needed because the kind of assistance being given was 
decided by the provider and not by themselves, the beneficiaries. They were not involved in 
any discussions or decision-making within programme plans. Therefore, what they expected 
and needed was not received. 
 
Problems of participation also emerged when INGOs tried to speak to representatives of the 
camp communities and the neighbourhood communities at the same time. INGOs are used 
to managing the provision of assistance in camps by creating ad hoc committees. However, 
real difficulties were seen in establishing the legitimacy of neighbourhood representatives. 
Representation and power conflicts existed between camp committees, who had managed 
aid since the disaster, and neighbourhood committees, who had existed before. The presence 
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of gangs further confused power relations, and there was also the need to consider 
municipal authorities within certain neighbourhoods where humanitarian aid was needed. 
Gauging these social dynamics and legitimate authority was necessary to undertake 
successful and locally owned neighbourhood interventions that were essential for recovery.  
Community participation is always, on paper, one of the key principles, but is often not 
undertaken or insufficiently implemented in the field. Consequently, this results in losing 
out on both local knowledge and the development of sustainable programmatic options for 
relief and recovery. 
 
This Chapter has presented the data analysis aimed to answer Objective 2 - To gauge the 
degree to which emergency response operations supported or hindered resilience at the 
individual/HH level and how it affected eventual recovery. The data has been discussed 
through the analysis and critique of specific emergency response approaches and their effect 
on resilience and resulting level of recovery, which has highlighted fundamental issues that 
have contributed to the lack of coherence between relief and recovery. The analysis has 
highlighted that certain programme approaches have directly hindered recovery and others 
that possessed supportive potential for recovery by building adaptive resilience of affected 
individuals/HHs. 
 
Actual interventions undertaken are hugely influenced by a variety of other variables 
operating around the response operation; these include financial mechanisms and 
coordination structures that make up the humanitarian framework. How these emergency 
approaches sit within the humanitarian framework and how the humanitarian framework 
influences current approaches to emergency operation will be dealt with in-depth in the 
following Chapter. 
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6. The Impact of the Humanitarian Framework on Resilience 
This Chapter looks to meet Objective 3 - To gauge the impact of the humanitarian 
framework on the level of resilience developed in the context of post-earthquake Haiti. The 
Chapter will be organised into a format that will, firstly, present the discussion of the main 
findings by drawing on relevant data sets, offering up their analyses, and secondly, 
concluding the main findings in order to make deductions relative to the objective in 
question within the case study context. The data analysis will be broken down into sections 
that will look in-depth at two key dynamics that operate within a response: finance and 
donor mechanisms and cluster coordination. The first section will deal with finance and 
donor strategy that was employed in Haiti, looking specifically at factors such as national 
involvement and economic development, which are key contextual factors involved in the 
stimulation of resilience. The donor system and its programmatic influence on the 
stimulation of resilience will also be evaluated. The following section will deal with cluster 
coordination and stakeholder effectiveness witnessed in this case study. 
 
6.1 Data Analysis Utilised 
Reviewing programmatic output within the response highlighted some key issues that 
hindered the development of individual/HH resilience, which were clarified earlier in 
Chapter 5. To understand the potential influence that key factors within the humanitarian 
framework have on eventual programmatic output this next chapter analyses data from the 
semi-structured interviews, online questionnaire and through archival data to gauge these 
dynamics and their specific influences. 
 
6.2 Finance and Donor Strategy  
Archival data (Groupe URD 2010; GHA 2010; EC 2011; USAID 2011) highlights the 
response to the 2010 earthquake in Haiti that saw the top five donors (US, Canada, the 
European Commission, the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank) 
funding humanitarian and reconstruction programmes; responding to CAP appeals, and re-
evaluating and revising development programmes.  
 
Even though there was a large level of funds pledged, not all were received and those funds 
that were received were not spent in their entirety.  Issues of lack of recovery and lack of 
reconstruction funds plagued the Haiti response. The following sections look in-depth at the 
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way funds were channeled, funding mechanisms and the overall set up of the funding 
system to gauge what affect this had on stimulating resilience and engaging recovery.  
 
6.2.1 Influence on National Involvement 
 
6.2.1.1 Breakdown of Funds Channeled to Implementation Partners 
Reviewing archival data in the form of reports, evaluations and secondary data produced by 
donors it could be seen that large sums were allocated for emergency activity (e.g. the US 
committed US$1.8 billion, CIDA disbursed US$178 million, EC disbursed US$100 
million), as well as for reconstruction and development (e.g. US committed US$1.8B, IDB 
committed US$1.73B, the World Bank committed US$560M, EC disbursed US$165M) 
(these figures were collected through direct donor data2). The UN also distributed large 
sums to carry out both humanitarian and recovery activities through 13 of its agencies.  
 
These funds were channeled through a variety of implementation partners, with each donor 
taking very different approaches. Table 6.1 (refer to pg. 200) details the amount of funds 
channeled through individual implementation partners for both emergency and 
reconstruction and development activity from some of the major government donors from 
2010-2012. Table 6.2 (refer to pg. 201) demonstrates the channeling of funds to different 
implementation partners by the 13 UN agencies operating in Haiti in 2011.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
2 EC’s direct data on status of all projects (July 2012). 
  IDB’s Quarterly report (August 2012) 
  World Bank’s Active portfolio (August 2012) 
  CIDA’s Project profiles (2005-2015) 
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*   Amounts that were not allocated under any specific label. 
       ** IDB all funds channeled through government, with exception of US$2million loan to private sector- local insurance  
            company. 
 
 
 
Donor Government 
Red Cross 
Movement 
NGOs  
UN 
Private 
Sector Unspecified* Total INGO LNGO 
CIDA          (Emergency activities) 0% 32% 22% 22% 0% 46% 0% 0% 
EC               (Emergency activities) 0% 14.5% 52% 52% 0% 30.5% 0% 3% 
EC             (Reconstruction and development activities) 37% 0% 13%  -  - 6.5% 38% 0% 
IDB          (Reconstruction and development activities) 99% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1%** 0% 
HRF (inc. World Bank, UN and IDB) (Reconstruction) 87.5% 0% 1.5% 0.8% 0.7% 8.5% 0% 0.6% 
 Table 6.1 Details percentage of budget distribution from donors to implementation partners from 2010-2012. [Source: Direct donor data] 
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Table 6.2 Details percentage budget distribution from different UN agencies to implementation partners in 2011. [Source: Direct UN data] 
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Government donors’ channeling figures indicate that emergency funds were channeled 
primarily through implementation agencies such as the Red Cross, INGOs and UN agencies, 
with very little directed through the government, local private sector or LNGOs (refer to 
Table 6.1, pg. 200). It is important to note that due to the protracted crisis, this approach to 
the disbursement of emergency funds was sustained for over a 2-year period. Conversely, 
with reconstruction and development funding, a different picture emerges, where larger 
sums of funds were disbursed directly to the government.  Funding to the private sector and 
LNGOs, however, remained low at 0%, 1%, 38% and 0% and 0.7% respectively (refer to 
Table 6.1, pg. 200).  
 
Amongst the UN agencies in 2011, almost half of the overall UN budget was being 
channeled to national actors, but there was significantly less channeled in the humanitarian 
period. The increase in channeled funds to national actors came in the transition to recovery. 
Within the UN, choices of implementation partners differs from one agency to the next, due 
to operational approach and the type of activity being supported. When looking at the 
overall budget disbursement by the UN in 2011, it can be noted that the largest percentage 
share of the budget is directed to NGOs, with INGOs receiving roughly 24% and LNGOs 
30%, followed by the local private sector receiving 16%, central and local government 
receiving 10%, and 10% respectively, and finally 7% went to the national private sector 
(refer to Box 6.1, pg. 203). A commitment to channeling funds at the national level stems 
from the UNs fundamental commitment to the Paris declaration and to principles of 
alignment, harmonisation, country ownership and mutual responsibility. 
 
The breakdown of budget disbursement to different implementation partners (refer to Box 
6.1 and Figure 6.1, pg. 203) shows different preferences between agencies: UNDP channel 
large proportions of its funds to the local government, local private sector and LNGOs; 
UNICEF mainly disbursed funds through INGOs and the local private sector and very little 
to government; IOM invested large amounts in the local private sector and LNGOs, relying 
less on the international private sector and the national government; UNOPS allocated funds 
solely in the private sector, channeling a larger share to the local private sector; UN-
HABITAT disbursed their largest proportion to INGOs, with smaller portions channeling to 
LNGOs and the local private sector; FAO split their funds fairly proportionally between 
national government, local government and LNGOs with a much small amount being 
channeled to INGOs (refer to Box 6.1 and Figure 6.2, pg. 203).  
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Box 6.1 Overview of UN agencies budget disbursement to implementing partners 2011. 
 
 
                                 
 
 
Figure 6.1 Budget disbursement to different implementation partners by all UN agencies 
operating in Haiti in 2011. [Source: UN direct data]. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2 Budget distributions to different implementation partners by individual UN agencies 
operating in Haiti in 2011. [Source: UN direct data] 
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Donor respondents noted that the choice of implementation partner has evolved, 
historically, through several factors, such as the organisational policy of the donor, 
established funding mechanisms, perceived effectiveness of working relationship with 
different partners, processes of accountability and desired programme outputs. The 
availability of established funding mechanisms also influences donor decisions on how 
funding is channeled. For example, grant and tender processes between donors, UN 
agencies, the Red Cross and INGOs are well established through processes such as the CAP 
(Consolidated Appeals Process), and are regularly used for channeling humanitarian funds. 
In contrast, mechanisms to channel funds through the government institutions, local private 
sector and LNGOs are often weak or lacking altogether. In Haiti, many LNGOs and local 
private sector entities were unable to understand and access tender processes for 
humanitarian and/or reconstruction programmes and little support was offered to facilitate 
their involvement in these complex processes (EC 2012).  
 
6.2.1.2 Support to Government  
Donor reports (EC 2012; IDB 2012; World Bank 2012) demonstrated that several donors 
established various methods for supporting the GoH, including through direct budget 
support and through the provision of technical assistance. IDB, EC and the WB disbursed a 
large proportion of funds through the public financial mechanisms of the GoH. CIDA, who 
did not channel funds directly through the government supported bilaterally by setting up 
Memorandum of Understandings (MOU) with the GoH and providing technical assistance.  
Support offered to government by donors was financial, technical and institutional, with 
different approaches offering varying degrees of ownership and inclusion.  
IDB attempted to strengthen institutional capacity through the development of the Haiti 
integrated government platform: a technology platform to provide secure communications, 
host critical information systems and recover key databases lost in the earthquake. The 
platform aimed to equip the Haitian public sector with data management tools that looked to 
increase the transparency and efficiency in the use of reconstruction resources. IDB also 
offered the government soft loans, working with the Ministry of Economy and Finance to 
increase efficiency and transparency of public resource management and raise the standard 
of living.   
The EC along with offering direct budget support, dedicated funds to the reconstruction of 
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ministry buildings (US$25M planned disbursement 2013-2014), the preparation of a new 
governance facility for technical cooperation (US$1.2M disbursed) and support to non-state 
actors and local authorities and to local investments (US$2.8M disbursed). The majority of 
World Bank programmes managed to fully involved the Ministry of Finance and the Haiti 
Reconstruction Fund (HRF) in 2012 came under the chairmanship of the Minister of 
Economy and Finance. These initiatives built government capacity to enable a further 
US$100M to be released for reconstruction.  
The GoH created the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC), which was co-chaired by 
the UN Special Envoy to Haiti; to ensure the planning and implementation of the recovery 
efforts were Haitian-led. It allowed communication and coordination between the GoH, 
donors, civil society, and private sector communities to promote Haiti’s development goals 
and ensure accountability and transparency. 
Many UN agencies also invested a lot of financial and technical resources into national 
government (e.g. UNDP, IOM, FAO, UNAIDS, UNWOMEN), local government (UNDP, 
UNICEF, WHO, FAO); as well as local entities, such as LNGOs and civil society (e.g. 
UNDP, IOM, UNWOMEN, FAO, UNAIDS, UNHCR) with the aim to strengthen these 
local capacities. 
 
‘It is not donors who make the biggest difference, national actors need to be built up to play 
the leading role in the recovery, reconstruction and development of their country’ 
- Nigel Fisher, UN Humanitarian and resident coordinator.  
 
UNDP channeled a large amount of funds to local authorities with 30% of the budget being 
spent in government institutions, which supported ministries through capacity building. The 
UNDP aimed to build in missing capacity and offer technical support and training. UNDPs 
transition strategy centers on the importance of key government leadership to allow 
humanitarian ownership to transfer to government ownership.  
 
Even with a number of donor and UN initiatives undertaken to involve the government and 
support recovery there were a number of challenges witnessed by respondents in the rate of 
recovery and reconstruction. What has been highlighted was the level of ownership, 
competence and leadership offered by the GoH (IMF 2012), but also the actual level of 
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funds offered to recovery and reconstruction activities compared to the needs (refer to Box 
6.2, pg. 207). Raising the questions as to whether the overall approach undertaken by donors 
was comprehensive enough in its strategy and its budget allocation to build the capacity of 
the government to undertake and own recovery and reconstruction activity. Box 6.2 
illustrates the amounts that donors contributed to supporting the GoH’s 18 month Action 
Plan for National Recovery and Development. As illustrated by Figure 6.3 (refer to pg. 
207), support was met for smaller budget requirements in the areas of DRR and urban 
development, but large gaps remained in reconstruction, institutional strengthening and 
education.  
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Box 6.2 Budget support to the GoH for post-earthquake recovery 
 
Approximately US$5.50B was pledged by 55 public sector donors at the pledging conference in 
March 2010 to support the GoH's Action Plan. As of December 2011 donors had provided US$1B 
in debt relief and approved US$4.5B in programme funds of which US$2.4B had been distributed 
by 2012. 
 
Of the US$335M received, the HRF channeled 89% of its disbursed funds directly through the 
government or government associated agencies, which offered the government strong ownership 
in the implementation of HRF-funded projects. Several donors also offered direct budget support 
to the government from 2010-2012, including IDB distributing US$50M in 2010, US$35M in 
2011 and US$27M in 2012, and EC distributing US$36M in 2010, US$26M in 2011 and 
US$150,000 in 2012. 
 
Figure 6.3 shows that there were still significant funding gaps in the GoH's 18 month budget plan. 
With programmes aimed at reconstruction, financial and economic recovery (jobs) and 
strengthening of administration suffering the most. Funding was met for the smaller budgets 
requested for DRR, development of regional hubs and urban development. 
     
 
 
Figure 6.3 Donor and HRF contribution to the GoH 18 month budget plan for funding post-
earthquake recovery. [Source: HRF 2012] 
 
 
 
 
 
 208 
6.2.1.3 Support to the Private Sector 
As demonstrated in Table 6.1 and 6.2 (refer to pg. 200 and 201), minimal amounts of the 
overall budget from donors was directly channeled to the private sector, despite the fact that 
budget offered in support of private sector development brought about many fundamental 
initiatives.  
  
IDB offered US$2M for low rate loans to be offered to SMEs through local financial 
institutions, e.g. an incentive called the Social Investment Fund; a Business Development 
Service, disbursing US$31.2M in total for private sector development; and a Productive 
Haiti programme (refer to Box 6.3, pg. 209). 
 
The EC channeled much larger amounts directly to the private sector (refer to Table 6.1, pg. 
200) supporting mango producers, offering a micro-credit system and developing 
commercial exchange.  
 
CIDA also offered a system of micro-credit and financial services through savings and 
credit cooperatives. By 2011, 47 cooperatives and 24 points of service were established. 
This programme has boosted credit and savings by 20% (with the total number of members 
at 390,000) as has helped generate stable, permanent employment in rural areas.  
 
Within the UN agencies: UNOPS, UNDP, WHO, UNICEF and IOM channeled large 
percentage of funds to the local private sector. Five agencies didn’t invest in the private 
sector at all, these include: UNEP, UNWOMEN, FAO, UNFPA and UNHCR. 
 
UNDP specialise in private sector development and job creation. The strategies they 
employed included; buying locally, offering support to companies on how to apply for UN 
tender processes, setting up an employment programme that worked with the private sector, 
i.e. helping them become more competitive and increase their quality of service, and they 
also offered support to entrepreneurs through a professional qualification a subsidy 
programme that asked the private sector what skills they were missing, then provided 
subsidies to the youth to study in those professions. 
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Box 6.3 IDB Support to the Private Sector  
 
Social Investment Fund Due to the limited access to credit and very high interest rates in Haiti 
post-earthquake IDB set up a Social Investment Fund (SIF) in 2011, which will be a 12 year debt 
fund with up to €50M in assets, offering SMEs a lower rate loan through local financial 
institutions (e.g. banks, micro-financers, cooperatives and leasing companies). The SIF will 
provide these local financial institutions (LFI) with loans that can cover up to 60% of the financial 
cost of eligible sub-loans; providing co-finance sub-loans that are blended at a lower rate, 
enabling more SMEs to have access to finance. Loans between US$10,000 and US$30,000 can be 
allocated by LFI to SMEs that comply with Haitian law. 
 
Business Development Services As most SMEs in Haiti lack formal business training, IDB’s 
business development service aims to help SMEs better prepare financial statements, formulate 
more precise business plans that better project their financial flows, as well as develop their 
entrepreneurial management skills - a process that will enhance the productivity of SMEs and 
allow them better access to credit. IDB have invested US$11M, with a further US$9M having 
been contributed from multiple donors. The business development service allocates funds upon 
demand and in high priority sectors and value chains. Further support will be offered once credit 
has been obtained through training to formulate or review business plans, strengthen managerial 
skills, support to the implementation of business plans and support for the training of new workers 
hired as a result of the financial investment. 
 
Productive Haiti Program Productive Haiti is a programmatic approach that aims to support 
credit requests on the market, enabling financial institutions to have more incentives to cater to the 
existing investment needs. This approach will include the implementation of five pillars: 
1. Partial Credit Guarantee Fund (PCGF): to reduce bank’s credit risk for existing clients 
(US$35M) 
2. Social Investment Fund (SIF): to enhance collaboration with private sector lenders to 
increase access to finance through lower rate loans (€50M). 
3. Business Development Services (BDS): for the provision of technical assistance to SMEs 
for SIF, PCGF or QEF financial eligibility (US$20M). 
4. Professional training (PT): to provide demand driven funding support for professional 
training. 
5. Quasi Equity Facility (QEF): to offer a multi-layered equity facility to provide ‘seed grants’ 
and equity funds to enable SME start-ups. 
 
[Source: IDB 2012] 
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6.1.2.4 Local Private Sector and LNGOs Assessment of Humanitarian Funding 
Several private sector, INGO and LNGO respondents stated they were critical of the way 
international aid was channeled and felt that there had been insufficient engagement with 
local private sector and civil society.  Humanitarian aid was seen to have been poorly 
administered and insufficiently regulated, which resulted in funds being channeled into 
programmes, which Haitians felt they had neither ownership nor control over.  
 
The most alarming impact of aid cited by INGOs and LNGOs was the destruction of social 
services and basic services, particularly in the health sector. In the field of health, 
engagement with the private sector was minimal, even though the vast majority of health 
service providers in the country are private. The lack of engagement with the private health 
institutions resulted in the bankruptcy of many private health centers and hospitals, the loss 
of jobs and the further weakening of local health institutions. Within water and sanitation 
archival data highlighted that many of the private local water vendors were unable to re-
engage their businesses due to being unable to compete with all the free provision 
undertaken by INGOs.  
 
Fragmentation and unreliability of assistance was also cited by private sector respondents as 
making a productive relationship between international donors and the local private sector 
difficult. Respondents were also critical of the way in which aid resulted in a distortion of 
local markets and disempowerment of local communities.  
 
The setting up of parallel aid systems was criticised within evaluatory reports (Fiscale 2011; 
OECD/DAC 2011; DEC 2011a) as leading to a continuous weakening of the Haitian State 
and Haitian institutions in general. In some cases, this resulted in a virtual collapse of 
certain sectors.  
 
Another issue articulated by a variety of stakeholders in interview was that aid was 
inefficient, wasteful, fragmented and unreliable. Inefficiency and wastage was considered to 
be directly related to the lack of understanding of the context and the bypassing of local 
institutions- ‘because of the perceptions of the culture of corruption in Haiti, there is a fear 
to work with local institutions’, states a private sector respondent. ‘Therefore the donors 
fund outside organisations who set up their own systems, but who do not have an 
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understanding of the reality. As a result, their projects are less effective and lots of money is 
wasted’, a statement by a government respondent.  
 
Aid that was channeled in this manner was perceived as an inefficient use of resources that 
undermined sustainability. In the words of an INGO respondent, ‘its like pouring money 
into a system that is broken. Millions have been spent and millions have been lost, not 
reaching people in need nor building systems that can be sustained’. 
 
Finally, aid was also described by several INGO respondents as not being innovative 
enough in supporting recovery, reconstruction and economic development, processes that 
would have encouraged the development of resilience within this vulnerable society.   
 
6.2.2 Influence on Recovery and Economic Development 
 
6.2.2.1 Donor Strategy for Recovery and Economic Development 
Literature (Groupe URD 2010; EC 2012; IDB 2012, World Bank 2012) has demonstrated 
that donors offer a variety of approaches in the wake of a crisis that coincide with the nature 
of the organisation and the funding instruments they have developed. Donor reports showed 
that, in Haiti, the EC, which offers both expertise and support in both emergency response 
(ECHO) and mid-long term development, provided two lines of support under their Civil 
Protection Mechanism and European Development Fund. Box 6.4 (refer to pg. 213) 
illustrates the sectoral division of these funds and the strategies developed specific to 
recovery and economic development (refer to Figures 6.4 and 6.5, refer to pg. 213).  
 
The EC undertook several strategies for addressing the earthquakes direct affects that 
offered long-term sustainability, resilience building and recovery and included: 
 Facilitating the return of displaced people to their place of origin or to relocate. 
Taking a neighbourhood approach, reconstructing homes and water and 
sanitation facilities. 
 Providing Haitians with access to healthcare in their neighbourhoods. 
 Integrating DRR methods in all reconstruction efforts. 
 Offering Cash for Work for debris clearing and rehabilitation. 
 Providing a food assistance programme that worked through cash or vouchers 
aimed at stimulating the local economy. 
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The EC also offered reconstruction and development initiatives that contributed to 
economic development: 
 Facilitating access to micro-credits in rural areas and strengthening the capacities 
of financial lenders, e.g. Caisses Populaires. 
 Supporting road and bridge rehabilitation and maintenance. 
 Offering support to the Ministry of Industry and Commerce.  
 Enhancing commercial exchanges between Haiti and the Dominican Republic. 
 Enhancing local community cooperation in border areas.  
 Promoting the economic development of the northern region. 
 
Furthermore, the IDB, an institution solely concerned with development, offered a different 
strategic approach. A Country Strategy Update was produced after the earthquake declaring 
7 priority sectors aligned to a reconstruction plan: infrastructure, transport, energy, WASH, 
agriculture, education (US$250m over 5 years) and private sector development, through 
access to finance and business development. 
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Box 6.4 EC’s sectoral budget division and strategic approach in post-earthquake Haiti 
 
   
                  
 
Figure 6.4 Breakdown of the EC’s emergency budget by sector 2010-2011. [Source: EC 2012] 
 
 
                    
 
Figure 6.5 Breakdown of the EC’s budget for reconstruction and development by activity. 
[Source: EC 2012] 
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6.2.2.2 Job Creation 
Donor reports (EC 2012; IDB 2012) established that donors aimed to create jobs through 
infrastructure projects that required large amounts of labour, such as the EC’s road and 
bridge rehabilitation projects and IDB’s support to the Caracol Industrial Park development. 
By 2012, HRF had provided 18% of total reconstruction financing, with US$274M being 
allocated to 17 projects since June 2010.  
 
Private sector development initiatives were also used to create employment opportunities, 
through the establishment of more SMEs, the development of industrial parks, such as 
Caracol Industrial Park, and loan support for the employment of local labour.  IDB offered 
such loan support to SMEs through their economic and social assistance fund. IDB also 
offered soft loans for the GoH to stimulate economic recovery and expand and diversify 
sources of income in poor rural and peri-urban communities.  
 
Evaluatory reports produced by the UN (UN 2011; UNDP 2013) showed that in 2011 UN 
agencies created just over 280,000 jobs, with IOM generating 140,000 jobs and UNDP 
creating 125,000 jobs. UNDP, in particular, invested in job creation in every commune. In 
the first 10 months the objective was to inject money into the economy, so money was 
pushed through any good employment suggestion, whether it was short-term or long-term. 
By November 2010 labor-intensive programmes were being provided, but, for maximum 
benefit, they needed to be framed within the long-term rehabilitation programme. By 2012, 
UNDP managed to create 400,000 jobs, inclusive of both short-term and long-term 
employments, using this approach. 
 
6.2.2.3 Cash Transfers 
Donor programmatic reports mention that cash transfers were offered by donors who 
undertook direct programme activity, such as the Cash for Work programmes offered by the 
EC, which gave out cash and vouchers for food assistance for labour undertaken (US$5M). 
The World Bank also offered cash grants for housing repair and reconstruction, i.e. 
US$1350 was given to a house-hold if the damaged house was assessed as structurally solid 
and US$3500 if a house that had been completely destroyed or was beyond repair (these 
funds facilitated the build of a core unit 18m2 in size).  
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Other UN agencies also have incorporated cash transfers into their programmes through 
mechanisms, such as CfW, reconstruction support, and rental support. UNDP set up a large 
CfW programme for activities such as debris removal. Cash was paid to 40,000 workers 
using mobile money. UNDP also supported working groups that coordinated hundreds of 
NGOs undertaking CfW programmes. UN and INGO respondents noted that reconstruction 
subsidies were also coordinated by a UNDP scheme where each family received a US$500 
coupon to buy construction materials and UNDP provided them with support from 
engineers, who could tell them what they needed to buy and also train them on how to repair 
their homes. Tools were also available for loan. Again mobile money was used to transfer 
the cash to the beneficiary. By 2012, IOM began to support the dissolution of IDP camps 
through rental support offered to those who moved out of the IDP camps; this strategy was 
initiated under the 16/6 programme (refer to Case study 2, pg. 155). 
 
6.2.2.4 Private Sector Views on Recovery and Economic Development 
All private sector respondents interviewed and some INGO respondents, referred to 
distortion of local markets in Haiti. Various kinds of distortion were described, including 
the distortion of salaries and the distortion in the rental market.  
 
The distribution of free food and goods was also criticised for distorting the local food and 
commodity market. Some private sector actors did develop proposals on initiatives to better 
link international assistance to local markets, but complained that these were never seriously 
considered (refer to Box 6.5, pg. 217).  
 
LNGO and INGO respondents were also critical of aid being channeled in a way that 
disempowered rather than strengthened local communities.  They cited the emergence of 
passive tendencies among the population as a result of not being involved in their own 
development.  
 
Distribution of free goods and services and CfW programmes were cited by LNGOs and 
INGO respondents as examples that undermined local notions and practices of self-reliance. 
‘People get used to receiving; becoming mere spectators to the activities of the NGOs’, one 
INGO respondent related. ‘Goods, services and cash are given without their having to work 
for them; expectations are raised and eventually not fulfilled. Then when the INGO finishes 
their project and leaves after a few years, it creates immense frustration among the 
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population and it undermines local solidarity, self-reliance and initiative’, stated another 
INGO respondent. 
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6.2.3 The Donor System and its Programmatic Influence 
Many respondents from the international community noted significant programmatic issues 
that stemmed from the operative nature of the donor. It is clear that response and recovery 
operations are heavily dependent on the donor and consequently often strategically impact 
programs carried out on the ground. These issues include: 
 
‘Time frames were extremely short, as is always the case with humanitarian funding. There 
has not been as yet, much ‘transitional’ funding for Haiti and not enough ‘development’ 
funding, which is sorely needed to prevent certain future disasters and to increase 
resilience’.  - INGO respondent 
 
‘Proposals are developed around available funding and time limits on spending were set. 
Organisations often follow donor money, resulting in programmes not being developed on 
real field based needs’. - INGO respondent 
 
‘Strategic direction essentially depended on the funding, we [agency] have been very 
dependent on funding where the donor specifies what is wanted, rather than being able to 
put our own ideas to donors’. - INGO respondent 
 
Box 6.5 Food aid and local markets 
‘Many food and beverage businesses faced enormous challenges after the earthquake because 
the majority of food was distributed for free for about 6 months. We from the private sector had, 
in fact, proposed that a voucher system be organized, that could be given to the affected 
population to use in local shops, and then local stores could be reimbursed by aid organizations. 
This would have ensured that the local commercial food was protected and it would have 
allowed people access to goods, to recover their sense of normalcy and their dignity. And it 
wouldn’t have cost anything more, just a different way of organizing assistance through 
partnership with the private sector. But such a system was never considered seriously and was 
never established.’ 
 
A quote given by a local Haitian private sector respondent. 
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‘Implementation of recovery was stunted due to lack of funding. It was sad that we could 
not implement earlier’. - INGO respondent 
 
Lack of donor coherence disconnects the response 
The literature review has presented how funds flow into an emergency through a variety of 
routes, i.e. the CAP, Flash appeals, CERF, ERF, private funds etc. (refer to sub-section 
2.4.2), which then flow through a variety of financial disbursement partners and 
implementation partners (refer to Table 6.1, pg. 200 and 6.2, pg. 201), with all parties of 
which having their own agendas. The current lack of coherence between the expansive array 
of donors that support the plethora of implementation agencies operating in a response lays 
the foundations for a confused and ineffectual approach, making coordination and strategy 
development extremely difficult. This approach does not allow the international response to 
function as a sum of its parts, which, if successfully achieved, would create a capacity that 
could streamline planning, strategy development and implementation, enabling the sector to 
rapidly assess and respond to the variety of needs presented in volatile post-disaster 
environments. Instead, the current approach operates as a disconnected body, which results 
in a significantly weaker capacity that struggles to undertake effective coordination and 
strategy development.  
 
Top-heavy decision-making weakens leadership 
Current funding architecture presented within the previous sub-section shows that decision-
making is frequently top heavy, and where response programmes are developed on the basis 
of donor perception and/or agenda and not enough on the reality and need on the ground. 
While, donors have a strong influence on response programme direction, however, they do 
not have the mandate nor sufficient capacity to offer leadership. This creates a dynamic 
where decision making authority is not in the hands of those who are in leadership positions 
within a response creating a power vacuum; making it difficult for effective leadership to 
exist. 
 
Short proposal timeframes affects effective planning 
A respondent from an INGO noted ‘donors can sometimes only give a couple of weeks after 
a call for proposals to plan an entire programme, which results in a rushed understanding of 
the most appropriate type of programme for the context, then you have to implement that 
prescribed programme’.  With little time to gain effective assessment of the operational 
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context and the needs of the affected population, along with a funding system that does not 
allow the flexibility to evolve programmes to meet the changing needs, sees the 
implementation of inappropriate programmes. The provision of a funding system that offers 
flexibility should be an intrinsic way of operating in dynamic and often volatile 
environments, such as emergency responses.  
 
A further challenge seen, within the issue of funding flexibility, that was highlighted by 
several INGO and UN agency respondents, can be seen when attempting to gain funding 
for, what is deemed, ‘recovery activities’. Often activities relating to recovery need to be 
funded under different funding streams, calls for proposals within these funding streams are 
irregular and the process needed to release the funds can take a year, which is a none starter 
in emergencies.  
 
Funding caps affects programmatic scope 
Many INGO respondents noted that relief funding often has a 6 month spending cap, which 
they witnessed led to misguided decision-making that focused on rapid spending strategies 
and not looking at how to meet the real needs with the most effective programme. It was 
also noted by INGO respondents that spending caps also made it very difficult for long-
sighted programming to be planned for. An INGO respondent states ‘if there is any unspent 
money there should be a system that can free up the money for use for other activities such 
as recovery. To do this firstly, donor’s mindset needs to change, as there is more interest in 
funding emergencies activity only because of its profile. Secondly, making a request for 
both relief and recovery funding needs to be made available at the same time. 
 
It had also been noted in Haiti by INGO respondents that when recovery activities were 
needed there was little to no money available. If relief, recovery and development are ever 
to find coherence, funding periods need to be extended, e.g. from the typical 6 months to 1 
year timescale to at least 1 to 5 years. This would allow for effective transitional 
programming that affords the possibility for strategy development. 
 
Donors push for quantity over quality and ‘visibility’ over ‘feasibility’ 
As noted in the previous section, donors often choose funding avenues based on the profile 
it can bring, e.g. relief activities, which come with huge media attention, a life saving profile 
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and quantifiable numbers to impress. Whereas, recovery is much more complex with results 
only being visible much further down the line.  
 
This mindset is extended into an approach of ‘visibility’ where funds are often released to 
activities that will gain the most media coverage, e.g. in PaP, a lot of work took place in 
camps nearest to the airport and the presidential palace. As is clear the choice of programme 
support was not based on need or feasibility, but on visibility, resulting in programme aims 
were being warped by donor pressure, reducing the effective scope of interventions. 
 
As noted by INGO respondents and demonstrated in donor pre-requisites, donors favour, 
and push for, quantifiable results, basing their impact on numbers achieved In Haiti, this 
consequently resulted in ‘UN agencies and many other INGOs focusing on numbers 
achieved with less of a focus on strategy’, as one INGO representative stated.  An example 
of this approach saw an X number of IDPs receiving X number of litres of water per day, 
which was achieved through the use of an incredibly expensive and unsustainable form of 
delivery; a form of delivery that ends when the money runs out, not when the need ceases. 
This current approach doesn’t look at the response in a holistic way, it does not encourage 
strategy development or the development of more effective operations to meet the real 
needs of affected communities. Relief professionals have often, consequently, developed 
their expertise to work solely in their perceived dedicated ‘phase’ and not developing the 
strategic base to ensure effective transition, exits and recovery can take place. This can be 
likened to the humanitarian sector operating with blinkers on; operating in the realms of 
donor architecture and not within the reality on the ground.  
 
Programmes chosen on financial imperative not on need 
It was also noted by several INGO respondents that programme choice by some agencies 
was made on a financial imperative and not on need. Where agencies would undertake 
programmes, i.e. either self-set or under a donor specified proposal application, that allowed 
for financial support to keep the agency in operation even though it was well understood 
that said programme(s) were either ineffective or even negative in its impact. The financial 
dependency that this current donor system creates can lead to the implementation of 
ineffective and misled programming that confuses, and potentially hinders, the overall 
effectiveness of response operations. These approaches need to be monitored and accounted 
for in the overall strategy to ensure international interventions are appropriate and worth 
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undertaking. If there is ever to be coherence between relief and recovery, donors and 
agencies need to be able to work off one platform. A platform that offers up a coherent 
strategy and that allows for a coordinated and capable response, rather than a chaotic and 
futile one. 
 
Separation of funding streams 
Current donor architecture is based on separated funding streams for ‘relief’ and ‘recovery’ 
orientated activities. The ‘phased’ disaster cycle paradigm has encouraged a funding 
framework that has developed ‘distinct branches with very different sets of benchmarks and 
heavy structuring, and there is not a friendly link between them’, states a donor respondent. 
This framework has developed a funding procedure that has created an inflexible system. A 
system that is unable to release funds outside its ‘phased’ parameters.  
 
Agencies are recognising the need to look at relief and recovery simultaneously, but are 
struggling to find financial support to undertake more strategic and context specific 
programming. Within the Haiti response, examples of this can be seen in IRDs response 
proposal that looked to include relief and recovery activities, but was refused by OFDA. 
However, further into the response, OFDA were described as ‘going beyond their mandate’ 
when they offered to support CHF’s programme that was more long-sighted in its thinking. 
 
Along with programme approach being influenced, the ability to exit correctly was also 
compromised. An example of this was seen under ECHO funding, where a sponsored 
organisation ran out of funds before being able to adequately exit, the donor told the 
organisation they needed to end activities anyway, resulting in unfinished programmes and 
services being dropped with no alternative put in place. 
 
The donor system frequently inhibits the potential for coherence to be created between relief 
and recovery, as the system doesn’t incentivise agencies to undertake more than relief and 
with handovers often not planned in. Therefore, strategy to adequately transition or exit is 
not inherent in programming. What is more significant is that the system does not allow for 
progressive development of operations within the humanitarian sector, a detrimental 
dynamic that ensures response operations will never reach their optimum operational state. 
Instead, operating in the chaotic and un-strategised manner that it currently finds itself in. If 
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humanitarian response is to ever increase in effectiveness and coherence, a significant 
redesign of the donor system needs to be undertaken. 
 
DFID have recognised this and state, in their most recent HERR, that there is a need to fund 
recovery from day one, recognising that their split-funding model (e.g. relief, recovery and 
reconstruction) has caused a false dichotomy between these activities. The review found 
that what affected populations want and need the most is an immediate start to livelihoods 
recovery and that the neat donor funding split does not work to meet this need (DFID 
2011b). 
 
Accountability and using the donor system to install standards 
Several INGO respondents note that there is an obvious lack of accountability and 
acknowledgement of failure by the humanitarian community. This results, in the 
consequences of ineffective or detrimental programmes going unaccounted for and critical 
learning never being fed back into operations, which is necessary to increase effectiveness.  
This state of affairs has been encouraged by the donor system. Firstly, through the lack of a 
system of accountability: an INGO respondent comments, ‘the lack of a system of 
accountability is not amended by donors because of their potential ‘fear’ of being 
accountable for all the mistakes’. Secondly, agencies are under a system that needs to prove 
success of funded programmes to ensure future funding is available, which prohibits the 
ability to admit failure and feed in learning.  
 
Ensuring a system of accountability will stimulate an environment of learning and greater 
flexibility, foster an acknowledgement of failure and highlight opportunities to improve 
programming and operations. Driving the humanitarian system to increase standards. 
 
Local private sector mechanisms for accessing funds 
If transition mechanisms are to exist and sustainable service options are to develop after a 
disaster, the local private sector needs to be involved in response and recovery activities. In 
order for the local private sector to re-establish access to the streams of finance that flow 
into an emergency need to be made more available. Private sector respondents stated that 
they struggled to access funds within the humanitarian response and, with free services 
being offered by the humanitarian community, private sector providers couldn’t compete 
and re-establish themselves; many who had lost their livelihoods as a result.  
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Bidding processes needed to be opened up to allow local companies to apply. Facilitation 
needed to be offered by funding institutions or implementation agencies to support local 
companies become aware of what was available and how to undertake the process.  
 
When considering opening up bidding processes, there also needs to be a discussion on 
criteria for application, as, within the response period, many agencies would only accept 
applications from ‘formalised’ companies. In Haiti, the majority of the local private sector 
groups were ‘unformalised’, which meant these local companies were often marginalised. 
Examples in Haiti saw PDT (Peace Dividend Trust), along with many other agencies, 
working only with formalised companies. UNDP, as an exception, worked with 
unformalised companies, which was essential as 90% of the private sector in Haiti is 
unformalised.  
 
This section has assessed in-depth the dynamics of financial mechanisms and donor strategy 
within international response and their outcomes for recovery within the Haitian context. It 
is clear that current donor strategies possess elements that have the capacity to promote 
recovery, however, their current scale and timeliness are not sufficient to make the 
necessary impact they are capable of. There are also elements within financial mechanisms 
and donor strategy that have a significantly negative impact on programming and its ability 
to stimulate recovery.  
 
6.3 Coordination 
A second critical factor within the humanitarian framework that impacts the effectiveness of 
programmes is coordination. This section will look at stakeholder perceived effectiveness, 
which will highlight reasons for development of particular working relationships, and 
cluster coordination will also be assessed within the Haitian context to highlight the level of 
strategy and leadership available to support programming and its impact.  
 
6.3.1 Stakeholder Perceived Effectiveness  
How emergency operations are approached and implemented often depends on the strength 
and capacity of stakeholders involved and their perceived effectiveness. In Haiti, and within 
every disaster response, there are a myriad of stakeholders from: national to local 
government, INGOs, LNGOs, private sector, military fractions, UN agencies and 
community groups. Within the online survey, participants were asked to rate the 
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Figure 6.6 Online survey results for the perceived effectiveness of some of the main 
stakeholders operating in the Haiti disaster response. [Source: data from the online 
questionnaire, refer to Appendix 1c] 
 
effectiveness of different stakeholders operating in the Haiti disaster response. This 
highlighted stakeholders that were perceived as most effective (refer to Figure 6.6, pg. 224) 
and those that were the least effective (refer to Figure 6.7, pg. 225).  The results are 
displayed as the sum total of respondent’s views on effectiveness of individual stakeholders, 
e.g. the most effective stakeholder perceived by respondents was INGOs receiving 23% of 
the total sum of allocated effectiveness. The summary of these results is given in the 
following section. 
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Summary of perceived stakeholder effectiveness 
The overall response from participants shows that the most effective stakeholders included 
INGOs, the cluster groups and community committees. It must be noted that the majority of 
respondents in this questionnaire were from INGOs. Community committees, along with the 
local private sector, were seen, in the main, part as effective by a variety of different 
stakeholders. However, some saw the operations of the private sector as disruptive to 
response programming - ‘Many private sector actors caused more harm than good, by 
putting up their prices, which reduced the level of services which INGOs were able to 
provide to earthquake victims. Price regulation from the government may perhaps have 
avoided this’, stated an INGO respondent. 
 
UN’s MINUSTAH were deemed effective, especially in providing logistical and security 
assistance in the onset of the disaster. The effectiveness of UN-OCHA gained a mixed 
review in its level of perceived ability and efficiency in coordinating their response. 
Figure 6.7 Online survey results for the perceived ineffectiveness of the main 
stakeholders operating in the Haiti disaster response. [Source: data from online 
questionnaire, refer to Appendix 1c] 
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Central government, along with local government, were both seen as highly ineffective in 
the emergency response, as well as within continued efforts. Local government was deemed 
slightly more effective than central, as access to, and participation of, representatives was 
higher - ‘Trying to work with some national government and local government agencies has 
been a nightmare. There have been a few exceptions though with local government, 
including Tabarre Mairie, who have been generally helpful’, stated an INGO respondent. 
 
6.3.2 Cluster System Coordination 
Archival data demonstrated that 12 cluster groups were set up a month after the earthquake 
hit Haiti. These cluster groups, and corresponding lead agencies, include: Emergency 
Shelter and NFI (IFRC), Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM)(IOM), 
WASH (DINEPA), Health (PAHO/WHO), Food (WFP), Agriculture (FAO), Early recovery 
(UNDP), Protection (MINUSTAH/OHCHR/UNICEF/UNFPA), Education (UNICEF), 
Logistics (WFP), emergency telecoms (WFP), Nutrition (UNICEF).  
 
The first important issue noted by several INGO respondents is the time it took to form the 
cluster groups. This occurrence left agencies scrambling to undertake patchy needs 
assessments with no common framework or coordination, developing proposals off the back 
of extremely limited information. Once clusters had formed, many agencies were already 
undertaking interventions, coming with their own agendas, which ultimately made 
coordination and strategy development difficult from the beginning. 
 
Several INGO respondents highlighted that the separation of cluster groups was not 
supported by an effective inter-cluster communication and coordination mechanism, which 
created a strategic gap when considering recovery. An example of this saw Emergency 
Shelter (IFRC), CCCM (IOM), and early recovery (UNDP) separated, which resulted in 
IDP camp creation and management strategically separated from T-shelter support, which 
again was separated from rubble clearing. Rubble clearing would have enabled many more 
IDPs to return to their place of origin and, with this accomplished, the international 
community would then be able to support the creation of permanent shelter. Rather than 
what occurred, which was the channelling of a significant amount of emergency funding 
into sustaining IDP camps and T-shelters. The cluster set up didn’t allow a conducive 
environment for transitional or recovery strategy to be developed and inform the 
progression of the emergency intervention.  
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The cluster system had the ability to get the humanitarian community working coherently 
by offering vital context assessments, a coherent response plan and strategic guidance (refer 
to sub-section 6.3.2). Archival data showed that, in Haiti, there was an inter-cluster rapid 
initial needs assessment for Haiti (RINAH), which was a process conducted by the CAP 
project ACAPS (Assessment Capacities Project), an initiative of a consortium of three 
NGOs (HelpAge International, Merlin and Norwegian Refugee Council). ACAPS works 
with a number of humanitarian actors, including the IASC Needs Assessment Task Force. 
However, the release of the report was delayed and, thus, the information was already 
outdated. The needs assessment also focused on needs alone, with no consideration for 
context, local participation and capacity, all vital for strategic recovery planning. To allow 
this information to be ascertained, the involvement of local and national authorities, LNGOs 
and the local private sector in coordination meetings was essential. In Haiti, this was not the 
case - local authorities stated they ‘felt like strangers in our own city’. A sole focus on 
emergency work within cluster meetings meant many local development actors were not 
listened to, missing a crucial opportunity for active knowledge transfer. This also 
marginalised actors that could offer the contextual insight and strategic thinking needed for 
recovery planning and building in resilience. 
 
With a lack of strategy and a focus on number crunching, the clusters in Haiti were not able 
to adapt to the changing needs. Strategic Advisory Groups (SAG) were set up in each 
cluster, which were made up of some of the major agencies within each respective cluster. 
These SAGs were commissioned to make some of the big decisions and communicate these 
with donors. This system operated for the first 6 months then a gap was experienced. There 
could be a number of reasons for this including, staff turnover, funding timeframes, lack of 
transitional and recovery expertise or external demands, i.e. the cholera outbreak, hurricane 
season. What is clear is that SAGs have the potential to offer the strategic capacity that is 
currently missing in response programming, but its mandate and capacity may not be 
operating at its full potential (refer to sub-section 8.6.1).  
 
Understanding coordination capacity and its dynamics within post-disaster Haiti has 
uncovered a significant level of strategic weakness and a general lack of leadership. This 
coincidence added to the challenges experienced within programming in the form of 
direction, scope and scale. The lack of strategic capacity within the agency itself (refer to 
section 5.5) is not compensated at the coordination level seeing a strategic void develop, 
  
 
 228 
which resulted in a lack of ideas and options particularly for exit, transition and recovery 
programming at the stages of the response where they were most essential.  
 
This Chapter in overview has examined two essential areas within the humanitarian 
framework that have a major impact on the outcome within an international response, and 
specifically for the focus of this research, individual/HH resilience building for recovery. 
This assessment has been undertaken in order to meet Objective 3. To gauge the impact of 
the humanitarian framework on the level of resilience developed in the context of post-
earthquake Haiti. The first section examined finance and donor strategy that was employed 
in Haiti, looking specifically at factors such as national involvement and economic 
development, followed by the influence the donor system has on programming, and lastly, 
cluster coordination and stakeholder effectiveness witnessed in this case study.  
 
The case study presents the decisions taken and approaches implemented in the response 
from the donor level down to the agency level. Highlighting the lack of funds channeled to 
the private sector, the limited focus on livelihood creation and limited transitional strategy 
for the creation of sustainable accommodation and servicing options. A response that left a 
nation vulnerable, instead of proactively building adaptive capacity for the affected and 
therefore their resilience. 
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7. The Relationship Between Post-disaster Resilience Building and Recovery 
This Chapter looks to meet Objective 4 - To determine the link between post-disaster 
resilience and the level of potential recovery experienced at the individual/HH level. Within 
this Chapter the conclusion of the key components of post-disaster resilience, that became 
evident through data produced through the case study and analysis of the literature, will be 
presented. Giving examples of how emergency response programming supported or 
hindered adaptive resilience of individuals/HHs in post-earthquake Haiti. The common 
barriers to recovery that were highlighted through data produced within the case study are 
then presented. The link between these key components and common barriers is made to 
highlight how adaptive resilience has the ability to stimulate recovery. Finalising the chapter 
by assessing how building adaptive resilience could have played a role in promoting 
recovery in Haiti. 
 
7.1 Data Analysis Utilised 
This chapter brings together the conclusions from Chapters 4-6 to determine the link 
between post-disaster resilience and the level of potential recovery experienced at the 
individual/HH level, therefore the data collection methods used to ascertain this objective 
included: the community discussion forum and Sociogram, semi-structured interviews, the 
online questionnaire, archival data and the literature review. 
 
7.2 Adaptive Resilience and the Key Components of Post-Disaster Resilience 
On analysis of the existing resilience frameworks (refer to sub-section 2.3.2), only a few 
frameworks looked at resilience in the post-disaster contexts, these were namely, Cutter 
(2008) and Maguire and Cartwright (2008), who managed to make crucial conceptual links 
between prior resilience and the level of absorptive capacity affected populations would 
have post-event, also how adaptive capacity can be increased through response interventions  
to increase potential recovery and future resilience. As Cutter et al. (2008) expressed in their 
Place-Based model (DROP) (refer to sub-section 2.3.2) individuals/HHs will possess an 
existing level of ‘resilience’ before a disaster that will stem from their access to resources, 
such as assets, services, financial resources and their strength of relationships with friends 
and family, local authority and civil society (Bosher 2004). This existing level of resilience 
ascribes the level of absorptive capacity made available to that individual/HH in the event of 
a disaster. This absorptive capacity determines the level of perturbation experienced, as well 
as the capacity available to recover/return to a state of functionality, i.e. adaptive resilience 
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(refer to Figure 7.1, pg. 230). Adaptive resilience is the term given to an individual’s/HH’s 
level of potential resilience expressed in a crisis event and the modality that humanitarian 
response can support and develop. 
 
 
The analysis of current resilience frameworks and previous emergency response approaches 
detailed in the literature review have highlighted that there is an obvious gap in knowledge 
surrounding how to practically support adaptive capacity post-disaster to ensure prior weak 
resilience doesn’t hinder potential recovery. There was a clear need to further break down 
and understand the ‘modality’ that humanitarian response can support and develop adaptive 
resilience at the individual/HH level within the post-disaster context. To better understand 
this modality, the fundamental nature of post-disaster resilience needed to be clarified. The 
research was able to clarify what truly constitutes the key components of post-disaster 
resilience. This was achieved through the review of the literature that presented a number of 
resilience frameworks and their corresponding concepts, and the review of the dynamics 
expressed through the data collection within this post-disaster context, at the individual/HH 
level (Community Discussion Forum and Sociogram) and within the emergency response 
(Semi-structured interviews and online questionnaire), which has clarified the essential 
components of post-disaster resilience. 
 
Figure 7.1 A schematic diagram of post-disaster adaptive resilience and necessary humanitarian 
support to increase level of potential recovery (adapted from Cutter’s DROP model). [Source: Cutter 
2008] 
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Six key components have been deduced from the literature and the data. The first 5 have 
been detailed as essential components of resilience by Bosher (2004) and further iterated as 
fundamental to adaptive resilience and recovery through data collected within the 
community discussion forum and Sociogram (refer section 4.2). Due to the small sample 
size the data produced through this methodology was triangulated with data from the semi-
structured interviews and online questionnaire to validate the fundamental nature of these 
key elements for adaptive resilience and therefore recovery (as detailed in the main findings 
of Chapters 5 and 6).  
 
The 6th component detailed in these key components of resilience is an addition to the main 
5 components described for resilience. This 6th component is risk perception, risk perception 
being an individuals conceptualisation of individual or community resilience, which will 
encourage self-belief and ownership of recovery and not dependency. Risk perception was a 
concept considered only within one resilience framework, a framework by Paton and 
Johnston (2001). The model considers social and psychological factors are fundamental in 
the conceptualisation of individual and community resilience. Particularly focusing on risk 
perception and risk reducing behaviour. The model presents that an individuals perception 
of a threat remains a pertinent precursor, the key factors are the consideration of whether 
risk may be reduced and whether the required actions are within the capabilities of the 
individual. As people make assumptions about the possible consequences of action before 
considering engaging in that behaviour, risk perception then becomes critical in determining 
the potential level of adaptive resilience that could be achieved.  
 
These social and psychological factors were not encompassed in later models. These factors 
are crucial when developing schemes to build in community preparedness, as well as 
considering resilience building initiatives in humanitarian responses. Indicating that the lack 
of consideration in later models could highlight a missing link in the holistic 
conceptualisation of resilience, which is necessary to effectively operationalise resilience. 
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6 key components of post-disaster resilience 
 
1. Access to assets 
Asset ownership, such as a house, transportation or tools forms a level of 
security and capital for potential recovery.  
2. Access to basic services 
Services, such as water, sanitation and health care are vital for survival and 
maintenance of health. Adequate provision also means time spent on ensuring 
these vital activities is limited, freeing up time for more productive pursuits, such 
as livelihood activities. 
3. Economic opportunities 
Proactively encouraging livelihood opportunities and market stimulation will 
foster local economic recovery, stimulating the rehabilitation of local services 
and amenities. It will also allow individuals/HHs to raise essential capital to 
manage their own recovery. 
4. Access to legal and financial services, i.e. loans, grants. 
Access to cash in a crisis can be fundamental to securing accommodation, 
starting up a business and offering an opportunity for individuals/HHs to manage 
their own recovery. 
5. Strong social and political networks 
Supportive social networks, such as friends, family and community members, 
help mitigate adverse consequences and maximise potential recovery. Political 
connections, i.e. access to local government, civil organisations and international 
organisations also provide essential support, information and guidance. 
6. Risk perception 
Individual conceptualisation of individual or community resilience is vital to 
encourage self-belief and ownership of recovery and not dependency. 
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7.3 Adaptive Resilience and the Stimulation of Recovery 
The level of recovery is intrinsic to the level of resilience expressed after a disaster event. 
Key barriers to recovery noted within the community discussion forum, semi-structured 
interviews and online questionnaire were: 
 
The common barriers to recovery for the affected individuals/HHs identified within this 
case study included: 
 Lack of adequate shelter provision 
o There was a fundamental need for shelter options that went beyond tented 
camps. 
o Shelter provision that could offer semi- permanent or permanent solutions, 
i.e. house repair, host family support, rental support, new construction. 
o The lack of shelter saw individuals/HHs unable to return to their place of 
origin, seeing that affected individuals/HHs were unable to return to a state 
of functionality. 
 Lack of sustainable basic services, i.e. water and sanitation 
o The main provisions of water and sanitation were accessible only in or 
around camps, seeing this provision linked to Shelter strategy. 
o Reliance on temporary, unsecured water and sanitation services saw 
individuals/HHs over time struggling to find adequate resources to lead a day 
to day productive life.  
o There was a significant need to foster more sustainable service options, 
within camps, but also within host communities, affected and un-affected 
neighbourhoods, either through the private sector or through the repair and 
development of state resources. 
 Limited or no livelihood opportunities 
o There were some livelihood options made available within the response 
through Cash For Work and some reconstruction programmes. However, the 
amount and timescale of these options was not adequate in dealing with the 
volume of need. Seeing individuals/HHs not being able to establish any form 
of income, increasing their dependency on external resources.  
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o Support to and development of private sector business and local market 
development was needed to aid the local economy, which could have 
generated livelihoods. 
 Limited or no access to cash, loans or grants 
o For disaster affected individuals/HHs there was limited cash available with 
some receiving cash from associated diaspora, others through cash 
programmes initiated by international agencies. However, loans and grants 
were virtually impossible to access. 
o This situation again saw individuals/HHs solely relying on unsustainable 
external resources, increasing their level of dependency. 
o The productive use of cash transfers, increase in livelihood provision, which 
is intrinsic for access to sustainable sources of cash, support to local bank 
institutions, the development and use of mobile money and the opening up of 
UN and other bidding processes to local private sector were all options 
needed to provision adequate access to financial support that could support 
domestic and livelihood activities. 
 
Figures 7.2, 7.3, 7.4 and 7.5 (refer to pg. 235) show a component of adaptive resilience, a 
common barrier that is related, presenting the improved recovery output that would be 
achieved, if that specified key component of adaptive resilience was supported through an 
emergency response intervention. For example, if economic opportunities were supported (a 
component of adaptive resilience), then the lack of livelihood opportunities (a common 
barrier to recovery) would no longer be a problem (improved recovery). 
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Figure 7.2 Demonstrates the link between adaptive resilience 
and common barriers to recovery, specifically looking at 
access to assets. 
Figure 7.3 Demonstrates the link between adaptive resilience 
and common barriers to recovery, specifically looking at 
access to basic services. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.5 Demonstrated the link between adaptive resilience 
and common barriers to recovery, specifically looking access 
to financial services. 
Figure 7.4 Demonstrated the link between adaptive resilience 
and common barriers to recovery, specifically looking at 
economic opportunities. 
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As noted in Chapter 4 recovery is difficult to achieve in the aftermath of a disaster without 
external assistance. If recovery is to be achieved it has been shown through the data analysis 
that adaptive resilience of the affected population needs to be supported and proactively 
developed. Figure 7.6 (refer to pg. 237) demonstrates that when a society who have weak 
levels of resilience endure a disaster the impacts can be substantial. The current 
humanitarian approach has the ability to ensure survival within an affected population in the 
aftermath of a disaster, however, as the literature and this research’s case study has 
highlighted this approach generates poor recovery and can often leave an affected nation 
vulnerable, with a weak level of resilience, which in turn leads to that society experiencing a 
continual cycle of disaster. If that same society with its former weak level of resilience is 
supported by the humanitarian sector by raising its potential adaptive resilience then that 
humanitarian approach has the ability to ensure survival, as well as recovery, raising the 
level of resilience experienced within that affected society ultimately breaking the cycle of 
disaster. 
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Figure 7.6 Demonstrates the relationship between adaptive resilience and recovery within 
an operational perspective. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.4 Examples of How Emergency Response Programming Supported or Hindered 
Adaptive Resilience of Individuals/HHs in Post-Earthquake Haiti. 
Looking at the 6 key components of post-disaster resilience examples are given for each to 
show programmatic approaches that had the ability to support adaptive resilience or to 
hinder it. These examples have been iterated in the previous 2 chapters, with each example 
referenced to its corresponding section. 
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Access to assets 
Asset ownership, such as a house, transportation or tools forms a level of security and 
capital for potential recovery.  
 
Supported: 
1. The World Bank offered cash grants for housing repair and reconstruction (refer to 
sub-section 6.2.2.3, pg. 214).  
2. Neighbourhood rehabilitation- Several agencies undertook neighbourhood 
rehabilitation programmes, including J/P HRO, who in Delmas 32, harmonised and 
moved services from the camp to the neighbourhood setting, which included school 
retrofits, the opening of two health clinics and a community center, as well as 
income generating projects including recycling and water kiosks (refer to Case study 
3, pg. 156). BRC carried out an early recovery assessment report at the end of week 
3 after the earthquake; this allowed them to focus on developing a comprehensive 
integrated neighbourhood scheme in Delmas 19. The approach integrated shelter 
rehabilitation and reconstruction, the installation or improvement in WASH 
facilities, and livelihood provision (refer to Case study 6, pg. 180). These 
programmes were designed as an incentive for return of IDPs to their original 
neighbourhoods, where they could re-establish assets, such as homes and community 
bonds.  
 
Hindered: 
1. After a full year on from the earthquake there were still approx. 800,000 IDPs of the 
original 1.5 million dwelling in over 1100 IDP camps. Seeing a huge population 
without access to permanent shelter options (refer to Figure 5.2, pg. 150).  
2. The lack of temporary to permanent shelter infrastructure made available to the 
affected population, seeing only 35,000 T-shelters achieved in the first year. Of the 
eventual provision of 80,000 T-shelters only 23% were provided to families living in 
camps. Since owning or having access to land was a prerequisite for a family to be a 
beneficiary of a T-shelter program (refer to sub-section 4.2.1, pg. 121).   
3. Housing repairs only began in February 2011, over a year after the earthquake, 
achieving 5275 repairs with the 18 months, offering little in the way of permanent 
shelter solutions within the 2 year time period since the earthquake (refer to sub-
section 4.2.1, pg. 121). 
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Access to basic services 
Services, such as water, sanitation and health care are vital for survival and maintenance of 
health. Adequate provision also means time spent on ensuring these vital activities is 
limited, freeing up time for more productive pursuits, such as livelihood activities. 
 
Supported: 
1. Oxfam helped re-establish a small number of water kiosks, repaired public water 
points, and worked with DINEPA to establish Haiti’s first drinking water and 
sewerage standards (refer to Case study 4, pg. 176). 
2. Early in 2011 IFRC began a strategy to take water supply services out of camps and 
place them close to neighborhoods, which were then managed by identified 
community members as a business (refer to Case study 5, pg. 177).  
3.   Within weeks of the response Mercy Corps began rehabilitating HHs immediate 
needs in Tabarre through vouchers for food and NFI (Non-Food Items), rental 
support and basic services through rehabilitating local water vendors and providing 
latrines in the neighbourhood. Within 2 months of their operation water supply 
returned to normal (refer to Case study 7, pg. 183). 
 
Hindered: 
1. alarming impact of aid cited by INGOs and LNGOs was the destruction of social 
services and basic services, particularly in the health sector. The lack of engagement 
with the private health institutions resulted in the bankruptcy of many private health 
centers and hospitals, the loss of jobs and the further weakening of local health 
institutions (refer to sub-section 6.1.2.4, pg. 210).   
2. Before the earthquake communities were self-sufficient through using water kiosks 
that sold low-cost water and generated profits that were then fed into community 
projects. Since the disaster many of these vital kiosks had to be abandoned due to the 
large amounts of free water being distributed in camps and nearby areas (refer to 
sub-section 2.6.4, pg. 72). 
3. This lack of preparation and operational ability to create options for sanitation 
services held up the response, created unsustainable service options that focused 
around camp provision and lacked sustainable maintenance options, causing 
significant environmental health risks (refer to sub-section 5.4.2, pg. 171).   
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Access to Economic opportunity 
Proactively encouraging livelihood opportunities and market stimulation will foster local 
economic recovery, stimulating the rehabilitation of local services and amenities, it will also 
allow individuals/HHs to raise essential capital to manage their own recovery. 
 
Supported: 
1. The EC channeled funds directly to the private sector (refer to Table 6.1, pg. 200) 
supporting mango producers, offering a micro-credit system and developing 
commercial exchange (refer to sub-section 6.2.1.3, pg. 208).  
2. UNDP looked at private sector development and job creation. Strategies they 
employed included buying locally, offering support to companies on how to apply 
for UN tender processes, an employment programme that worked with the private 
sector, i.e. helping them become more competitive and increase their quality of 
service, they also offered support to entrepreneurs through a professional 
qualification subsidy programme that asked the private sector what skills they were 
missing, then provided subsidies to the youth to study in those professions (refer to 
sub-section 6.2.1.3, pg. 208). 
3. Jobs were created through infrastructure projects that require large amounts of 
labour, such as the EC’s road and bridge rehabilitation projects and IDB’s support to 
the Caracol Industrial Park development (refer to sub-section 6.2.2.2, pg. 214). 
4. UNDP set up a large CfW programme for activities such as debris removal. Cash 
was paid to 40,000 workers using mobile money (refer to sub-section 6.2.2.3, pg. 
214). 
 
Hindered: 
1. Job creation that was achieved, could only meet the needs of a portion of the 
affected and many of these opportunities were short-term in nature, therefore, could 
not offer sustainable livelihood options to raise resilience in the long-term. 
2. Private sector respondents were critical of the way in which aid resulted in a 
distortion of local markets and the distortion of salaries (refer to sub-section 6.2.2.4, 
pg. 215). 
3. Some private sector actors developed proposals on initiatives to better link 
international assistance to local markets, but complained that these were never 
considered seriously (refer to Box 6.5, pg. 217). 
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Access to legal and financial services 
Access to cash in a crisis can be fundamental to securing accommodation, starting up 
business and again opportunity for individuals/HHs to manage their own recovery. 
 
Supported: 
1. IDB offered low rate loans to be offered to SMEs through local financial institutions, 
set up an incentive called the Social Investment Fund; a Business Development 
Service; and a Productive Haiti programme (refer to Box 6.3, pg. 209). 
2. CIDA offered a system of micro-credit and financial services through savings and 
credit cooperatives, which helped generate stable, permanent employment in rural 
areas (refer to sub-section 6.2.1.3, pg. 208).   
 
Hindered: 
1. No access to cash by the HH to pay of loans or set up new rental contracts, due to 
just putting down large sums for rent before the earthquake (refer to sub-section 
4.2.4, pg. 128). 
2. Private sector respondents stated they struggled to access funds within the 
humanitarian response. Bidding processes needed to be opened up to allow local 
companies to apply (refer to sub-section 6.2.2.4, pg. 215). 
 
Strong social and political networks 
Supportive social networks, such as friends, family and community members, help mitigate 
adverse consequences and maximise potential recovery. Political connections, i.e. access to 
local government, civil organisations and international organisations provide essential 
support, information and guidance. 
 
Supported: 
1. Neighbourhood rehabilitation to facilitate a rapid return to places of origin, as 
mentioned previously, will allow former community bonds to be re-established as 
well as securing existing ones (refer to sub-section 5.3.4, pg. 151). 
2. The 16/6 rental support scheme helped families exit from camps through the 
provision of cash grants that support the rental of a safe property of their choice in 
the neighborhood of their choice (refer to Case study 2, pg. 155).  
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Hindered: 
1. Not support offered to host communities to enable them to support displaced family 
and friends. 
2. The lack of decentralisation from the IDP camps strategy in the first 2 years of the 
response. 
3. Development of relocation programmes that resulted in the separation of existing 
community groups, i.e. Corraille (refer to Figure 5.3, pg. 152). 
 
Risk perception 
Individual conceptualisation of individual or community resilience is vital to encourage 
self-belief and ownership of recovery and not dependency. 
 
Supported: 
1. Interventions that engaged camp communities and committees in undertaking 
assessments, as well as developing programmes and sustainable solutions (refer to 
sub-section 5.5.5, pg. 195).  
2. Training to allow community members to more effectively participate in programme 
implementation, i.e. camp WASH caretaker or hygiene promoters (refer to sub-
section 5.5.5, pg. 195).  
3. Implementation of feedback mechanisms, such as discussion sessions, complaints 
lines and suggestion boxes (refer to sub-section 5.4.2, pg. 171). 
 
Hindered: 
1. Humanitarian aid was seen to have been poorly administered and insufficiently 
regulated, which resulted in funds being channeled into programmes, which Haitians 
felt neither ownership nor control over (refer to sub-section 6.2.2.4, pg. 215). 
2. Aid has also been seen to have been channeled in a way that disempowered rather 
than strengthened local communities, with the emergence of passive tendencies 
among the population as a result of not being involved in their own development 
(refer to sub-section 5.4.1, pg. 168). 
3. The distribution of free goods and services, and CfW programmes were cited as 
examples that undermined local notions and practices of self-reliance (refer to sub-
section 6.2.2.4, pg. 215). 
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4. The lack of participation saw that ‘beneficiaries’ were not involved in any 
discussions or decision-making within programme plans, seeing little ownership 
develop (refer to sub-section 5.5.5, pg. 195). 
 
7.5 Could Adaptive Resilience Building Have Played a Bigger Role in Recovery in 
Haiti? 
This next section reviews the humanitarian response that was assumed in the urban Haitian 
context to understand whether the approaches and interventions undertaken were able to 
support or hindered adaptive resilience and consequently how this impacted recovery. There 
are several key approaches and sectoral interventions that essentially did weaken 
individual/HH level resilience. A selection of agencies managed to implement approaches 
that had the potential to raise individual/HH level resilience. However, their timeliness and 
scale prevented these efforts from realising their full potential. These key approaches and 
interventions are discussed in more detail below. 
 
The Shelter strategy 
The repetitive fail-safe model of camp creation in disaster aftermath is renowned in the 
humanitarian sector, with little other strategy supported in the initial stages of a response, as 
demonstrated in this particular case study. In Haiti, IDPs were setting up small camps 
naturally close to their place of origin, although a vast proportion of people also fled the 
capital (refer to Figure 4.11, pg. 135). A more decentralised strategy could have been 
supported to steer the focus away from what eventually occurred, which was the mass 
migration back into PaP and the exponential growth of IDP camps. A decentralised 
approach could have seen more effective support offered to host families, through: rental, 
food, NFI, services, support in neighbourhoods, i.e. rubble clearing, reconstruction, non-IDP 
neighbourhoods, to increase host and rental option, thus, taking pressure off the camps. 
These approaches would have ensured social connections stayed strong, an important 
element of adaptive resilience, along with the rapid return of assets and provision of 
sustainable services. 
 
The choice of the Shelter cluster to invest almost solely into T-shelters as a transitional tool 
was a mistake in Haiti, as it is a complex and expensive programme that takes considerable 
time and resources to implement, particularly for the outcome to only last a few years, for 
which new options will need to be found (refer to sub-section 5.3.2). The time and resources 
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could have been better spent increasing the provision of longer-term options, such as rental 
support and reconstruction, options that would have stimulated resilience early through the 
increase in individual/HH asset ownership and increased protection. 
 
The World Bank and UNDP offered cash grants and subsidies for housing repair and 
reconstruction, offering technical support and training. However, these initiatives were 
implemented over 2 years after the disaster seeing this option not become an alternative to 
camp dwelling till late in the response (refer to sub-section 5.3.4). IOM began to support the 
dissolution of IDP camps through rental support, this strategy was initiated under the 16/6 
programme in 2012. This programme showed good results offering the much needed 
strategy to close the thousands of IDP camps that still exist in PaP (refer to Case study 2, pg. 
155). Interestingly, several INGO respondents highlighted that rental options were 
suggested in the early stages of the response, but were disregarded due to the over enthused 
approach of Build Back Better (BBB) that was being pushed by the IHRC for Haitian 
recovery. The rental support options were seen as not supporting sustainable reconstruction 
and merely as a temporary measure. But in reality, rental support would have stimulated the 
private market and encouraged homeowners to repair and construct homes to support the 
new rental market demand. Build Back Better was a concept that took huge planning and 
investment and which capacity was not there in Haiti, resulting in a failed rehabilitation 
approach that disregarded more immediate and contextually relevant approaches that could 
have had the potential to stimulate recovery and even built into an eventual BBB approach. 
 
The WASH strategy 
With the heavy focus on IDP camps the WASH strategy fell in line with catering for the 
ever expanding multitude of IDP camps that were sprouting up all over the city and beyond. 
In the main part trucking of water was employed, which was an expensive, short-term 
strategy. However, in the context of Haiti, the continuation of camp dwelling and a lack of 
alternative options saw this short-term strategy going on for over 2 years. DINEPA, Haiti’s 
dedicated water and sanitation ministry requested a transition and exit from trucking in 
2010, but the agencies were unable to undertake this request, with many just dropping 
service provision or dumping it on the doorstep of DINEPA to pick up, leaving un-served 
communities and immense pressure on remaining institutions (refer to sub-section 5.4.1).  
There was a wealth of options in this urban environment that could have been stimulated in 
the first few months to offer much needed transitional options that would have built in 
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sustainability and allowed recovery to thrive. These options included: utilisation of the 
private sector for water supply and waste management services; neighbourhood service 
provision- in neighbourhoods of origin, neighbourhoods close to IDP camps and host 
communities, creating water supply businesses at the household level, host family HHs 
treatment provisions, HH owned latrines; the repair and construction of permanent 
infrastructure, i.e. water supply pipelines, public tap stands, waste treatment plants (refer to 
sub-section 8.3.2). These options were not identified due to weak rapid assessments that do 
not tap into local knowledge; missing a tremendous amount of local capacity, particularly 
on offer in urban environments that could be tapped into in the immediate response and 
allowed the creation of sustainable service options, the ability to transition and exit early 
and stimulate adaptive resilience and recovery. 
 
Overall response dynamics 
The international response in Haiti saw a major focus on a centralised approach of camps, 
food aid and services based in camps. These approaches were extremely expensive options 
and were only aimed to support in the immediate aftermath. However, with little alternative 
options set up for transition and exit these approaches lasted for an extended period of over 
2 years. There was also little focus on livelihood generation and economic recovery, which 
often resulted from a lack of understanding about the context, agencies inexperience and 
lack of policy relating to working with the private sector and encouraging business. 
 
The level of community participation particularly in the early stages of the response was 
extremely low, with participation that took place being insufficient in it quality and 
implementation. This was not due to a lack of approaches or tools, as there are plenty, but 
the mindset that there is no time for consultation in the immediate aftermath. This mentality 
automatically resulted in supply-led interventions that missed out on utilising vital 
contextual information, seeing that interventions often didn’t meet the complexity of needs 
that evolved over the response period. This humanitarian response model saw that affected 
people’s adaptive capacity was not built on, but was instead, often impeded; creating 
dependency, market disruption and weakening existing services, which ultimately reduced 
resilience and countered any potential for rapid, sustainable recovery. 
 
The end of 2011 saw many agencies closing down relief-orientated operations and/or 
handing over continuing programmes in order to exit. Several INGO and government 
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respondents stated that a large number of INGOs left due to the lack of funds, abandoning 
many needed services. This caused some volatility from the Haitian community against the 
international community. The ministries, some agencies and financial institutions attempted 
to implement recovery initiatives and essential infrastructure, but there was a considerable 
lack of recovery expertise, capacity, resources and holistic strategy to ensure a rapid 
transition (refer to section 5.5). The conceptualisation and planning of recovery 
interventions was not undertaken by many deemed ‘relief-only’ agencies, some within the 
first 6 months, however, only a few conceptualised recovery from the onset of the response 
(refer to sub-section 5.5.3).  
 
A overall response approach that ensured a protracted relief situation, that wasn’t actively 
supporting adaptive resilience, instead hindering it. Ultimately affecting recovery, leaving a 
weakened society that struggled to recover and rehabilitate itself. Thus, the questions 
remains: What measures can be developed that would support and foster resilience at an 
early stage? How can these strategies be mainstreamed into humanitarian programming? 
And what are the differences in potential approach between different types and scales of 
disaster? 
 
This section’s aim was to meet Objective 4 - to determine the link between post-disaster 
resilience and the level of potential recovery experienced at the individual/household level. 
This was achieved by analysing the data to further understand the concept of post-disaster 
resilience by ascertaining the main components that made up adaptive resilience as 
witnessed within the case study. Then understanding these components through the 
humanitarian operation undertaken within the Haiti earthquake response, assessing 
programmatic approaches to gauge whether adaptive resilience was supported or hindered 
and its consequential effect on recovery in the post-disaster context. The section has allowed 
for further conceptual clarification of resilience in the post-disaster context and has 
highlighted the importance of supporting adaptive resilience through humanitarian 
interventions for the stimulation of recovery. 
 
The following Chapter aims to answer these questions by presenting a variety of 
programmatic options to be used in different types and scales of disaster. Also the chapter 
will present strategies that could be used to mainstream resilience building initiatives into 
humanitarian programming. 
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8. Resilience Building for Breaking Barriers to Recovery 
This Chapter looks to meet Objective 5 - to comprehend possible resilience building 
initiatives within emergency response operations and Objective 6 - to comprehend how 
resilience building initiatives can be supported within the humanitarian operational 
framework. By taking the data produced within the case study, as well as literature detailing 
different types of interventions achieved through different emergency contexts, this Chapter 
aims to describe the basic approach to supporting adaptive resilience of individuals/HHs 
within emergency response operations and then to detail appropriate interventions within 
different emergency contexts, i.e. rapid onset (natural disaster/conflict), slow onset (natural 
disaster), long-term humanitarian programming (natural disaster/conflict),  urban and rural 
environments. Lastly, to highlight how this approach could be better supported within the 
humanitarian operational framework, looking within the agency, i.e. assessments, as well as 
within the international response framework itself, i.e. coordination and financial 
mechanisms. 
 
8.1 Data Analysis Utilised 
To ascertain the theoretical conception of resilience building for breaking barriers to 
recovery it is necessary to lay out the concluded key components of adaptive resilience, then 
state the key components concluded for the barriers to recovery to begin to develop 
relationships between these variables, drawing on data analysis undertaken in previous 
Chapters. 
 
8.2 Adaptive Resilience Approach  
To begin to look at adaptive resilience in context of post-disaster interventions the two 
figures below, Figures 8.1 and 8.3 (refer to pg. 248 and 251 respectively), demonstrate some 
specific examples of humanitarian interventions that could be implemented to support the 6 
key components of adaptive resilience. Figure 8.1 presents the 6 key components of 
adaptive resilience and Figure 8.3 presents several interventions to be used for each of the 6 
key components of adaptive resilience. 
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Taking these components into consideration post-disaster initial response should be looking 
at approaches such as:  
ü Neighbourhood interventions, i.e. host family support, rehabilitation and rapid 
return, which will keep and strengthen social and political connections and allow 
people to build back assets. 
ü Utilising and capacity building the private sector for the sustainable provision of 
basic services, like water and sanitation. 
ü Community-led interventions to ensure demand-led interventions that take into 
account real relief and recovery needs, installs a level of risk perception and 
develops ownership of individuals, HHs and communities; increasing the ability of 
affected communities to manage their own recovery. 
ü Offering or encouraging the access to loans, grants and cash to improve livelihood 
options and to remedy potentially devastating debt. 
(refer to Figure 8.3, pg. 251) 
 
Figure 8.1 Key components of post-disaster adaptive resilience.	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Humanitarian approaches like this build on affected individuals/HHs adaptive resilience, 
supporting them to build and manage their own recovery. Operationally these approaches 
allow the utilisation and optimisation of local resources and capacity to increase the 
effectiveness of the response and build essential strategy and options for transition, exit and 
recovery.  
 
Understanding what adaptive resilience is and gauging the type of interventions that can be 
used to support and develop adaptive resilience enables a comparative understanding of the 
outcomes seen through the current emergency model and its continual challenges of: weak 
transition capacity, weak exit strategies, protracted relief, dependency, market disruption, 
weakening of essential services and slow recovery. Offering the potential within an 
emergency approach that proactively supports adaptive resilience to improve operations by 
ensuring effective relief operations that are able to meet real needs, creating transitional 
mechanisms, effective exit strategies, rapid recovery and sustainable solutions for recovery 
and rehabilitation (refer to Figure 8.2, pg. 250).  Figure 8.3 describes a variety of adaptive 
resilience building interventions associated with specific key component of resilience to 
give an overview to the type of approach needed within emergency response programming. 
These interventions are further detailed within Chapter 10 - Recommendations. The next 
section looks to breakdown this approach to provide appropriate interventions for different 
emergency contexts. 
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Figure 8.2 Current humanitarian response approach with continuing challenges verses a resilience approach and its resulting improved operations. 
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Figure 8.3 Post-disaster adaptive resilience building approaches. 
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8.3 Key Programmatic Barriers in the Haiti Response and Potential Adaptive 
Resilience Interventions 
As noted the six key components to adaptive resilience developed through this research are: 
access to assets, access to services, economic opportunities, access to legal and financial 
services, strength of social and political connections and risk perception. On this basis the 
following section will highlight the observed programmatic barriers to recovery seen within 
the Haitian response as highlighted through the case study and suggest interventions that 
could have supported adaptive resilience. Two sectors will be looked at: Shelter and 
WASH. 
 
8.3.1 Programmatic Barriers and Interventions: Shelter 
Analysis of the Shelter sector in section 5.3 highlighted some key programmatic barriers 
that affected the Shelter sector’s ability to adequately develop individual/HH adaptive 
resilience, which became one of the main barriers to recovery within the Haiti response- 
access to assets. These key operational barriers were: 
 Weak policy environment 
 Land tenure issues 
 Weak transition mechanisms 
 Poor recovery planning 
 Lack of strategy 
 Sole focus on camps for immediate intervention 
 Sole focus on T-shelters for a transitional intervention 
 
Approaches needed to support adaptive resilience and combat these programmatic barriers 
include: 
 Host family support- which would have decentralised the shelter strategy, 
decreased dependency on IDP camps, kept social connections strong. 
 Integrated neighbourhood approach- early implementation would have quickened 
the pace of rehabilitation and reconstruction, allowing for a rapid return allowing 
social connections to remain strong and assets to be regenerated. 
 Rental support- could have been used early in the response to accommodate 
displaced persons as an immediate approach, as an alternative to camps or more 
widely used as a strategy to close camps and to avoid large relocation programmes. 
 Participatory approaches 
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o PASSA (Participatory Approach to Safe Shelter Awareness)- could have 
created demand for safer housing and community-led effective 
interventions. 
o Skills training- could have developed local capacity and livelihoods, raising 
resilience. 
 Household cash grants 
o HES (Household Economic Security)- is a rapid response cash grants 
process. Helping HHs pay off existing loans (in Haiti there was a revolving 
community loan system (SOL) prior to earthquake, loosing capital in the 
earthquake left loans unpaid) This approach could have ensured loans could 
be paid and housing sort for IDPs to avoid depending on IDP camps. 
 Utilise local products and services- taking on this approach would have stimulated 
market development and provide essential livelihoods. 
 
These interventions are further expanded in Chapter 10 - Recommendations 
 
Undertaking these adaptive resilience building approaches would have encompassed several 
adaptive resilience mechanisms that include: 
 The development of participatory methods to ensure programmes are demand-led, 
ownership is developed and expectations are managed. For shelter land ownership 
can be faster determined to increase the pace of shelter reconstruction, raising 
resilience early.  
 Proactively investing in options that decrease dependency on camps and decentralise 
the shelter strategy, i.e. support rental options, existing neighbourhoods and host 
families. 
 Increase household economic security through grants to pay off existing loans. 
(refer to Figure 8.4, pg. 254) 
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 Figure 8.4 Presents the main operational barriers seen within the Shelter sector and the types of 
interventions to be used to develop adaptive resilience within humanitarian response. 
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8.3.2 Programmatic Barriers and Interventions: WASH 
Analysis of the WASH sector in section 5.4 highlighted some key programmatic barriers 
that affected the WASH sector’s ability to adequately develop individual/HH adaptive 
resilience, which became one of the main barriers to recovery within the Haiti response- 
access to basic services. These key programmatic barriers were: 
 WASH services and infrastructure was short-term and expensive 
 Weak participation and ownership, leaving services poorly maintained. 
 Weak transition mechanisms 
 Weak exit strategy 
 
Approaches needed to support adaptive resilience and combat these programmatic barriers 
include: 
 Demand-led interventions- would have ensured a needs assessment that was able 
to gauge real relief and recovery needs, allowing decision-making to be in the hands 
of the affected, which would have strengthened ownership, tapped into local 
capacity and manage expectations. 
 A business model approach- would have develop sustainable service options, 
livelihood and created exit and transition options. 
 Neighbourhood rehabilitation- would have allowed for a rapid return and the 
development of local, sustainable services. 
 Investing in infrastructure- would have developed sustainable services and would 
have developed good relationships with government and the private sector. 
 
These interventions are further expanded in Chapter 10 - Recommendations. 
 
Undertaking these adaptive resilience building approaches would have encompassed several 
adaptive resilience mechanisms that include: 
 The development of participatory methods to ensure programmes are demand-led, 
ownership is developed and expectations are managed. This will allow transfer and 
exit options to be clear from the start. 
 The rehabilitate and fostering of new local service options early to undertake work 
in relief and recovery activities, i.e. water vendors, reservoir and well owners, 
trucking and waste disposal companies. This will develop early sustainable service 
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options that offer the necessary exit and transition options, allowing the development 
of livelihoods and rapid recovery. 
 Investment in longer-term infrastructure would have enabled an effective supply for 
both relief and recovery needs, as well as developing crucial long-term 
infrastructure. 
(refer to Figure 8.5, pg. 257) 
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 Figure 8.5 Presents the main operational barriers seen within the WASH sector and the types of 
interventions to be used to develop adaptive resilience within humanitarian response. 
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8.4 Adaptive Resilience Interventions by Emergency Context 
Sections 8.2 and 8.3 developed an understanding of the types on interventions that could be 
used within an emergency environment to support adaptive resilience of individuals/HHs. 
This next section looks to clarify the use of such interventions within different emergency 
contexts, as each context offers unique characteristics that will allow certain interventions to 
be capitalised on, but also will see some interventions inappropriate for the context. The 
context specified within this section are: rapid onset (natural disaster/ conflict), slow 
onset/cyclical (natural disaster) and long-term humanitarian programming (natural disaster/ 
conflict). Each of the interventions detailed within these contexts will be evaluated to 
whether the intervention is possible within urban and/or rural contexts, as well as whether 
they are possible within large and/or small scale responses.  
 
With the breakdown given here, it is important to note that this approach is about a mindset 
to response programming, it enables agencies to take the context into account and have 
strategies and resources ready to capitalise on local resources and respond appropriately, as 
each context will offer different opportunities and challenges. Agencies need to better equip 
themselves to be able to capitalise on the opportunities and work with the challenges to 
increase the effectiveness of emergency response. Building agency capacity to support these 
types of interventions is detailed in the next section.  
 
Table 8.1 (refer to pg. 259) details the different emergency interventions that can build 
adaptive resilience at the individual/HH level, that have been highlighted through this case 
study, indicating which emergency context the intervention could be used in. Also 
referenced, are examples of these interventions within other previous emergency responses 
globally. All interventions highlighted within the table are detailed in Chapter 10 - 
Recommendations. 
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Table 8.1 Resilience building interventions and their applicability in different emergency contexts 
 
Sector 
Adaptive Resilience 
Intervention 
Response Context Urban/Rural Large/Small Scale 
Emergency 
Example 
Ref 
Shelter 
 
 
Host family support:  
 
        - Cash transfers or vouchers for  
      host families 
 
        - Service provision for host  
          families 
 
 
Rapid onset- Natural disaster  
 
Rapid onset- conflict 
 
Slow onset/ cyclical 
 
Long-term humanitarian 
Rural- offering support in urban 
centers within a rural response 
could offer an option to IDPs 
other than heavy reliance on 
camps.          
       
Urban- Urban conflict settings 
could see IDPs scattering out to 
rural areas, again rural and 
urban host family support will 
offer an alternative option to 
the inevitable creation of 
camps. 
Large and small- for large 
scale it can offer a 
decentralisation option, along 
side camps. 
Jordan/ 
Lebanon/Syria 
(conflict)- 
UNDP, CARE  
 
UNDP (2014)   
 
CARE (2014) 
         
  
Somalia 
(natural 
disaster)- 
AGIRE 
AGIRE (2011) 
      
 
   
     
 
Neighbourhood rehabilitation:  
 
       - IDP and non-IDP neighbourhood 
    support 
Rapid onset- natural disaster 
 
Long-term humanitarian 
Urban- predominantly an urban 
focus due to number of 
neighbourhoods that exist in 
one center.               
Rural- however, rural 
community rehabilitation can 
be a key strategy to reduce 
dependence on camps and 
secure a rapid return. 
Large and small- for large 
scale it should be apart of the 
shelter strategy early, in 
parallel with immediate 
shelter options- will reduce 
the dependency on camps in 
the medium term. 
Haiti (natural 
disaster)- BRC                              
BRC (2012) 
          
  
Lebanon 
(conflict)- SCI  
King (2014) 
Rental support 
Rapid onset- natural disaster Urban- predominantly an urban 
focus due to the volume of 
rental options found in the 
urban environment.            
Rural- can be used where 
possible. 
Large and small- for large 
scale it should be apart of the 
immediate shelter strategy to 
the capacity of available 
properties. 
Haiti (natural 
disaster)- IOM 
 
IOM (2013) 
Rapid onset- conflict 
 
Slow onset/ cyclical   Lebanon 
(conflict)- SCI 
King (2014)  
Long-term humanitarian   
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    Participatory approaches:  Rapid onset- natural disaster 
Urban and rural Large and small 
Darfur, Sudan 
(conflict)- 
Tearfund, Haiti 
(natural 
disaster)- IDB 
Philippines 
(natural 
disaster)- ARC 
Tearfund UK 
(2013) 
     -  PASSA (Participatory Approach for 
        Safer Shelter Awareness) 
Slow onset/cyclical  IDB (2012) 
     -  Skills training community  
        members   
Long-term humanitarian ARC (2014) 
  
     
Household cash grants 
Rapid onset- natural disaster 
Urban and rural Large and small 
Myanmar 
(natural 
disaster)- SCI, 
Indian Ocean 
Tsunami 
(natural 
disaster)- HPG 
SCI (2009) 
Slow onset/cyclical  
 
Rapid onset- conflict Adams (2007) 
Long-term humanitarian   
Utilise local products and services:  Rapid onset- natural disaster 
Urban and rural Large and small 
Haiti (natural 
disaster)- 
Oxfam GB             
Lebanon 
(conflict)- 
UNHCR 
Oxfam (2012c) 
      -  Buying construction materials   
         locally 
Slow onset/cyclical  UNHCR (2013) 
     -  Utilising local capacity Long-term humanitarian   
WASH 
 
A business model approach:  
 
       - Rehabilitating local service  
    capacity, i.e. water vendors 
       -  Create funds that support  
         entrepreneurs 
   - Cash and voucher systems 
Rapid onset- natural disaster 
 
Slow onset/cyclical 
 
Long-term humanitarian 
Urban and rural Large and small 
Haiti (natural 
disaster)- 
Oxfam GB 
 
West Africa 
(Ebola)- 
CordAid 
Oxfam (2012) 
 
 
CordAid (2014) 
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Demand-led approach:  Rapid onset- natural disaster 
Urban and rural 
 
Large- an intervention that 
should be implemented to 
the scale possible, it can 
ensure a rapid level of 
construction.                                  
Small- a focus should be 
placed on this intervention 
over others to develop 
ownership and ensure 
appropriate facilities.  
 
South Sudan 
(conflict)- 
Oxfam GB 
 
Oxfam (2012b) 
      -  HH latrine construction 
 
      - Zero cost options 
Slow onset/cyclical  
Haiti (natural 
disaster)- 
Oxfam GB 
Oxfam (2012a) 
 
Long-term humanitarian     
 
 
Neighbourhood approach:  
 
      - IDP and non-IDP neighbourhood  
          support 
 
      - Host family support 
 
Rapid onset- natural disaster 
 
Slow onset/cyclical  
 
Long-term humanitarian 
Urban- predominantly an urban 
focus due to number of 
neighbourhoods that exist in 
one center.      
                                                
Rural- however, rural 
community rehabilitation can 
be a key strategy to reduce 
dependence on camps and 
secure a rapid return. 
Large and small- for large 
scale it should be apart of the 
shelter strategy early, in 
parallel with immediate 
shelter options- will reduce 
the dependency on camps in 
the medium term. 
 
Haiti (natural 
disaster)- IFRC, 
Mercy Corps, 
BRC     
 
Syria (conflict)- 
UN-HABITAT, 
SCI, GOAL     
 
Thesis- IFRC, 
Mercy Corps 
(pg. 177&180)       
                                    
BRC (2012)    
 
UN-HABITAT 
(2014)                             
   
Practitioner 
first hand 
experience 
Syria 
(SCI/GOAL) 
  
  
 
Invest in infrastructure 
Rapid onset- natural disaster 
 
Slow onset/cyclical 
 
Long-term humanitarian 
Urban and rural 
Large- an intervention that 
should be implemented to 
the scale possible, it can 
ensure a rapid level of 
construction.    
 
Philippines 
(natural 
disaster)- 
USAID   
 
Syria (conflict)- 
SCI, GOAL                                               
USAID (2014) 
 
Practitioner 
first hand 
experience 
Syria 
(SCI/GOAL) 
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8.5 Improving Agency Capacity to Support Adaptive Resilience in Emergency 
Programming 
This next section presents key areas that agencies could improve their ability to support 
adaptive resilience programming; these key areas were highlighted within the case study 
(refer to section 5.5). Key areas that were assessed through the data were, assessments, data 
management and planning, and capacity and expertise. Outputs are presented in the form of 
suggested activities that could improve the capacity of an agency to support adaptive 
resilience in an emergency. 
 
8.5.1 Improving Assessments 
The case study highlighted the lack of adequate assessments and use of assessments within 
emergency response to plan programmes effectively (refer to sub-section 5.5.1). Improving 
existing assessments and investing in new assessments holds the key for significant 
programmatic improvements, key assessments that should be integrated and standardised 
into emergency programming, include: 
Ø Rapid assessments 
Post-disaster operations are often planned on the back of weak or no contextual 
information gathered to plan appropriate and effective interventions. A knowledge 
base is crucial if needs are to be truly understood and met, and transitional and exit 
plans are to be conceptualised and realised. There is potential to glean some of this 
information within sectoral rapid assessments, examples include: 
o Shelter sector rapid assessment: neighbourhoods within and surrounding 
affected areas could be scoped out and basic information on local skills and 
resources could be gleaned. Basic information on host family dynamics and 
locations should be gathered. Within the IDP registration process neighbourhood 
or place of origin could be established to strategise rapid return.  
o WASH rapid assessment: information on how affected population accessed 
water and sanitation before the disaster should be gauged, along with existing 
resources and capacity, this will highlight strategic option to build up national 
resources and provide essential transition and exit mechanisms. 
o Rapid context and resilience assessment: this would be a new type of 
assessment that may require additional human resources, which could be created 
in the form of a ‘recovery team’ that would be deployed within an emergency 
response team. This new capacity would be dedicated to gleaning contextual 
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information from local stakeholders and assessing community level resilience; 
information that will allow the development of medium to long term strategy to 
be developed. With the new capacity able to assess the progression of the 
response interventions can be initiated in a timely and more effective manner, 
developing recovery strategy and capacity from day one. 
o Baseline 
Response operations that have poor assessments at the start of the response have 
little or no baseline information for the impact of programmes to measure against 
and so fail to effectively implement Monitoring and Evaluation (M+E). Without 
this, there is little valid feedback on the effectiveness of different types of 
intervention. Ensuring this will see progressive learning within the humanitarian 
sector on the most effective and appropriate response operations, thus, improving 
quality and standards. This type of comprehensive baseline survey could be 
undertaken by a hired external private company, that has the expertise and 
capacity for such a rapid, full-scale survey. It would be a worthwhile investment 
because is could layout priority areas quickly and ensure all stakeholders are 
coordinating off the same page. 
o Monitoring and Evaluation 
Enabling proactive M+E from an early stage of the response allows programme 
impact and appropriateness to be evaluated, and modified if necessary, in a 
timely fashion. This enables programmes to meet changing needs in volatile and 
uncertain environments. This approach to programming will see adaptive 
capacity is understood and built up in an appropriate way to increase the rate of 
recovery. There are several areas that will make the implementation of M+E 
easier and more accessible in response programming, these include: 
o The development of a user-friendly, concise reporting system where data, 
opinions and strategic plans can be regularly fed in, ensuring the continuity 
of strategic development throughout the entirety of the response.  This will 
particularly help with issues of staff turnover. 
o The education and training of staff in M+E methods and the instilment of the 
importance of its integration. 
o Install its use in policy and programmatic reporting requirements. 
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Improved Operations- Assessments 
The lack of adequate assessments substantially hinders effective relief and recovery 
programming and should be seen as a weak link. Improving existing assessments and 
investing in new assessments holds the key for: 
• Improved contextual knowledge in the early stage of the response, which will 
increase strategy for programme planning.   
• Early development of longer-term planning and the comprehension of the 
impacts of programme choices on recovery.  
• Increasing the effectiveness of relief activities, whilst simultaneously stimulating 
recovery.  
• Ensure all stakeholders are coordinating off the same page.  
• Support handovers when new staff takeover (making sure knowledge and 
experience is not lost). 
• Build in of DRR strategies early. 
• Early and regular initiation of M+E will enable more responsive programming 
that can gauge and build on adaptive resilience of affected communities.  
• Measuring impact, which will allow for performance reviews and best practice to 
evolve. 
 
8.5.2 Data management and Planning 
The analysis of current practice (refer to sub-section 5.5.4) revealed there is a need for a 
data management system that has the capacity to effectively communicate learning and 
feedback information into programmes. A system, that will allow programme planning to be 
more strategic. With high staff rotation, feedback mechanisms and hand-overs are weak. 
This has resulted in a lack of continuity within programmes, missing the feed in of crucial 
information and capacity to recognise opportunities and build on them. Methods that could 
improve data management and planning include: 
Ø A centralised method of reporting and planning within an agency could offer a  
more succinct and coherent way to operate. Setting up a user-friendly information 
system that allows all stakeholders to routinely and concisely feed all assessment 
and performance information into it, will begin to build a base of knowledge. Also, 
making it mandatory to tap into the database when developing new programmes, 
would ensure more well-informed decision-making that would then allow more 
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integrated and context appropriate programming.  Specific key information can be 
gleaned from this system to feed into the Cluster database to help trace activity and 
feed in context information. 
Ø Contingency database 
Setting up contingency plans that will account for the many possible scenarios that 
could be faced in a disaster response as a tool to be accessed by field staff could 
provide the knowledge base needed to support faster, more effective decision-
making. This would enable programmes to more rapidly respond to changing needs 
and exploit all opportunities by providing the technical and strategic knowledge 
necessary to support programme changes. This approach can also help inform field 
staff of resilience building approaches that can be initiated in the early stages. To do 
this, an agency would need to invest in the write up of potential risks and scenarios 
that could be faced in different disaster cases and how to respond and manage them. 
However, such a system should leave scope for innovative thinking and not 
necessarily be prescriptive. Essentially, the database would be envisioned as a tool to 
strengthen the operational system and to be able to counter any areas of weakness in 
the capacity or expertise of transitioning field staff, whilst also allowing the 
stimulation of innovation and the proactive capture of opportunities. 
 
Improved Operations- Data management and planning 
Building capacity for data management and planning within an agency’s operations will 
ensure: 
o More integrated and context appropriate programming  
o An accessible knowledge base 
o To support faster, more effective decision-making 
o A more succinct way of operating 
o Provide technical and strategic knowledge required to meet changing needs 
o Streamline DRR approaches into programming 
o Ensure long-term programmes can be carried through until their entirety 
o Develop internal operational preparedness 
o Smoother handovers 
 
Integrating these improved methods will offer the foundations for operationalising 
programmes that can support the development of adaptive resilience 
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8.5.3 Capacity and Expertise 
The case study highlighted that many agencies deeming any form of ‘recovery’ activity 
outside their mandate. However, as noted, recovery begins from day one, and needs to be 
conceptualised and strategically accounted for in response programming. Therefore, this 
sees few agencies with recovery expertise at a very fundamental stage of the recovery 
process (refer to sub-section 5.5.4). 
Ø Recovery expertise 
Currently within many organisations there is a lack of capacity to assess the context, 
survey results and develop recovery programming. It has been noted that emergency 
specialists don’t make good recovery analysts, as mindset on approach can be very 
different. This situation often results in weak knowledge on early strategic options, 
delaying and potentially hindering transitional mechanisms and sustainable 
programme options. 
 
There is a need to conceptualise the reality of the long-term and create a programme 
approach that looks ahead. This could be achieved through the development of 
recovery capacity, creating a ‘recovery specialist’ role that could be deployed from 
the very start of the response. This specialist or recovery team could become the 
capacity, which would be necessary to produce the knowledge needed, to initiate 
programmes that support adaptive resilience to stimulate effective recovery early. 
The recovery specialist or team could: 
o Undertake a rapid context assessment, tapping into local knowledge to 
understand the political and social environment, the level of resilience in the 
community, the skills available and local resources. Feeding this information 
into the development of relief programmes. 
o As the response progresses the recovery specialist can continually overview and 
assess the context recognising opportunities for building in resilience and other 
timely recovery initiatives. 
o The specialist will bring the recovery expertise so lacking in a response and will 
strategise from the start to ensure strong transitional planning, exit strategies and 
longer-term planning if necessary.  
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Improved Operations- Capacity and Expertise 
Increasing operational capacity within agencies to cater for recovery will improve 
programming by: 
o Enabling a rapid context assessment and resilience assessment to be carried out. 
o Developing transitional mechanisms and exit planning.  
o Providing much needed recovery expertise and longer-term strategy. 
o Enabling programmes to meet recovery programme implementation needs. 
o Allowing the development and implementation of demand-led approaches. 
o Developing sustainable, transferable service options. 
o Developing potential business models to provide sustainable services building local 
livelihoods.  
o Deployment of a small ‘recovery team’ to increase capacity at critical times. 
o Enabling impact and recovery assessments to be undertaken. 
 
8.6 Improvements to the Humanitarian Framework to Support the Programming of 
Adaptive Resilience in Emergencies 
This section looks at the barriers within the humanitarian framework that were highlighted 
within the case study through the assessment of coordination mechanisms, agency planning 
and the finance and donor strategy (refer to sections 6.2 and 6.3) and offers suggestions for 
improvements within the framework to better enable the response to support adaptive 
resilience. These suggested improvements are broken down into coordination and planning 
and finance and donor strategy. 
 
8.6.1 Humanitarian framework Barriers and Suggested Improvements: Coordination 
and Planning 
Analysis of cluster coordination and agency planning in sections 6.3 and 5.5, respectively, 
highlighted some key operational barriers that affected programmatic ability to adequately 
develop individual/HH adaptive resilience. Issues that have been demonstrated to hinder the 
potential mainstreaming of a resilience building approach into response programming. 
These key operational barriers were: 
Ø Weak strategic capacity and planning 
Ø Weak capacity and involvement of government 
Ø No policy environment at the start 
Ø Weak context analysis 
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Ø Emergencies are not interested in setting up baselines, data collection or 
M+E 
Ø Lack of recovery expertise; resulting in the lack of and the delay in 
transitional mechanisms 
Ø Separation of cluster groups weakening strategic potential 
Ø Weak or no exit planning 
 
Approaches needed to support adaptive resilience and combat these operational barriers 
include: 
Ø Cluster Coordination and the development of the SAG 
Getting the plethora of agencies, government and private sector working coherently 
is often a huge feat; a large element of this is the weak strategy that is provided 
throughout the response. Strategic capacity needs to be drastically improved if 
response operations are to utilise existing opportunities, undertake effective holistic 
relief activity, support adaptive capacity and allow for the development of transition 
and exit options. This could be possible through the optimisation of the Strategic 
Advisory Group (SAG) at an inter-cluster level to offer the capacity to evaluate and 
prioritise activity for both relief and recovery. SAG, under this capacity could offer a 
longer-term vision disseminating strategic ideas to donors, the government and 
response agencies, offering much needed operational strategic guidance - Clusters 
can use this authority to help scale up operations, as many involved agencies have 
weak capacity and foresight to plan ahead and think outside of the box. To develop 
this capacity: 
o Each Cluster group would provide 1 or 2 experts that create a ‘think tank’ 
mechanism/SAG at the inter-cluster level, which will ensure holistic, integrated 
and timely strategic planning. 
o The mandate and processes of the inter-cluster level SAG could be developed 
and monitored at the Global Cluster level. This will increase the important 
function of the Global Cluster, which in turn could produce a function of 
authority. Utilising this to potentially mandate more synchronised activities 
within the operating frameworks of agencies, i.e. the processes of assessment 
and reporting within agencies could be synchronised. With the Global Cluster 
producing effective assessment and reporting tools that encourage the consistent 
implementation of context, risk, DRR, impact, M+E and recovery assessments.  
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Synchronising activities will enable more informed, coherent programming that 
is able to feed information into a central database accessible for comparison and 
review by all.  
o Rapid context assessment undertaken by SAG 
The new capacity within the inter-Cluster SAG could also form the function of 
initiating a rapid need and context assessment (through its capacity or through 
hiring of an external company) covering all sectors, with sector specific 
information going to each Cluster group.  This would make up for weak initial 
assessments and ensure strategic planning from the start that all stakeholders 
could utilise and begin to build coherent operations. 
o Data management and dissemination coordinated by SAG 
Using the SAG’s ‘think tank’ set up to rapidly process information coming in and 
provide the strategic capacity to devise priority actions from the start, that has the 
long-term vision to allow transition and exit strategies, and effective recovery. 
These strategic ideas can be sold to the donors and disseminated to the 
government, the agencies and the private sector. This function of the SAG ensures: 
o Government is kept updated with agency activities, opening up 
communication and cooperation to allow capacity building within the 
government and the development of an early policy environment. Which will 
develop a conducive operating environment where major issues, such as land 
rights, can be approached and remediated quickly. Increasing government 
involvement from the start will also provide opportunities for effective 
transfer mechanisms. 
o A central database, where agencies report on programme progress and feed 
in any contextual data (through a user-friendly information management 
system, that can be accessed by all). This will allow SAG to overview 
progression of the response, recognising issues and gaps to then have the 
capacity to resolve them in a timely fashion. 
o Regular communication of new information and priority action to all 
implementing agencies through a highly managed portal, weekly email 
updates and texting service.   
o Regular communication with affected communities allowing them to receive 
updates and guidance, but also opens up a channel of communication to feed 
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in context information, their needs and feedback on programmes being 
undertaken. 
 
Improved Operations- Coordination and Planning 
Utilising and developing the capacity of SAG would create new capacity for:  
o Timely context assessment to inform more effective programme decision-making. 
o Strategic thinking that can bring foresight and reduce the incidence of weakly 
planned programmes. 
o The dissemination of information and ideas to government, donors, agencies and the 
private sector over the whole period of the response. 
o Stimulation of a policy environment to guide an operational framework from the 
start. 
o Effective communication channels to exist with affected communities, feeding in 
information, as well as gaining contextual insight and programmatic feedback. 
o Building in resilience and DRR approaches. 
o Coordinating capacity, that reduces gaps and overlaps, and enables more holistic, 
integrated and context specific programming. 
o To engage effectively with government, build capacity, develop an effective policy 
environment early and ensure more sustainable handover mechanisms. 
o Generate private sector involvement. 
o A central database where agencies report on programme progress allowing an 
overview of progression of the response; enabling rapid recognition of issues and 
gaps, offering capacity to rectify them in a timely manner. 
 
These mainstreaming approaches are further elaborated in Chapter 10 - Recommendations. 
 
Undertaking these adaptive resilience building approaches encompassed several adaptive 
resilience mechanisms that include: 
Ø Increasing capacity of government through information sharing and involvement 
in strategic planning. Opening up communication and cooperation to develop a 
conducive policy environment to speed up activity and develop sustainable 
handover mechanisms. 
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Ø Capacity for strategic planning that will enable the early integration of a longer-
term rational, resilience building, DRR strategy, exit planning and the 
development of transitional mechanisms. 
Ø Introduce and increase capacity to conduct assessments that are geared towards 
understanding the changing context, and how programmes can meet these needs in 
a context-specific way that proactively builds resilience early. 
Ø Increase capacity for early transfer and exit planning will allow the development 
of sustainable programming. 
Ø Introduce recovery expertise and capacity early will increase capacity for timely 
recovery interventions. 
Ø Proactively building in a DRR and resilience building knowledge base that will 
offer sustainable options for relief and recovery programme planning, enabling 
better transfer mechanisms.  
 
8.6.2 Humanitarian framework issues and suggested improvements: Finance and 
Donor Strategy 
Analysis of finance and donor strategy in section 6.2 highlighted some key operational 
barriers that affected programmatic ability to adequately develop individual/HH adaptive 
resilience. These operational barriers have been demonstrated to hinder the potential 
mainstreaming of a resilience building approach. These key operational barriers were: 
Ø Lack of donor coherence 
Ø Separation of funding streams 
Ø Top-heavy decision-making 
Ø Short proposal timeframes 
Ø Funding caps 
Ø Donors push for quantity over quality 
Ø Visibility' over 'feasibility' 
Ø Programmes chosen on financial imperative not on need 
Ø Lack of accountability 
Ø Local private sector unable to access funds 
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Approaches needed to support adaptive resilience and combat these operational barriers 
include: 
Ø Option 1: A new centralised funding system to increase coherence and improve 
strategy (refer to Figure 8.6, pg. 274 and sub-section 10.4.1). The development of more 
central funding systems, where donors can place their donations into a central pot, so not 
to support individual projects, but contributing to an overall strategic approach. This 
system will open up the opportunity to provide the timely release of financial resources 
and allow for coordinated efforts.  
o This system will allow for better information management, coordination and 
effective programming.  Developing a more consolidated funding process, 
where funding decisions can be better controlled strategically by a system 
operating at ground level. Rather than a system that is controlled by donor 
agendas and pre-requisites. A process that will allow for better strategic 
placement of funds in a timely manner, that comes with more appropriate 
performance expectations. 
Ø Option 2: Improve the current system 
o Flexible funding- donors need to re-evaluate their funding architecture to 
develop more coherence between separated funding streams. To allow 
response programmes to meet the real needs of an affected population in a 
timely manner and stimulate recovery. 
o Extension of funding period- ridding of spending caps and enabling 
medium to long-term financial provision will allow more effective 
programmes to be developed. 
o Donor pre-requisites- Donors often push for quantity, with a focus on 
numbers achieved and less focus on strategy. Donor education is needed, 
which could be done through the development of cost-benefit and cost-
effectiveness arguments on longer-sighted strategy that promotes early 
recovery, ease of transition/exit and DRR.  
o Direct financing to local stakeholders- If transition mechanisms are to exist 
and sustainable service options are to develop after a disaster the local 
private sector need to be involved in response and recovery activities. In 
order for the local private sector to re-establish themselves access to the 
streams of finance that flow into an emergency need to be made more 
available. 
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(refer to Figure 8.7, pg. 275)  
 
These mainstreaming approaches are further elaborated in Chapter 10 - 
Recommendations. 
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Figure 8.6 Presents a new financial mechanism and cluster capacity, detailing the various stakeholders and the dynamic of each relationship. 
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Figure 8.7 Presents the main operational barriers seen within finance and donor strategy and the 
types of interventions needed to allow adaptive resilience building to be mainstreamed into 
humanitarian programming. 
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Figure 8.7 Presents the main operational barriers seen within finance and donor strategy and the 
types of interventions needed to allow adaptive resilience building to be mainstreamed into 
humanitarian programming. 
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8.7 A Resilience Approach How it Will Support Emergency Operations 
Developing resilience in the post-disaster environment has been shown to be possible and 
possesses the ability to improve strategy within humanitarian operations. Developing 
resilience enables programming to improve the provision of essential services, substantially 
increase transitional and exit options and proactively stimulate rapid recovery. An approach 
that will improve adaptive resilience of disaster affected individuals/HHs within a response 
to ensure recovery is not hindered and increase resilience for the future. Overall creating 
much needed cohesion between relief, recovery and development and stimulating a cycle of 
increased resilience and preparedness globally. 
 
A resilience orientated approach would enable response programming to be much more 
strategic, developing its capacity to meet context dependent evolving needs, create a 
multitude of transition and exit and recovery options. Offering the humanitarian sector a 
way to leave a legacy of sustainable solutions and scale up resilience. 
 
Programmatically, a resilience orientated approach would translate for Shelter activities into 
proactively undertake a decentralised approach, localising interventions by either supporting 
affected communities in their place of habitation, rehabilitating place of original habitation 
for a rapid return and/or supporting host families. This moves programmes away from the 
default camp model. Depending on scale of displaced persons and the operating 
environment this approach can be integrated to varying degrees. The approach offers 
alternative strategies for shelter that builds post-disaster resilience by allowing relationships 
in the community to stay strong, the opportunity to develop sustainable services, build asset 
ownership, as well as the creation of livelihoods. Installing strategy that will stimulate a 
rapid recovery and build DRR and preparedness thinking into local communities, 
strengthening resilience for the future. 
 
For WASH activities a resilience orientated approach would translate into the undertaking 
of a more holistic WASH strategy from day one of a response, to produce a programmatic 
approach that is demand-led, ensuring the real needs are understood and options are 
developed that adequately meet them, building ownership and sustainability of service 
provision. A business approach allows local markets to be stimulated, supply chains to be 
improved and provide options for the private sector to recover. This would enable the 
development of livelihoods and sustainable service options that can help the initial response, 
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provide transition and exit strategies, as well as building in infrastructure for the future. 
Increasing HH’s adaptive resilience by providing sustainable services, supporting 
neighbourhood options to keep social connections strong and providing livelihoods, will 
raise the level of resilience that supports a rapid recovery and future resilience. 
 
Mainstreaming a resilience approach will encourage improvements in financial provision by 
allowing the system to evolve and develop through the stimulation and uptake of new 
response strategies that proactively promote resilience and rapid recovery and in many cases 
become a lot more cost-effective. A push for more flexible funding will allow 
implementation partners to respond to the real needs of an affected population in a timely 
manner, essential in a volatile environment faceted with unknowns. Considering a re-
evaluation of current financial mechanisms holds the potential to drastically increasing 
strategy and leadership, which currently is some of the key challenges faced by the 
humanitarian sector today. 	  
This Chapter has reviewed and further analysed data from previous sections to highlight 
how barriers to recovery can be overcome by supporting adaptive resilience of 
individuals/HHs, through emergency programming, financial mechanisms, coordination and 
planning. Key practical interventions that have the ability to support resilience building 
within humanitarian response presented within the case study have been highlighted. These 
interventions have been supported through examples from other emergency responses in 
order to evaluate their applicability in different emergency contexts. Presenting a resilience 
approach that has the ability to transform humanitarian operations.  
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9. Conclusion 
In fulfilment of the aims and objectives of the research, this Chapter presents the 
conclusions of the research, highlighting key findings and contributions to knowledge. 
Recommendations for practice and for further research are also embodied within this 
Chapter. 
 
9.1 Fulfilment of the Aim and Objectives of the Research 
This research sought to investigate the research problem - Can resilience building within 
post-disaster environments increase potential recovery of disaster-affected populations and 
is it feasible to build individual/household resilience through emergency response 
operations? Its aims were to conceptualise what individual/HH level resilience means in the 
post-disaster environment, to understand what a resilience building approach could look like 
in the humanitarian sphere and how it could improve humanitarian programming, and to 
comprehend what would be needed to mainstream such an approach within the 
humanitarian framework. This was achieved through the fulfilment of 6 objectives: 
• Objective  1. To clarify the concept of resilience within the post-disaster context.  
• Objective 2. To gauge the impact emergency response programmes had on 
individual and household resilience in post-earthquake Haiti.  
• Objective 3. To gauge the impact of the humanitarian framework on the level of 
resilience developed in the context of post-earthquake Haiti.  
• Objective 4. To determine the link between post-disaster resilience and the level of 
potential recovery experienced at the individual/household level.  
• Objective 5. To comprehend possible resilience building initiatives within 
emergency response operations.  
• Objective 6. To comprehend how resilience building initiatives can be supported 
within the humanitarian operational framework.  
 
The conclusions from each of these individual objectives are presented in the following sub-
sections. 
 
 
	   279 
9.1.1 Objective 1 
Objective 1 sought to assess and analyse what individual/HH level post-disaster resilience is 
and to understand its importance in the post-disaster context. This was achieved by 
analysing data from the community discussion forum, the literature review, archival data, 
semi-structured interviews and the online questionnaire (refer to Appendix 1c, 1d and 2a 
and section 2.6) to further understand the concept of post-disaster resilience by ascertaining 
the main components that made up adaptive resilience as witnessed within the case study. 
These identified components were then investigated within the humanitarian operation 
undertaken in Haiti, assessing programmatic approaches to understand whether adaptive 
resilience was supported or hindered and its consequential affect on recovery in the post-
disaster context. 
 
Individual/HH level post-disaster resilience essentially looks at adaptive resilience, which 
describes an individual’s/HH’s/community's adaptive capacity within a post-disaster 
environment, which can be developed within a post-disaster context to actively raise 
resilience for recovery. The term ‘adaptive resilience’  was first described in Cutter’s DROP 
model (2008) (refer to sub-section 2.6.2). Where individuals/HHs will possess a level of 
‘resilience’ before a disaster that will stem from their access to resources, such as assets, 
services and financial resources, as well as their strength of relationships with friends and 
family, local authority and civil society. This existing level of resilience ascribes the level of 
absorptive capacity made available to that individual/HH in the event of a disaster. 
Correspondingly, this absorptive capacity determines the level of perturbation experienced, 
as well as the capacity available to recover/return to a state of functionality. In post-disaster 
contexts understanding and supporting individuals/HHs adaptive resilience will ensure 
former weak resilience will not hinder their ability to recover and will also build in 
resilience for the future, strengthening absorptive capacity and the ability to manage their 
own recovery. 
 
The research was able to pinpoint and verify the key components of post-disaster adaptive 
resilience. This was achieved through the analysis of literature in Chapter 2, which 
highlighted the importance of the existing theory presented by Bosher (2004), which stated 
5 components of disaster resilience, including: access to assets, access to basic services, 
economic opportunities, access to legal and financial services, i.e. loans, grants, and strong 
social and political networks. The research explored the level of resilience experienced 
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before and after the earthquake in Haiti through these 5 individual components to gauge the 
impact of pre-earthquake resilience on the level of absorptive capacity post-event and how 
this translated into the level of resilience expressed, highlighting key areas of adaptive 
resilience utilised (Chapter 4). This analysis verified the relevance and importance of these 
components in determining post-disaster adaptive resilience and its link to the recovery 
deficit witnessed in Haiti.  
 
Further assessing the concept of resilience in the humanitarian sphere, through the analysis 
of the relationship between adaptive resilience and potential recovery within the post-
disaster environment, highlighted the obvious gap in knowledge surrounding how to 
practically support adaptive capacity post-disaster. This led to the need to break down and 
understand the ‘modality’ that humanitarian response can support and develop adaptive 
resilience at the individual/HH level. This analysis highlighted the necessity of a sixth 
component of adaptive resilience- risk perception. Risk perception, which describes an 
individual’s conceptualisation of individual or community resilience, which will encourage 
self-belief and ownership of recovery and not dependency. A concept considered only 
within one resilience framework, a framework by Paton and Johnston (2001). Due to the 
nature of post-disaster adaptive resilience, individuals/HHs are required to take immediate 
action and capitalise on available resources.  As people make assumptions about the 
possible consequences of action before considering engaging in that behaviour, risk 
perception then becomes critical in determining the potential level of adaptive resilience that 
could be achieved (refer to section 7.2). 
 
These social and psychological factors were not encompassed in later resilience 
frameworks. These factors are crucial when developing schemes to build in community 
preparedness, as well as considering resilience building initiatives in humanitarian 
responses. Indicating that the lack of consideration in later models could highlight a missing 
link in the holistic conceptualisation of post-disaster resilience, which is necessary to 
effectively operationalise resilience in the post-disaster environment. 
 
Therefore, an outcome of this research offers the conceptualisation of 6 key components 
that are fundamental to post-disaster adaptive resilience: 
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1. Access to assets 
Asset ownership, such as a house, transportation or tools forms a level of 
security and capital for potential recovery.  
2. Access to basic services 
Services, such as water, sanitation and health care are vital for survival and 
maintenance of health. Adequate provision also means time spent on ensuring 
these vital activities is limited, freeing up time for more productive pursuits, such 
as livelihood activities. 
3. Economic opportunities 
Proactively encouraging livelihood opportunities and market stimulation will 
foster local economic recovery, stimulating the rehabilitation of local services 
and amenities. It will also allow individuals/HHs to raise essential capital to 
manage their own recovery. 
4. Access to legal and financial services, i.e. loans, grants. 
Access to cash in a crisis can be fundamental to securing accommodation, 
starting up a business and offering an opportunity for individuals/HHs to manage 
their own recovery. 
5. Strong social and political networks 
Supportive social networks, such as friends, family and community members, 
help mitigate adverse consequences and maximise potential recovery. Political 
connections, i.e. access to local government, civil organisations and international 
organisations also provide essential support, information and guidance. 
6. Risk perception 
Individual conceptualisation of individual or community resilience is vital to 
encourage self-belief and ownership of recovery and not dependency. 
 
The analysis conducted within this research has been able to further clarify the concept of 
post-disaster resilience and its importance within post-disaster contexts. This has enabled 
Objective 1 to be met.  
 
9.1.2 Objective 2 
Objective 2 sought to gauge the impact emergency response programming had on 
individual/HH resilience in post-earthquake Haiti. Objective 1 was able to clarify the 
concept of individuals/HHs adaptive resilience and Objective 2 further contexualised this 
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concept, looking to understand how emergency programmes undertaken in the earthquake 
response supported or hindered adaptive resilience. The data collection methods used to 
ascertain this objective included: semi-structured interviews, an online questionnaire, and 
archival data (refer to Appendix 1c and 2a). 
 
Programme approaches within the Haiti response, specifically looking at Shelter and WASH 
interventions, were successfully assessed in terms of how the approaches undertaken 
supported or hindered adaptive resilience in Haiti. The research, through triangulated 
primary and secondary data, has clearly pinpointed critical areas within the Shelter and 
WASH responses that significantly hindered the development of individual/HH adaptive 
resilience. The lack of strategic vision within the immediate response resulted in the classic 
adoption of the camp approach and other immediate, supply-led programme approaches. 
This approach inherently was unable to effectively support the development of adaptive 
resilience at the scale needed, which looks to develop access to assets, basic services, 
economic opportunities, access to financial and legal services, strengthen social and 
political connections and develop risk perception. Due to this immediate strategic vision 
undertaken by the international community, programming outputs actively hindered the 
development of adaptive resilience, examples of these outputs include:  
• Limited community engagement sort by the international community, which is 
essential if risk perception was to be gauged and developed and, therefore, creation 
of ownership.  
• The inadequate choice of shelter options, i.e. large-scale IDP camps and a focus on 
T-shelter construction, which were unable to stimulate access to assets and ensure 
critical social and political connections stayed strong. 
• The provision of unsustainable service options that were not locally managed, which 
limited the availability of basic services and opportunity for livelihood development, 
as well as the development of local infrastructure. 
 
This approach proved a missed opportunity, due to the fact that the response was operating 
in a large urban environment, which often has the potential to offer a multitude of 
alternative options. Ultimately, this saw the dismissal of crucial decentralisation strategies 
that could have increased individual’s/HH’s access to assets, strengthened social and 
political bonds, increased access to basic services, increased livelihood options and local 
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economic development. These crucial decentralisation strategies included, for Shelter: host 
family support, rental support and neighbourhood rehabilitation, and for WASH: utilising 
local private sector capacity, supporting host families and neighbourhood rehabilitation, and 
the investment in infrastructure. This consequently, limited consideration for the 
development of adequate transition, exit and recovery mechanisms. 
 
The programmatic approach that was developed in this response can be directly linked to 
the lack of contextual knowledge that existed amongst response agencies. This information 
could have been generated through a baseline, sector specific rapid needs assessment and/or 
a context assessment. However, as the research indicated, these types of assessments were 
limited in their application by agencies, and often, if they were utilised data was either 
collected too late or the information was not used in a timely way to ensure effective 
programme planning. These types of assessments are fundamental, if the true need of the 
affected population is to be gauged, potential individual/HH adaptive resilience and local 
capacity is to be understood and information generated to support effective programme 
plans.   
 
There is a lack of consistency between agencies on the types of assessments carried out, 
along with the level of information produced and the timeliness of that information. This 
outcome is consistent with the literature, as ACAPS (2012) also highlighted the lack of 
commonly accepted methodology within the humanitarian system. Group URD’s RTE 
reports (2010) highlight that the initial assessments, which preceded water and sanitation 
programmes in Haiti, did not account for pre-existing practices, in terms of access to water 
and excreta management etc., particularly in the urban context. 
 
The lack of understanding of and investment in viable options saw minimal development 
and support of individual/HH adaptive resilience and a significant lack of transitional and 
exit strategies made available. Recovery expertise and strategy was not seen at crucial times 
during the response, resulting in ‘emergency minded experts’ scrambling for options.	   For 
example, for Shelter, a focused strategy was placed on T-shelter provision, with minimal 
support to more effective, sustainable housing options, such as rental support and 
neighbourhood rehabilitation achieved within 2 years of the response. For WASH, the main 
exit option for many agencies engaged in supplying WASH services included, the transfer 
of services to the already overwhelmed ministry dedicated to water and sanitation, 
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DINEPA. There was, also, the limited development of private sector capacity and 
infrastructure, which could have provided these basic services locally and in a sustainable 
manner. This created a response that was not able to offer the adequate shelter facilities and 
basic services that affected communities needed to recover. This inevitably saw a protracted 
relief situation prevail and limited recovery achieved within 2 years after the earthquake hit 
Haiti. This is an observation that is familiar to the humanitarian responses as seen during the 
2005 Indian Ocean tsunami (Oxfam International 2005), the 2005 Pakistan earthquake 
(Oxfam 2006) and the 2011 Cyclone in Myanmar (UNDP 2011). 
 
Undertaking this in depth post-disaster case study in the protracted relief context of Haiti, 
has allowed evidence to be produced that reveals the impact emergency response 
programmes can have on individual/HH resilience. Producing the outputs required for 
Objective 2. 	  
 
9.1.3 Objective 3 
Objective 3 sought to gauge the impact of the humanitarian framework on the level of 
resilience developed in the context of post-earthquake Haiti. This objective was effectively 
met by examining finance and donor strategies that were employed in Haiti. Looking 
specifically at factors, such as national involvement and economic development and the 
influence the donor system had on programming. Cluster coordination and stakeholder 
effectiveness witnessed in this case study was also assessed for its impact on programming. 
Information was generated from the semi-structured interviews, archival data and the online 
questionnaire (refer to Appendix 1c and 2a). 
 
When assessing the finance and donor strategy undertaken in Haiti, it is clear there were not 
adequate levels of support within the response period to encourage national involvement or 
sufficient economic development, which would have been key stimuli for recovery and the 
development of a more resilient society. Government donors channelled emergency funds 
primarily through implementation agencies, such as the Red Cross, INGOs and UN 
agencies, with very little channelled through the government, local private sector or 
LNGOs. Within the emergency period, UN agencies themselves, as a whole, also did not 
channel a great deal of funds to local actors. Although, several donors did establish various 
methods for supporting national actors like the GoH, through financial, technical and 
institutional support, with approaches offered resulting in varying degrees of ownership and 
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inclusion. This led to the question as to whether the overall approach undertaken by donors 
was comprehensive enough in its strategy and its budget allocation to build the capacity of 
the government to undertake and own recovery and reconstruction activity. Several attempts 
to encourage private sector development were undertaken by donors. However, the private 
sector themselves noted that the fragmentation and unreliability of assistance made a 
productive relationship between international donors and the local private sector difficult. 
The private sector was also critical of the way in which aid resulted in a distortion of local 
markets and disempowerment of local communities, with the setting up of parallel aid 
systems leading to a continuous weakening of the Haitian State and Haitian institutions, in 
general, and, in some cases, resulting in a virtual collapse of certain sectors. Overall, the 
finance and donor strategy undertaken wasn’t able, in its scale, commitment or insight, to 
actively encourage national involvement or stimulate economic development to the degree 
needed to proactively foster adaptive resilience and, therefore, stimulate recovery. 
 
When examining the influence of the donor system on response programming several key 
issues come into play: the lack of coherence amongst donors, which caused in a 
disconnected approach within the response; top-heavy decision-making weakened 
leadership; short proposal timeframes affected planning; funding caps and the separation of 
funding streams influenced programmatic scope; donors’ push for quantity over quality and 
‘visibility’ over ‘feasibility’; and many programmes were chosen on financial imperative 
rather than on need. These key issues all significantly impacted the effectiveness and 
timeliness of resulting programme outputs in the response, with many agencies expressing 
their inability to meet the real needs on the ground and adequately programme for transition, 
exit and recovery. 
 
Understanding coordination capacity and its dynamics within post-disaster Haiti has 
uncovered a significant level of strategic weakness and a general lack of leadership. This 
environment added to the challenges experienced within programming in the form of 
direction, scope and scale. The lack of strategic capacity within the agency itself is not 
compensated at the coordination level seeing a strategic void develop, which resulted in a 
lack of ideas and options particularly for exit, transition and recovery programming, at the 
stages of the response where they are most essential.  
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As has been uncovered through this research, the humanitarian operational framework had a 
significant impact on response actor’s ability to programme effectively and the involvement 
of local partners to encourage adaptive resilience for recovery and allow for essential 
transition and exit mechanisms to be developed. This evidence and analysis has contributed 
towards completing Objective 3. 
 
9.1.4 Objective 4 
Objective 4 sought to determine the link between post-disaster resilience and the level of 
potential recovery experienced at the individual/household level. To determine this link the 
key components of post-disaster adaptive resilience were determined, as presented in 
Objective 1 examples of how emergency programmes can support each of these key 
components of post-disaster adaptive resilience were extracted from the data produced by 
the case study. Also the common barriers to recovery were determined through data 
produced within the community discussion forum, the semi-structured interviews and the 
online questionnaire. The link between the promotion of adaptive resilience and recovery 
was made by assessing each of the common barriers to recovery in relation to the key 
components of adaptive resilience, understanding the programmatic activity involved, 
which proved it had the ability to break the barriers to recovery.  
 
The common barriers to recovery for the affected individuals/HHs identified within this 
case study included: 
• The lack of adequate shelter provision 
o There was a fundamental need for shelter options that went beyond tented 
camps. 
o Shelter provision that could offer semi- permanent or permanent solutions, 
i.e. house repair, host family support, rental support, new construction. 
o The lack of shelter saw individuals/HHs unable to return to their place of 
origin, seeing that affected individuals/HHs were unable to return to a state 
of functionality. 
• The lack of sustainable basic services, i.e. water and sanitation 
o The main provisions of water and sanitation were accessible only in or 
around camps, seeing this provision linked to shelter strategy. 
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o Reliance on temporary, unsecured water and sanitation services saw 
individuals/HHs over time struggling to find adequate resources to lead a day 
to day productive life.  
o There was a significant need to foster more sustainable service options, 
within camps, but also within host communities, affected and un-affected 
neighbourhoods, either through the private sector or through the repair and 
development of state resources. 
• Limited or no livelihood opportunities 
o There were some livelihood options made available within the response 
through Cash For Work and some reconstruction programmes. However, the 
amount and timescale of these options was not adequate in dealing with the 
volume of need. Seeing individuals/HHs not being able to establish any form 
of income, increasing their dependency on external resources. 
o Support to and development of private sector business and local market 
development was needed to aid the local economy, which could have 
generated livelihoods. 
• Limited or no access to cash, loans or grants 
o For disaster affected individuals/HHs there was limited cash available with 
some receiving cash from associated diaspora, others through cash 
programmes initiated by international agencies. However, loans and grants 
were virtually impossible to access. 
o This situation again saw individuals/HHs solely relying on unsustainable 
external resources, increasing their level of dependency. 
o The productive use of cash transfers, increase in livelihood provision, which 
is intrinsic for access to sustainable sources of cash, support to local bank 
institutions, the development and use of mobile money and the opening up of 
UN and other bidding processes to local private sector, were all options 
needed to provision adequate access to financial support that could support 
domestic and livelihood activities. 
 
These common barriers presented through the research are intrinsically linked to the key 
components of resilience. For example, if economic opportunities (a component of adaptive 
resilience) were supported through the generation of jobs and business creation (a 
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programmatic intervention), then the lack of livelihood opportunities (a common barrier to 
recovery) would no longer be an issue, resulting in improved recovery. Similarly, if access 
to sustainable basic services (a component of adaptive resilience) was provisioned through 
the development of local capacity and infrastructure (a programmatic intervention), then the 
lack of basic services (a common barrier to recovery) would not hinder day to day 
functioning, therefore, improving potential recovery. 
 
As noted within this research recovery is difficult to achieve in the aftermath of a disaster 
without external assistance (refer to Chapter 2 and 4). If recovery is to be achieved it has 
been shown through the data analysis that adaptive resilience of the affected population 
needs to be supported and proactively developed. The research has demonstrated that when 
a society who has a weak level of resilience endures a disaster, the impact can be 
substantial. The current humanitarian approach has the ability to ensure survival within an 
affected population in the aftermath of a disaster. However, as the literature and this 
research’s case study has highlighted, this approach generates poor recovery and can often 
leave an affected nation vulnerable, with a weak level of resilience. This in turn leads to that 
society experiencing a continual cycle of disaster. If that same society with its former weak 
level of resilience is supported by the humanitarian sector, by raising its potential adaptive 
resilience, then that humanitarian approach has the ability to ensure survival, as well as 
recovery. This will consequently, raise the level of resilience experienced within that 
affected society, ultimately breaking the cycle of disaster (refer to section 7.3). 
 
The link between the key components of post-disaster adaptive resilience and the common 
barriers to recovery has been determined. This presents the idea that adaptive resilience has 
the ability to stimulate recovery. An output that enables Objective 4 to be met. 
 
9.1.5 Objective 5 
This research has been able to meet Objective 5 - to comprehend possible resilience 
building initiatives within emergency response operations, by assessing the data produced 
within the case study, as well as the literature, that detailed different types of interventions 
achieved through different emergency contexts. The basic approach to supporting adaptive 
resilience of individuals/HHs within emergency response operations has been described. 
Also detailed are the appropriate interventions that support the development of 
individual/HH adaptive resilience within different emergency contexts, i.e. rapid onset 
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(natural disaster/conflict), slow onset (natural disaster), long-term humanitarian 
programming (natural disaster/conflict), as well as, within urban and rural environments and 
at different scales, i.e. large and small (refer to Table 8.1, pg. 259). 
 
It has been demonstrated that to ensure recovery and allow for a more resilient society to 
evolve, to break the cycle of disaster, adaptive resilience needs to be and can be supported 
and developed within humanitarian operations (refer to Chapter 8). Interventions that have 
been highlighted to have the ability to support the development of adaptive resilience are:  
 
For Shelter 
• Neighbourhood interventions: 
o Host family support 
o Neighbourhood rehabilitation- IDP and Non- IDP 
o Rental support 
o Household cash grants- HES (Household Economic Security) (i.e. a rapid 
response cash grants process). 
• Participatory approaches: 
o PASSA (Participatory Approach for Safe Shelter Awareness) 
o Skills training community members 
 
For basic services 
• A business model approach: 
o Rehabilitating local service capacity 
o Create funds to support entrepreneurs 
• Demand-led approach: 
o Zero cost options 
• Participatory approach: 
o HH latrine construction 
• A neighbourhood approach (fitting WASH services alongside shelter options) 
• Invest in infrastructure 
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For access to livelihoods and financial resources 
• Job creation/livelihood stabilisation - support entrepreneurs, support local markets 
and local service infrastructure, acquire local labour for any infrastructure projects. 
• Skills training 
• Offering as an agency or encouraging and supporting local capacities to improve 
access to loans, grants and cash. 
 
These interventions are further expanded in Chapter 10 - Recommendations. 
 
These interventions have the ability to proactively develop one or more of the 6 components 
of adaptive resilience (i.e. access to assets, access to basic services, economic opportunity, 
access to legal and financial services, strong social and political networks and risk 
perception). Neighbourhood interventions, allow an emergency response to decentralise the 
shelter strategy away from camps, which would see the development of access to assets by 
individuals/HHs, as well as supporting and strengthening essential social and political 
networks. The utilisation and capacity building of the private sector, for the sustainable, 
immediate and long-term provision of basic services, like water and sanitation, enables 
services to be re-established quickly. This will allow individuals/HHs to increase their 
access to sustainable basic services. Engaging with local capacity and private sector entities 
also, increases livelihood opportunities. Offering as an agency or encouraging and 
supporting local capacities, to improve access to loans, grants and cash, can stimulate 
livelihood options, as well as remedy potentially devastating debt. Demand-led 
interventions, that take into account real relief and recovery needs, instils a level of risk 
perception and develops ownership by the individual/HH. This will ultimately, increase the 
adaptive resilience of affected communities within a post-disaster environment and enable 
them to better manage their own recovery. 
 
Once concluding a selection of interventions that have the ability to support the 
development of adaptive resilience to stimulate recovery, the research looked to clarify the 
use of such interventions within different emergency contexts, as each context offers unique 
characteristics that will allow certain interventions to be capitalised on, but also will see 
some interventions inappropriate for the context. This approach allowed a level of 
generalisability of the outcomes of the research.  Table 8.1 (refer to pg. 258) notes the 
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different emergency interventions that have been highlighted through this case study, 
detailing which emergency context the intervention could be used in. Also referenced, are 
examples of these interventions within other previous emergency responses. 
 
The research has highlighted that this approach is about a mindset to response 
programming. The approach enables agencies to take the context into account and have 
strategies and resources ready, to capatilise on local resources and respond appropriately, as 
each context will offer different opportunities and challenges. Agencies need to better equip 
themselves to be able to capatilise on the opportunities and work with the challenges, to 
increase the effectiveness of emergency response.  
 
Through the assessment of the case study conducted as a part of this research, as well as 
assessing previous emergency responses globally, the research has been able to comprehend 
possible resilience building initiatives, that can be used to support the development of 
adaptive resilience of individuals/HHs, within emergency response operations. This 
outcome has enabled the requirements for Objective 5 to be met. 
 
9.1.6 Objective 6 
This research has been able to meet Objective 6 - To comprehend how resilience building 
initiatives can be supported within the humanitarian operational framework, by 
investigating the supportive elements within agency capacity, needed to enable detailed 
emergency interventions, highlighted in Objective 5, to support adaptive resilience. These 
include: assessments, data management, planning, capacity and expertise. The research 
presented the outputs for each of these elements in the form of suggested activities that 
could improve the capacity of an agency, to support adaptive resilience in an emergency. 
Following the investigation of agency capacity, several fundamental components of the 
humanitarian framework were further investigated, these included: coordination and 
planning, and finance and donor strategy. These components were evaluated to highlight 
what would be needed to mainstream this resilience approach as a culture within the 
humanitarian sector. 
 
9.1.6.1 Agency Capacity 
Outputs suggested to improve an agency’s capacity to effectively undertake interventions 
that can support adaptive resilience include: 
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Assessments 
The case study highlighted the lack of adequate assessments and use of assessments within 
emergency response to plan programmes effectively (refer to sub-section 5.5.1). This has 
shown to consequently, hinder effective relief and recovery programming substantially and 
should be seen as a weak link. Improving existing assessments and investing in new 
assessments holds the key for significant programmatic improvements, key assessments 
include: 
Ø Rapid assessments 
o Shelter sector rapid assessment 
o WASH rapid assessment 
o Rapid context and resilience assessment 
Ø A comprehensive baseline survey 
Ø Monitoring and Evaluation 
 
Each assessment is detailed further in sub-section 10.3.1. 
 
The integration and standardised use of these assessments will improve: contextual 
knowledge in the early stage of the response, which will increase strategy for programme 
planning; the early development of longer-term planning and the comprehension of the 
impacts of programme choices on recovery; the effectiveness of relief activities, whilst 
simultaneously stimulating recovery, as local capacity will be highlighted; stakeholder 
coordination, as assessments will reveal the context early for all active partners; the early 
and regular initiation of M+E, which will enable more responsive programming that can 
gauge and build on adaptive resilience of affected communities; which will help to build 
DRR strategies in early; and it will enable impact to be measured, which will allow for 
performance reviews and best practice to evolve. 
 
Data management and Planning 
The analysis of current practice (refer to sub-section 5.5.4) revealed there is a need for a 
data management system that has the capacity to effectively communicate learning and 
feedback information into programmes. A system, that will allow programme planning to be 
more strategic. With high staff rotation, feedback mechanisms and effective hand-overs are 
weak. This has resulted in a loss of institutional memory and a lack of continuity within 
programmes, missing the feed in of crucial information and capacity to recognise 
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opportunities and build on them. Methods that could improve data management and 
planning include: 
Ø A centralised method of reporting and planning 
Ø A contingency database 
 
Each data management and planning method is detailed further in sub-section 10.3.2. 
 
Improving data management and planning methods within agencies will result in, more 
integrated and context appropriate programming, due to the development of an accessible 
knowledge base, that will support faster, more effective decision-making and a more 
succinct way of operating. It will provide technical and strategic knowledge required to 
meet changing needs and develop internal operational preparedness. Integrating these 
improved methods will offer the foundations for operationalising programmes that can 
support the development of adaptive resilience. 
 
Capacity and Expertise 
The case study highlighted that many agencies deeming any form of ‘recovery’ activity as 
outside their mandate. However, as noted, recovery begins from day one, and needs to be 
conceptualised and strategically accounted for in response programming. Therefore, this 
sees few agencies with recovery expertise at a very fundamental stage of the recovery 
process (refer to sub-section 5.5.4). This situation often results in weak knowledge on early 
strategic options, delaying and potentially hindering transitional mechanisms and 
sustainable programme options.  
 
Including ‘recovery’ expertise into the immediate response could develop the required 
capacity to produce the knowledge needed, to initiate programmes that support adaptive 
resilience to stimulate effective recovery early (refer to sub-section 8.5.3). 
 
9.1.6.2 Humanitarian Framework 
Improvements to the humanitarian framework necessary to support the programming of 
adaptive resilience in emergencies, include: 
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Coordination and Planning 
Operational barriers, to effectively stimulating recovery, within coordination and planning, 
were highlighted within the case study (refer to section 6.3). These key operational barriers 
included: weak strategic capacity and planning, weak capacity and involvement of 
government, no policy environment at the start, weak context analysis, separation of cluster 
groups which weakened strategic potential, weak or no exit planning. To improve 
coordination, it has been posed that the strategic advisory capacity within the cluster system 
needs to be developed. 
 
Strategic capacity needs to be drastically improved, if response operations are to utilise 
existing opportunities, undertake effective holistic relief activity, support adaptive capacity 
and allow for the development of transition and exit options. This could be possible through 
the optimisation of the Strategic Advisory Group (SAG) at an inter-cluster level to offer the 
capacity to evaluate and prioritise activity for both relief and recovery. SAG, under this 
capacity could offer a longer-term vision, disseminating strategic ideas to donors, the 
government and response agencies. This new capacity could offer much needed operational 
strategic guidance. Clusters could use this authority to help scale up operations, as many 
involved agencies have weak capacity and foresight. 
 
Utilising and developing the capacity of SAG could create new capacity for: strategic 
thinking, that can bring foresight and reduce the incidence of weakly planned programmes; 
the dissemination of information and ideas to government, donors, agencies and the private 
sector over the whole period of the response; the stimulation of a policy environment to 
guide an operational framework from the start; effective communication channels to exist 
with affected communities, feeding in information, as well as gaining contextual insight and 
programmatic feedback; and develop coordinating capacity, that reduces gaps and overlaps, 
and enables more holistic, integrated and context specific programming. This improved 
capacity will offer a conducive environment to support the development of programmes that 
aim to build the adaptive resilience of individuals/HHs. 
 
Finance and Donor Strategy 
Analysis of finance and donor strategy in section 6.2 highlighted some key operational 
barriers that affected programmatic ability to adequately develop individual/HH adaptive 
resilience. These operational barriers have been demonstrated to hinder the potential 
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mainstreaming of a resilience building approach. These key operational barriers were: lack 
of donor coherence, the separation of funding streams, top-heavy decision-making, short 
proposal timeframes, funding caps, donors push for quantity over quality, visibility' over 
'feasibility', programmes chosen on financial imperative not on need, lack of accountability, 
and local private sector unable to access funds. 
 
To improve the current financial system, two options have been posed: 
Ø Option 1: A new centralised funding system to increase coherence and improve 
strategy (refer to Figure 8.6, pg. 276 and sub-section 10.4.1). The development of 
more centralised funding systems, where donors can place their donations into an 
un-specified central pot, so not to support individual projects, but contribute to an 
overall strategic approach. This system will allow for better information 
management, coordination and effective programming.  Developing a more 
consolidated funding process, where funding decisions can be better controlled 
strategically, by a system operating at ground level. Rather, than a system that is 
controlled by donor agendas and pre-requisites. A process that will allow for 
better strategic placement of funds in a timely manner, that comes with more 
appropriate performance expectations. 
 
Ø Option 2: Improve the current system 
o Flexible funding 
o Extension of funding period 
o Develop informed donor pre-requisites 
o Direct financing to local stakeholders 
(refer to Figure 8.7, pg. 275)  
 
Considering a re-evaluation of current financial mechanisms holds the potential to 
drastically increase strategy and leadership, which is fundamental, if emergency response 
programming is to develop in its effectiveness and ability to integrate emergency 
programming that supports the development of adaptive resilience in the humanitarian 
sphere. 
 
The extensive evaluation of agency capacity and the humanitarian framework has 
highlighted, some key solutions to improve the humanitarian operational framework, in 
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order to support the development of adaptive resilience in emergencies. This has ensured 
Objective 6 has been met. 
 
The conclusion of all 6 objectives has enabled this research to examine the research 
question in-depth. Concluding that resilience building within post-disaster environments has 
the ability to increase potential recovery of disaster-affected populations and that it is 
feasible to build individual/HH resilience through emergency response operations.  
 
9.2 Key Findings of the Research 
This thesis has determined that resilience building within post-disaster environments has the 
ability to increase potential recovery of disaster-affected populations and that it is feasible to 
build individual/HH resilience through emergency response operations. This has been 
achieved by the following: 
 
Firstly, clarifying the concept of post-disaster resilience, which sees adaptive capacity of an 
individual/HH as its fundamental attribute. Understanding adaptive capacity as ‘the ability 
or capability of a system to modify or change its characteristics or behaviour to cope better 
with actual or anticipated stresses’ (Brookes 2003). The research has supported Cutter’s 
(2008) theory of adaptive resilience, which further breaks down this concept, stating that the 
level of resilience experienced by an individual/HH before a disaster event is intrinsic to the 
absorptive capacity that they will express post-event. This absorptive capacity will 
determine the impact felt. The level of resilience expressed in a post-disaster environment 
has a direct effect on the level of achievable recovery of that individual/HH. It has been 
presented that initial levels of resilience can be improved early on and this is deemed 
adaptive resilience (refer to Chapter 4).  
 
Further assessing the concept of resilience in the humanitarian sphere, saw the need to break 
down and understand the ‘modality’ that humanitarian response can support and develop 
adaptive resilience at the individual/HH level. The research was able to pinpointing 6 key 
components of adaptive resilience: access to assets, access to basic services, economic 
opportunities, access to legal and financial services, i.e. loans, grants, strong social and 
political networks, and risk perception (refer to section 7.2).  
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Secondly, the research has analysed a post-disaster intervention that saw a significant 
recovery deficit, this case study was the 2010 Haiti earthquake. The research was able to 
break down the main barriers to recovery experienced by affected individuals/HHs, which 
were: the lack of adequate shelter provision, the lack of sustainable basic services, limited or 
no livelihood opportunities, and limited or no access to cash or loans. This allowed a 
practical understanding of recovery at the individual/HH level to be defined. The key 
components of adaptive resilience and the common barriers to recovery were then assessed 
to establish the relationship between them. It has been demonstrated that to ensure recovery 
in a post-disaster event and allow for a more resilient society to evolve, it is fundamental 
that adaptive resilience is supported and developed within emergency response 
programming (refer to Chapter 7).  
 
Thirdly, the impact the humanitarian operation in Haiti had on adaptive resilience was 
established. Offering a focused analysis of programming within the Shelter and WASH 
sectors, as well as the humanitarian framework that encompassed it.  The research 
pinpointed critical areas within the Shelter and WASH response. These included the lack of 
strategic vision and limited consideration for developing transition mechanisms, which 
resulted in the dismissal of crucial decentralisation and community engagement strategies. 
An outcome that was directly linked to the lack of contextual knowledge generated through 
baselines, rapid needs or context assessments. Assessments that are essential in order to 
gauge real need within the affected population, potential individual/HH adaptive resilience 
and local capacity. Information that would have supported effective programme planning 
needed to build adaptive resilience (refer to Chapter 5).  
 
Coordination capacity and its dynamics within post-disaster Haiti were also assessed within 
the research, a significant level of strategic weakness and a general lack of leadership was 
uncovered. This incidence added to the challenges experienced within programming in the 
form of direction, scope and scale. The lack of strategic capacity within the agency itself 
was not compensated at the coordination level seeing a strategic void develop, which 
resulted in a lack of ideas and options particularly for exit, transition and recovery 
programming at the stages of the response where they are most essential (refer to section 
6.3).  
 
	   298 
The finance and donor strategies undertaken in Haiti did not allow adequate levels of 
support within the response period to encourage national involvement or sufficient 
economic development. Key issues were highlighted that significantly impacted the 
effectiveness and timeliness of resulting programme outputs in the response. Thus, 
contributing to agencies’ inability to meet the real needs on the ground, support the 
development of individual/HH adaptive resilience and adequately support programmes for 
transition and exit (refer to section 6.2). 
 
Not recognising and investing in options that could have supported adaptive resilience to 
ensure viable recovery options, saw a lack of transition and exit strategies made available. 
Which ultimately, contributed to the development of a protracted relief situation.	  This case 
study supports the many previous incidences within humanitarian response of inadequate 
recovery due to the approach of emergency response programming, as seen through the 
literature (refer to Chapter 2). 	  
 
Fourthly, the research was able to stipulate specific programmatic and operational 
interventions that will enable an agency to carry out programmes that are have the ability to 
support the development of adaptive resilience within their emergency response 
programmes (refer to sections 8.3 and 8.5). These suggested interventions were evaluated 
for their potential use in different emergency contexts, i.e. rapid onset (natural 
disaster/conflict), slow onset (natural disaster), long-term humanitarian programming 
(natural disaster/conflict), as well as, within urban and rural environments and at different 
scales, i.e. large and small (refer to section 8.4). System improvements within the 
humanitarian coordination mechanism and the financial and donor system have also been 
suggested. These suggested improvements are crucial to enable agencies to undertake an 
approach, that will proactively support the development of adaptive resilience (refer to sub-
sections 8.6.1 and 8.6.2). 
 
Through the in-depth analysis of this post-disaster case study in the 2010 Haiti earthquake, 
this research has shown that developing resilience in the post-disaster environment is 
possible and an approach that has the ability to improve strategy within humanitarian 
operations. This is an approach that will allow programming to improve the provision of 
essential services, substantially increase transitional and exit options and proactively 
stimulate resilience and consequentially, a rapid recovery.  
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This strategic approach to emergency response programming offers the coherence needed 
between relief, recovery and development. Determining that a resilience approach could be 
the ‘missing link’ or resolution to the perceived operational ‘gap’ between relief, recovery 
and development. Pursuing a resilience approach could be the start of a much needed 
cultural change within the humanitarian sector that will shape operations for a more 
strategic and successful future. 
 
9.3 Contribution to Knowledge 
Knowledge can be seen as a justified true belief (Knight and Turnbull 2008); a belief in 
itself is not enough, it has to be justified. Through the interpretation and analysis of existing 
literature and collected and analysed data, the findings of this research assert such beliefs 
through methodological, empirical, theoretical and industrial contributions to knowledge. 
This thesis has been able to make 6 contributions to knowledge; these will be briefly 
described in the following sub-section theoretical, empirical, methodological and practical 
contributions. 
 
9.3.1 Theoretical Contribution 
• The thesis presents a clarified conceptualisation of post-disaster resilience, 
highlighting key components of adaptive resilience at the individual/HH level. 
• The research has demonstrated the relationship and resulting value of resilience 
building in the post-disaster environment in the stimulation of individual/HH 
recovery. 
• The thesis presents the innovative theory that a resilience building approach in 
humanitarian operations is the ‘missing link’ or perceived operational ‘gap’ between 
relief, recovery and development. The key to the development of coherence between 
humanitarianism and development. 
 
9.3.2 Empirical Contribution 
• The research has provided original, previously uncollected data on individual/HH 
resilience in the post-disaster context. 
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9.3.3 Methodological Contributions 
• A new methodology was trialled through this research. This method was the 
Sociogram, which was used to gather data on post-disaster resilience at the 
individual/HH level. 
 
9.3.4     Practical Contribution 
• The thesis has been able to pinpoint and develop key areas, emergency response 
operations, can build resilience at the individual/HH level. These areas include: 
o Programmatic: specific sectoral focus on Shelter and WASH, presenting 
strategic programmatic ideas that have the ability to build and/or encourage 
resilience.  
o Supportive: detailing elements, such as assessments, data and planning, and 
capacity and expertise, needed to support programmatic interventions. 
o Institutional: detailing elements necessary to allow mainstreaming of an 
approach, such as resilience building. These include: donor and financial 
mechanisms, and coordination. 
All practical contributions are detailed further in Chapter 10 - Recommendations. 
 
9.4 Limitations 
The main limitation within the research was the limited sample size of the respondents 
representing the affected population, due to the complex and volatile nature of the post-
disaster environment at the time of data collection. This led to the revision of the number of 
community discussion forums that could be safely undertaken. It also saw that the 
representative communities were ones that were directly associated with particular INGOs, 
reducing the ability of the sample to be representative.  
 
The use of a singular case study design also limits the ability to generalise findings to the 
humanitarian sector and would need further case studies in different post-disaster 
interventions and within a variety of contexts to be developed to offer comparative data and 
more conclusive evidence. However, this research was exploratory, i.e. theory generating, 
and this unique case study offers the ability to draw on key messages produced within this 
research to be applied to the humanitarian sector and further explored within programming 
and policy.  
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10. Recommendations 
Developing resilience in the post-disaster environment has been shown to be possible and 
has the ability to improve strategy within humanitarian operations, to allow programming to 
improve the provision of essential services, to substantially increase transitional and exit 
options and to proactively stimulate rapid recovery. It is an approach that will support and 
encourage adaptive resilience of disaster affected individuals/HHs within a response to 
ensure recovery is not hindered and increase resilience for the future. Overall, it is an 
approach that can create the much-needed cohesion between relief, recovery and 
development and stimulate a cycle of increased resilience and preparedness globally. 
 
10.1 Programmatic Resilience Building Interventions- Shelter 
This section lays out in detail the types of programmatic interventions within the Shelter and 
WASH sectors that have the ability to build post-disaster resilience.  Looking also at the 
supportive elements needed to enable these interventions to be effectively implemented in 
the early stages of the response. This section also lays out key areas at the institutional level 
that are needed to mainstream this approach as a culture within the humanitarian sector. 
 
Shelter specific resilience building interventions are described below, these are operational 
approaches that could be undertaken by agencies within their emergency response model to 
support and develop individual/HH level post-disaster resilience.  
 
10.1.1 A Decentralised Shelter Strategy 
Ø Host family support 
In a crisis, many individuals/HHs rely on their friends and family for immediate 
support, allowing affected communities to tap into known resources and ensures 
social connections to stay strong, which is an essential component in raising initial 
levels of resilience. However, if no provision is offered to encourage and support 
this, then new guests can become an immense burden, often forcing IDPs to have to 
rely on international support, i.e. IDP/refugee camps. Supporting host families to 
better provide for new guests is a key approach to decentralising the burden on 
IDP/refugee camps. This can be done in a number of ways: 
o Cash transfers or vouchers for host families: supporting host families to 
maintain the extra people through cash transfers or vouchers can allow host 
families to lessen the burden by giving them the option to support their 
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situation through the purchase of food, water, essential NFIs, building extra 
facilities, like a shower or improving their property, i.e. roofing. (brochures 
and technical support should be provided). A programme that will allow 
longer-term support to IDPs, offering the time needed to pursue their own 
recovery strategies. Cash transfers and vouchers also allow an injection of 
cash into the local economy stimulating service provision and livelihoods, 
rather than just overwhelming local resources, which can be a source of 
conflict. 
o Service provision for host families and communities: providing NFI items, 
such as HH water treatment, along with improvements in community water 
supply and sanitation infrastructure, can significantly help the burden of 
resource consumption that comes with an influx of new people needing help, 
increasing the potential for longer-term support for IDPs. 
Ø Neighbourhood rehabilitation 
Instead of the immediate push to develop camps, consideration of localised support 
should be initiated to identify whether IDPs can be supported close to their existing 
neighbourhoods or, if in IDP camps, to deploy a rapid return policy. 
o An Integrated Neighbourhood Approach should be considered, which 
looks at shelter rehabilitation and reconstruction, the installation or 
improvement in WASH facilities, and livelihood provision from day one. To 
achieve this, a proactive approach to evaluate neighbourhoods within and 
surrounding affected areas through initial assessments should be carried out. 
The process of cross-referencing for land entitlement can be used, where 
ownership of land is cross-referenced with neighbours in a community to 
establish original housing plots, quickening the pace of reconstruction and 
faster return, further promoting a better level of resilience and recovery. 
Furthermore, the cross-referenced land map could also be used to attempt to 
legalise ownership. 
o Rapid return to neighbourhoods: if IDPs are already accommodated within 
camps, there is a need to proactively seek strategies for a rapid return to 
neighbourhoods from camps (though only in non-conflict contexts). The camp 
registration process could be utilised to indicate where IDPs originally came 
from, this information could then be used by agencies to deploy early 
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rehabilitation efforts in priority areas to push for a faster return, reducing 
dependency on the camp. 
Ø Non-IDP neighbourhood support 
Other neighbourhood strategies, such as provisioning underserviced neighbourhoods 
close to camps, with basic services, such as water, sanitation and health. Services that 
should be created and run where possible through available local capacities, i.e. 
community level (i.e. create a HH business), private sector or through state provision. 
Setting up these services will provide alternative options for residence and other 
affected people ensuring they stay away from the camps. Again decentralising the 
common approach of camps, allowing for more sustainable housing options to be 
created from the start of a response. 
Ø Rental support 
Rental support programmes could also be used to assist in the accommodation of 
displaced persons, either as an immediate approach or as a strategy to close camps. 
Rental support provides families with help locating and funding a rental property and 
provides further finance to support them for 1 year. After the 1 year rental support 
finishes, families are in a better position to be able to negotiate to stay in the same 
rental property with their own means, paying rent in another property or by moving in 
with family or friends. This strategy stimulates the private sector and homeowners to 
rehabilitate housing stock, provides new forms of income and allows for faster 
recovery. IDPs are also housed rapidly, ensuring dependency on unsustainable camps 
doesn’t occur. An additional consideration is that this approach also enables 
rehabilitation of existing settlements rather than utilising unrealistic relocation projects 
that can result in dire negative consequences in many disaster recovery situations. 
Ø Participatory approaches 
Strong community participation from the beginning allowing HHs to become 
informed decision-makers, develop ownership, manage expectations and makes the 
most of people’s skills and strengths. This approach allows for more sustainable, 
transferable service options that can develop local business, develop cost-recovery 
mechanisms, offer scalability, and provide longer-term services. These include: 
o Demand-led approaches: this approach proactively seeks immediate 
consultation with communities within the planning process in order to ensure 
interventions are demand driven and not supply driven. Thus, selecting 
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programmes that are appropriate, that can tap into local capacity and develop 
ownership. 
o PASSA (Participatory Approach for Safer Shelter Awareness): the use of 
PASSA informs individuals, HHs and community understanding of 
vulnerability related to the built environment, and leads to the identification 
and promotion of locally appropriate measures to achieve safer shelter and 
settlement. This approach helps develop risk perception, stimulating 
individuals, HHs and communities to proactively improve their resilience, 
which also provides a good DRR strategy. 
o Skills training: the training of community members in areas, such as safe 
construction methods to undertake repair and reconstruction of their homes. 
This approach will allow HHs to regain previous assets rapidly and increasing 
the level of protection. The new skills can also offer new livelihood 
opportunities, again increasing resilience. 
Ø Household cash grants 
HES (Household Economic Security) is a rapid response cash grants process. Helping 
HHs pay off existing loans (In Haiti there was a revolving community loan system 
(SOL) prior to the earthquake, and due to the loss of capital in the earthquake, many 
loans  were left unpaid). 
Ø Utilise local products and services 
Utilising and investing in local resources stimulates the local economy and supports 
livelihood options, offering much needed income in a crisis. 
o Buying construction materials locally:  understanding the local market and 
existing capacity can reap huge benefits, using tools such as Oxfam’s 
Emergency Market Mapping and Analysis toolkit (EMMA), which is a 
guidance manual to assist front-line staff to do rapid assessments of market 
systems in the first few weeks of a crisis. Its purpose is to improve early 
response planning so that resources are used effectively and ensure that 
opportunities are not missed, bolstering future recovery in the local economy.  
o Utilising local capacity from contractors to individual masons: gaining 
contextual information on what local construction capacity exists will offer a 
huge resource to provisioning rehabilitation and (re)construction capabilities at 
the local level. This will allow rapid asset recovery and livelihood stimulation, 
essential for developing post-disaster resilience. 
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10.1.2 Improved operations using a decentralised shelter strategy 
Proactively undertaking a decentralised approach localises interventions by either supporting 
affected communities in their place of habitation, rehabilitating place of original habitation for 
a rapid return and/or supporting host families. This moves programmes away from the default 
camp model. Depending on scale of displaced persons and the operating environment, this 
approach can be integrated to varying degrees. The approach offers alternative strategies for 
shelter that builds post-disaster resilience by allowing relationships in the community to stay 
strong, the opportunity to develop sustainable services, build asset ownership, as well as the 
creation of livelihoods. Installing strategy that will stimulate a rapid recovery and build DRR 
and preparedness thinking into local communities, strengthening resilience for the future. 
 
10.2 Programmatic Resilience Building Interventions- WASH 
WASH specific resilience building interventions are described below, these are operational 
approaches that could be undertaken by agencies within their emergency response model to 
support and develop individual/HH level post-disaster resilience.  
 
10.2.1 A Holistic WASH Strategy 
 
Ø A business model approach 
A business approach seeks to help reinstate previous, and foster new, service 
provision (i.e. water kiosks, public latrines and health services etc.), which will help 
develop local markets and strengthen local services. The approach also offers 
opportunities for sustainable transition and exit strategies that will allow a rapid 
recovery and increase basic service provision that will raise post-disaster resilience. 
o Rehabilitating local water vendors: to undertake this activity, it is 
necessary to first assess pre-existing service provision and then the currently 
existing capacity for water supply needs to be understood. This sort of 
information could be gleaned from a WASH rapid needs assessment. If there 
is local capacity, locate this capacity in the areas of operation. Assess 
capacity needs and offer support where necessary. This support could be in 
the form of rehabilitation of a reservoir or delivery points, capital or subsidy 
for the purchase of chlorination products, water supply containers/bags etc. if 
capacity exists, a small level of support could significantly scale up capacity 
to deliver a water supply locally and sustainably. 
	   306 
o Create funds that support entrepreneurs: making available business 
grants and loans will enable a much needed injection of cash to stimulate the 
private sector to rebuild or start new business. Grants could be won through 
entrepreneurial competitions. Loans will require micro-finance institutions to 
make available and manage the repayment of loans, support could be given 
to the re-establishment of such institutions, financial provision for loan 
dissemination and facilitating access to loans by potential users. 
o Cash and voucher systems: providing cash or vouchers to affected 
households to stimulate the purchase of water, creating the demand for the 
services to be supplied. 
Ø Demand-led approach 
This approach aims to build strong community participation from the beginning, 
allowing HHs to become informed decision-makers, develop ownership, manage 
expectations and make the most of people’s skills and strengths. This approach will 
allow for more sustainable, transferable service options, options that can develop 
local business, bringing a cost-recovery mechanism that will naturally scale up, and 
provide longer-term services and livelihoods.  
o HouseHold latrine construction: this can take place in a camp or 
neighbourhood setting, where the community are consulted to understand 
their sanitary needs, gauging skills available. If sufficient skill capacity 
exists, HHs are to be given tools and materials, or in applicable situations, a 
voucher system (to stimulate the local market), along with technical advice, 
if necessary, to construct their own HH latrines. Quality of construction will 
be checked and HHs supported. This intervention allows for significantly 
more latrines to be constructed in a short time, HHs develop ownership for 
latrine maintenance, which moves responsibility away from the agency, and 
it offers skills training in construction and maintenance methods HHs can use 
to sustain latrines in the future. 
o ‘Zero cost’ options: which sees communities participating in their own 
decision-making about how to achieve their WASH needs with agencies 
supplying guidance, tools and a potential voucher system.  This participation 
method will help inform the community of the options available and let them 
decide how they can achieve these goals.  The community will then develop 
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ownership of the programme and expectations will be managed. An approach 
that will guide a realistic, demand-led intervention. 
Ø Neighbourhood rehabilitation 
Neighbourhood rehabilitation allows the WASH intervention to become 
decentralised, looking at servicing neighbourhoods of origin to ensure a rapid return, 
host families to sustain support to IDPs and non-IDP neighbourhoods to take 
pressure off camps and to reduce potential conflict. This approach could include: 
o Undertaking a vulnerability assessment: an assessment that aims to 
understand the context in relation to WASH needs, highlighting 
vulnerability, the level of current resilience and potential adaptive capacity. It 
will allow strategic development of appropriate options for sustainable 
interventions, e.g. rehabilitation or scale up of available sources, privately 
owned sources and kiosks. 
o Neighbourhoods of origin: it is essential to integrate shelter and WASH 
strategy in order for services to be provided and neighbourhoods to be 
adequately rehabilitated for a rapid return (where possible). Water supply 
provision should aim to be sustainable. However, emergency and/or semi-
permanent or transitional WASH infrastructure could be employed in the 
early stage of the response to give time for more sustainable options to be 
established. Sanitation should be HH built and owned where possible, again 
using temporary provision (e.g. public latrines) until more sustainable 
options can be established. This approach needs to be implemented early to 
ensure that a decentralised strategy away from camp provision is established 
and a rapid return strategy is made possible.  
o Non-IDP neighbourhood support: in neighbourhoods that have not been 
directly affected by the disaster, but that have little or no water services or 
sanitation may need support to enable IDPs to potentially accommodate 
themselves there, discourage non-IDPs from trying to capitilise on camp 
resources and discourage potential conflict between IDPs and non-IDP 
communities. 
o Host family support: as it has been noted, affected people often seek help and 
support from family and friends after a disaster occurs, allowing a substantial 
alternative to camp provision. To ensure this strategy is sustainable in the short 
to medium term, host families need to be supported. For WASH provision at 
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the HH level, the construction of HH toilets and showers could be supported, 
HH water treatment, e.g. lifesaver cubes, candle filters, aquatabs/PUR, NFI, 
e.g. sanitary products. At the community level the implementation of 
neighbourhood water supply services will be crucial in lessening the burden. 
Ø Invest in infrastructure 
Deciding to invest in infrastructure early on will give the ‘transitional options’ 
needed and bequeath useful WASH infrastructure that will build resilience. 
Infrastructure option could include: 
o The repair and development of water supply networks to supply in the 
response and for the long-term. 
o Large scale treatment infrastructure: The repair or construction of water and 
wastewater treatment plants. 
o Small scale waste management infrastructure: composting, biogas, on-site 
wastewater treatment, i.e. use of lime or treatment ponds.  Some of these 
options can produce saleable goods, e.g. methane for cooking and heat, 
compost, fertilizer and other agricultural products, creating viable business 
options, as well as providing longer-term waste management infrastructure. 
 
Improved operations using a holistic WASH strategy 
Undertaking a more holistic WASH strategy from day one of a response can produce a 
programmatic approach that is demand-led, ensuring the real needs are understood and 
options are developed that adequately meet them, building ownership and sustainability of 
service provision. A business approach allows local markets to be stimulated, supply chains 
to be improved and provides options for the private sector to recover. This allows the 
development of livelihoods and sustainable service options that can not only help the initial 
response, but also provide transition and exit strategies, as well as building in infrastructure 
for the future. It also helps in increasing HH’s adaptive capacity by providing sustainable 
services, supporting neighbourhood options, keeping social connections strong and 
providing livelihoods, raising the level of resilience that supports a rapid recovery and 
future disaster resilience. 
 
10.3 Supportive Framework for Building Resilience 
Elements that support programming have been assessed and recommendations made to 
ensure effective programmes are developed to support and encourage resilience. The 
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following sub-sections will detail supportive elements, such as assessments, data and 
planning, and capacity and expertise. 
 
10.3.1 Improving Assessments 
Ø Rapid assessments 
Post-disaster operations are often planned on the back of weak or no contextual 
information gathered to plan appropriate and effective interventions. A knowledge 
base that is crucial if needs are to be truly understood and met, and transitional and 
exit plans are to be conceptualised and realised. There is potential to glean some of 
this information within sectoral rapid assessments, examples include: 
o Shelter sector rapid assessment: neighbourhoods within and surrounding 
affected area could be appraised and basic information on local skills and 
resources could be gleaned. Basic information on host family dynamics and 
locations should be gathered. Within the IDP registration process, 
neighbourhood, or place of origin, could be established to strategise rapid return.  
o WASH rapid assessment: information on how affected population accessed 
water and sanitation before the disaster should be gauged. Along with existing 
resources and capacity, this will highlight strategic option to build up national 
resources and provide essential transition and exit mechanisms. 
o Rapid context and resilience assessment: this would be a new type of 
assessment that may require additional human resources, which could be created 
in the form of a ‘recovery team’ that would be deployed within an emergency 
response team. This new capacity would be dedicated to gleaning contextual 
information from local stakeholders and assessing community level resilience; 
information that will allow the development of medium to long term strategy to 
be developed. With the new capacity also able to assess the progression of the 
response, interventions can be initiated in a more timely and effective manner, 
developing recovery strategy and capacity from day one. 
o Baseline 
Response operations that have poor assessments at the start of the response have 
little or no baseline information for the impact of programmes to measure against 
and so fail to effectively implement Monitoring and Evaluation (M+E). Without 
this, there is little valid feedback on the effectiveness of different types of 
intervention. Ensuring this will see progressive learning within the humanitarian 
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sector on the most effective and appropriate response operations, thus, improving 
quality and standards. This type of comprehensive baseline survey could be 
undertaken by a hired external private company, that has the expertise and 
capacity for such a rapid, full-scale survey. It would be a worthwhile investment 
because is could layout priority areas quickly and ensure all stakeholders are 
coordinating off the same page. 
o Monitoring and Evaluation 
Enabling proactive M+E from an early stage of the response allows programme 
impact and appropriateness to be evaluated, and modified if necessary, in a 
timely fashion. This enables programmes to meet changing needs in volatile and 
uncertain environments. This approach to programming will see adaptive 
capacity is understood and built up in an appropriate way to increase the rate of 
recovery. There are several areas that will make the implementation of M+E 
easier and more accessible in response programming, these include: 
o The development of a user-friendly, concise reporting system where data, 
opinions and strategic plans can be regularly fed in, ensuring the continuity 
of strategic development throughout the entirety of the response.  This will 
particularly help with issues of staff turnover. 
o The education and training of staff in M+E methods and the instilment of the 
importance of its integration. 
o Install its use in policy and programmatic reporting requirements. 
 
Improved Operations - Assessments 
The lack of adequate assessments hinders effective relief and recovery programming 
immensely and should be seen as a weak link. Improving existing assessments and investing 
in new assessments holds the key for: 
• Improved contextual knowledge in the early stage of the response, which will 
increase strategy for programme planning.   
• The early development of longer-term planning and the comprehension of the 
impacts of programme choices on recovery.  
• Increasing the effectiveness of relief activities, whilst simultaneously stimulating 
recovery.  
• Ensuring all stakeholders are working coherently.  
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• Supporting handovers when new staff takeover (making sure knowledge and 
experience is not lost). 
• Building in of DRR strategies early. 
• The early and regular initiation of M+E that will enable more responsive 
programming that can gauge and build on adaptive resilience of affected 
communities.  
• Measuring impact, which will allow for performance reviews and best practice to 
evolve. 
 
10.3.2 Data management and Planning 
Ø A centralised reporting system 
There is a need for a system that has the capacity to effectively communicate 
learning and feedback information into programmes, allowing programme planning 
to be more strategic. With high staff rotation, feedback mechanisms and hand-overs 
are weak, resulting in a lack of continuity within programmes, and missing the feed 
in of crucial information and, thus, the capacity to recognise opportunities and build 
on them. 
Ø A centralised method of reporting and planning within an agency could also offer 
a more succinct and coherent way to operate. Setting up a user-friendly information 
system that allows all stakeholders to routinely and concisely feed all assessment 
and performance information into it, will begin to build a base of knowledge. Also, 
making it mandatory to tap into the database when developing new programmes, 
would ensure more well-informed decision-making that would then allow more 
integrated and context appropriate programming.  Specific key information can be 
gleaned from this system to feed into the Cluster database to help trace activity and 
feed in context information. 
Ø Contingency database 
Setting up contingency plans that will account for the many possible scenarios that 
could be faced in a disaster response as a tool to be accessed by field staff could 
provide the knowledge base needed to support faster, more effective decision-
making. This would enable programmes to more rapidly respond to changing needs 
and exploit all opportunities by providing the technical and strategic knowledge 
necessary to support programme changes. This approach can also help inform field 
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staff of resilience building approaches that can be initiated in the early stages. To do 
this, an agency would need to invest in the write up of potential risks and scenarios 
that could be faced in different disaster cases and how to respond and manage them. 
However, such a system should leave scope for innovative thinking and not 
necessarily be prescriptive. Essentially, the database would be envisioned as a tool to 
strengthen the operational system and to be able to counter any areas of weakness in 
the capacity or expertise of transitioning field staff, whilst also allowing the 
stimulation of innovation and the proactive capture of opportunities. 
 
Improved Operations - Data management and planning 
Building capacity for data management and planning within an agency’s operations will 
ensure: 
o More integrated and context appropriate programming  
o An accessible knowledge base 
o Support faster, more effective decision-making 
o Provide a more succinct way of operating 
o Provide technical and strategic knowledge required to meet changing needs 
o Streamline DRR approaches into programming 
o Ensure long-term programmes can be carried through until their entirety 
o Develop internal operational preparedness 
o Support smoother handovers 
 
10.3.3 Capacity and Expertise 
Ø Recovery expertise 
Currently, within many organisations, there is a lack of recovery expertise to assess 
the context, survey results and develop recovery programming. It has been noted that 
emergency specialists don’t make good recovery analysts, as each mindset is very 
different. This results in weak knowledge on early strategic options, delaying, and 
potentially hindering, transitional mechanisms and sustainable programme options. 
 
There is a need to conceptualise the reality of the long-term and create a programme 
approach that looks ahead. This could be achieved through the development of 
recovery capacity, creating a ‘recovery specialist’ role that would be deployed from 
the very start of the response. This specialist or recovery team could become the 
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capacity and knowledge needed to initiate effective early recovery. The recovery 
specialist or team could: 
o Undertake a rapid context assessment, tapping into local knowledge to 
understand the political and social environment, the level of resilience in the 
community, the skills available and local resources. Feeding this information 
into the development of relief programmes. 
o As the response progresses, the recovery specialist can continually overview and 
assess the context, recognising opportunities for building in resilience and other 
timely recovery initiatives. 
o The specialist will bring the recovery expertise so lacking in a response and 
strategise from the start to ensure strong transitional planning, exit strategies and 
longer-term planning if necessary.  
 
Improved Operations - Capacity and Expertise 
Increasing operational capacity within agencies to cater for recovery will improve 
programming by: 
o Enabling a rapid context assessment and resilience assessment to be carried out. 
o Developing transitional mechanisms and exit planning.  
o Providing much needed recovery expertise and longer-term strategy. 
o Enabling programmes to meet recovery programme implementation needs. 
o Allowing the development and implementation of demand-led approaches. 
o Developing sustainable, transferable service options. 
o Developing potential business models to provide sustainable services building local 
livelihoods.  
o Potentially initiating the deployment of a small ‘recovery team’ to increase capacity 
at critical times. 
o Enabling impact and recovery assessments to be undertaken. 
 
10.4 Institutional Framework for Building Resilience 
To allow resilience building programming to be undertaken, there is a need for strategic 
changes at the programmatic level and at the institutional level. Innovations need to be 
found within the funding framework and within coordination capacity. Many structural and 
operational areas need to be evaluated and re-designed if a resilience approach is to be fully 
able to show its potential in emergency response operations. 
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10.4.1 Donors and Financial Mechanisms 
Ø Flexible funding 
Current donor architecture sees funding streams for ‘relief’ and ‘recovery’ orientated 
activities separated, with streams made up of very different sets of benchmarks and 
heavy structuring. Response operations struggle to find financial support to 
undertake more strategic and context specific programming, and, thus, there is a dire 
need for more flexible funding that will allow response programmes to meet the real 
needs of an affected population in a timely manner. To achieve this, donors and 
financial institutions need to re-evaluate their funding architecture to develop more 
coherence between separated funding streams. DFID have begun this process, 
recognising that their split funding model, i.e. relief, recovery, reconstruction has 
caused a false dichotomy between these activities. Past and current response activity 
advocates for this need and donors are becoming more aware of this. 
 
Ø Reducing the influence of donor’s agendas 
Many respondents from the international community noted significant programmatic 
issues that stemmed from the operative nature of the donor. It is clear that response 
and recovery operations are heavily dependent on the donor and, consequently, the 
strategic impact of programs carried out on the ground.  
 
Further to this, and as a consequence of the top-heavy decision-making, leadership 
on the ground is weakened. This current funding architecture sees decision-making 
that is top heavy, with the development of response programmes based on donor 
perception and/or agenda and not enough on the reality and need on the ground. 
Donors have a strong influence on response programme direction. However, they 
often do not have the mandate or sufficient capacity to offer leadership. This creates 
a dynamic where decision making authority is not in the hands of those who are in 
leadership positions within a response creating a power vacuum, making it difficult 
for effective leadership to exist.  
o To change this funding, mechanisms need to be drastically changed. 
Decision making needs to be at a strategic level on the ground and with funds 
to support that dynamic. This is where the SAG (Strategic Advisory Group) 
could be developed to manage funding and programmatic direction in a 
response to get the most effective output for the finance made available.  
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Ø Rethink spending caps 
Relief funding may often have short-term spending caps - in the range of 6 months 
up to 1 year. This often leads to misguided decision-making that focuses on rapid 
spending strategies and not looking at how to meet the real needs of the affected 
population with the most effective programming. Also, long-sighted programming 
can’t be planned for. This needs to be changed from within the donors/financial 
institutions operational framework, which should be supported through the 
humanitarian sector by advocacy and education on the cost-benefits of holistic, 
medium to long-term programming. 
Ø Donor pre-requisites 
Donors often push for quantity, with a focus on numbers achieved and less focus on 
strategy. Again donor education is needed, which could be done through the 
development of cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness arguments on longer-sighted 
strategy that promotes early recovery, ease of transition/exit and DRR. Presenting 
these arguments to the donor system, as well as coordinating with institutions and 
anyone who is involved in programme planning. 
Ø Direct financing to local stakeholders 
If transition mechanisms are to exist and sustainable service options are to develop 
after a disaster, the local private sector need to be involved in response and recovery 
activities. In order for the local private sector to re-establish themselves, access to 
the streams of finance that flow into an emergency need to be made more available. 
This can be optimised through: 
o Opening up bidding processes to allow local companies to apply: 
facilitation needs to be offered by the funding institution or implementation 
agency to support local companies to become aware of what is available and 
how to undertake the process.  
o When considering opening up bidding processes, there also needs to be a 
discussion on criteria for application, as, at present, the current options 
available only accept applications from ‘formalised’ companies. In many 
countries the majority of the local private sector are ‘unformalised’, which 
means such companies are often marginalised. 
Ø Change the financing mechanism 
Funds flow into an emergency through a variety of routes, i.e. the CAP, Flash 
appeals, CERF, ERF, private funds etc., which then flow through a variety of 
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financial disbursement partners and implementation partners, all parties of which 
have their own agendas. The current incoherence of the expansive array of donors 
that support the plethora of implementation agencies operating in a response lays the 
foundations for a confused and ineffectual approach, making coordination and 
strategy development extremely difficult. To allow more coherence, effective 
strategy and leadership, a new way of financing implementation agencies and 
institutions should be established.  This could be done through: 
o The development of more central funding systems, where donors can place 
their donations into a central pot, so as not to support any one individual 
project, but contribute to an overall strategic approach. Such systems would 
open up the opportunity to provide the timely release of financial resources 
and allow for coordinated efforts.  
o The new system could build on systems like the CAP (Consolidated Appeals 
process), where the Cluster SAG would become the central data manager for 
context information, coordinating partners and providing strategic thinking to 
devise priority actions. A collective document could also be produced for a 
flash appeal, with the SAG sending this information out to agencies along 
with a call for proposals for funding. Thus, improving coordination and 
strategic planning. Agencies would then propose programmes for funding to 
SAG, who would assess on the basis of appropriateness and the agencies 
capacity to fulfil, sending them to centralised funding systems.   This will 
strengthen the development and dissemination of the CHAP (Common 
Humanitarian Action Plan).  
 
This system will allow for better information management, coordination and effective 
programming.  Thus, developing a more consolidated funding process, where funding 
decisions can be better controlled strategically by a system operating at ground level, rather 
than a system that is controlled by donor agendas and pre-requisites (refer to sub-section 
8.6.1).  
 
Improved Operations- Donors and financing 
Improvements in financial provision have the ability to stimulate the uptake of new 
response strategies that proactively promote resilience and rapid recovery and, in many 
cases, would prove a lot more cost-effective. More flexible funding will allow 
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implementation partners to respond to the real needs of an affected population in a timely 
manner, essential in a volatile environment faceted with unknowns. Considering a re-
evaluation of current financial mechanisms holds the potential to drastically increasing 
strategy and leadership, which currently is some of the key challenges faced by the 
humanitarian sector today. 
 
10.4.2 Cluster Coordination   
Ø Strategy 
Getting the plethora of agencies, government and private sector working coherently 
is often a huge feat; a large element of this is the weak strategy that is provided 
throughout the response. Strategic capacity needs to be drastically improved if 
response operations are to utilise existing opportunities, undertake effective holistic 
relief activity, allow for transition and exit, whilst stimulating recovery and raising 
resilience. This is possible through optimising the use of the SAG at an inter-cluster 
level to offer the capacity to evaluate and prioritise activity for both relief and 
recovery. SAG, under this capacity, could offer a longer-term vision, disseminating 
strategic ideas to donors, the government and response agencies, offering much 
needed operational strategic guidance. Clusters can use authority to help scale up 
operations, as many involved agencies have weak capacity and foresight to plan 
ahead and think outside of the box. To develop this capacity: 
o Each Cluster group could provide 1 or 2 experts to create a ‘think tank’ 
mechanism/SAG at the inter-cluster level to ensure holistic, integrated and 
timely strategic planning. 
o The mandate and processes of the inter-cluster level SAG could be 
developed and monitored at the Global Cluster level. This will increase the 
important function of the Global Cluster, which in turn could produce a 
function of authority. This could then be utilised to potentially mandate more 
synchronised activities within the operating frameworks of agencies, i.e. the 
processes of assessment and reporting within agencies could be coordinated, 
with the Global Cluster producing effective assessment and reporting tools 
that encourage the consistent implementation of context, risk, DRR, impact, 
M+E and recovery assessments.  Synchronising activities will enable more 
informed, coherent programming that is able to feed information into a 
central database accessible for comparison and review by all.  
	   318 
o HR capacity will need to be sort to support new activities. 
Ø Rapid context assessment 
The new capacity within the inter-Cluster SAG could also form the function of 
initiating a rapid need and context assessment (through its capacity or through hiring 
of an external company) covering all sectors, with sector specific information going 
to each Cluster group.  This would make up for weak initial assessments and ensure 
strategic planning from the start that all stakeholders could utilise and begin to build 
coherent operations. 
Ø Data management and dissemination 
Using the SAG’s ‘think tank’ set up has the potential to rapidly process information 
coming in and, thus, provide the strategic capacity to devise priority actions from the 
start, which, with long-term vision, allows for transition and exit strategies, and 
effective recovery. These strategic ideas can be sold to the donors and disseminated to 
the government, the agencies and the private sector. This function of the SAG ensures: 
o Government is kept updated with agency activities, opening up 
communication and cooperation to allow capacity building within the 
government and the development of an early policy environment, which will 
cultivate a conducive operating environment where major issues, such as 
land rights, can be approached and remediated quickly. Increasing 
government involvement from the start will also provide opportunities for 
effective transfer mechanisms. 
o A central database, where agencies report on programme progress and feed 
in any contextual data (through a user-friendly information management 
system that can be accessed by all). This will allow SAG to overview 
progression of the response, recognising issues and gaps, and to then have 
the capacity to resolve them in a timely fashion. 
o Regular communication of new information and priority action to all 
implementing agencies through a regularly updated and highly managed 
portal, weekly email updates and texting service.   
o Regular communication with affected communities allowing them to receive 
updates and guidance, but that also opens up a channel of communication to 
contribute updated context information, to advise of changes in their needs 
and to feedback on the progress of programmes being undertaken. 
 
Improved Operations - Coordination 
Utilising and developing the capacity of SAG would create new capacity for:  
o The undertaking of timely context assessments to inform more effective programme 
decision-making. 
o Strategic thinking that can bring foresight and reduce the incidence of weakly 
planned programmes. 
o The dissemination of information and ideas to government, donors, agencies and the 
private sector over the whole period of the response. 
o The stimulation of a policy environment to guide an operational framework from the 
start. 
o Effective communication channels to exist with affected communities, feeding in 
information, as well as gaining contextual insight and programmatic feedback. 
o The building in of resilience and DRR approaches. 
o Coordinating capacity, that reduces gaps and overlaps, and enables more holistic, 
integrated and context specific programming. 
o Engaging effectively with government, build capacity, develop an effective policy 
environment early and ensure more sustainable handover mechanisms. 
o Generating private sector involvement. 
o Building a central database where agencies report on programme progress allowing 
an overview of progression of the response; enabling rapid recognition of issues and 
gaps, offering capacity to rectify them in a timely manner. 
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11. Recommendations for Further Research 
Further research should be undertaken to develop a broader and more comprehensive 
evidence base that will be able to develop a more generalisable theory and practice for the 
humanitarian sector in regard to the use of a resilience approach to stimulate recovery in 
emergency response operations. 
 
11.1 Post-Disaster Resilience in Different Contexts 
Undertaking replica case studies in different contexts, i.e. other natural disasters, conflict-
related disasters, urban v’s rural contexts, as well as different scales of disaster and levels of 
displacement, will begin to build the necessary evidence base to validate and generalise the 
potential of a resilience approach within humanitarian operations, as well as developing 
more critical and context specific interventions. 
 
11.2 Methodological Development of the Sociogram 
The use of Sociograms to further develop and verify the concept of post-disaster resilience 
should be investigated. A large sample of affected communities should be surveyed using 
the Sociogram methodology. This should be done in a variety of post-disaster contexts. 
 
11.3 Assessment of Funding Architecture  
Understanding the evolution of the humanitarian and development funding mechanisms is 
key to comprehending where many programmatic issues, highlighted within this research, 
come from, i.e. lack of donor coherence, the separation of funding streams, top-heavy 
decision-making, short proposal timeframes, funding caps, donors push for quantity over 
quality, visibility' over 'feasibility', programmes chosen on financial imperative not on need, 
lack of accountability, and local private sector unable to access funds. There is a need to 
look at why funding architecture, that is known to be flawed, has persisted for so long. This 
knowledge will drive an understanding to how this system in practice could be improved. 
 
11.4 Perception- How to Change the Mindset and Mainstream a Resilience Approach 
An investigation is needed into the theory of change, particularly in reference to the current 
humanitarian culture and mindset within the operational framework and within 
programming. This investigation is needed in order to begin to breakdown what are the 
critical factors that could mainstream a resilience approach holistically into the 
humanitarian sector. 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix 1a. Informed Consent Form 
 
 
 
 
Consent for the Participation in an Interview for the Purpose of Research 
 
I volunteer to participate in a research project conducted by the Principle Investigator 
Katrice Grace King, BSc, MSc from Loughborough University. I understand that the 
project is designed to gather information that will contribute to doctoral level research 
that is accountable to the Loughborough University. 
 
1. My participation in this project is voluntary. I understand that I will not be 
paid for my participation. I may withdraw and discontinue participation at any 
time without penalty.  
2. I understand that most interviewees will find the discussion interesting and 
thought-provoking. If, however, I feel uncomfortable in any way during the 
interview session, I have the right to decline to answer any question or to end 
the interview. 
3. Participation involves being interviewed by a researcher from Loughborough 
University. The interview will last approximately 30-45 minutes. Notes will be 
written during the interview and a transcript produced.  
4. I understand that the researcher will not identify me by name in any reports 
and that my confidentiality as a participant in this study will remain secure. 
Subsequent uses of records and data will be subject to standard data use 
policies, which protect the anonymity of individuals and institutions. 
5. Faculty and administrators from my campus will neither be present at the 
interview nor have access to raw notes. This precaution will prevent my 
individual comments from having any negative repercussions. 
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6. I understand that this research study has been reviewed and approved by the 
Ethics Committee for Studies Involving Human Subjects at Loughborough 
University. 
7. I have read and understand the explanation provided to me. I have had all my 
questions answered to my satisfaction, and I voluntarily agree to participate in 
this study. 
8.  I have been given a copy of this consent form. 
 
 
 
____________________________ My Signature 
 
____________________________ My Printed Name 
 
____________________________ Date 
 
 
                           Signature of the Investigator 
 
 
For further information, please contact: 
Katrice Grace King  
k.king2@lboro.ac.uk 
(+509) 46436459 
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Appendix 1b. Semi-structured Interview Coding Outline 
 
Interview Coding 
Interviewee:  
Organisation:  
Role:  
 
Barriers and Opportunities for the sustainable transition from relief to recovery 
 
Internal Operations: 
 
 
External: 
 
  Negative Positive  
Operating 
environment 
   
Cluster    
 
UN     
INGOs    
LNGOs    
Private sector    
Government    
 
Resilience: 
 
  Hindered 
recovery 
Supported 
recovery 
Access to assets, services 
before disaster 
   
Access to assets, service in    
  Barrier  Opportunity 
Mandates and 
policies 
 
   
Donor set up 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Staffing/ 
professionalism 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Assessments 
 
  
 
 
 
Programme 
implementation 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Recovery triggers 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Exit strategies   
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post-disaster environment 
Coping strategies    
Social engineering    
Cholera    
 
Time-frame of operations in Haiti 
 
 Assessment and 
planning 
Programmes Conceptualisation of 
recovery strategies 
Week 1-4    
Month 2-3    
Months 3-6    
Months 7-12    
Months 13-18    
Months 18- 22    
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Appendix 1c. Online Questionnaire (English version) 
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Online Questionnaire (French version) 
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Appendix 1d. Bosher’s (2004) Sociogram Tool  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
YOU 
 
   x3  
x2 
x1 
x1 
x2 
x3 
Formal 
Informal 
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Connection with community/ church leaders seems 
to vary from individual to individual, but has 
marginally weakened after the earthquake. 
Connection with local organisations and civil society 
was fairly weak before the earthquake and got 
stronger after the earthquake. 
Connection with local government was weak before 
and after the earthquake. 
Strength of Social Connections and Access to Services and Livelihoods Before and After the Earthquake Appendix 1e. Sociogram Results 
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Access to credit/loans/grants was fairly weak 
before the earthquake, access decreased after the 
earthquake. 
A majority had some access to livelihoods prior to 
the earthquake, after some gained access and others 
lost access to livelihoods. 
Access to assets varied within the community before 
the earthquake. With many losing all assets after the 
earthquake. 
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Rate of Perceived Recovery
On average the perceived rate of recovery over the 2 years since the earthquake has increased, with the rate slowing down from year 1 to year 2.  Even with the 
increase in the perceived rate of recovery over 2 years the majority of the participants believe there has been some changes over the time, but they are still struggling 
to find basic provisions, such as food, water and shelter. 
 
Breaking down these results to the individual shows that 28% believe the level of their recovery has not changed at all over the 2 year period, 39% believe it has 
increased (with several giving a 4 for the level of recovery), 5% believe their level of recovery has decreased, with 11% saying the rate increased at year 1 and since has 
decreased and 5% showed the level dropped for them at the year 1 mark, but since has increased. 
 
Overall there has been a low rate of recovery, with varying rates amongst individuals. This incident can be attributed to different individual social connections and 
access to livelihoods. 
 
 
Key: 
          1 = No recovery, i.e. still no access to basics like permanent shelter and  
       water sources. 
    2 = Some changes, but struggling to find basic provisions, i.e. food, water,  
       and shelter. 
     3 = A lot of changes in living standard since the earthquake,  
       but life has not returned to the standard of living before the earthquake. 
 4 = A lot of changes in living standard since the earthquake, situation is  
       comfortable, but not the same standard of living prior to the earthquake. 
5 = Fully recovered, I am living a life that is equivalent or beyond the 
       standard before the earthquake. 
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Community Discussion Forum Report 
Delmas 19 Community 1 
 
Agency: The British Red Cross 
Date:  10/04/2012                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
Introduction 
The focus group activity was held on Tuesday April 10, 2012. Eighteen members of the community 
took part (8 males and 10 females).  There was a mixture of age groups from 18- 70. 
 
Katrice King and Jean Baptiste took the lead of this activity, and Corentin Markentoch supported the 
session by helping the community complete the activity and by transcribing discussion points. The 
session lasted for 1h 45 minutes.   
 
1. Strength of connection and access to the following before/after the earthquake   
 
When the focus group started it was not easy for the participant to understand   the diagram, Jean 
Baptiste, Katrice and myself explained the exercises to the community and after a period of time the 
community understood how to complete the activity.  The result was good and Katrice took all the 
activity sheets in the end for analysis.   
 
Discussion Points 
 During the first months of the earthquake, most people of Delmas 19 community said they 
were able to rely on their family who lived outside of the affected area or overseas, as well 
as INGOs. It was noted that there was very strong ties of solidarity within the community.   
 Family that participants had in the city were all experiencing the same level of loss and so 
couldn’t help. 
 Some participants found support from family in the US who send them money. 
 The government didn’t help this community at all. It could be noted the feeling of complete 
abandonment by the government. 
 They also explain that everything they had prior to the earthquake was lost, like their 
houses, even their ID’s.      
 Most of them explain that from the beginning they received basic resources from INGOs or 
family members, but now they received nothing, even though their situation is still the same 
as at the time of the earthquake.   
 
Summary from Sociogram activity (refer to the separate results sheet) 
 
For most of the participants family connections were strong before and after the earthquake, also 
with friends, but this decreased after the disaster. Connections with other community members 
increased after the event, along with local NGOs, civil society and INGOs. There has been weak 
connection with local government before and after the earthquake. 
 
Access to livelihoods was very varied prior to the earthquake, after many lost their livelihoods and 
some gained new ones. Access to credit/loans/grants has always been low with the situation 
worsening after the disaster. Many lost assets in the earthquake and have not regained them since. 
Service provision, i.e. supply of water, sanitation, health services, was low prior to the disaster and 
remains low 2 years after. 
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2. Rate of Recovery   
   
The exercise was easy to understand. 
 
Discussion points 
 After 6 months most people said that they were able to access basic resources, such as water, 
foods, hygiene kits and money, but their position stayed the same; things didn’t change 
much up until the first anniversary. 
 After the first anniversary of the earthquake they were still able to get access to basics 
resources, but not at the same service level, they were obliged to get things through their 
family and try to help each other in the community. They explained their situation and rate 
of recovery did not change. 
 Now many people commented that they still struggle because the rate of recovery has 
slowed down.   BRC   made   them   believe   that   they were going   to realize specific 
project like the implementation of toilets, restoration and clean up of the canal and so on, but 
these activities are taking to much time and they are getting impatient. Now they don’t want 
the focus to be on just supplying basic needs now, they want to look at long-term projects 
and are waiting for the realisation of the main goals set by BRC. 
 
Summary from exercise (refer to the separate results sheet) 
 
On average the perceived rate of recovery over the 2 years since the earthquake has increased, with 
the rate slowing down from year 1 to year 2.  Even with the increase in the perceived rate of 
recovery over 2 years the majority of the participants believe there has been some changes over the 
time, but they are still struggling to find basic provisions, such as food, water and shelter. 
 
Breaking down these results to the individual shows that 28% believe the level of their recovery has 
not changed at all over the 2 year period, 39% believe it has increased (with several giving a 4 for 
the level of recovery, refer to the results sheet), 5% believe their level of recovery has decreased, 
with 11% saying the rate increased at year 1 and since has decreased since and 5% showed the level 
dropped for them at the year 1 mark, but since has increased. 
 
Overall there has been a low rate of recovery, with varying rates amongst individuals. This incident 
can be attributed to different individual social connections and access to livelihoods. 
 
3. What assistance was provided and how? 
 
Discussion points 
 The type of assistance provided was sanitation, livelihoods (cash grant) and basic needs, 
such as food, NFI and shelter from BRC only. 
 For example BRC gave money for people to leave the market place and to find some other 
housing. They organized to give money to people, but many people were unable to get 
access to this money creating a lot of frustration.   
 Many of them explain that they were only receiving some of the assistance needed by the 
community, because the kind of assistance being given was   decided by the provider and 
what they expected and needed to receive they didn’t.  
 They were not involved in any discussions or decision-making when food and NFI was 
given, but were involved in discussions concerning the cash grant   programme. But the 
distribution of the cash was bad, many couldn’t access the money and some only received 
one payment of the two that were scheduled. 
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4. Communication  
 
Discussion Points 
 All assistance they received was from NGOs explaining that the communication with the 
assistance providers was good because they were experiencing their situation and could 
really understand their case.   
 The participants explained that they received information through social mobilizers and 
other BRC representatives. But not enough information was available to answer all their 
questions. 
 
5. Over the last 2 years were your needs met at the time you needed them? 
 
 For the last 2 years, they think that only the basic needs were satisfy. They explain they are 
still living in the same way they were a few months after the earthquake.   
 The participants also commented that things are worst because many of them lost their 
houses and still have not regained one and rain is a huge problem. Many also they lost their 
livelihoods and so still can’t get back on their feet.   
 
6. Plan for the future: what are your next steps? 
 
 For the future they just dream to see the realization of BRCs objectives.  
 They would like to get access to money for setting up business’s and also access to other 
activity that can help them for the future.       
 They are waiting for job opportunities and access to knowledge through skills training that 
could help them for the long term. 
 They are still waiting for BRC to concretize its promises.         
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Appendix 2. Semi-structured Interview Respondents 
 
Organisation 
 
Stakeholder Role 
Date of 
Interview 
1 GOAL  INGO Management 09/2011 
2 British Red Cross INGO Management 09/2011 
3 MSF-Belgium INGO WASH 09/2011 
4 British Red Cross INGO Shelter 09/2011 
5 British Red Cross INGO Shelter  09/2011 
6 Action Against Hunger INGO WASH  10/2011 
7 Haven INGO Management 10/2011 
8 Concern Worldwide INGO WASH  10/2011 
9 British Red Cross INGO Management 10/2011 
10 Centre for Affordable 
Water and Sanitation 
 
INGO Management 10/2011 
11 Concern Worldwide INGO Management 12/2011 
12 
Oxfam Intermon 
 
INGO WASH  01/2012 
13 GOAL INGO  Management 02/2012 
14 
Pure water for the World 
 
INGO Management 02/2012 
15 Private Sector- mobile 
money/ agricultural 
enterprise 
 
 
Private sector Private sector 02/2012 
16 SOIL INGO Management 02/2012 
17 All Hands International INGO Management 02/2012 
18 
UNICEF 
 
UN Emergency Specialist 02/2012 
19 
IFRC 
 
INGO WASH  02/2012 
20 
CHF 
 
INGO Management 02/2012 
21 
GOAL 
 
INGO Management 03/2012 
22 
GOAL 
 
INGO 
Monitoring and 
Evaluation  03/2012 
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23 
MSF-Belgium 
 
INGO WASH  03/2012 
24 
COOPI 
 
INGO Management 03/2012 
25 
Haiti Out Reach 
 
LNGO WASH  03/2012 
26 
UNDP 
 
UN Recovery Specialist 03/2012 
27 IRD (International Relief 
and Development) 
 
INGO Management 03/2012 
28 CRWRC  INGO Management 03/2012 
29 USAID Donor Management 03/2012 
30 InterSOS/ UN-HABITAT  UN Shelter  03/2012 
31 IFRC INGO WASH  03/2012 
32 
UNICEF 
 
UN 
Early recovery 
specialist 03/2012 
33 IOM UN Shelter 03/2012 
34 Mercy Corps INGO WASH  03/2012 
35 Construction company Private sector Private sector 04/2012 
36 Government (DINEPA) Government  Management 05/2012 
37 ECHO Donor WASH  05/2012 
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